

The Semi-official Letters of British Envoy
Sir Ernest Satow from Japan and China (1895-1906)

Edited by Ian Ruxton

With an Introduction by Jim Hoare

*The Semi-official Letters of British Envoy Sir Ernest Satow from Japan and China
(1895-1906)*

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Acknowledgements by the Author

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Relevant Books by the Same Author

I. Ruxton (ed.), *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929): A Scholar-Diplomat in East Asia*, Edwin Mellen Press, 1998 (A general introduction to Satow's life and letters.)

I. Ruxton (ed.), *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Tokyo (1895-1900): A Diplomat Returns to Japan*, Tokyo: Edition Synapse, 2003

I. Ruxton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Japan, 1895-1900, Volume One*, Lulu Press Inc., 2005 (Chiefly official letters addressed and sent to Satow from the Foreign Office, the Tokyo legation and consular staff at Kobe, Nagasaki and Hakodate. Satow Papers reference PRO 30/33 5/1 through 5/10.)

I. Ruxton (ed.), *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Envoy in Peking (1900-06)*, Lulu Press Inc., 2006 (Two volumes. Volume 1 – 1900-03; Volume 2 – 1904-06)

For these and other books, including translations from Japanese to English, see <http://www.lulu.com/ianruxton> and the amazon websites (search for “Ian Ruxton”).

Notes

1) References in the footnotes to “Kuwata” refer to the following book:

Masaru Kuwata, *Kindai ni Okeru zaiNichi Eikoku Gaikōkan* [The British Diplomats in Japan 1859-1945], Kobe: Mirume Shobo, 2003. This is a useful collection of abstracts from the Foreign Office Lists, obituaries in *The Times* and *Who Was Who*. The abstracts are all in English.

2) References in the footnotes to “Nagaoka” refer to:

Nagaoka Shōzō (translated and annotated), *A-nesuto Satō Kōshi Nikki* [The Diaries of Minister Ernest Satow in Tokyo, 1895-1900], Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha. Vol 1, 1989; Vol. 2 with Fukunaga Ikuo, 1991.

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INTRODUCTION

Sir Ernest Satow was a meticulous person. Unlike most diplomats, not only did he keep a diary for almost the whole of his adult life, but he also kept a careful record of much of the informal correspondence that he conducted with the Foreign Office and with other parts of the government in London, as well as many letters to friends and acquaintances. All this material was deposited on loan at the Public Record Office (now the National Archives), and has been freely available to scholars for many years. There are other collections of diplomats' papers, but Satow's have occupied a unique place in the study of those countries with which he was involved. This is particularly true of East Asia, where he began his official career, and where he eventually ended it as Minister to China in 1906, but it also applies to his other postings as well. As a result, there is scarcely a book written in English over the last forty years on East Asia whose author has not used the Satow archive to expand on the official record and to provide Satow's personal insight on the problems and peoples he encountered. This volume, the latest in Ian Ruxton's annotated publications of the Satow archive, which reproduces Satow's record of his outgoing private correspondence to his political masters in London, to the Foreign Office, and to other diplomats will enable many more scholars to benefit from this important collection.

Like all diplomatic heads of mission, Satow recorded his formal actions and gave his considered opinion on issues in weighty despatches (or dispatches, the form preferred by the *Oxford English Dictionary*) often classified 'confidential' or 'secret'. Despatches provided the official record of diplomatic activity, and would eventually form part of the public record. They remained in widespread use in British diplomacy until the 1990s, and even today, they have not entirely disappeared. Satow, in his *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*^{*}, written after his retirement, noted that despatches should be in plain language, without attempts at wit. They could be given a wide distribution, including to the monarch. By the time Satow left Japan in 1900, most despatches were typewritten,

^{*} E M Satow, *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 2nd revised edition, 1922), as quoted in G R Berridge and Alan James, *A dictionary of diplomacy*, (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 62.

although in earlier years they had been laboriously copied out by hand. Once received within the Foreign Office, an elaborate procedure ensured that they received an appropriate distribution.* Today, the original Satow despatches covering the same period as this volume are available in the National Archives, and for a complete picture, those records need to be consulted in addition to Satow's private papers.†

The correspondence in the present volume, although described as 'private letters', was more 'demi-official', in the contemporary jargon. Normally, these letters were a parallel series to the despatches or telegrams, meant to provide some additional information, or to express some relatively controversial opinion that Satow deemed not appropriate for the wide distribution of the official correspondence. These letters were not meant to become part of the formal record, though in practice, an occasional private letter, or an extract from it, might be copied into the official record or reproduced in the Confidential Print. After Satow's departure from the Diplomatic Service, this type of letter would become a much more common method of communication, and increasingly part of the official archive, until replaced in recent years by the all-consuming e-mail.

Those who have looked at the official correspondence or at Satow's diaries for the period will notice many familiar themes. Meetings noted in the diaries often produced a letter to London; many of these linkages are highlighted in the notes accompanying the text of the letters. From Japan there is much about the consequences of the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, growing Japanese self-confidence, and the lead up to the introduction of the revised treaties in 1899. The earlier part of the China letters are naturally dominated by the Boxer settlement, and later the growing tension between Japan and Russia becomes evident. Railway and missionary issues also frequently feature in the correspondence. Some of the acerbic comments on his diplomatic colleagues that are such a feature of his diaries can also be found in the letters. Some of the standard

*See Zara S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 14-16.

† Satow's original despatches from Japan (1895-1900), and China (1900-1906), can be found in Foreign Officer records Political and Other Departments, General Correspondence before 1906 at FO46 (Japan) and FO17 (China). After 1906, the system of registering General Correspondence changed. Most despatches were also printed in the Confidential Print series, most of which is available in published versions. The drafts of Satow's despatches from Japan and China can be found in FO228 and FO262.

prejudices of the period are very much in evidence; there are a number of thinly disguised anti-Semitic comments directed at businessmen whom Satow did not like.

In both Japan and China, questions relating to the consular service occasioned much correspondence. As a former consular official himself, Satow might have been sympathetic to his former colleagues' concerns and complaints, but he often expresses some exasperation at their ability to find 'extraordinary collections of mare's nests' over consular commissions and like matters. The letters, like the diaries, reveal that he could be somewhat inconsistent in his judgements. As I noted in the introduction to his 1900-1903 diaries, Satow was godfather to one of William Ker's children,^{*} and he seems to have been on good terms with Mrs Ker, but this did not stop him dismissing Ker as only fit for work 'in a maritime port' in 1900, rather than in the Chinese Secretariat in the Legation. Later, however, he refers to Ker as an efficient officer, and by 1906, refers to him as a 'capable little man, who takes trouble'.[†]

Another theme from the diaries reflected in these letters is Satow's poor state of health. He was 57 when he took up the China appointment, and by that age, many of his consular contemporaries were either already retired or were seeking retirement on health grounds – indeed, quite a number of his letters are taken up with the state of health of various consular officers and their wives. In Satow's own case, most of his service had been in what were deemed unhealthy posts, and he too might well have been ready to go by 1900. He certainly seems to have been by late 1905, when he wrote to F. W. Campbell in the Foreign Office that his health 'cannot stand [the Beijing] summer any longer', and that the pleasures of earlier years, such as book buying, curio collecting or gardening were either no longer available or no longer appealed.[‡] Whether or not Satow was ready to leave the Diplomatic Service in 1906, he was certainly ready to leave China.

J. E. Hoare

^{*} See Ian Ruxton, ed., *The Peking Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow* (Lulu.com, 2006) vol. 1, viii.

[†] See below, pp. 202, 477, 578.

[‡] See below, p. 551.

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Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/8

Letter Book. Moroccan and Japanese missions, mainly the former. Book labelled by Satow "Private Letters from 30 November 1894 to 29 October 1895".

[Note: The letters from Morocco have been omitted.]

Japanese mission (p.68 et seq.)

1. Satow to Sir Arthur Bigge ¹

Tokio

Aug. 15, 1895

Dear Sir Arthur (Bigge),

When I went yesterday to pay my respects to Their Imperial Highnesses Princes Komatsu Akihito & Yoshihito, the latter speaking English fluently, said that he remembered vividly the kind reception he had experienced fr. the Queen & the Prince of Wales when he was in Engl. in 1893, & he specially requested me to let this be known to H.M. & to HRH.

I shld. be much obliged if you wld. kindly mention this, when you can find a convenient occasion to H.M. & to HRH.

y.v.t. [yours very truly]

2. Satow to Lord Salisbury (prime minister and foreign minister)

Aug. 15, 1895

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

Since the occasion reported in my desp. I have not seen the Min. Pres. ² again, for the past 10 days he has been invisible, endeavouring to avoid accepting the title of Marquis and a Grand Cordon wch. had been conferred on him by the Emperor. It is the custom at this

¹ Sir Arthur Bigge, private secretary to Queen Victoria, responded that the Queen and Prince of Wales had seen Satow's letter and were gratified at Prince Yoshihito's remarks. (Bigge to Satow, October 5, 1895, PRO 30/33 5/2, letter no.4)

² Itō Hirobumi, Minister President for the second time, 8 August 1892 – 18 September 1896.

court for honours not to be notified beforehand to the recipients. There has been a good deal of talk abt. the affair, as some people could not understand the motive of his refusal & the 'Times' correspondent laid it to the acct. of an intrigue on the part of the Satsuma men to drive him fr. office. It wld. be a great misfortune for Japan if he were to go out, as he is almost the only really intelligent and coolheaded man in the Cabinet.

As far as I can learn the 3 PP [Powers] have said no more up to the present on the subject of the Liaotung peninsula. The Fr. Germ. & R. ministers were here last wk, but did not go near the F.O. & the Japse. think that Germany is beginning to be lukewarm, & [German minister Freiherr/Baron von] Gutschmid's way of talking shows that he, at least, is no advocate of the recent policy. But I am not sure that he knows much, and Itō has no confidence in him.

As Y.L. [Your Lordship] is aware I came out here without any special instructions. Ld. K. [Kimberley] was good enough to give me his ideas of the situation, & repeated to me what he had said to Katō abt. the desirability of a close understanding betw. Engl. & Japan, in order to frustrate Russian plans for the acquisition of an ice-free port. But there is no official record of this. Perhaps Y.L. may think it worthwhile to give me some directions as to the line I shld. take.

One or two Japse. officials have expressed their desire for joint action c. G.B., but I have not heard anything wch. wld. lead me to suppose that this is the wish of the Cabinet. Fr. what I know of their character I shld. expect them to prefer trying to get out of the mess by their own skill in temporising, & that they wld. not readily enter into an alliance in wch. they wld. have to play second fiddle. But England is a favourite at present, on acct. of her general attitude during the war, & my reception by the Court & members of the Govt. has been particularly cordial.

I recd. an anonymous letter today ¹ informing me that it was the intention of the writers to remove the faithless ministers of the Emperor & that they wld. begin by burning down the city. They requested I wld. cause B.Ss. [British subjects] to withdraw, & added that they had made a similar request to the U.S. minister. If however I divulged their plans they wld. cut me in pieces. I am going to give the letter to the Acting Min. for F.A. to do what he thinks best with it. I do not imagine there is any danger of these threats being carried out.

The Japse. have got hold of a hornets' nest in Formosa, & are raising their forces there to 45,000 men. The Min. Pres. told me that it was to be 45,000 in addition to the 15,000

¹ This letter is mentioned in Satow's diary. (Ruxton, 2003, p.16)

already sent. Climate and disease have no doubt been working havoc. As the local English papers have been talking of massacres of women & children by Japse. troops, I have drawn the attention of the Min. for F.A. to the statements, while carefully avoiding saying that I believe them. But as there seems to be little doubt that Chinese begging for quarter were slaughtered at Port Arthur,¹ it is quite possible that similar things may go on in Formosa. That is one reason why I am anxious that [military attaché] Capt. du Boulay shld. go there. It wld. also be useful if we cld. form an idea of how far Formosa is likely to be a drain on the Japse. army.

I fancy the Spaniards are anxious to get all the help they can to defend the Philippines agst. supposed ambition of the Japanese; as they have profited by our support in Morocco, they hope, if I may judge fr. what Ojeda said to me before I left Tangier & de la Rica's language the other day², they look mainly to England to join them in preventing a further Japse. advance to the South.

y.v.t.

3. Satow to Sir Nicholas O'Connor (British minister in China, April 1892 – October 1895)

3 Sept.

My dear O'Connor,

Yr. 1st teleg. took me down to Tokio, where, as you will see fr. my desp. to F.O. I tried to do what was possible in the matter. But as you will have understood, the other affair has to be got out of the way first. You may be sure I will not relax my efforts.

I left London when the new cabinet was in process of formation, & without seeing our new chief [Lord Salisbury]. So I have no idea what his personal views may be, tho' probably they will be the same as Ld. K's³ namely that China has shown she can never be of any use to us as an ally, & that we shld. try to make fast a friend of Japan as agst. Russia.

Wld. you have any objection to Hillier & the consuls in Formosa sending copies direct to me of their despp. to you that are likely to be of value. It wld. in some cases save a good deal of time that is now lost.

The treasury will prob. kick at having to put consular officers at the four new ports, but if

¹ See D. Keene, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and his world, 1852-1912*, Columbia University Press, 2002, pp. 491-495.

² Satow met Don Jose de la Rica, the Spanish minister, in Yokohama on August 12, 1895. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, pp. 13-14).

³ Margin note: 'in cypher'.

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I may offer an opinion it wld. be that no time ought to be lost, if we intend to give our people an equal chance with the others. The Formosan consulates will I suppose be eventually placed under Tokio, & then will arise a question as to the future of the 2 consuls, whether they are to become members of the Japan Consular Service or go back to China. Some opportunity to give the men in this country a rise is badly wanted, but I daresay the China consular service is in the same plight.

4. Satow to O'Connor

15 Sept. 1895

My dr. O'Connor,

Yr. letter of the 28 Aug. reached me a few days ago, after I had seen the Min. Pres. & talked to him again abt. the W. River affair. I do not feel very sanguine of success, but it is on the cards that the Japse. may ask for it by way of part compensation for the [Liaotung] Peninsula. My despp. will show you what I have done. There is a slight difference betw. Hayashi's acct. of the proposals of the 3 PP for the evacuation. Originally the Japse. had made the payt. of the first 2 instalments of the War Indemnity one of their conditions, the other being the conclusion of a commercial treaty. Now they have been told that the evacuation must be arranged for independently of the execution of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as a guarantee for that is provided in the occupation of Wei-hai-wei. I have not had an opportunity of ascertaining whether Hayashi's acct. or that of the F.M. is the correct one.

[Military attaché] Du Boulay has been told that the fighting at Takao & Anping is not expected to be of any importance, so he is not going to Formosa at present. The landing force for those 2 places is to leave Kelung on the 20th, while an advance is made simultaneously fr. Chenghua. I was very glad to receive Hopkins' report of Aug. 2.

What a troublesome business you have had at Kucheng. I am glad however to think that things are proceeding satisfactorily as regards the trial of the rioters, as the Admiral telegraphs that he is leaving Mororan [in Hokkaido] today for Yokohama, wch. he wld. scarcely do if his presence was likely to be needed down South.

y.v.t.

5. Satow to F.L. Bertie

Oct. 3. 95

Dear Bertie,

By this mail a desp. goes forward dealing with the question of increasing the staff of the Kobe-Ozaka Consulate on wch. [Mr. Hugh] Fraser wld. have reported had he not died soon after his return here.

Of the 2 alternatives I propose the transfer of Longford to Kobe seems to me preferable in the interests of efficiency. But he wld. not like to be moved unless he got an increase of pay, wch. his length of service seems to justify his asking for. He is quite thrown away at Tokio.

Bonar wld. be ready to go to Kobe even without an increase of pay, in order to get the title of V-C, but then I shld. have great difficulty in finding a man to do Registrar & Interpreter in Mowat's Court.

If Formosa is placed under Tokio I suppose the 2 consulates in that island wld. be given to men in the Japan service. The 2 seniors are Hall & Longford. In that case the extra £100 now asked for Longford need not be continued to his successor at Kōbe, to whom it wld. be quite fair to give the present salary of V-C, wch. is £600.

y.v.t.

6. Satow to O'Connor

4 Oct. 95

My dr. O'Connor,

Hearty congratulations on your promotion to St. Petersburg. It must be very pleasant to get away fr. Peking wch. must have been a very trying post during the last 15 mos.

I have just recd. yr. desp. of 13 Sept. enclosing copy of one in wch. you reported to F.O. yr. conversation with Hayashi.¹ I think his Engl. must be a little imperfect or else he had misunderstood what was telegraphed fr. here. The 3 PP did not, as I am informed, say that Liaotung must be evacuated irrespective of the payment of the extra indemnity.

Gutschmid tells me that they expect to induce China to pay 80,000,000 taels on the 8th Novr. i.e. 50,000,000 due under the Treaty of Shimonoseki & 30,000,000 for Liaotung. The Japse. are a little anxious to know what is to be the nature of the "serious guarantee" promised by Hitrovo. Altogether they seem rather sorry they ever went into the business. I confess I do not see how they allowed themselves to think Russia wld. let them have the Peninsula. The talk abt. doubling their army seems to be dying away. They cannot afford it,

¹ Hayashi Tadasu (1850-1913) was minister to China, 1895-97.

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& as far as my present information goes, the increase will not much exceed 22000 combatants, not very alarming under the circs.

y.v.t.

7. Satow to Salisbury

Oct. 8. 1895

Dr. Ld. S,

It seems that the Japse. Govt. are anxious to get out of Liaotung as quickly as possible, & equally desirous of extracting from China as large an indemnity as they can get. They have in fact abandoned all the conditions they were holding out for, except the last named, & even this they have consented to reduce from 50,000,000 taels to 30,000,000, and this apparently under slight pressure. Marquis Itō speaks as if he felt the hopelessness of resistance, & I do not believe he seriously thinks that Russia will let Japan stay in the Peninsula in the event of China declining to pay the 30,000,000. Altho' he has said this to me, I doubt whether the Min. for F.A. has ventured to make any such declaration to my 3 colls. The "serious guarantee" of wch. Mr. Hitrovo held out a prospect has been converted into a general promise of good offices with China to obtain the fulfilment of the Treaty of Peace, & this M. Hitrovo said included putting pressure on China to obtain her consent to the payt. of the extra indemnity for Liaotung. Marquis Itō all the same would rather take his chance of getting this sum thro' the 3 PP than close with the offer of 15,000,000 wch. was implied in O'conor's telegram to me.

I have done what I could about the opening of the West River, & even advised Mr. Itō to ask for Peking & a port on the T'ung-ting Lake, so that the Chinese might at any rate give the first. But I have no doubt he thinks our advice to be calculated in our own interests, & that is why he always harps on French objections.

It is pretty certain that Japan will also clear out of Corea, as both Itō and Inouye have told me they see no reason for keeping their troops there. Gutschmid was informed by Itō that if the Liaotung question were once settled, the troops wld. be withdrawn in two months, say 2 mos after the complete evacuation of the Peninsula, as their principal use is to ensure that the telegraph line to Liaotung shall not be tampered with.

I think it is to be regretted that Japan cld. not have the reforming of Corea. She is able to do it, & the Coreans are incapable of any effort in that direction. Left to themselves they will go fr. bad to worse. But the Japanese have had notice to quit fr. Russia, & they will not

venture to resist tho' Gutschmid has told them that Germany's cooperation with Russia is limited to Liaotung.

I have lately seen Ōkuma [Shigenobu] whose scheme of treaty revision was brought to so abrupt a termination by the bomb of an assassin [in 1889], & Soyejima another ex-min. for F.A. Both expressed to me their earnest desire to be on the most friendly terms with England, but of the Cabinet only the Min. of the Household has spoken to me in that sense.¹ Ōkuma however told me that altho' it was an easy matter to beat China, they were not strong enough to fight a first-class European Power. He said their small-arms factory was very limited as to out put, & their financial resources insufficient.²

On the whole it seems as if the immediate future wld. be peaceful. The Japse. will be fully occupied with the work of developing Formosa & of strengthening their navy, especially in the training of officers. It is possible I think that there may be some difficulty abt. the later instalments of the war indemnity, & if they get 80,000,000 taels only it will scarcely cover their expenditure. To have to solicit the "good offices" of the Three Powers on every occasion will be rather humiliating, & involve an amount of interference betw. them & China that will hamper them at every moment.

E.S.

8. Satow to O'Connor

9.10.95

My dr. O'Connor,

Yr. letter of Sept. 24 reached me on the 7th. I at once went to Itō & talked to him very strongly abt. the way in wch. things had drifted during the past 6 mos, the result being that the 3 PP [Powers] had ended by being arbitrators betw. China & Japan, this I said cld. not but be harmful to the interests of Eastern Asia. I suggested that it was worthwhile to sacrifice ½ the 30 million, & by accepting 15, wch. on your authority I cld. assure him the Chinese were ready to give, to get rid of this interference of the 3 PP wch. must constantly tend to assume larger proportions.

He said it was too late. If the Chinese had at the beginning offered to treat directly he wld. have done so. But Li Hung-chang was the only Chinese statesman he cld. trust & he feared that once his utility was exhausted by successfully negotiating the retrocession and the

¹ Hijikata Hisamoto, Minister of the Imperial Household, called on Satow on August 10th and spoke of an alliance between Japan and England. (Diary)

² See Satow's diary for October 4, 1895.

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Commercial Treaty, he wld. be discarded, & China wld. fail to carry out the engagements entered into by Li. Therefore he preferred negotiating thro' the PP.

This agrees with what Hayashi told you abt. the disposition of his govt.

On the 5th the Japse. Govt. told the 3 RR [Representatives] that they wld. accept 30,000,000 & evacuate within 3 mos of the payments being completed.

[Russian minister Mikhail] Hitrovo had previously held out the expectation that the 3 PP wld. give a "serious guarantee" that China wld. pay 30,000,000. But on the 5th he produced a teleg. in wch. for this phrase was substituted "bons offices", the latter however being made to extend to all the Chinese engagements, including those of the Treaty of Peace.

Please regard all this as strictly confidential.

I think the position is getting worse. The 3 PP by promising to use their good offices, if Japan appeals to them as there is every likelihood of her having to do, assume the direction of international relations betw. China & Japan.

HMG. I suppose are inclined to leave the Japse. to fight their own battles. Having disregarded the advice given [by Her Majesty's Government] to them before the war, they seem to think they must take the consequences.¹

They will no doubt have to clear out of Corea, wch. will then become a sort of Morocco, a thoroughly corrupt & decrepit state, & Sôul a centre of intrigue like Tangier. I regret the Japse. could not be left to reform Corea, for they have the ability to do it.

I had a long talk with Inouye the other day: he is pessimistic. We have just heard that the Taiwönkun [Korean regent] is at it again, & the Queen has disappeared after her usual fashion on these occasions.

I am sending you an extract fr. a desp. to F.O. abt. my efforts to induce Itô to press the opening of the West River, not very successful as you will see. But I have done my best. Itô is not at all inclined to put his hand in the fire for us, or to run counter to what he says is French opposition. I suggested the addition of a port on the T'ung ting Lake, as well as Peking, that the Chinese might have something to abate of a possible Japanese demand.

R.L. Thomson is here, full of big schemes. He talks a great deal, & I am not sure that he can be trusted.

y.v.t.

¹ See D. Keene, *Emperor of Japan*, p. 480. Britain offered to mediate between Japan and China on July 17, 1894 but the Japanese "deliberately proposed conditions they knew the Chinese could not accept."

9. Satow to Salisbury

17.10.95

Dr. Ld. S,

When I wrote privately on the 8th there was not the least sight of the coup d'état wch. had even then been accomplished at Söul, & the Japse. Govt. are very anxious abt. the possible consequences. I do not think there is the slightest ground for suspecting them of having had a hand in it, tho' at Soul no doubt attempts will be made to create that impression. The choice of Miura was a great blunder. He has absolutely no experience of diplomacy, & for several years past has led a retired life. Being a Chöshiū man, Itō doubtless thought he wld. be able to control him, & he was certainly sent to Söul because he was expected to pursue a quieter line than Inouye [Kaoru]. It happens however that Mutsu [Munemitsu] was strongly opposed to his going there. One of my informants, who has been connected with politics for the past 30 yrs. describes Miura as fancying himself a sort of younger Napoleon of the East, & very likely to take a headstrong course of his own. This accords with the language used about him by Saionji, who evidently thinks he knew what was going to happen, & fancied it was a clever stroke to get rid of the Queen & instal a pro Japanese cabinet. I am told that the Japse. consul warned him a few days before of what was likely to happen, & got a snub for his pains. The desp. of Komura, who was Ch. d'Aff. at Peking at the beginning of the Korean trouble indicates great dissatisfaction c. Miura. Komura is intelligent & educated in European fashion, & he will no doubt get to the bottom of the whole affair. It is reported this morning that some arrests have already been made of Japse suspected of having had a hand in the murder of the Queen.

The observations that are reported to have been addressed to the new Korean Cabinet by the Foreign RR or a majority of them, look like intervention of a very vigorous sort. My American coll: tells me he thinks Allen, the U.S. Ch. d'Aff is under the influence of the Russian, & that the latter is doing all he can to make things as black as possible for the Japse. Govt. Dun's idea, which does not seem very practical, is that the Great PP shld. jointly undertake to preserve order in Corea, nominating Switzerland or Denmark to carry out reforms in the name of the King. But if Corea is to be ever independent, too much interference wld. I think defeat the object. If wisely advised, the present Cabinet might manage to keep things going. I knew the Min. of Education So Kuang-bom many years ago & the Min. for Finance O Yunjung, both men of parts, & on the whole they have the reputation of being a progressive set. The coup d'etat, whatever the result may be, will

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hardly strengthen the Japse. position, & I do not think Itō will resist a demand fr. Russia to clear out. It might be otherwise if the military party were to overthrow him, but of that I see no signs at present. Of course they blame his bad management.

The Russian, Germ & Fr. Minrs. were expected to inform the Japse. Govt. today that the 3 PP are satisfied with the ans. given to them on the 5th inst. & tho' I have not yet heard whether this really took place, it seems highly prob. fr. what Gutschmid said last night to Paget abt. all his work being finished.

10. Satow to Itō Hirobumi

Thursday (24 Oct. 1895)

Dr. Marquis Itō,

Respecting the matter of wch. I told you privately at the end of our conversation, I think it is only right to let you know confidentially that I have instructions to ask the Japse Govt. what explanation the Japse. Govt. have to offer respecting the stoppage of a Br. ship [the *Thales*] by a Japse. man-of-war on the high seas & her search & detention.

I propose to call on the Min. for F.A. [Saionji Kinmochi] this afternoon & ask him this question officially, & I hope that I shall find there is readiness on his part to undertake that full satisfaction will be given by the Japse. Govt.

y.v.t. E.S.

11. Satow to Bertie

Private

25 10 95

My dear Bertie,

China papers contain an announcement that Hurst & Ayrton have been transferred to the Japan Consular Service, wch. will be a great disapptmt. to the men in Japan. For over seven yrs. there has been a block in promotion here, while during the same period there have been 13 vacancies in China. I can only hope that the interests of the men in the Japan consular service who entered it before Hurst & Ayrton entered the China service may have been provided for in making the arrangement. If either of them were subsequently to be promoted to a Consulate in Japan, he wld. be quite "out of it", not knowing the language nor the work. In fact I think that as things now are in Formosa, men fr. here who speak Japse. wld. be more likely to be useful than those who only know Chinese. Japse. high offs.

in Formosa are not likely to speak any foreign language, & I shld. think it desirable to have Japse. speaking consuls for that reason.

If it has been decided that Hurst & Ayrton are to occupy their present posts, could it be arranged that they get their promotion to posts in China & be succeeded by men fr. Japan. Otherwise, as things stand at present, there seems to be no chance for any one here, as neither Enslie nor Troup have any intention of retiring.

y.v.t.

12. Satow to Salisbury

26 10 95

Dear Ld. S,

The Min. for F.A. said to me the day before yesterday that the more they looked into the affair at Söul the worse it turned out to be, without a redeeming feature.

What is now said here is that Miura had discovered that the Queen was intriguing with the Russian Ch. d’Aff. Waeber to accept a Russian protectorate. That it was resolved to get rid of her & so defeat the scheme. I think that is very likely the explanation. The Japse. press has been very loud in its condemnation of such methods of proceeding, but political assassination has been too common here during the last 35-40 yrs. for the ordinary Japse. to feel any deep horror at the murder of the Queen. The Cabinet however are alarmed at the effect that may be produced in Europe. The Min. Pres. quite recognizes that Japan will have to play a subordinate part in any future arrangements regarding Corea. He was called upon by the Japse. press to send in his resignation, as being responsible for Miura’s apptmt. & some of the politicians out of office seem also to have expressed the same opinion, but up to the present he is resolved to stay in. I told him I thought the determination a wise one, for if he were to go I doubt if we shld. get a better man. The newspapers now seem to be coming round to that point of view.

Scarcely anything has been said in either native or foreign press abt. the Yayeyama searching the “Thales”, but I suppose we shall hear more abt. it fr. the China papers. I have been careful to avoid giving any hint of an opinion as to what reparation wld. be expected by Gt. Britain.

If the Japse. get the Chinese to agree to their proposals for the Commercial Treaty, foreign trade in China will benefit very considerably.

13. Satow to Sanderson

26.10.95

My dr. Sanderson,

My informant as to the naval programme of the Japse. Govt. is Capt. Münter the Agent here of the Elswick firm, who doubtless knows a great deal, but I am not sure that they have made up their minds to such a big expenditure.

Mr. R.L. Thomson who was so active in Bangkok in 1893 as a chief counsellor of Capt. Jones & of Devawongse recently turned up here, with great schemes in his head. I believe he has seen Itō & talked to him among other things of a scheme for establishing steel works here. He has now gone over to China to see O'Connor, & to talk to him abt an idea he has of raising the balance of the indemnity, as one to dish the Russians.

Among other things he told me on the auth. of a man in the China Customs service that only 40% of that revenue is at present taken by the Impl. Govt, a fact wch. if true wld. seem rather to diminish its value as a security for the payt. of interest.

Since [W.G.] Aston left Corea the service in that country has been entirely officered fr. China. Wld. it not be useful, seeing the great number of Japse there, & their activity in various ways if Hillier had a subordinate who cld. speak Japse. Either Hampden or Parlett wld. do well for the purpose; not that I want to get rid of either. If neither of them were selected for such service, Lay wld. be the best man for it. y.v.t.

14. Satow to O'Connor

26.10.95

My dear O'Connor,

I take advantage of an opportunity offered by Clement Allen's return to send you a few lines of farewell. It is a great source of regret to me that you are leaving Peking, tho' for yourself I can only heartily congratulate you on the recognition of the valuable work you have done there.

I have advised the Jap. Govt. to withdraw their garrison from Söul, replacing it by men fr. other parts of Corea, & to intimate their readiness to settle the Corean question in consultation with the other pp by means of a circular desp. to their mins. in Europe, declaring at the same time that the rest of the Japse. troops are remaining there for the present to guard the telegraphic communications with Liaotung, the necessity for wch. will

come to an end as soon as the evacuation is completed. I am certain that the Japse. are anxious to get out of Korea if they can do so decently.

y.v.t.

15. Satow to Salisbury

Oct. 29. 1895

Dear Ld. S,

After my conversation with Itō on the 23rd, I thought it wld. be well to see him once more, & give him in writing the principal points of the advice I gave him abt. Corea. He at once produced a teleg. that had been already despatched to Japse. RR abroad, instructing them to declare that after what had recently happened, Japan thought it necessary to say that she had no desire to interfere in Corean politics more than she cld. help, that the reforms set on foot might be allowed to go on by themselves, that the Japse. troops for the most part were required to protect overland telegraphic communications with the Liaotung Peninsula & wld. be withdrawn as soon as the evacuation of Liaotung was completed. There wld. then remain only the necessity of protecting Japanese residents, who are very numerous, & the Japse. Legn. & Consulates. The teleg. ended by an instruction to ask for an expression of views fr. the Govt. of the P. to wch. each is accredited.

He also showed me a teleg. fr. Awoki saying that at Berlin the reported statement of Prince Lobanof to the Germ. Emperor was regarded as apocryphal, & that the Liaotung ? having now been settled, Germ. Feeling was agst. going any further with Russia.

He also read to me a teleg. fr. their Min. in Paris reporting that Hanotaux had said Fr. would be very ready to be of service to Japan, & particularly in obliging China to pay the extra indemnity for Liaotung. This he asked me not to tell Y.L. so I have not telegd. it.

The demand made by the F RR [Foreign Representatives] at Söul that the Corean drilled troops shld. be disbanded & if necessary disarmed by the Japse. garrison caused him much anxiety. To turn all those men loose without any pay wld. be to create a new source of disorder, & he had instructed Komura not to comply, but if the point were insisted on he would give instructions, but refuse to be responsible for the consequences. He telegd. also to Nissi at Petersburg to point out the dangerous character of such a measure to the Russ. Govt. His reason for confining himself to telegraphing to Petersburg was that he believed the proposal to emanate fr. the R. Ch. d'Aff. [Russian Chargé d'Affaires] at Söul.

Since Katō communicated the summons addressed by Russia to Japan at the beginning of

Aug. & was not able to elicit any expression of opinion fr. H.M.G. it seems that Itō has come to the conclusion that he must deal direct with Russia in Korean matters & with Russia alone. I thought therefore that it was desirable to induce him to make it an international question, as there was, it seemed, some danger that we shld. be left out of the eventual arrangements.

I have recd. nothing fr. Hillier but précis of his despp. to Peking, owing to his inadequate clerical assistance. As far as I can judge however, I imagine that the F. RR. at Sōul are acting jointly agst. the Japse. & agst. the prest. Cabinet, the R. Ch. d’Aff. being the head of the combination. That seems very natural after all that has occurred, especially after the murder of the Queen. But now that Komura has replaced Miura & the Japse. Govt. is in a reasonable frame of mind, it seems to me that it has become possible to work with the Japse. & that it might be better if the Russian did not exercise quite so much influence over his colls.

The K [King] of Corea has been induced to postpone assuming the title of Emperor, wch at first sight seems an absurd designation for the Sovran of so insignificant a state. But I think the proper explanation is this. The title huang ti wch. the dicty-makers render ‘Emperor’ denotes an independent sovereign, while ‘wang’ wch. they translate ‘King’ means vassal sovereign. Partly as a ‘solatium’ to the K. for the rough treatment he has experienced, but in the main as a declaration of independence, the Corean Cabinet wanted him to take the higher title, & I am inclined to think that, however ridiculous it may look to European eyes, it wld. have been politic to let them have their own way.

Itō told me that he did not intend to let his countrymen know of the observn. [?] abt. Korean matters that was addressed to Japan at the beginning of Aug. I think it very possible that some fanatic might try to murder him for having given way to Russia in the matter.

I have been told by a politician out of office named Gotō [Shōjirō]¹ that Okamoto, the man credited with the actual murder of the Queen, was taken to Corea last year by Count Inouye & forced on the Corean Govt. by him as Adviser in Military matters. Also, he remarks, Inouye must either be very dull not to have known before he left Corea the other day that a conspiracy was on foot, & as he is known not to be a fool, the natural inference is that he knew & held his tongue. But Gotō has always been a frondeur [malcontent, agitator] and as he also told me that Inouye had supplanted him in regard to some loan to Corea that he desired to float, I imagine him to be partly actuated by spite in expressing such views. In

¹ Satow was visited by Gotō Shōjirō on October 26, 1895. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.32)

fact I believe him to be working hard to turn Itō out of office.

There seems to be a widespread impression that the Japse. Govt. were privy to a plot of some kind, tho' they may not have meant murder, & Gutschmid who talks a great deal, expressed that opinion to me quite openly a day or two ago. I told Saionji at the outset that people wld. naturally inquire who was to benefit by the death of the Queen, & that the reply wld. be "the Japse. Govt." For my own part I do not think Itō wld. be mad enough to contrive such a murder.

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/9

Letter Book. Japanese mission. Book labelled by Satow “Private Letters 2 November 1895 to 30 December 1897”.

1. Satow to Bishop Henry Evington¹

2 11 95

Dear Bp. Evington,

I write a few lines to explain that tho' I have ansd. yr. letter officially forwarding you a couple of letters of introd., I shld. much have preferred that yr. original communication to me had been in the shape of a private letter. Officially I cannot give you or any other member of the missionary body any kind of assistance qua missionary, much as I might wish to do so, for I am in sympathy with your work. All that I can do for you is what I shld. do for any other Englishman in the position of a gentleman, give him a letter of introduction of quite a genl. character. This I trust will be sufficient explanation of my not having mentioned to either of the consuls the object of your visit to Formosa, but I hope that this omission will not in any way prove an obstacle to the attainment of your wishes.

y.v.t.

2. Satow to Lord Salisbury

Tokio

7 11 95

Dr. Ld. S.

Last night at dinner I met genl. Kawakami the chief of the Staff. Talking of Russia he said she was by no means so powerful out here as people seemed to think – at Wladivostok they have only 30,000 men, not very 1strate soldiers, & even when the Siberian Rlwy is completed, he doubts whether they cld. ever carry on a war on an extended scale at such a distance fr. their base. He instanced the war of 1877 as proof of what he said. Russian troops he admitted were numerous, but cld. not be wielded in large masses. The Japse. fleet he said was of course inferior at present in strength, but the delivery of the 2 battleships [*Fuji* and *Yashima*] now building in England wld. make a great difference. Fr. something he dropped abt. Japan being stronger 10 yrs. hence I gather that he is in favour of waiting

¹ Evington's reply dated 6 November 1895 from Bishop's Lodge, 9 Deshima Nagasaki, is in PRO 30/33 6/14.

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before beginning again. But in case of need he thought it wld. be quite an easy business to throw troops into Corea by way of Tsushima, even if the Russians were superior at sea, by decoying them away fr. the straits for a few hours. The coast of Corea is visible fr. the island of Tsushima.

Russian parties he said are at present engaged in surveying the roads fr. Port Lazareff & Fusan to Soul, & there is another party in Manchuria. As to Russia desiring Pt. Lazareff [Wonsan] for the terminus of the Siberian rlwy. he said the country betw. it & Wladivostok was too mountainous for the purpose.

He expressed his anxiety to see England assert her influence in Eastern Asia. In this he was merely uttering a sentiment wch seems to be pretty general among the Japse. I have conversed with. I made no remark.

This is the second time I have dined with a party of Japse. officers invited by [Captain Noel] Du Boulay. Last night they were particularly cordial. Du B is a great favourite with them all, & if it cld. be arranged by the W.O. [War Office] I shld. be extremely glad to keep him here as military attaché. He has acquired a position with them that is not easy to gain. Genl. K. was very anxious that he shld. get a decoration, in common c. other military attaches, but I have satisfactorily explained to him that it cannot be done. Now they talk of giving him a war medal.

Saionji told me the other day that he did not believe there was any likelihood of the Russians stepping into Liaotung the moment the Japse. left it, but he wld. not say what might happen later on.

The announcement that the troops are to be withdrawn from Corea has excited no remark in the Japse. press. The 2 anti-Japse. Engl. papers at Yokohama heap scorn on Itō's head for having taken this decision. The pro-Japanese paper [Japan Mail] on the other hand says it was resolved on months ago.

3. Satow to Walter Hillier

15.11.95

My dr. Hillier,

Many thanks for yr. letter of the 28th & yr. despp. [despatches] wch. I am acknowledging officially. I was particularly glad to get copy of yr. desp. to Peking of the 5th, as the Russian Legn. here had tried to create the impression that Inouye had initiated the proposal to turn out the Korean guard by force, whereas if I rightly understand the proposal was Waeber's.

After the 8th Oct. & the admitted complicity of Japse. officials & others in the plot wch. resulted in the Queen's murder the Japse. Govt. felt they cld. not hope to maintain a preponderant position in Corea. On the 25th they sent telegraphic instructions to their RR [representatives] in Europe to inform the PP [Powers] having treaties with Corea that they intended to withdraw the greater part of their troops as soon as the evacuation of Liaotung was completed & to abstain in future fr. interfering in Corean domestic affairs. Hence their unwillingness to consent to the proposals urged on them more than once to disband the drilled troops, & to put their own in the Palace as a guard. They feel here that to adopt the proposal made on the 5th inst. wld. be inconsistent with the declarations they have made to the PP, & that if adopting it, they had to use force, resulting in bloodshed, the blame wld. be laid on them. I have encouraged them to adhere to this course. It seems to me important in their own interests that they shld. be consistent, & in the interests of peace that they shld. take no more or greater share of control at S'oul than the other PP. The Queen having now disappeared, the entire withdrawal of the Tai-w'ŏn-kun [Regent] seems to me desirable in order to restore the balance, & if that were done, I am under the impression that the present Cabinet might carry on affairs with some prospect of success. Thanks for your offer to send me despp. The précis you sent me the other day is excellent; & is sufficient; but I shld. be much obliged for a copy of your Nos 94 & 95.

y.v.t.

4. Satow to Buller (letter summary only)

15.11.95

To Buller, telling the ans. of Saionji on 5th abt. the "Thales" & no ans. fr. F.O.

5. Satow to Buller (summary)

To Buller, mentioning "Chung-king" case, but leaving the arrangets. to him. That I had delivered Note verbale on 19th.

6. Satow to Buller (summary)

To Buller, 5 Dec. informing him of the discussions with Saionji abt. salute in ans. to his of Nov 15th.

7. Satow to Salisbury

5 Dec. 1895

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The part of the teleg. of 30/11 respecting the Thales wch. referred to the 3 PP ¹ was originally drafted by the Jap. Min. in much stronger terms of hostility, but I advised him to leave that out – partly because I did not wish to have the appearance of encouraging such feelings. They are pretty strong I fancy, but the Japse. wld. cool down if they thought I had a hand on the bellows.

On the other hand he had inserted a sentence implying that to insist on the salute wld. excite ill-feeling agst. Engl. thro' wch. I put my pencil quietly on the ground that telegr. ought to be as brief as possible. So it was cut down to something like reasonable limits. The Japse. doubtless regard the firing of a salute as a humiliation to themselves, as they know that on the last occasion it was done by the despised Chinese in the case of the “Chungking”. I cld. not remember any other case myself except our saluting the Argentine flag abt 1850 after the Anglo-Fr. intervention in the River Plate. But the Kowshing affair, the refusal of the Japse. Min. of Marine to agree to arbitration in the case of a collision ² some months ago betw. the vessel that sank the Kowshing & a Br. str. [steamer] entering Nagasaki, & lastly the overbearing proceedings of the “Yayeyama” with regard to the Thales seem to show that the Japse. navy is disposed to be arrogant, & need to be taught a lesson. If the salute is dispensed with & the Japse. offer to publ. their very apologetic note with the placing [on the reserve list] of Ad. [Admiral] Arichi is accepted, I can assure the publication being effective. After all, the fact of a salute having been fired might easily be burked [suppressed, ignored] by the Japse. press but the apology published in the Official Gazette will be widely known.

The Minr. Prest. has been away for more than 3 wks, talking of wishing to resign on the ground of ill-health. Up to the present however I have not heard anything to make me believe that this is genuine, & am inclined to think he will come back with more power than ever, having acquired the support of a powerful party in the Diet. He is a favourite with the Emperor, and of his possible rivals noone hitherto has ever been able to hold office for more than a brief period.

¹ See Satow's diary for November 30, 1895. (Ruxton, 2003, p.42)

² The I.J.N. cruiser Naniwa collided with the Turbo owned by Samuel Samuel & Co. in Nagasaki harbour in May 1895. The case was settled by an out-of-court payment from the Navy department to the company of 1,510 yen. (Kajima Morinosuke, *Nihon Gaikō Shi*, Vol. 4)

Very curious things are going on in Corea. One wld. suspect the Japse. partisans of the coup d'état of 8/10 of trying to make out [that] the Russian & U.S. Mins. were no better than Miura. I find my Am. coll. admitting that Americans had a hand in the recent attempt of 28/11 to carry off the King. It is curious too that it shld. have happened the day after Hillier's reassuring teleg. reporting the reinstatement of the late Queen's memory. The Corean Ch. d'Aff. wrote to his colls. informing them that State mourning had been decreed, so I replied in the usual manner & put the flag halfmast. The Court is talking of going into mourning for 9 days.

Nothing seems to be yet settled abt. the question whether Formosa shall be made an integral part of the Japse. Empire or treated as a Crown Colony, but everything seems to point towards the latter. Restrictions upon the immigration of Chinese have been already adopted, & the Japan Mail advocates buying up all Chinese interests, & segregating from the rest of the population all those who remain under the Art. of the Treaty of Shimonoseki wch. stipulates that they shall be treated as Japse. subjects. Something in the way of special legislation for the Chinese is very likely to take place.

We have had some trouble abt. duties levied at Yokohama on sugar fr. Takao. In one case I was able to get the duties refunded, but the other is still under consideration.

I ought to have said that the Min. for F.A. a day or 2 ago hinted at willingness to settle the collision case above referred to. This is because I had pressed for precise information as to the Court in wch. the Br. owners might bring an action, wch. the Min. of Mar. wishes to avoid.

Foreign commerce continues to flourish & the native Steamship Co. is contemplating lines of strs. [steamers] to Australia, America & eventually to Europe. This sort of enterprise is likely to occupy a good share of Japse. energy, & I do not think there is any danger of their adopting a warlike policy. Their only sore point is Corea, but I incline to hope the Russians will refrain fr. an active policy. I said to Speyer who is here on his way to Söul, that I felt convinced that Japan wld. act sensibly & moderately ¹, to wch. he replied that Russia wld. certainly not provoke a conflict. In genl. I have hinted to colls. [colleagues] that I have given tranquilizing advice to the Japse.

The Fr. Legn. however entertains I am told a suspicion that a secret alliance exists betw. us & Japan. I have taken care to deny this explicitly to my informant.

E.S.

¹ See Satow's diary, November 29, 1895. (Ruxton, 2003, p.41)

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P.S. Dec. 6. Harmand who was dining here last night said that fr. his correspondence in Fr. Indo-China he gathered that relns. with the Siamese were again becoming tense. He said it ought to be possible for Engld. & Fr. to come to an understanding with regard to Siam. That they shld. take Siemrap & Battambang, wch. wld. give them a more practicable frontier than the absurd one traversing the Talé Sap [Tongle Sap, 'Great Lake'] Lake, while we shld. of course take the whole of the Malay Peninsula.

He seemed also to have an inkling of a plan that has been mentioned to me by others of an Engl. protectorate over Siam. In fact it was in connexion with this idea that he broached the addition of those 2 pros [provinces?] to Cambodia. It is perfectly natural, since they originally belonged to Cambodia. The Fr. wld. want I suppose to hold Chantaburi, as the natural port of Battambang.

E.S.

8. Satow to Sanderson (summary)

6 Dec.

Short note to Sanderson abt. Gubbins, Longford & Lowther's usefulness. Relns. c. colls. good except Hitrovo, who shows no hospitality to either L. or myself.

9. Satow to Buller (summary)

9 Dec. 95

To Buller, asking him to arrange that the Hong Kong & Amoy papers get copies of Notes Verbales about "Thales".

10. Satow to Consul Gardner (summary)

To C.T. Gardner Amoy acquainting him with the "Thales" settlement.

11. Satow to Walter Hillier at Seoul

19 Dec. 1895

To Hillier in cypher, by Speyer.

"I have not been able to find out what your new Russian colleague [Speyer] has been doing here. But he told me he had come to consult with the Russian Minister.

A Japse. newspaper publishes report of an interview with him, in wch. he said Russia & Japan shld. settle the Corean question betw. them alone. That is also the idea of the

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Japanese Prime Min. [Itō] Inouye favours consultation c. all the PP.

Fr. home I have no indication of policy, & suppose Lord Salisbury's attention is monopolized by Turkey. When the Armenian question is settled, he may turn his attention to this part of the world.

If I learn anything further abt. Speyer's doings I will let you know."

Wrote in clear saying that he wld. find Speyer very pleasant socially.

12. Satow to Bergne (summary)

16 [Dec. 16th?] to Bergne that it was no use asking Japse. to join international convention for the protection of Industrial property etc. till treaties with Germany & France signed & ratified.

13. Satow to Salisbury

Jan. 1, 1896

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

As far as one can read the signs of the times Marquis Ito's term of office is drawing towards a close, at least that is the general opinion among people who are credited with knowing how the currents run. He has for some time past talked of being tired of office, & has apparently offended the leading men of his own clan. People do not forgive him for having given way abt. the Liaotung peninsula, & even in the "Thales" affair it seems to be thought that he has given way too much.

I am told that among the educated class foreigners are pretty universally detested, & England more than any other country. It is said that we have been unfairly harsh towards Japan abt. the "Thales" affair, which they profess to imagine was a mere innocent mistake that might have happened to anyone. But of this feeling I have seen hardly any signs in the press, & the Govt. does not show any resentment. They have settled all the small questions I have had to bring before them, including the collision case I mentioned in my letter of Dec. 5. I was able to procure payt. of the cost of repairs, the str. agents waiving their claim for demurrage, wch. they wld. have had to establish by litigation that might possibly have gone agst. them. The only matter on wch. I have not been able to obtain an ans. [answer] is as to the conditions on wch. the Colonies may adhere to the new [Anglo-Japanese] treaty of commerce [signed in July 1894], but I shall go at them abt. it again after the holidays are over.

The Japse. are perh. a little vexed that Engd. did not side with them actively agst. the PP concerning the Liaotung peninsula, & there is a disposition to talk as if Engld. were abandoning her rôle of preponderant naval Power in Eastern Asia. I tell them that there are more important affairs nearer home that engage the attention of H.M.G. at the present moment. The opposition is bringing forward a vote of censure agst. the Ministry [government] on the ground that they have mismanaged their foreign policy, wch. will I suppose be debated in a few days, but the Govt. appears to feel sure of a majority. They are bringing forward a budget abt. 50% larger than the last one, & are no doubt determined to strengthen both army & navy with a view to making their voice heard in any future settlement of Chinese affairs. As regards Corea their policy seems to be to disarm Russia by affecting great moderation, so as to give the latter no pretext for intervening to protect the King.

Fr. all that I hear I shld. imagine that Russia will not aim at Port Lazareff [Wonsan] wch. wld. be difficult to connect by rail c. Vladivostock, & that Port Arthur not being large enough to hold a fleet nor to admit battleships, they wld. be more likely to desire Talienwan Bay as their winter quarters for the Pacific squadron.

Of an alliance betw. Japan & Russia I see no signs, & there is nothing at present that could bring them together. Japan is not ready to take the part she is ambitious of playing. She has to get more naval officers & men, & to double her main line of railway, & the political pamphleteers, who are ahead of the govt., talk of ten years careful nurturing[?] & development of her resources. I am convinced however that the Japse. are ambitious of becoming a great naval & military power, & they are confidently persuaded that they possess the necessary gifts. The military spirit is very strong among them. Their one idea for the last 40 yrs. has been that only the want of modern appliances prevents them dealing with the Gt. PP of Europe on a footing of complete equality. They will not be content until they have obtained that position, by fighting if necessary, but at least by making ready to fight at any moment.

P.S. I ought to mention as I told Lord Kimberley, that one of their grievances agst. Engl. is that their Emperor has not got the [Order of the] Garter. He has I believe most of the higher European orders. It has never been mentioned directly to me, but I know that this feeling exists. I believe they have been told that the Garter is never given to extra-European sovereigns except on a visit to England, & I do not think they wld. venture to let the present Emperor go to Europe, on acct. of his marked intellectual inferiority. E.S.

14. Satow to R.W. Hurst¹ (summary)

Jan. 30. 96 to Hurst. Will relieve him by end of April. Claims to be sent to F.O. but in the meantime shall sound Japse. Govt. Asking whether Consul cld. manage alone, or must have assistant. If so, where shld. consul reside. What sort of houses & other govt. property, & whether whole staff of writers & servants necessary.

15. Satow to Salisbury

Jan. 30, 96

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

As far as one can see fr. the proceedings in the Diet, the Govt. is holding its own, having successfully resisted the motion of censure brt. agst. it on acct. of the retrocess[io]n. of the Liaotung Penin. & the recent doings in Corea. At present there are no signs of Itō's having to resign, but people think he is tired of office & wld. like nothing better than a holiday in Europe. During his absence his rivals wld. make blunders & he wld. come back with renewed energy as the only man for the post. There have been rumours that he wishes to go to Moscow for the coronation of the Emperor, but nothing is certain yet. He wld. take advantage of the opportunity of the coronation to negotiate an agreeet. abt. Corea. I do not think that wld. take the shape of a division of the Peninsula betw. the 2 PP, but more likely it wld. be a joint undertaking not to annex. If both abstain fr. forcible intervention, the Japse. are likely to wield greater influence than the Russians, they have more numerous agents & the Corean officials, at least those of the progressive party, will be more disposed to lean on them. Coreans are not stupid people, & their principal fault seems to be a want of principle.

There is no doubt at all that Genl. Miura plotted the murder of the Queen, but he has powerful backers & nothing will be done to him. The majority of the Japse. people are disposed to applaud his doings, political assassination being in complete accordance with Japse. notions of what is fit & proper. Only the official organ has condemned his conduct.

I am sending home in full the claims for Br. property destroyed or pilfered by the Japse. at Takow. The whole does not amount to much more than £1000, & I have heard indirectly that the Japse. Govt. are prepared to settle them. I propose therefore without waiting for

¹ Richard Willett Hurst of the China consular service was appointed Consul at Tainan, Formosa on December 1, 1893. He was transferred to Pakhoi on February 4, 1896. He wrote to Satow on January 9, 1896 about an application for home leave and other matters connected with the transfer of consulates from the China to the Japan service. (PRO 30/33 5/11, letters 1-5).

instructions to try & arrange the matter c. the Min. for F.A. unofficially.

Hirovo tells me he is going home abt. the end of Feb. for the coronation of the Emperor, & that he will return by land towards the end of the summer. He talks of the Siberian rlwy. being completed by the end of 1898, & expects that it will revolutionize postal & travelling communication betw. Europe & the Extreme East. If we can get fr. Tokio to London in 15 days we shall all prefer that route.

16. Satow to Salisbury

27 Feb. 1896

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

It is just a fortnight since we heard of the King of Corea having taken refuge in the Russian Legn. I recd. the news whilst conversing with a Corean refugee ¹, who foreseeing a storm had left Söul abt. the beginning of the month. His name in fact was on the list of proscriptions issued on the 11th, as he had been Chief of Police in the Cabinet established after the Queen's murder. Clothes for the King and Heir Apparent [to] make their escape in had, he said, been supplied by the Russian & American Mins. who were acting in concert.

He said Corea was a small & weak state, but the people had no desire to be protected by Russia. Wld. not Engld. the greatest power in the world come to her rescue.

I remarked that for a couple of years past the Coreans had looked to Japan as their protector. Engl. sympathised with the Corean nation & was anxious to see them make progress, but our political interests were less than those of Russia & Japan her immediate neighbours.

He replied rather contemptuously abt. Japan. That power had been growing gradually less influential for some time past, & doing less for Corea. So he came to me to ask for Engl. help. Engl. interests made it a matter of importance that Russia shld. not get possession of Port Lazareff, fr. which she wld. be able at any time to interfere with our commerce. He knew there was already an agreeet. dftd. betw. the Russian Ch. d'Aff. & the King, giving Russia leave to bring the Siberian rlwy fr. Vladivostock to Port Lazareff [Wonsan], wch. only needed the King's seal to be affixed. Wld. Engl. not interfere to prevent that.

I told him the construction of a rlwy wld. be no easy matter. There were high mtns. to

¹ See Satow's diary for February 13, 1896 (Ruxton, 2003, p.61). The refugee was Kwön Yöng-chin. J.H. Gubbins brought the news of the King in an extra of the Asahi newspaper.

cross. He said the line cld. be brought along the coast.

I told him that I had no instructions abt. Corea, as there was a Cons. Genl. at Söul, on wch. he broke off abruptly saying that in that case he need not have come to me & took his leave.

I believe he was more or less concerned in the Queen's murder, & was put into the posn. of Commr. of Police at Söul by Genl. Miura. Afterwds. when the Japse. began to withdraw their support, in acc. with their declaration of non-intervention, he was forced to resign by foreign influence. Hence his bitterness agst. both the Russians & Japse. A few days later I had the interview with the young Corean Prince¹ reported in one of my despp., & made the most out of our having sent a guard of marines to Söul. In fact fr. the telegram I was under the impression that the Rainbow had left Nagasaki for the special purpose of taking as many as cld. be spared to re-inforce the first detachmt. But it turned out afterwards that she had merely returned to her station at Chemulpho.

I saw Itō on the 16th who seemed rather vexed at the King having stolen a march on them c. Russian aid. Gutschmid, who had been lunching with Hitrovo had just been to tell him that the latter had no news, but Itō doubted this. He asked me whether the Russian Govt. was likely to have known beforehand what was in preparation, to wch I replied that our experience in Central Asia was that previous knowledge was usually denied, but the impossibility of undoing a fait accompli was always insisted on. So it did not much matter.

Itō said his only fear was lest some of the more hot headed among the young Japse. at Söul might provoke a conflict, and I am certain he telegraphed to Komura to be very prudent. Komura he told me had no suspicion of what was coming, he imagined the Russian sailors were to help suppress the local insurrection near Söul. The Japse. he said had refused such help to the Corean Govt., confining themselves to action when their own people were attacked.

I gathered fr. his tone that he had no intention of resisting Russia by force.

He wanted very much to know how the negotiations for the Anglo-German loan to China were getting on. The last idea of the Ch. he had heard was to pay the 50,000,000 taels due in May next with what remains of the Franco-Russian loan & L 41,000,000 borrowed fr. America.

Itō's chief pre-occupation ever since the intervention of the 3 PP has been to get the indemnity paid. Japan wants the money very much, and I don't think she will go to war as

¹ I Sun-yong. See Satow's diary, February 19, 1896. (Ruxton, 2003, p.67)

long as it is unpaid. One sees fr. the way things are managed in the Diet that public opinion is very artificial. If it is thought convenient to stir up national feeling either to obtain Treaty Revision or for a war agst. China, the press is put in motion. But when the Cabinet is afraid of a big power like Russia, the general tone is astonishingly moderate.

It is curious that, a few days earlier, Hitrovo had said to the Acting F.M. [Saionji] that the King of Corea was kept too much as a prisoner, & suggested that he shld. have more liberty allowed him. Before Speyer left he lulled Japanese watchfulness asleep by giving out that his instructions were to study the state of Corea & report, but not to adopt an active policy.

I am convinced that both the Japse. Govt. & people wld. willingly undertake a war agst. Russia with an ally, and they think we ought to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. As they went to war [with China] agst. our advice, they can hardly expect our help now. The danger I think is that Russia finding anarchy continues may find it necessary to put down the insurgents by landing[?] troops fr. their squadron. The reported chartering of 12 vessels at Shanghai to carry coal to Vladivostock, if true, wld. facilitate such an operation. But the Japse. troops must either be withdrawn, or confined in Söul and at the open ports. I gathered today fr. the V.M. for F.A. [Hara Kei] that the troops wld. be left where they are, but that no attempt wld. be made to permanently protect the lines of telegraph fr. Söul to Wönsan & Fusan.

I saw Mutsu, the invalid Min. for F.A. today for a few minutes. He is an old friend of mine. I fear he will never be well enough to resume his duties. It is a great inconvenience to have an Acting Minister like Saionji who is little better than a dummy, and often away fr. his office. Since the last affair at Söul he has been scarcely visible.

17. Satow to Bergne

12 March, 1896

My dear Bergne,

You will see fr. a desp. I am sending home that the Germans are going to negotiate a consular convention with Japan.

I do not know whether the views of H.M.G. have at all changed on this? but the little experience I have had in non-extraterritorial countries has convinced me that if we cld. negotiate such conventions they wld. be of very great value, especially in protecting property left by B.S.s dying abroad, whether testate or intestate. I have no doubt that my experience is by no means unusual. Here in Japan it wld. be particularly desirable that the

consuls shld. have the power of intervening after the new Treaty comes into force. At present they can take possn. under the O. in C. [Order in Council] but as the new Treaty stands Br. intestate estates will be left to the tender mercies of quite inexperienced Japse. judges.

y.v.t.

18. Satow to Salisbury

24 Mar. 1/96

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

Things seem to be going fr. bad to worse in Corea, & the last information represents the Japse. settlement at Chemulpho [Inchon] as being threatened by the insurgents. In the face of all that has happened the Japse. Govt. seem to have shown great prudence. The news I telegraphed however of their having secretly increased their forces in the Peninsula to a small extent seems to be confirmed by what Hillier writes, & they have sent a couple of men-of-war to the coast near Fusan to inquire into the recent murder of 15 Japanese fishermen. Yamagata certainly has instructions to come to some arrange[men]t abt. Corea when he arrives at Moscow. It is very diff. [difficult] to see what solution can be found that wld. please either side. A condominium is impracticable, & a division of territory equally so. Both Russia & Japan have declared over & over again that they desire to maintain the independence of Corea, & annexation wld. be too glaringly in contradiction to the assurances they have given. The Korean people are not warlike, have no arms nor discipline, but they are accustomed to gue[r]rilla warfare, & it wld. cost a great deal to subjugate them. So a settle[men]t on this basis seems out of the question. On the other hand one does not see how the Japse. can clear out entirely, as the number resident at Söul & the 3 ports is nearly 12000 & if the troops were withdrawn, the danger of attack fr. the Korean population wld. be very great.

A teleg. gives the substance of a speech by Mr. Balfour [margin note: Bristol 5th Feb.] in the course of wch. he said that he felt no jealousy of the commercial outlet for Russia in the Pacific Ocean. This seems to have caused a good deal of anxiety among the Japse. who think it means that Engl. has given Russia a free hand in the Pacific.

There are a certain number of them who talk of an alliance with Russia, failing Engld. but they do not carry much weight. As far as I can tell the prevailing tendency is in favour of Japan relying on her own skill to bring her safely thro' her present troubles. A Japse. fr.

whom I get a great deal of useful information¹ tells me that Engl. is as much a cause of uneasiness as Russia. People cannot make out what our policy towards Japan is going to be. I assured him that it was very simple: to befriend Japan in every possible way, & to help her to cast off Asiatic traditions so as to become one of the family of nations. As for Corea, she went into that business agst. the advice of H.M.G. & cld. not expect that we shld. give her any help agst. Russia. But if Japan's independence were in danger, that wld. be a very diff. [different] matter. I believe [French minister Jules] Harmand is trying to create prejudice agst. us in the minds of the Japse. but not with any measure of success.

Itō not long ago told me that [Russian minister] Hitrovo knew everything that went on here, and that many Japse. frequented the Russian Legn. & then he proceeded to talk abt. the use made of spies by the former Chinese Min. evidently meaning to imply that Hitrovo too has Japse. in his pay. He buys a good many Japse. swords, & I think that is nothing but a cover for giving money to a personage who helps him ostensibly in their purchase. I have heard fr. other sources that he spends a good deal among Govt. officials.

Lord Spencer² arrived at Nagasaki this morning, & started at once in H.M.S. Porpoise for the new arsenal at Sasebo. The "Edgar" has gone to meet him at Kōbe to take him down to Kure, the arsenal at the further end of the Inland Sea. As all permission has hitherto been refused to foreign men-of-war to visit those places, this will be interpreted as an indication that Engld. & Japan are on very friendly terms, wch. will be rather a help to the latter & do us no harm. I had no difficulty in arranging Lord Spencer's visit, & the Admiral lent him the "Porpoise" & "Edgar". The Russian Adl. says he asked permission for two torpedo boats to winter at Sasebo, but recd. a refusal. I am spending a little money, about £6 a month at present, on "intelligence", & may perh. spend a little more in cultivating friendships. The tone of the Japse. press is excellent, & may be turned to acct. [account].

Formosa has given me a little work lately, chiefly in regard to opium. 2 shipments had left HongKong before notice was recd. that the Japse. Treaty, wch. prohibits the drug, was to be put in force. I have obtained permission for those shipments to be imported, but have informed the HongKong merchants thro' the Govr. that the Legn. cannot help in getting leave for further shipments. The Japse. are going to make it a monopoly, & of course will

¹ Probably Asahina Kansui, Satow's paid informant. See G. A. Lenssen, *Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904: The Observations of Sir Ernest Satow*, pp. 21-24. (Sophia University, 1966).

² See letters from Satow to Thomas Glover (23 Feb. and 12 Mar. 1896) and from Lord Spencer to Glover (8 April 1896) partially quoted in Ruxton, 1998, pp. 461-462. See also Satow's diary, April 1896 (Ruxton, 2003, p.78 et seq.). Spencer was First Lord of the Admiralty, 1892-95.

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buy their opium in HongKong.

The Budget for Formosa for the yr. 1896-7 shows a deficit of over 50% on the civil administration alone, to say nothing of the cost of maintaining the garrison there.

Thomson, the stormy petrel of diplomacy, who was in Siam in 1893 & more recently in China & Japan has taken a house in Tokio.¹ He says he is backed up by Ld. Rothschild & is engaged in negotiating abt. rlwys in China.

y.v.f. [Yours very faithfully]

19. Satow to Salisbury

16 April 1896

Dr. Ld. S.,

The main incident lately has been the visit of Ld. Spencer. At his request I got leave for him to visit the new Jap dockyds. at Sasebo & Kure. To the former he was conveyed in the “Porpoise”, to the latter in the “Edgar”, & captns. Pelly & Henderson will have reported on what they saw there to Ad. Buller. Ld. S. also saw the dockyard at Yokosuka. At none of these places were there any signs of getting ready for active operations. A portion of the troops in Corea it is said are to be shortly withdrawn. In face of the continual arrival of transports at Nagasaki with troops for Vladivostock & the steady despatch of Russian ships fr. Europe, the peaceful attitude of Japan seems to indicate a settled determination not to oppose Russian actions in Corea. I asked Count Mutsu today how things were going on in that country. He replied that he had said to the Russian Ch. d’Aff. that if Coreans went on murdering Japse. the opposition press wld. make it very hot for the Govt. His own earnest wish was to keep things quiet in Corea for the next 5 yrs. & to see what wld. turn up in the course of time. Katō had repeated to him yr. Lordship’s remarks abt. Russia in Corea. You had said to K. that you saw no objection to Russia getting a commercial port in Corea by peaceful means, such as purchase or otherwise, but that Gr B. wld. regard the use of force to obtain a military port as a question to be dealt with when it arose. His own comment on this was that Russia had no need to use force for such a purpose either towards China or Corea, as the tendency of recent events plainly showed. Mutsu’s version of Kato’s report of the words you actually used to him does not differ very much fr. what is given in your desp. 14A of Feb. 19. I took Ld. Spencer to call on Marquis Itō, who among other things said Japan had a modus vivendi with Russia abt. Corea, but he did not explain what it was. I

¹ See Satow’s diary, 18 October 1895. (Ruxton, 2003, p.30)

think he merely thought of a sort of understanding that they wld. freely exchange views thro' the medium of their repres[entati]ves at Söul, & communicate to each other every step they thought fit to take. As I have said before, that has hitherto proved but a one-sided arrangement.

I remarked to Mutsu that people had talked abt. a division of territory betw. Japan & Russia. For my own part I thought that quite impracticable. The difficulty of establishing a frontier & guarding it wld. be insuperable.

His ans. [answer] was that Japan wld. of course require Fusan as a sine qua non in such a case, but for his own part he did not believe it wld. be possible to divide Corea. What he earnestly wished for was the independence of that Kingdom. Russia had made a similar profession. G.B. & other PP held similar views. And then he repeated that what he desired was peace for at least 5 yrs. He thought that however much noise the oppn. papers might make, the leading men in the country were sensible eno' [enough] to see that peace was an absolute necessity & the discipline of the army was so good that there was no fear of its trying to override the Govt.

I said I agreed with him that under pres. circs. peace was an absolute necessity for Japan.

But in spite of it all, I think there is a deeprooted hostility towards Russia, wch. is the only P. fr. wch. Japan has anything to fear, & the professions of a desire for peace only mean that they want not to have to fight again before they are ready.

Some people say that the tendency of Japan is to expand further S. again, & that after taking Formosa the next step will be in the direction of the Philippines. One has only to look at the map of Asia to recognize that this wld. be to weaken Japan, by spreading her forces over a long line that cld. easily be cut at any point. Any how, such an idea cannot be entertained by any one but my Spanish colleague, who seems a little apprehensive. ¹

Lord Spencer's visit has had no political bearing. As an ex-First Lord he was fêted by the Japse. naval people. The dinner given to him by the Japse. Oriental Society ² was nothing more than an expression of good will. Mr. E.W. Beckett also spoke at it in laudatory & friendly terms. Ld. Spencer also saw Mutsu, but they had no political talk. He leaves tomorrow for Canada by the str. [steamer] that carries this letter.

Ad. Buller has also got leave to visit Sasebo and Kure. Possibly other foreign admirals will ask permission wch. will be accorded to them. They will see what we saw, an

¹ Satow met Don Jose de la Rica y Calvo on 12 August 1895 in Yokohama. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, pp.13-14)

² The dinner was held on 11 April 1896 (Satow's diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.80).

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appearance of no preparation for immediate eventualities.

One has a sort of feeling however that the Japse. are like a conjuror, who displays to his audience an empty box, & then shortly proceeds to draw fr. it an incredible quantity of articles that he had concealed in his sleeve all the while.

Longford who has gone to Tainan as Consul was recd. in a very friendly manner before his departure by both Mutsu & Itō, the latter of whom begged him to write. As Longford told me this himself, I suppose there is nothing in it, otherwise I shld. have thought such a request rather odd.

I remain &c.

20. Satow to Salisbury

8.5.'96

Dear Ld. S,

I hope I did not do wrong in sounding Mutsu abt. the idea of a joint declaration of neutrality with regard to Corea. It wld. have been difficult to give an ans. without mentioning it to him, because for a long time past the question has been so entirely in abeyance. I was at Kōbe when yr. teleg. came, & it was ford. [forwarded] on to me by Lowther whom I asked to go to Mutsu and put the question on my behalf. I added that if Mutsu wished it I wld. come back to Tokio at once. He wld. not see Lowther, who had to deliver my message thro' a p.s. [private secretary] & the reply was that he wld. like to see me as soon as possible. So I came back to Tokio on Sunday [May] 3 & had the conversation reported in my No. 93 the day after. The impression I derived fr. the con. [conversation] was that Japan had at one time rather hoped for our help in the Corean matter, but not having recd. any encourage[men]t on any of the occasions when they had appealed to H.M.G. they had found themselves forced into negotiating with Russia, & they were on the point of signing something. If however they felt sure Engld. cld. help them even now, they wld. prefer that. But that they doubt, judging by past experience, whether she cld. carry other PP with her. In that case the RR [Russians] wld. be annoyed at her listening to such a proposition fr. us & make the terms of arrange[men]t harder, perh. refuse to make any whatever. I think I have reported his conversation pretty exactly, but he is rather difficult to follow & remember, as he talks very rapidly & at great length.

The papers at once found out that I had returned earlier than I had intended & that I had been to see Mutsu. They have been talking a good deal during the past 10 or 12 days abt. an

approaching compromise c. Russia, & conjectured that my movements had something to do with it.

Yesterday morning a local paper came out c. a para. roundly asserting that a serious hitch had occurred, & that the Japse. Govt. had appealed to Engld. & that I had come back for that purpose.

De Speyer went this afternoon to Mutsu, & asked him what truth there was in all this. Mutsu said to him that the story of a hitch was nonsense. There were no difficulties of any importance, as Speyer must very well know. The points under discussion were the return of the King to his Palace, the no. of Jap. troops to be kept in Corea, a stipulation that the RR. [Russians] shld. not at any time bring there a larger force than the Japse. & the maintenance of the Söul-Pusan teleg. line. If Waeber & Komura were sensible they cld. easily settle all this at Söul, but not being reasonable dips. [diplomats?] these questions had to be referred to Tokio, where of course they wld. be settled. There was no hitch, & Japan had not appealed to any 3rd P. either Engld. or another. My visit to him was merely on my return fr. an absence fr. Tokio.

H. [Harmand] also went to him with a similar query, to whom he replied that he had better ask Speyer, who of course wld. tell him all abt. it.

This is what Mutsu told me this afternoon, he added that they were very anxious to get an ans. to my teleg. of the 4th, & begged me to teleg. to ask for a reply. I told him that he must know that the Sh'ai [Shanghai] cable had been broken fr. 4th to 6th & as my teleg. of the former date had been sent by Russia, it might possibly have been delayed on the way. He seemed to be really anxious, because a favourable ans. will save them fr. having to accept whatever terms Russia chooses to impose.

It was Gutschmid who gave me the informn. contained in my No. 96 abt. the modus vivendi now being negotiated. He got it fr. Speyer, who also told Harmand. The latter said to Speyer, I hear, that he ought not to have told G. That looks as if the 3 were not working very well together, & the Frenchman doubtless dislikes being in the same boat as the Germ. Mutsu's statements this afternoon confirmed what G. [Gutschmid] said in almost every particular.

Sp[eyer] after having seen Mutsu came straight to me, & we talked for half an hour in a most friendly way without Corea being even alluded to. I have also paid a visit to Harmand, but the subject was not mentioned betw. us. The latter is working very hard agst. us, telling the Japse. that they must not trust Engld. & so forth. A little of this may stick, but not much. I

think if HMG. were willing, Japan wld. throw herself into our arms. Most of the press advocates a close understanding c. Engld. If we do not take their side, they will be driven to make terms c. Russia, and as Yamagata is not the only Russian partisan in the cabinet, they might try to get up a combination to our disadvantage. Enomoto who was formerly at Petersburg is pro-Russian, & so is Saigō [Tsugumichi].

One or two of the papers advocate an alliance betw. Engl. Japan & China, agst. R[ussia], but I hardly think the Chinese will be in a hurry to forget the humiliation they have undergone at the hands of the Japanese.

Another paper a day or two ago contained what purported to be the opinion of a Russian officer on the question of an ice-free port. He was made to say that neither Kiaouchou Bay nor Port Arthur was desirable, because a Power holding the straits of Tsushima wld. be able to cut the squadron off fr. Vladivostok, or if part of it were there & part at either of the former two places, he cld. prevent their junction. Pt. Lazareff [Wonsan] was the only port worth having, or perh. Sestakow (I cannot identify this) wch. cld. be connected by land c. Vladk.

I doubt however the genuineness of this conversation.

As to the exclusion of Russia fr. Corea, I believe that wld. be within the range of possibility. Japan wld. strain every effort, if her communications by sea cld. be maintained via Tsushima & Pusan, as they certainly cld. be by our help. There is no question the Japse. people are so profoundly interested in as in keeping their hold over Corea. It is a part of their national history fr. the very earliest times, it is their Alsace-Lorraine & Egypt all in one.¹ If Russia succeeds in keeping them out & managed to do it without hurting their amour proper too much, they might turn their energies in another direction wch. we shld. not so much like. Japan & Russia wld. be able to command Fr[ench] assistance also.

There is some talk of Marq. Itō paying a visit to Formosa, fr[om] wch. much good is to be hoped. At present the subordinate officials there are trying to put all sorts of obstacles in the way of our merchants, but things seem of late to be taking a better turn, owing to the representations Gutschmid & I have made. We have worked in complete harmony there.

I was much surprised to see the immense development of trade at Kobe & of industries at

¹ This has been partially quoted in B.M. Allen's memoir, *The Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G.* (Kegan Paul & co., 1933). Allen omits reference to Egypt (p. 110). In 1894-5 Inoue Kaoru tried but failed to "Egyptianize" Korea by bullying the Korean government into granting railway concessions and accepting loans. (Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, p.135) Inoue believed he was following the example of British intervention in Egypt by providing Korea with capital to strengthen Japan's position in that country.

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Osaka during the 12 yrs. that I have been absent fr. Japan. The former bids fair to become the 2nd busiest port in the East of Asia. Fr[om] the manufactures in Osaka, except in the matter of cotton yarns, I do not think we have much to fear. It is German trade wch. will suffer fr. the competition in the production of cheap & inferior articles.

21. Satow to Mutsu Munemitsu

May 11. 1896

Conf!

Dear Count Mutsu,

I hasten to let you know that I have recd. a reply fr. wch. it seems that things have not yet taken a shape wch. wld. enable us to give a complete ans. to your questions.

This was only a reply to the telegram I sent after seeing you on Thursday.

y.v.t.

22. Satow to Salisbury

Dr. Ld. S.

28 May [1896]

My despp. abt. the trans-pacific cable need only one word of explanation. The delay on the part of the Japse. in answering my note of Mar. 5 was due to a notion of the Min. [Minister] of Commun. [Communications] that it was sent in only “à titre d’information” & required no reply. On my part, I was expecting to receive further instructions as to the proposals of H.M.G. I gather that the Japse. are not desirous of entering into any combination with American projectors that wld. involve a subsidy, while on the other hand they are unwilling to give a monopoly to the Eastern & Northern Cos. Mr. Stone ¹, fr. whom I recd. the confidential documents I am sending home, the Engl. Sec. of the Dept. of Ports & Telegs alias Communications is very friendly, but at the same time he is a faithful servant of Japse. interests, & having formerly married a Fr.[French] woman, has a certain pro-Fr. bias, tho’ not in any sense anti-English.

Formosan questions are I am happy to say settling down, & my Germ. coll. [colleague] & I have by working in concert, managed to get the Govt. to recognize the status quo of the camphor trade, pending a discussion betw. the Min. for F.A. [Foreign Affairs] & ourselves. I learn that a syndicate headed by the late Col. North had got up a “corner” [monopoly] in

¹ William Henry Stone (1837-1917). British adviser on telegraphy to the Japanese government, 1872-1917.

camphor, wch. enabled them to send up the price so high that it gave 150 per cent profit on the cost of the drug laid down in HongKong. His death caused a panic, & the price fell to only 25% profit. The administration in Formosa seems to be in a chaotic condition, but our men now there, who are accustomed to Japse. officials, are gradually putting things straight. At Tamsui the consulate is too far fr. the administrative centre for practical purposes. We ought to sell it and move up the river to Twatutia.

The Japse. Govt. have approached me with an offer to settle the claims arising out of the looting at Takow and Anping when their forces took possession, and I hope to avoid making an official question of it. ¹

The so-called *modus vivendi* with Russia abt. Corea has not made much progress, notwithstanding Mutsu's official communications to me. Itō professed to me recently that he did not care whether the King went back to his Palace or not, as his remaining in the Russian legation relieved Japan of any responsibility for his service. Waeber, he said, was offering opposition to any arrangement. I learn privately that after all nothing will be done until the result is seen of Yamagata's efforts at Petersburg. The position of Japan is so weak that she will be obliged to accept any terms that Russia imposes. Ad. Buller thinks the King will return to the Palace under the protection of bluejackets. For my own part I shld. imagine it more likely that when he eventually moves there, it will be with a guard of Corean troops under Russian military officers. Anyhow the Japse. do not mean to fight at present, unless we help them.

Sir Andrew Noble ², who with Watts of Armstrong's has been here for the past three weeks & leaves for England via Vancouver on the 30th has told me in the strictest confidence that the object of his visit is to arrange for a plan to strengthen the Japanese fleet without anyone observing it. In short, the Japse. want him to build some good ships in addition to the official programme, & keep them in stock as it were, so that when they are ready they may be purchased & the money obtained fr. the Diet on the ground of emergency. In particular they want a ship that shall be able to beat the Rurik. He says he can do that by constructing one of 2000 less tonnage & consequently less coal-carrying capacity and protection, but three more guns and three knots greater speed. He will doubtless give Y.L. all the details when he gets home. No one is to know of the scheme, not even the agent of

¹ On the claims see W.E. Davidson to Satow, PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 8 (March 12, 1896); see also PRO 30/33 5/11, Longford to Satow, no. 20, August 20, 1896; and Satow's diary for May 27, 1896 (Ruxton, 2003, p.98).

² See Satow's diary for May 23, 1896. (Ruxton, 2003, p.97)

Armstrong's here nor the Jap. Min. in London.

I have always suspected that the Japse. while communicating certain details of their naval programme to the Diet wld. secretly order more ships, so that the foreign legations might not know what they were doing. That wld. only be of a piece with the stealthy manner in wch. they carried on their preparations for war with China. It is quite evident that they intend to make themselves as strong as possible both by sea and land in the next 5 years. I do not think they are likely to combine with Russia to divide China, but wld. much rather act with us to keep her intact. And they will try, when their preparations are complete, to recover their position in Corea, I feel almost certain.

My Japse. purveyor of information told me a couple of days ago ¹ that the genl. opinion is that "only in combination with England can the peace of the East be maintained". This I think is a very probable view. The events of the past few months have convinced them that England holds the balance of power. But, he added, people also think that Japan must be strong at sea in order to be such an ally as England wld. care to have.

Sir Andrew has just been to tell me that he has signed a contract this morning for two 1st class cruisers wch. will be stronger for defence than the Rurik, & he hopes also stronger for offence. They are to cost 1½ million £, & he says will certainly be more powerful than any cruisers afloat. Prob. they will also order a battleship on the same terms. No money is to be paid till 1 April next. A stipulation in the contract is entire secrecy. He has telegd. home today to have the ships put in hand as "stock" cruisers. They will be completed with all possible despatch, & be ready even before those in the prog. for this Japse. financial year. He also spoke of a 2nd-class cruiser.

He particularly asked me to request that this information be kept secret.

The Japse. are ordering a 3rd-cl. cruiser in the U.S. & may probably yield to French importunity to a similar extent.

Ad. Buller has asked me to go down to Kure with him in the "Centurion" on the 6th June, & I am to come back in the "Edgar" being away abt 8 or 9 days.

I am afraid that the Consul at Kōbe Mr. Enslie is on his death bed ², & Mr. Quin at Nagasaki is applying for sick leave, his digestion being almost ruined. ³ Having had to send

¹ Satow met Asaina Kansui on May 26, 1896. (Diary)

² J.J. Enslie's last letter to Satow was dated May 21, 1896. (PRO 30/33 5/8, no. 23). He died in Kobe on June 14, 1896.

³ J.J. Quin's last letter to Satow was from the R.M.S. "Empress of China" at Yokohama on June 18, 1896. He did not feel well enough to leave the ship and was on his way home for sick leave granted by Satow (PRO 30/33 5/10 no. 27). He retired on a pension on November 11, 1896 and died in Ireland on February

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3 men to Formosa, I am very short handed.

The Russian & Fr. colls: have come strongly impressed with the idea that Japan & ourselves are working together, & I suppose there is no harm in their thinking so.

Believe me etc.

P.S. I always carefully abstain from giving the Japse. any encouragement to suppose that we shall help them in Corea, & advise them to come to an understanding with Russia if possible. The colls: however were much excited because I came back fr. Kōbe earlier than I had given out, & went to see Mutsu the following day. A day or two afterwds, however, the papers had the terms of the modus vivendi. To Wydenbruck, who asked me a question, I said that judging from what Hillier said and did I supposed our interest in Corea to be of a secondary character, & of course he will have repeated it.

E.S.

23. Satow to Salisbury

June 18/96

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The retirement of Count Mutsu from the F.O. was I believe entirely caused by the state of his health, wch. wld. not much longer have stood the strain of politics, for besides F.A. [Foreign Affairs] he was much mixed up in party intrigues. We were always on the best of terms. A story has been going abt. to the effect that I had given him advice to insist on keeping Japse. troops in Corea, & that acting on this he had used very uncompromising language to de Sp. [Speyer] & Harmand, in consequence of wch. the Russian Govt. insisted on his resigning. The origin of this is very probably what I recounted of his conversation in my private letter of May. Mutsu was rather too fond of hearing himself talk, & what he said to my 2 colls. & his manner of saying it no doubt vexed them. Saionji has the reputation of being a friend of France, probably because he speaks French, but on the whole I do not find him badly disposed. We have got an excellent man in Komura ¹ the new V.M. [Vice

2, 1897.

¹ Komura Jutarō (1855-1911). In 1893 he became first secretary of the legation in Peking. During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 he was a civil administrator of Japanese-occupied areas in Manchuria and later drafted the Japanese peace demands. In May 1896 he signed an agreement with Russia, the Komura-Waeber memorandum, allowing joint interference in Korean internal affairs. He was vice-foreign minister until September 1898, when he was named minister to Washington. Foreign minister from September 1901. Helped conclude the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902) and signed the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905). In June 1906 he was named ambassador to England. In August 1908 he was made foreign minister again.

Minister for Foreign Affairs]

I returned from my visit to Kure with the Ad. [Admiral Buller] on the 16th. The position will be impregnable. The entrance is narrow, & completely commanded by the new forts, wch. seem not to have been armed as yet. We saw a large dock in course of construction, wch. will hold a battleship of 14,000 tons, & another is projected. We also were shown over the workshops. Ad. Buller will be able to send home a very full account of everything. Fr. there we went on to Moji, the port for coal export. In 7 or 8 yrs. what was a hamlet has become a large & growing port.

The memo. abt. Corea no doubt contains what I had previously reported. Komura told me he expected it wld. be some time before the K. [King] returned to his Palace, & that when he did it wld. be under the protection of troops drilled & officered by Russian officers. He did not believe that Russian sailors and soldiers wld. be used for the purpose. "Russia" he said "always acts with circumspection, & wld. never take a step that wld. so completely alter the situation". The Japse. I imagine consider that [Karl Ivanovich] Waeber's kidnapping the King is fair tit-for-tat for Miura's murdering the Queen. Besides they want to have peace while their navy is being brought up to the strength they contemplate. Nothing has leaked out abt. the arrange[men]t I spoke of in my letter of May 28, & I am convinced that they will always be secretly making larger preparations than anything we or other Legns. can get to know for certain.

Marquis Itō with Saigō [Tsugumichi] the Min. of Marine & Genl. Katsura [Tarō]¹ the new Gov. Genl. of Formosa are at present in that island, studying the future policy to be adopted there. No doubt they will be surprised to find out how completely everything is in the hands of foreigners & Chinese, leaving little or no room for Japanese enterprise. It is only the worst class of adventurers fr. this country who will go there for the climate is unhealthy, & living much more expensive than in Japan. But the necessity of having to rule their new possession under the eyes of foreign critics will be a useful lesson to them. I sometimes think the nearest parallel to Japan & its adoption of Western ideas & methods must be Russia since the time of Peter the Great, with this in their favour that it is much more of a popular movement, & I imagine too that the average Japanese is more intelligent.

Satow met Komura who told him of the Komura-Waeber memorandum on June 16, 1896. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.102)

¹ See Stewart Lone, *Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan: The Three Careers of General Katsura Taro*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. Katsura (1848-1913) of Chōshū reformed the army under Yamagata Aritomo. Governor General of Formosa, 1896-98. Army minister 1898-1901 and prime minister three times: 1901-06, 1908-11 and 1912-13.

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They have great capacity, & if they can be kept straight will be a useful factor in civilization. If only they could be Christianized! The period when the new Treaties come into force will put them to a severe test, & great self-control & tact will be needed on both sides.

Hawaii has approached them officially abt. a cable but they think little of the Hawaiian project. The Americans have talked unofficially abt. the scheme that was discussed in the Senate recently, but nothing definite has been proposed. The suggestion that exclusive landing rights wld. be to the disadvantage of Japan is I can see likely to take their fancy. By next mail I shall be able to send home our exchange of verbal notes on the subject.

Mr. Barrett Hamilton will be conveyed to the Commander Islands in the “Linnet” sailing fr. Yokohama abt. 15 July. ¹ Ad. Buller cld. not arrange to despatch a vessel earlier, & there is no other means of communication.

I am told that discussions in the Cabinet are imminent, but the cry of wolf has been uttered so often that I do not place any faith in these vaticinations [predictions], & Itō is clever enough to drive the coach over everything. There is an idea here that Yamagata did not get a particularly cordial reception at Moscow, & he is expected back here early in August. Nissi, the Min[ister] at Petersburg is coming home, ostensibly on acct. of his health. y.v.t.

24. Satow to Anderson

Copy

June 30./96

My dear Anderson,

As we have heard fr. the F.O. that the Consular despp. fr. here go now into the Consular dept., I suppose I am not wrong in writing to you abt. the arrangements I am submitting consequent on Enslye's death.

Hall tells me that even if Tamsui were paid at £900 instead of £800 he wld. prefer Nagasaki; & so I have made no change in my proposals. If Quin is not well enough to come out again, I shld. be glad to see Hall sent to Kōbe. As it is, he has applied for Kōbe, as you will have seen, on the ground of his being a lawyer of some years standing, while Quin is not. But I feel that I shld. not be right in taking upon myself the responsibility of

¹ In connection with the Bering Sea Dispute and American attempts to control seal hunting off the coast of Alaska. See G.E.H. Barrett-Hamilton to G.A. Lowther, 24 September 1897 (PRO 30/33 5/5).

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recommending a departure from the strict rule of seniority, as I do not know of anything agst. Quin. But if the latter shld. make up his mind to ask for his pension I shld. hope he wld. get it, as he has been nearly 30 yrs in the services, & the older men are sometimes rather in the way of a healthy incultation of promotion.

After I had drafted my desp. recommending Hampden for the acting apptmt. of Assistant Jap. Secy., he came to me & urged various reasons why he shld. not be apptd. One was that he wld. like to go to a consulate to learn the work there, another that he thinks the work too much combined with that of the VC-ate [Vice Consulate], & third that he has to work all day. I rather suspect that his real motive is that he does not like to work under Gubbins, & that he is afraid of exciting the jealousy of others. In my own opinion tho' he is junior to Wileman & Lay he is better suited for the special work than either, & I do not think that these apptmts. at the Legn. of men fr. the Consular service ought necessarily to be determined by Seniority. If I find it is absolutely impossible to keep him I suppose I shall have to bring Lay here, but I shld. prefer to have the apptmt. made as recommended; & if the emergency arises I cld. put an acting V-C in his place.¹

The desp. shows that there is a considerable annual saving on the estimate for Japan, so I hope you may see your way to supporting my request for increased salary at Tamsui & Tainan.

We have no record here of the dates at wch. the Consuls apptd. the other day begin to draw their new rates of pay, & they have not yet been informed that they may draw their outfit allowances. In fact they have only recd. their commissions.

25. Satow to Salisbury

July 9. 1896

Dear Ld. S,

Nothing further has come out abt. the understanding supposed to have been arrd. at betw. Russia & Japan abt. Corea. My German coll: asked the F.M. what Yamagata had arranged with Prince Lobanof, & was told by him that it was "sacrée" meaning I suppose that it was a profound secret. Itō has not yet returned fr. his trip to Formosa, but I shall try to see him as soon as he returns. The idea among the Japse. abt. Russia is that he advocates a close understanding & even an alliance with Russia. My last information is that Mutsu gave up

¹ Ernest Miles Hobart-Hampden was employed as Assistant in the Japanese Secretary's office in Tokyo from April 1 to November 26, 1896. He was appointed H.M. Vice-Consul at Tokyo (local rank) on August 21, 1896. The post was abolished one year later. (Kuwata, 2003, p.306, quoting F.O. List 1950).

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the For. Dept. because his views were not in accord with those of Yamagata.

It is unfortunate that disturbances shld. have again broken out in Formosa, this time at a spot where British interests (the camphor manufacture) are involved. I do not think the Japse. can be blamed for the murder of the B.S. [British Subject] nor the murder of the Chinese employé of another. They have themselves lost heavily.

During my recent cruise on board the “Centurion” I read the Port Hamilton papers with Ad. Buller. He is strongly adverse to Chusan as a naval station, the tides are strong & the place is much subject to fogs. In his opinion Port Hamilton [Komundo] is altogether to be preferred. I think it is very likely that most of the gentlemen of the China Association, who are so strong on the subject of Chusan only know the place by hearsay. If I ventured to have an opinion it wld. be in favour of Port Hamilton. It is curious that a Japse. paper this morning discussing the Korean question, says that Great Britain’s reply to a forward Russian policy would be the re-occupation of the island.

The usual official holidays begin in a couple of days, & most of my colls: have already betaken themselves to the hills. I am building a cottage there [at Lake Chuzenji] myself & shall be backwards & forwards during the hot weather. We have induced the Gov. to put up a teleg. line, so that we are in touch with the outer world.

Mr. Barrett Hamilton was to start yesterday fr. Hakodate for the Commander Islands in HMS. “Spartan”; & is to be met there by Prof. D’Arcy Thompson. I have two of our astronomers staying with me en route for Yesso [Hokkaido], & expect the Astronomer Royal in abt. a fortnight’s time.

y.v.t.

26. Satow to J.H. Longford

13.7.96

My dr. Longford,

Yr. budget reached me by the “Exe” on the 10th, & I have only just finished a first reading. I am sorry that under present circs. in Formosa I cannot give you leave of absence. It wld. never do for you to come away when the state of the island is such as to need your presence imperatively.

Pray try to possess your soul in patience. One must accept some sacrifice for the sake of promotion. I have promised Hall that he shall have the acting apptmt. at Kōbe when Troup comes out in Oct. Whether he will get the permanent billet or Quin is uncertain. Possibly

the latter may not come back, as his state of health is such as to suggest that retirement wld. be wise. I have left the man on the spot acting in both cases, but I have your wish to get out of Formosa in mind. Only it is difficult to justify your transfer to act at Nagasaki on the ground of its being more important than Takow. If I see any sign of Quin not returning, leading to the conclusion that Nagasaki wld. be offered to you, I might stretch a point & bring you there to act abt. the end of the year, when there will be a general post. I don't suppose that the new apptmts. consequent on Enslie's death will be out before that time, unless the F.O. telegraphs.

I quite agree that the present arrangements in Formosa are not the best imaginable. I shld. regard a well-paid consul at Tamsui as nearer an ideal, but there are pros & cons, & the Auth: [Authorities] at home are difficult to move.

I think you must go on with the Spaniards, at least for the present, just telling the missionaries when they write to you on any difficult matter that you will send their letter on to [Spanish minister at Tokyo L. de la] Barrera. The latter is not disposed, as far as I can see, to take up the cause of Christian Chinese.

I must defer any observations on your despatches till another opportunity.

Paget has just lost his father & it is just possible he may have to go home on leave.

y.t. [yours truly]

27. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio

30.7.96

Dr. Ld. S.

Mr. Gubbins tells me he is applying privately for the post at Söul wch. it is understood is likely to become vacant. Altho' I shld. be sorry to lose him from here, I shld. not like to put any obstacle in the way of his promotion, & under present circs. it may possibly be thought useful to have a Consul-Genl. at Söul who would work well with his Japse. colleague, & fr. his knowledge of Japse. character wld. be able to fathom Japse. schemes there. Mr. G. is also a good Fr. [French] scholar, & possesses an intimate acquaintance with Far-Eastern Affairs.¹

¹ Eric Barrington, Lord Salisbury's private secretary, replied to this letter apologising that Lord Salisbury had been unable to comply with Gubbins' request. John N. Jordan was appointed to Seoul as soon as the post fell vacant. (PRO 30/33 5/2 letter no. 10, dated September 29, [18]96.)

28. Satow to Salisbury

30.7.96

Dr. Ld. S.,

The death of Hitrovo does not seem to have produced much excitement here, but he will scarcely be regretted by any Japse. except those who were in his pay. Speyer, I am told, thinks either Kaprist[?] the Director of the Asiatic Dept. or Koyander[?] fr. Cairo will be sent.

I forgot to mention that v. Brandt went thro' Yoko. abt. 2 mos. ago by the Canadian Pacific Str. No one, not even Gutschmid, knew of it at the time, & his name was kept out of the list of passengers. He made himself very obnoxious here by his pamphlet on East. Asiat. affairs, & he had given out that it was he who had induced the Germ. Empr. to join Russia & France in intervening after the [Sino-Japanese] war. Prudence, it is supposed, counselled his avoiding recognition.

I saw Itō on the 13th ¹ & asked whether Yamagata's visit to Moscow had been a success. He made a grimace & said he supposed it must be so regarded, but tho' the Russians had accorded to Li Hung-chang the precedence of a Prince, they wld. not give it to Yamagata, as Fushimi was a prince by birth. As to Corea, Japan desired its independence, & the Russians denied any intention of taking it, wch. came to the same thing. Of course all the Japse. wanted was to protect the large no. of their resident traders. The understanding with Russia amounted to no more than this, that both sides wld. try to avoid a collision. The King is going to live, he said, in a Palace close to the Russian (& consequently to our) Legation.

Yamagata returned here on the 28th & yesterday I asked the Min. for F.A. if he had brought them back anything. Saionji replied that he believed so, but did not yet know what it amounted to. All my outside information goes to show that Yamagata accomplished nothing at Petersburg & that he went there as a dummy. First of all Itō had wanted to go, to see whether he cld. come to such an arrangement with Pr. Lobánow as he made with Li Hung-chang in 1884, & if not, then to give himself a good holiday. When the rest of the Cabinet insisted on his staying here, it was found that they were committed vis à vis the Russians to sending somebody, so they got Yamagata to go, who is no diplomatist. On the whole I think the memo. signed by Waeber & Komura at Söul abt. 2 mos. ago providing a modus vivendi is the only thing that has been accomplished.

If Li Hung-chang returns to China by way of the U.S. & Japan he wld. have a very

¹ See Satow's diary for July 13, 1896. (Ruxton, 2003, pp. 110-111)

friendly reception here. Itō said to me that he doubted whether he wld. even come on shore, for it would be said at Peking that he had visited Japan to obtain his reward for signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Formosan affairs look ugly. Japanese of the lower classes are capable of a great deal of brutality when let loose among a conquered race. But I ask myself how much of the lawless conduct wch. is attributed to them is the normal accompaniment of operations for the establishment of authority in a new dependency, & how much is due to innate brutality. I think the Govt is fully alive to the necessity of restraining their people & I have spoken to Itō as well as Saionji on the subject. The official organs, including the Japan mail, whose editor is the “Times” correspondent, deny that there has been any unnecessary slaughter or bad treatment, but they do this on a priori grounds. I imagine that a good deal abt. Formosa is likely to appear in the home papers, & I have therefore sent home all Longford’s despp. The source of his information is the same person who writes at great length to the “Japan Gazette” of Yokohama.

I have had the Astronomer Royal here for a couple of days, & he left yesterday for the eclipse station in the “Linnet.” Admiral Buller asked me to go up, but I do not like to go so far fr. Tokio. At Chiuzenji I am only 8 hrs. distance.

I think Col. Sartorius will be able to do some good work here. He tells me that he expects to go home in Feb. next, & that the W.O. [War Office] has a project of sending a military attaché for China & Japan conjointly. This I think wld. not do well. The Japse. wld. suspect such an arranget. & wld. give no information. They have naturally been much flattered by a distinguished officer like Sartorius being sent here, & I count upon his getting in touch with the leading people when the summer vacation is over.

29. Satow to Longford

15.8.96

My dear Longford,

I have seen a long report fr. [acting German consul in Tamsui Dr.] Grünewald on the late revolt, wch. agrees with what I have heard fr. you & read in the papers. But the sources of information appear to be identical, & I suppose one must discount a little what Chinese “witnesses” say. However I have in a private letter to Itō told him briefly of what has reached me, & the subscription fr. the Imperial purse, not to mention the tone of the Japan Mail, appear to indicate a desire to admit that there have been victims of injustice.

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When [F.J.] Marshall [of the Office of Works, Shanghai] comes next month, I will talk to him abt. Takow. Yr. letter of appointmt. enables you to live at Anping & place the Asst. [Assistant] at Takow, if you think it better for the public service.

I have telegd.to F.O. mentioning your wish to exchange Tamsui for Tainan, & I shld. think they will make no difficulty abt. it. If the Tamsui consulate is moved to Twatutia where it ought to be, you may not like the surroundings quite as much.

y.v.t.

30. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio

20 Aug. 1896

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

For some days past there has been something brewing in the political world wch. may give rise to a change of cabinet. Yamagata came back here with a fit of dyspepsia, & was much annoyed to find things at 6s & 7s ¹ in Formosa, a rebellion going on, & discord betw. the military & civilian elements. So he went off in a huff to his retreat at Kioto. The present state of the finances is said to be bad, the taxes yield less than the estimates, & large demands are made by the depts. for an increase next year. This is specially so in the case of Formosa. In spite of the large sum voted this year, it is found insufficient for the large military expenditure and the necessary outlay on public works. The Min. of Finance seems to have declared his desire to resign in consequence. Then there is a constant outcry for a Min. of F.A. who shall have that dept. only, instead of Saionji, who is Min. of Education as well. To fill these 2 posts one party advocates the admission of Yamagata & Okuma. But if the latter comes in, it will not be possible for him to pull together with Itō. Matsugata too would scarcely care to be Minister of Finance under Itō & aspires it is said to the Presidency of the Council. As a financier he wld. inspire great confidence, but it is not impossible that he might like to try an experiment with gold monometallism. If Itō goes out, & he is constantly talking of his wish to leave office and take a rest, he will at once begin to undermine the position of his successor. I do not venture to predict the outcome of it all, but certainly some change appears to be pending [~~'imminent'~~ crossed out, 'pending' inserted].

I think there must be a good deal of truth in the reported bad behaviour of soldiers and gendarmerie in Formosa. But the people here are rather alarmed, & have sent orders to take

¹ at sixes and sevens: in a confused, badly organized or undecided situation.

prisoners & try them before specially constituted courts. I have given them advice to inflict no capital punishment on rebels, & to substitute terms of imprisonment. Layard wrote to me privately fr. Tamsui accts. [accounts] of the insolence & brutality of the Japanese lower orders of wch. he had been an eyewitness, & I spoke pretty plainly to Saionji on the subject.

¹ He admitted that even the officials who had been sent to administer Formosa were a very inferior set of men. So I hope things may improve.

Baron Rosen, who was formerly here as Secretary & is now in Servia [Serbia], is the last man spoken of as likely to succeed [Russian minister Mikhail] Hitrovo. [Aleksei de] Speyer says the latter [Hitrovo] did him an ill turn with the Japanese. I rather think it must have been he [Hitrovo] who suggested to the Japse. that Speyer & not Waeber had contrived the flight of the Corean K. [King] to the R. [Russian] Legn. As regards Corea the Japse. press is almost silent. One wld. think they had forgotten its existence. It is a case of still waters run deep.

With regard to the little hitch abt. the German commercial treaty, the blame is laid upon [Japanese minister in Berlin] Aoki [Shūzō] for not carrying out his instructions. He is not a favourite with Itō & Saionji.

The Japse. are evidently very anxious that the Australian Colonies shld. adhere to the Treaty, as they fear difficulties might otherwise be put in the way of their new line of steamers, & the announcement that New S. Wales & Victoria wld. not join unless they obtained full power to restrict immigration has brought them round. As Komura said to me, “our interest in Australia in Australia [sic] is commerce, not emigration.” I suspect our chief opponent has been [Henry Willard] Denison ² the Am. legal adviser of the F.M., who does not wish us to get more than the U.S. Some one, I do not know who, spread about the idea that in this matter I had gone beyond my instructions.

Believe me etc.

31. Satow to Bertie

¹ See Satow's diary for August 17, 1896 (Ruxton, 2003, p.115).

² Henry Willard Denison (1846-1914). American legal adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, 1880-1914. One of the longest-term foreign employees (*o-yatoi gaikokujin*) of the Meiji period. First employed by Inoue Kaoru, and served as aide to each foreign minister thereafter. Influential in the negotiations leading to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty (1894) in which extraterritoriality was abolished; in relations with Russia before and after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05); and in planning the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and revisions in 1905 and 1911. He remained an American citizen, but was named one of Japan's representatives at the Hague Court of International Justice, and was awarded the Order of the Rising Sun. (Kodansha's Encyclopedia).

PRO 30/33 14/9 Japan (1-64)
(November 2, 1895 – December 30, 1897)

20.8.96

My dr. Bertie,

If, as seems prob. [probable] fr. [from] your teleg. [telegram] of 17th, Quin does not come out again, then Longford wld. like to go to Nagasaki, & my recommendation for Tainan wld. be Kenny, Bonar going to Tamsui as I originally suggested. If so, then it wld. be a great convenience to have Kenny go straight to Tainan & relieve Longford, whom I wld. move to Nagasaki on K's arrival. Longford is always bothering me to take him away fr. Formosa, wch. now that he has got he detests. I have told him that tho' I shld. find it difficult to justify his transfer to Tamsui on the ground of its being more important than Takow, I wld. perh. if I saw signs of Quin's not coming back, stretch a point & bring him back to act at Nagasaki when Kenny arrives.

It wld. be very obliging of you to send me a teleg. when you get this wch. wld. enable me to do this.

It is not easy to content Longford, who thinks he has rendered great services, but I am thankful to say no one else grumbles at his lot.

Forster, who is acting at Nagasaki, is very satisfactory, & keeps his eyes open.

Mowats' having written abt. Hall has greatly relieved me, as it enabled me to teleg. to you recommending him for Kōbe. y.v.t.

32. Satow to Longford

21 Aug. 1896

My dear Longford,

The enclosed cutting is from the Japse. gazette. It contains very much the same news as that given by Griffiths ¹ in his memo. enclosed in your no 108. I noticed the same thing on a previous occasion. Can you tell me how this happens, and who is the "Gazette" correspondent.

I think there is a considerable probability of your getting Nagasaki, regarding the pay of wch. port on further conson. [consideration] I made no suggestion of reduction. In a month

¹ Ernest Alfred Griffiths (1863-1913). He entered the Civil Service in 1880, and transferred to the Consular Service in 1884. He served in Japan and Formosa until 1912. Acting Consul at Hiogo in 1893. Promoted to be 1st Assistant, August 8, 1896. Pro-Consul and sometimes Acting Consul at Tainan from 1896 to 1900. Acting Vice-Consul at Hiogo in 1900. Again Acting Consul at Tainan in 1902 and 1903. Acting Consul at Kobe in 1903 and 1904. Promoted to be Consul for the Consular District of Shimonoseki, December 22, 1904. Retired on a pension, December 9, 1912. (Kuwata, 2003, pp. 281-282, quoting F.O. List, 1914 and *The Times*, October 15, 1913.)

or so I hope to hear definitely. Unless your health absolutely requires it you had better stay at your post. If necessary to ask for sick leave you can always get a certificate from the doctor & telegraph.

y.v.t.

P.S. In your No. 108 the value per chest of the camphor supposed to be burnt was left blank.

I think if not too great an expense it wld. be well to teleg. the nos. of despp. [despatches] fr. here as soon as received.

33. Satow to Longford

10.9.96

My dr. Longfd.,

I have but a short time left in wch. to answer your letters of July 28 (2) Aug 20, 21 & 25.¹

1stly [Firstly] I think the question of having a superior consul at Tamsui & subordinates at Anping & Takow must be left for the present, until things develop themselves a little more.

I have ansd. [answered] Marshall's letter of July 21[?] after talking the whole matter over with him, deprecating the idea of selling the house at Takow & urging the necessary expenditure for a new roof & interior renovation. I have also spoken in it of the insanitary condition of the house at Anping. & finally I have sent copies to F.O. recording my dissent fr. the proposal to shut up Takow. We shall not hear for some months what the result is to be.

I cannot make out whether Anping or Takow is the better place for the consul fr. the point of view of hygiene or transaction of business, & am disposed as I have said before to leave the point to the decision of the man on the spot.

It is very stupid of the Chancery to go on directing your despp. to Tainan, as I told them long ago to address them to Takow.

Midzuno's letter was I take it a transcript of what had been written to him by the colonization dept. I told Komura that I was going to instruct you to return M's letter & that I wld. rather make it an official question & report the whole to the F.O. than allow such a view of the settlement to remain on record. I had only consented to the use of the word 扶助金 [fujokin: grant, "relief money"] on the assurance given to me that it had been used

¹ Satow was at Lake Chuzenji from September 11-21, 1896. (Chuzenji diary, PRO 30/33 17/16, quoted in Ruxton, 2003, p.453) Longford's letters to Satow are in PRO 30/33 5/11.

in 1874 to denote the indemnity paid by China to Japan for the Formosan affair.¹ So you can safely send Midzuno his letter with a few polite lines, retaining however the money in statu quo.

As I wrote to you the other day I have asked Bertie to teleg. whether Quin is coming out again or not, as in that case I wld. send you to act at Nagasaki. I cannot however expect an ans. [answer] for abt. [about] ten days or a fortnight, & then I must look abt. me to see how the various changes are to be effected. I think it may be necessary to hurry Kenny out, as if you go to Nagasaki he wld. succeed you at Tainan & I may perh. [perhaps] have to move Griffiths. To fit every man into the hole that suits him is no easy task.

I am sorry Patel's case turned out to have so little in it. However, as you have so handsomely acknowledged that there was a mistake, I have simply put the correspce. [correspondence] away. On the strength of what you wrote I had complained to both Itō and Saionji.²

No one can tell who is going to be the new Minister President. I think in any case Itō will have to take the reins again before long.

34. Satow to Barrington

10.9.95 [should be 96]

Dear Barrington,

I am thinking if all goes well of asking for 6 mos. leave of absence abt. the end of May next. Since Jan 91 I have spent altogether abt. [about] 3 mos. [months] in Engl. [England] & shld. like a little holiday. I do not wish to extract a promise beforehand from Ld. Salisbury, & will write again when the time comes, but as you might hear fr. some other quarter that I was talking of leave, it is better you shd. know it fr. myself.

If I shd. come to Engl. then [G.A.] Lowther wld. like to be in charge, & he knows

¹ In May 1874 Japan sent a punitive expedition of more than 3,000 men led by Saigo Tsugumichi to southwestern Taiwan. The pretext was the murder of 54 shipwrecked Ryūkyū islanders by Taiwanese aborigines in December 1871. The ulterior aims were to force Chinese acknowledgement of Japanese claims of sovereignty over the Ryūkyū islands and to gain a foothold in Taiwan. After fierce resistance from the Taiwanese the Japanese forces withdrew, but China agreed to pay an indemnity of 500,000 taels and thus tacitly acknowledged Japanese sovereignty over the Ryūkyūs. (Kodansha's *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia*, p.1504).

² Satow spoke to Saionji about Patel's case on July 29, 1896. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.113) In July 1896 the Japanese army in Taichun, Formosa killed several hundred people and burnt down more than a thousand dwellings in an effort to suppress rebellious natives. This provoked 40-50,000 to revolt. At that time Mr D. Ollia of Dinshaw & Co. was mistaken for a Japanese and killed. Mr. Patel of Mehta & Co. escaped unharmed. (Nagaoka, vol. 1, p. 167)

everything I have done. I mention this lest you shd. think of moving him & because I flatter myself he does not desire a change. y.v.t.

35. Satow to Salisbury

10/9/96

Dr. Ld. Salisbury

During the past fortnight since Ito's resignation the Presidency of the Council has been offered to Yamagata [Aritomo], recently special envoy to the Coronation at Moscow, Kuroda [Kiyotaka] the President of the Privy Council & Saigō [Tsugumichi] the Min. of Marine, who have in turn refused it, & the last news is that Matsugata [Masayoshi] has undertaken to form a cabinet. Four out of Itō's Ministers remain in but there will have to be perh. apptmts to the F.O., W.O. & Min of Finance. Okuma [Shigenobu] is said to be holding out for a distinct recognition of the principle of party cabinets, wch. must lead to the responsibility of the Ministry [i.e. government] to the Diet. It is therefore still uncertain whether he will come in.

I hear that the Russian Ch. d'Aff. talks as if he had upset the Itō Cabinet. He says that altho' he expects more difficulty with the new men, he is glad to see Itō out of office. The only reason for this can be that Itō by his elusive skill gives Russia no excuse for decisive action in Corea, & that he anticipates provocation from the incoming ministry, especially if Ōkuma goes to the F.O. I hope he may be disapptd. It is curious that a Saigon[?] paper has been talking of Russia calling upon Japan to evacuate Formosa, in language wch. looks as if it were inspired, & laying claims to the Japse succession there & in the Pescadores on the ground of the operations in 1884. The 3 PP [Russia, France & Germany], suspicious of us, in consequence of the offers made by the so-called Formosan Republic to come under Br. protection, obtained fr. Japan an undertaking not to cede the island to a 3rd Power, but that of course wld. not be invoked agst. a possible prise de possession by France.

With a cabinet in wch. Ōkuma was Min. for F.A. & Kawakami (the 'Moltke' of Japan ¹) Min. for War I shld. not feel so certain of peace as with Itō at the head of affairs.

It seems to be doubted whether the new Cabinet can last long, when it comes to meet the Diet. Itō, no doubt, had been eagerly desiring to give up & take a holiday, & he seized what most people thought an insufficient pretext for resigning. But if the new people fail, & he is

¹ Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891). Chief of the Prussian and German General Staff (1858-88) and the architect of victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1871), which paved the way for German unification. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th edition)

recalled to power, he will come back with greater prestige than ever, as the only man who can save the country. A good many think that this will be the eventual outcome of the present crisis.

Li Hung-chang it is reported will arrive at Yoko. [Yokohama] fr. Vancouver abt. the 26th & it is hoped that he will land for the purpose of having an audience of the Emperor. After his brilliant success in Europe, the Japse. wld. not like to be passed over. The contrast betw. his reception by the Great PP & the insignificant figure cut by Prince Fushimi & Marshal Yamagata must be very mortifying to their pride.

The précis of Articles fr. a Jap. paper enclosed in my Desp. No. 170 is a fine specimen of Chauvinism. The Japse. look upon themselves as the coming race. They are spreading all over the world, & wherever they settle in considerable numbers become a source of trouble. Australia and Canada are quite right in taking precautions to restrict immigration. If the Japse. Govt. object to this, our ans. [answer] is that they have for their own protection taken similar precautions in the new Treaty to exclude foreign agriculturalists & capital, by refusing to let foreigners hold land except on lease or to engage in agricult[ural] undertakings.

36. Satow to Longford

26.9.1896

My dr. Longford,

I have your 2 private letters of Sept. 1 & 6.¹ The latter reached me today, the former on the 23rd. I have made representations to the Japanese V.M. for F.A. [Komura] who says instructions were sent to Midzuno a fortnight ago to recognize the status quo.² Owing to the Cabinet crisis I have not been able to get anything else done.

I am glad you gave only a bare receipt for the \$8000.

I see you give Rinkipoh as the equivt. of Hoonin[?]. I had been under the impression that Hoonin was Hakka for Yünlin or Unrin.³

¹ These letters are in PRO 30/33 5/11.

² Satow spoke to Komura about camphor and handed him a memo on September 23, 1896.

“He said Midzuno a fortnight ago telegraphed to inquire whether the status quo ante was to be maintained, and was told by Colonization Department affirmative, but whether by teleg. or post does not know. Asked him to find out and let me know what was done, that I may inform Longford. Expressed also the opinion that the articles proposed by Midzuno with some modifications would serve as the basis for an arrangement.” (Satow’s diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.120)

³ PRO 30/33 5/11 no.23, Longford to Satow dated September 1, 1896.

Your suggestion that [French consul to Formosa, 1895-99 Vicomte R.] de Bondy should be put in charge of Sp. [Spanish] affairs is not practicable, for the reason in the 1st place that he is not in Formosa, & not likely to go there until a house is built for him at Tamsui, & 2ndly because it suits the policy of the Br. & Sp. Govts better that Sp. Affairs shld. be looked after by an Engl. consul. I hope you will not recur to this matter again.

Yr. longer letter of Sep. 6 reached me on the 20th. I am quite satisfied with the acct. you give of your sources of information abt. the slaughter of the Chinese etc. & I have come to the conclusion that the memos. sent by Griffiths were compiled fr. documents on wch. the “Gazette” correspondents were also working.

You need only teleg. the no. of a despatch for me to know that it has been recd. It is of importance to know when despp. reach you, as our communications so frequently cross.

I had hoped by this time to be able to tell you something definite abt. your future. Of course I do not think of sending you to act at Naga. [Nagasaki] if you are ultimately destined to Tamsui, & it wld. scarcely be fair to Forster, who has been doing very well. The question of your going to Tamsui & recg. the outfit [allowance] for that post, & then on to Nagasaki & getting an outfit there will of course depend not on myself but on the F.O. There are a great many people to be considered in connexion with the expected moves, besides the interest of the public service, but I can promise you at least that your claims in the way of personal convenience shall not be postponed to those of others. y.v.t. E.S.

37. Satow to Salisbury

Oct.8. 1896

Dr. Ld. S.,

I went to see Count Matsugata yesterday ¹, who at once began to talk finance ², & said that after the war in wch. his countrymen had triumphed so easily & extracted a certain amount of money fr. the Chinese, their ambition knew no bounds. As he put it graphically “their heads swelled.” The late [Itō-led] Cabinet had plunged into greater expenditure than the country cld. bear, & the finances were in a dire state of confusion, rendered worse by the constant depreciation of silver. He remarked that all countries in the world, with the exception of China, Japan & Siam, had adopted gold mono-metallism, & that appeared to

¹ See Satow’s diary entry for October 7, 1896. (Ruxton, 2003, p.124)

² Matsukata Masayoshi (1835-1924) was Minister President (prime minister) from September 18, 1896 to January 12, 1898. He was also finance minister concurrently, and served in that role in seven of the first ten cabinets and for 18 of the 20 years from 1881 to 1901.

him the only sound system.

I told him that China is really on a copper basis, & that the value of taels of silver in relation to copper cash has recently declined to a considerable extent.

Rumours have been spread about that the mercantile classes will not support him, because they find cheap silver an advantage to their trade, & fear his monometallic tendencies. If he shld. last long enough to change the coinage fr. silver to gold, the fears (mostly unfounded I think) that have been expressed with regard to the effect of Japse. competition on our trade wld. I suppose die away.

Matsugata told my German colleague that his relations with the Mins. of War & Marine were very strained in consequence of his insisting upon cutting down their estimates for next year, & I have heard the same fr. another source that is usually well-informed. I imagine however that they have patched up their differences & that they will get along safely until the meeting of the Diet at least. Their downfall within 9 mos. seems to be expected on all hands. Then Itō wld. come back with a group of his own special adherents but he is very clever, & will not precipitate matters till he is well-prepared.

[General Viscount] Takashima [Tomonosuke], Min. of War ¹ & Colonies, is an influential man in the Cabinet, having been the chief means of upsetting Itō, & has the reputation of being greedy, so that it will not be his intent to quarrel with Matsugata, on the principle that half a loaf is better than no bread. Saigō the Min. of Marine [Navy] is a man of pleasure, who drinks too much. He is subsidised by a rich merchant named Ōkura ², who gets a great many govt. contracts & pumps [subsidies?] from him. He is less greedy than Takashima, so Matsugata will have to yield more to him for the creation of the new navy.

The tone of the Japse. with regard to the Philippines is not quite reassuring. They had been harbouring the refugees mentioned in my desp. & were quite aware of their character, before the request was made for their surrender.

¹ Minister of War, or war minister, is the usual English rendering of 陸相 rikushō, but Minister of the Army seems less militaristic and therefore preferable.

² Probably Ōkura Kihachirō (1837-1928). Entrepreneur and founder of the Ōkura zaibatsu (financial and industrial combine). Born in what is now Niigata prefecture, Ōkura opened a gun shop after the Meiji Restoration (1868). He later established the Ōkura-Gumi Shōkai (1873), a general trading company, amassing great riches as a trader with the military. He financed a number of Japanese corporations, including Tokyo Electric Lighting (now Tokyo Electric Power Inc.) and the Imperial Hotel. He also started a variety of businesses in China and Korea. In 1911 Ōkura created a huge industrial combine headed by Ōkura-Gumi. He also established the Ōkura Commercial School (now Tokyo University of Economics) and the first private art museum in Japan (Ōkura Shūkokan Museum). (Kodansha's *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia*, p.1146)

PRO 30/33 14/9 Japan (1-64)
(November 2, 1895 – December 30, 1897)

I cannot help feeling that they [the Japanese] are likely to be a troublesome nation. They will take every opportunity of manifesting their sympathy with Asiatics under the domination of Europe [e.g. the Philippine nation], & will not stick at intrigues of any sort with malcontents. They encourage their people to settle in places like Hawaii, the Caroline Islands & similar spots in the Pacific with the aim of obtaining preponderant influence, & later on of interfering. I do not suppose that General Kawakami's mission to Tonquin & Annam [regions of North Vietnam, part of the French Empire until 1954] is one of idle curiosity, but rather to spy out the weak points in the French power there. He devised the plan of campaign in Corea, having explored a good deal of the country beforehand in person. I do not mean that there is any present plan on foot, but they are preparing for any chance fortune may offer them.

I have had to address a note to Ct. Ōkuma abt. what seems to me a serious miscarriage of justice in a recent case, where a number of Japanese firemen [i.e. stokers on ships], fancying they had cause for complaint agst. a Mr. Barrie in the employ of the Jap. Steamship Co. penetrated into his house, hit him abt. the head with iron bars & wld. have killed him had he not luckily effected his escape. I am unable to send all the papers by this mail, as they are rather voluminous, but I hope to do so shortly.

I think that a real effort will be made to put things straight in Formosa. They have been very bad, I think, but not so bad, I think, as they have been represented by an ubiquitous writer in the local press of Hongkong & S'hai.

P.S. I learn on good authority that de Speyer, acting no doubt on instructions, protested agst. Ōishi being appointed to Corea, & said that if Ct. Ō[kuma] persisted, it wld. be impossible for Russia & Japan to get on together at Söul. Ōishi when in Corea before displayed a very overbearing disposition. I am also told there is a proposal on foot for the King [Kojong] to remain at the Russian Legation for the benefit of his safety, & for the Russian Min. to have one of the K's [King's] palaces – prob. the palace that lies close to the Engl. & Russ. legations.

E.S.

38. Satow to Salisbury

5 Nov. 1896

Dr. Ld. S,

When Ad. [Admiral] Buller was here last wk [week] he expressed to me his opinion of

the necessity for apptg. [appointing] a naval attaché here, & suggested that I shld. write officially on the subject. I entirely share his opinion, but as Mr. Trench [the previous Minister before Satow ¹] in reply to a desp. on the subject by Ld. Kimberley was told that the Admiralty did not consider there was any reason at present for making such an apptmt. I replied to Ad. B. that I thought the recommendation wld. have more weight if it came fr. himself. At present the Russians & the Spaniards are the only PP that have naval attachés at Tokio.

I regret very much that [Colonel E.H.] Sartorius is leaving, but fr. the first he said that his apptmt. was only for 6 mos. I begged him not to mention this, but it leaked out thro' the Japse. legation in London. One reason for wishing that a military attaché shld. be appted. here is the impossibility for us to find out what is being done abt. the increase of the army, as the Japse. military men look down upon civilians & do not mix with them. When we meet it never goes beyond an exchange of polite phrases.

The Russians have now Col. Yanjoul & Capt. Samoïloff, the Fr[ench] Comte de Pimodane with the title of Chef de la mission militaire française, the Spaniard Major Cologan, the Germans, Austrians & Americans each a military of lower rank attached to the Legation, but without the title of attaché militaire. It wld. look very marked if we alone of the Great PP had none. I quite agree with Sartorius that his successor shld. be of a higher rank than a Capt., & I also think it very desirable that there shld. be no great interval of time betw. them. If S. had arrived here before the departure of [Capt. Noel] Du B. [Du Boulay] the latter wld. have been able to introduce him to all of his military friends, whereas an interval of nearly 6 mos. elapsed.

Domestic politics are very quiet, & it seems likely that the new Cabinet will carry the majority of the Diet with them. It does not meet till the end of Dec[ember].

I learn that the Russian Ch. d'Aff. has been trying to stimulate Japse. interest in the troubles at Manila, with the object of turning their attention away fr. Corea. The capitalists who are interested in the projected Japse rlwy fr. Söul to Fusan talk hopefully of getting a concession, but I do not think anything is being done abt. it, as Hara [Takashi] the Japse. Min[ister] in Corea is over here, & there are signs that he will not return to his post. The Min. at Peking also has left for Japan, & it is rumoured that he will be sent elsewhere. Aoki [Shūzō] has given much dissatisfaction by the concessions he made to Germany with

¹ See 'The Hon. Le Poer Trench, Chargé d'Affaires 1887-89 and Minister 1894-95', by Hugh Cortazzi in Cortazzi (ed.) *British Envoys in Japan 1859-1972*, Part I 1859-1900 (Global Oriental, 2004). See also F.O. List 1900 and *The Times* obituary, May 2, 1899 (both in Kuwata, 2003, pp. 472-473).

regard to patents & trademarks, & I think it very likely he will be recalled [from Berlin] after the exchange of ratifications.

I have found Ct. Ōkuma very stiff abt. the demand of the Colonies to be allowed to legislate with regards to labour immigration, & disposed to put obstacles in the way. He remarked with some heat ¹ that if the Australian Colonies treated Japse. harshly the feelings of the nation wld. be much excited, & that the Treaties wld. be denounced at the earliest possible moment. I asked what he meant by 'harshly', & was told that bills had been promoted for imposing a tax of £100 on each Japse. immigrant, & limiting the no. [number] allowed to be carried by passenger str. [steamers] I said that there was no fear of this, & that the Col. Govts. only desired to have something to show the Labour party there was a weapon of exclusion in reserve.

For my own part, seeing what has happened in other places where Japse. coolie labour has been imported, their increasingly turbulent character & aptitude for combination, I think the Colonists are quite right in being unwilling to have a large no. of them. But I think that a treaty reserving power to exclude labourers & artisans, even tho' it be terminable at one year's notice by the Japse. is better than allowing the adhesion of the colonies [to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1894] to fall thro' & I am doing my best to obtain a satisfactory arrangemt.

I remain etc.

39. Satow to Bertie

24.11.96

My dr. Bertie,

My desp. no 223 reporting that I have instructed Litchfield ² to prosecute Mrs. [Edith] Carew for poisoning her husband ³ & have sent a retainer to [H.S.] Wilkinson ⁴ for the trial needs a few words of explanation unofficially.

¹ See Satow's diary, October 15, 1896. (Ruxton, 2003, pp. 126-127)

² Henry C. Litchfield, LL.B. of Cambridge. Called to bar November 1867. Appointed Crown Prosecutor at Tokio, July 23, 1885. (F.O. List, 1906)

³ For a detailed account in English of the Carew case see Molly Whittington-Egan, *Murder on the Bluff: the Carew Poisoning Case*, (Glasgow: Neil Wilson Publishing, 1996).

⁴ Hiram Shaw Wilkinson (1840-1926) was appointed Crown Advocate at Shanghai, December 12, 1881. Acted as Chief Justice on various occasions. Was Acting Judge of H.M. Court for Japan from April 1, 1894 to May 31, 1895; and from June 18 to November 10, 1897 when he was appointed Judge of H.M. Court for Japan. Appointed Chief Justice of H.M. Supreme Court for China and Corea, May 26, 1900. (from F.O. List, 1927 quoted in Kuwata, 2003, p.484)

L[itchfield] is as deaf as a post, & quite unable to conduct a X exam [cross-examination] or to hear the speeches of Counsel. Moreover he is exceedingly dull & slow. But I cld. not ever put this in a desp. The 2nd point is that Mowat ¹ wrote privately to me urging that W. [Wilkinson] shld. be retained, & offered to address me officially on the subject. But as I think the judge ought not to appear officially except on the bench, I have not accepted his offer, the more so because I feel that W's being entrusted c. [with] the case is absolutely necessary.

L. was made Cr. Prosr. [Crown Prosecutor] some years ago when [W.M.H.] Kirkwood resigned, there being no other man available at the time. Otherwise I feel certain no one wld. have recommended him, as he was then as deaf as he is now. I am told that his legal capacity is first rate.

The case is Mrs. Maybrick ² over again with interesting variations. If she is convicted of murder, I shall have to commute the sentence, for no hangman cld. be got. ³

40. Satow to Layard ⁴

26.11.96

My dr. Layard,

I am sending you copy of a desp. wch. is going to Griffiths ⁵ abt. land. The Prefect of Tainan wrote to Longford that he saw no necessity for referring the ? [question] to Tokio, as it was clear that neither in Japan nor China cld. foreigners 'own' (所有) land. So I obtained fr. a thoroughly well-informed source the exact nature of the arrangements in China, & whatever land foreigners held before the cession of the island, they will be entitled to stick to & B Ss [British Subjects] will be backed up as regards their rights.

Lands acquired betw. the cession & the establt. [establishment] of Japse. authority are

¹ Robert Anderson Mowat was promoted to be Judge of H.M. Court for Japan, April 1, 1891. Retired on a pension, June 18, 1897. Died at Hove, June 7, 1925. (F.O. List, 1921)

² Mrs. Florence Maybrick had been found guilty of poisoning her husband in Liverpool in 1889. She served a 15 year sentence in Aylesbury prison for a while alongside Mrs. Edith Carew.

³ Mrs. Carew was not hanged. Satow took advantage of an amnesty by the Japanese Emperor on the death of the Empress Dowager to commute the sentence to life imprisonment. She was freed in 1910 and finally died aged 90 in 1958. (See PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 13, Cockerell to Satow, March 16, 1897 enclosing a signed minute by law officer W.E. Davidson approving Satow's action informally.)

⁴ R. de B. M. Layard (1859-1941) was Acting Consul at Tamsui (Formosa) in 1896. Promoted to be H.M. Vice-Consul for Hiogo and Osaka, to reside at Hiogo, February 27, 1896 (did not proceed). He was promoted to Consul for Hakodate and Niigata, to reside at Hakodate, from December 28, 1896. (F.O. List, 1897, quoted in Kuwata, 2003, p.331)

⁵ E.A. Griffiths was Pro-Consul at Tainan from 1896 to 1900. (F.O. List, 1914)

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more difficult. There was no proper auth. [authority] to register them. If any such cases come before you, report them fully, for I shld. have to send them home. It is a delicate question of international law.

Shld. any other letters of mine come to you with the appearance of having been opened telegraph the fact to me 'en clair'.

I think Bonar may perh. get to Tamsui before Xmas, but it is diff. [difficult] to be sure. In any case you will come to Tokio for a night or two c. Mrs. Layard & Christabel, & as soon as you can fr. any point enroute teleg. yr. exact date please do so, as I have a plan for spending a few days betw. Xmas & New Year at Dzushi with Baelz. ¹

y.s.

P.S. Yours of Nov. 6. did not reach me till the 22nd.

41. Satow to Cockerell

26/11/96

My dear Cockerell,

Many thanks for your letter of Oct. 2 ² & still more for your teleg. saying Quin has retired. This enables me to at once move Longford, Bonar & Layard to the posts to wch. they are likely to be destined. L[ongford] wrote to me that he wld. like to go first to Tamsui & afterwds. to Nagasaki so as to receive the outfit [allowance] of each place, but I think this is asking too much. For the public service it is better that men shld. go at once to the posts they are ultimately destined to; 6 mos. at a post, & then to be moved to another does neither the service nor the man himself any good. When Longford's 2 mo[nth]s sick leave are up, I propose to send him to Nagasaki, bringing Forster to Yokohama to relieve Lay, who will then come here as Asst. Japse. Secy. Hampden after handing over Hakodate to Layard will, at his own desire, be transferred to Kōbe, vice Chalmers who comes to the Court at Yokohama, in order that Wileman may get his leave of absence, now considerably overdue. I shld. like to keep men on leave to the precise amount of time they are entitled to, for if they get extensions, other men have to wait for their turn to come; & it is not good for their 'morale' that they shld. be overlong away fr. Europe.

I hope you will give your support to the proposal to define consular districts made in my no. 81 of Nov 14 of that series. Questions as to the districts are constantly cropping up.

¹ In fact Satow went to Nikko and Lake Chuzenji from December 26 to 28, 1896. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.148)

² Cockerell to Satow, PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 11.

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Formerly the Treaty limits of each port formed the district, but since foreigners have been allowed to reside in the interior under various pretexts & have the right of travelling all over the country, the Treaty limits have practically ceased to exist. The union of Tokio & Niigata with Yokohama wld. be a great convenience. Troup I believe is to be made Consul General, but I do not suppose that wld. make any difference. To avoid misunderstandings my commission as Cons-Genl. might be cancelled, without my authority to give instructions to the consular service being impaired, for I fancy the Min. [Minister] at Peking is no longer styled Chief Superintendent of Trade. Formosa is shortly to be subdivided into 7 new prefectures, & I am awaiting that event before offering any suggestions as to the delimitation of Tainan & Tamsui.

42. Satow to Layard

2.12.96

My dear Layard,

Yr. desp. no 59 abt. Dr. Rennie's land puts me rather in a hole. In yr. no. 55 you seemed to suggest that he was not legally entitled to more than the principal & interest, & yr. priv. [private] letter of Oct. 24 said you wld. personally be glad if I instructed you that nothing cld. be done officially. Seeing also that there was no proof that Ayrton had been asked to transfer the land beyond Dr. Rennie's bare assertion (& one can never be too careful to insist upon proof when a man makes an assertion to support a claim), I thought the instructions I sent were calculated to strengthen yr. hands. I do not like to go back on them unless it is shown to me officially that Dr. Rennie's claim to have the land now transferred to him is good. I recommend you therefore, if you are of opinion that his case taken on its own merits ought to be reconsidered, to write a desp. on the same lines as the one wch. I am instructing you to send me abt. Mr. Ashton's case. In the latter it is important to know whether the mortgage was previous to the cession of the island, therefore I point out that the date must be shown. & secondly, is it actually true that the Japse. have recognized Mr. A as the beneficial owner by paying rent to him, & if so how did this come abt. Yr. despp. [Your despatches] have been models of conciseness & moderation, but when it is a matter of claim one can never be too minute and careful in scrutinizing what is alleged in support and in reporting in full detail.

You will have got my teleg. saying that you are bound for Hakodate a couple of days after you wrote your private note, & I hope it has not come to you as a shock. I imagine that

as you go there on an acting apptmt. your travelling expenses will be paid. I hope you will not find the change of climate too sudden & severe. Of course you will come & stay with me a day or two before proceeding north. y.v.t.

43. Satow to Salisbury

2.12.96

Dear Ld. S,

Sartorius in one of his recent reports to the Intell. Dept. gave an acct. [account] of talks he had had with the Min. of Marine [Saigō Tsugumichi] & Genl. Kawakami, in the course of wch. he asked what help Engl. & Japan cld. give each other in case of joint operations agst. a common enemy. This question seems to have excited the interest of the Cabinet, for the other day I recd. a call fr. Matsugata the Min. Pres. & in the course of conversation, in reply to a remark of mine that tho' everyone cld. see the necessity of a strong navy for a P. [Power] situated like Japan, the enormous no. of 500,000 to wch. the army is to be raised wld. excite notice – he said that Engl. & Japan ought to have a very close understanding c. [with] each other. ¹ As it was impossible for Engl. to transport any large no. of men to this part of the world, a big Japse. army might one day prove useful. As he referred to S's conversations c. his colls. I inferred that he wanted to find out their exact bearing, but I simply re-echoed his words abt. a friendly understanding. Fr. what I can gather the idea with wch. the Japse. are imbued is they must work to make their alliance worth having, & they understand that at present they have nothing to offer us. At the same time I have not much doubt that they are ready to jump into our arms, especially with the present men in power. But it is quite impossible to say how long they [the present government] will last. Already they have incurred unpopularity for having suspended some newspapers for a few days, a measure to wch. they were driven by calumnious arts. [articles] agst. the Min[ister] of the Household. ² It would be a pity if they were turned out, for they are more friendly to Engl. than their predecessors. Ōkuma in particular has Engl. notions, while Itō was very German in his ideas, & his chef de Cabinet especially anti-Engl.

¹ See Satow's diary for November 19, 1896. (Ruxton, 2003, p.138)

² Takahashi Kenzō, proprietor of the Osaka magazine *Nijū Roku Seiki*, included an article attacking Imperial Household Minister Hijikata and former Minister President Itō in the October 1896 issue. At first this was not considered a problem, but in the November 9th issue of *Nippon Shinbun* the whole article was re-published, and caused a major controversy. The Cabinet met and decided to ban *Nijū Roku Seiki*, and suspend publication of the *Nippon Shinbun* temporarily. Hijikata offered his resignation, but it was not accepted. (Nagaoka, vol. 1, p. 199).

Matsugata ¹ spoke very highly of Sartorius & said he hoped such distinguished officers wld. constantly be sent to Japan. S. is to see him tomorrow by special invitation, & I am curious to hear what comes of the interview. Perh. there may be time before the mail closes to write a few lines. I hope that a successor may be found without diff[iculty] & that there may be no long interval betw[een] the two.

M. talked to me a great deal abt. gold, saying he was convinced Japan must eventually adopt the gold standard. It wld. be necessary to arrange matters so that no one wld. lose by the change. He spoke with much admiration of the closing of the Indian Mints, wch. had been done at the right moment. In my letter of 8 Oct. I gave some acct. of his views on this question [see letter no.37 above]. Having 10 yrs. ago very skilfully managed the return to specie payts. fr. a position in wch. the paper money had fallen to ½ its value, he feels confident in his own ability, but he says the only basis of sound finance consists of honesty & economy. I told him what I had heard abt. his gold tendencies disposing the mercantile community agst. him, & gave him a warning not to speak his mind too freely on the subject. He replied that he shld. hold his tongue but stick to his plans.

He also enlarged on the military & financial weakness of China, wch. he much deplored. I said that past history showed that these were congenital to the Chinese nation, but if left in peace it managed to get along & conduct a vast commerce. He remarked on this that the business probity & credit of the Chinaman are very high, much higher than those of his own countrymen – wch. is perfectly true.

Speaking of Formosa he said the Japse. who first went there were little better than riffraff. Moreover they bullied the Chinese inhabitants & tried to force them to adopt Japse. ways. That had been at the bottom of all the trouble. The Engl. system in India was the right one to adopt.

He stayed talking abt. an hour, & was evidently anxious to produce an impression of a friendly disposition towards Engl. & Engl. ideas.

The Emperor & several of his ministers went to the races at Yoko. [Yokohama] in Oct., the first time for several years. ² They are an Engl. institution, & my predecessors have always been presidents of the Club. In the same capacity I was had up to H.M. tribune to talk horseflesh to him, & he was very gracious. And at his garden party last month [on November 11th, mentioned in diary] he bestowed many smiles on me. Fr[om] all this I

¹ For an account of Matsukata Masayoshi see *Samurai and Silk: A Japanese and American Heritage* by his granddaughter Haru Matsukata Reischauer. (Harvard University Press reprint, April 1988)

² See Satow's diary for October 29, 1896. (Ruxton, 2003, p.132)

gather that the disposition at present is to cultivate Engl[and].

My Fr[ench] coll[eague] made himself ridiculous the other day by sending back to Okuma an invitation to a garden party [held on November 17th, mentioned in diary] because it was in English. I am told Okuma replied thro' his private secy. that as it was a private affair at his own country house, he had used the language he knew best, & was sorry he cld. not oblige the Fr[ench] Min[ister] by sending him a diff[erent] invitation to the rest. The result was that all the diplomats went except M. Harmand, his wife & dau[ghter].

44. Satow to Barrington

3.12.1896

My dr. Barrington,

I do not know whether it is quite in order for me to say anything abt. the choice of a possible successor to Sartorius, but Col. The. O'Gorman has written to me that he has applied for the post of military attaché here, on hearing that Sartorius was about to resign. It is also possible that Major Park of the Devonshire Regiment now on the staff at Wellington in the Madras Presidency ¹ may apply. I know both men & their wives, & think Park the better man of the two, & he has the further advantage of knowing something of Japse., wch. he has picked up during furloughs spent in this country. y.v.t.

45. Satow to Sanderson

12 Dec. 96

My dear Sanderson,

Hawes writes to me fr. Honolulu abt. his title of Comr. & Cons-Genl. At present he comes after the American & Portug[uese], but it seems the Japse. are shortly going to send a Ch. d'Aff., who will pass over his head. Fr. what I have heard here, I think his information is correct. Perh. Ld. S. might think it worth while under the circs. to give him the title of Min. Res. [Minister Resident] wch. was held by his predecessor. It is a matter on wch. Hawes naturally feels some delicacy in making a suggestion of the kind. y.v.s.

¹ Madras is the shortened name of the fishing village Madraspatnam, where the British East India Company built a fort and trading post in 1639-40. At that time, the weaving of cotton fabric was a local industry, and the English invited the weavers and native merchants to settle near the fort. By 1652 the factory of Ft. St. George was recognized as a presidency (an administrative unit governed by a president) and between 1668 and 1749 the company expanded its control. By 1801 the English had become masters of southern India, and Madras had become their commercial and administrative capital. (from Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th edn.)

46. Satow to Salisbury

31 Dec. 1896

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

Sartorius' reports of his conversations with the Prime Min. & Min. for F.A. forwarded in my Nos. 236 & 239 will I think be found interesting. It was at their special request that the interviews took place. The P.M. dwelt upon his anxious desire to be on intimate terms with G.B. A day or two afterwards when I was dining with him he said he had repeated all Sart. said to the Emperor, & that he was going to send instructions to Katō [Japanese Minister in London] to speak in the same sense. The F.M. [Foreign Minister Ōkuma] spoke chiefly of the necessity of maintaining the status quo in China. Here then there is a strong desire on the part of Japan to gain our friendship, & an object for wch. it seems we can work with them. I observe in several quarters a disposition to urge that in an apprehended partition of China we shld. claim the Yangtze valley. But I doubt whether those who advocate such a policy for Engl. have carefully considered what it means. I have in vain tried to get any of those who have broached the subject with me to explain what they understand by the phrase. They say it means the Yangtze up to Hankow & several hundred miles beyond, up to the W frontier of China, but cannot give any boundaries north and south of that river. [British consul at Canton Byron] Brennan who is here just now tells me there is no national boundary to the North, tho' one might be found to the S. And the favourers of this policy altogether ignore the physical difficulties of controlling Szuchuen¹ fr. the Yangtze, fr. wch. it is separated by a wide mountainous tract, almost uninhabited. And they entirely leave out of consideration the hostility of the Chinese people.

I shall have great difficulty in finding out what the Bank wants to know abt. the intentions of the Japse. Govt. with regard to the £9 000 000, but will do my best. Their huge naval estimates imply a large expenditure in Engl. within the next year or two, & I am told they will be paying some £4,000,000 in 1897 for ships and guns, besides what they will have to pay in Fr[ance] Germ[any] & the U.S. for ships. I am also told that they have already brought £2 000 000 of the indemnity here, but part of this has, I feel certain, come in the shape of silver, tho' possibly they are also strengthening their gold reserve. During the present year they have not issued more than £120,000 in gold. They seem to have been

¹ Sichuan province is located in the Upper Yangtze valley in southwestern China. It is bordered on all sides by lofty highlands. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th edition) It is not difficult to visit in modern times.

buying silver in London fr. time to time in small quantities, & shipping it by their own str[s. steamers] wch. now run betw. Yoko. & London once a month. Altho' the Prime Min advocates a gold standard, I think he has no idea of being able to realise a change within a short period. They are spending large sums in armaments, & cannot afford the luxury of a gold coinage at the same time.

Mr. R.L. Thomson formerly of the "Times" told me ¹ he has recently had talks with Japse. belonging to the political world who appeared to entertain rather wild notions abt. the acquisition of territory in Mexico for colonizing purposes, & that while they carefully avoided mentioning the Philippines, they evidently had their eye upon Borneo & Java. Just now they say nothing abt. the Philippines, because they are aware of the suspicions that attach to them in that quarter. In Mexico land has been acquired by a Co. of wch. the present Min. of Agric[ulture] & Commerce [Enomoto Takeaki] is President, & the idea is to transport thither a large no. of immigrants. To Brazil they talk of sending 20,000, & a navy doctor is being sent there to inquire abt. the climate. I have been asked to give letters of introduction to our consuls at Santos & San Paolo.

[François-Jules, usually Jules] Harmand has been at me again abt. the Siamese, & the difficulties they make c. [with] regard to Fr[ench] protégés. He says that altho' he "inspired the agreement of Jan[uary] 15 [1896]", it is very unsatisfactory, as it prevents Fr[ance] fr[om] covering Siam. He lamented [Consul Gabriel] Aubaret's ² Convention of 1867 ³ wch.

¹ On December 29, 1896 Satow wrote 'Called on R.L. Thomson, who as usual talked a great deal about Japanese politics and statesmen.' (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.149)

² Gabriel Aubaret was the French consul at the time in Bangkok. Jules Harmand had been a later French consul in Bangkok, 1880-83, himself an ex-naval officer and explorer of parts of Indochina, who had been viewed in those days by the Siamese (or Thai) as a very aggressive French expansionist years before the annexation of Laos. When Satow arrived in Bangkok in March 1884, the Siamese were still nervously anticipating his (Harmand's) return from leave, but in fact he never returned. But as French consul in Calcutta in 1886, he was proposing a division of Siam into 'spheres of influence', as some hoped the January 1896 Joint Declaration here referred to signified. [See Nigel Brailey, 'Ernest Satow and the 1880's Crisis in Britain's Siam Policy', JSEAS 29, 1 (March 1998), p. 78. For more on Harmand, see F R Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). And for Aubaret, L.P. Briggs, 'Aubaret and the Treaty of July 15, 1867 between France and Siam', FEQ VI (1947), 122-138, and A.L. Moffat, *Mongkut the King of Siam*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961). With thanks to Dr. Nigel Brailey for this information.]

³ Through the Aubaret Convention (treaty) of 1867 the French secured Bangkok's recognition of their new protectorate over Cambodia previously claimed by the latter as their dependency. At the same time however, the treaty at least implied French recognition of Bangkok sovereignty over both banks of the Mekong valley north of Cambodia. Subsequently, as the French cast increasingly covetous eyes in the direction of Laos, they became increasingly unhappy about this treaty. And in 1893 they claimed justification for annexing the whole east bank of the middle Mekong in the famous Paknam Incident,

secured to Siam the provinces of Battembang & Siemreap wch. are indispensable for the protection of Cambodia. Suppose, he said, Engld. annexed Siam, the boundary betw. us wld. be most unsatisfactory. I told him he might be easy abt. that, as Engld. had never entertained such an idea, but he replied that Govts. can never tell what they may be forced to do.

The Corean Min. took his departure suddenly the other day, sending to myself & my colls: as a parting gift the Engl. pamphlet printed at Söul containing Greathouse's ¹ report of inquiry into the murder of the Queen. It seems that he had instructions to press the Japse. Govt. to reopen the question, & has been sent to explain why he makes no progress.

Believe me &c.

47. Satow to Salisbury

Jan. 25, 1897

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

C. [With] ref[erence] to my desp. [despatch] of today's date abt Siam, I think Ct. Ōkuma is a little nervous abt. offending the French. M. [Monsieur] Harmand he of course knows entertains a belief that there is some sort of understanding or agreeet. [agreement] betw. England & Japan on Eastern Asiatic questions. Hence his anxiety that his request shld. be regarded as very confidential; & in fact he introduced the subject by saying it was to be a "secret" betw. us. ² The Fr[ench] legation is devoured by suspicion, & may be trusted to work hard agst. the conclusion of a Treaty betw. Japan & Siam, not only because it wld. put an end to the French protection of Jap. residents at Bangkok, but also because Siam, if backed up by G.B. & Japan wld. be much more difficult to intimidate.

Three centuries ago the Japse. played an important part in Siam. ³

48. Satow to Salisbury

Jan. 28, 1897

with a view in the eyes of some to making further inroads into Siamese territory. (From an e-mail to the author from Dr. Nigel Brailey, December 24, 2003)

¹ Clarence R. Greathouse (1846-99) was appointed U.S. Consul General to Japan by President Cleveland in 1886. From 1890 a legal adviser to the Korean Foreign Ministry. Died in Seoul.

² Ōkuma and Satow discussed the Siam treaty on January 21, 1897. (Ruxton, 2003, p.155)

³ Satow served from 1884 as Consul General in Siam, and Minister Resident from 1885 until 1887. He also wrote 'Notes on the Intercourse between Japan and Siam in the Seventeenth Century', Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 13, Part 2, 1885.

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Dear Ld. Salisbury,

I take the liberty of enclosing under flying seal a private letter I have written to Sir Arthur Bigge, [see no.50 below] for transmission to him if there shld. be no objection to its contents. There is very little to add to what I have said in it, & in my desp[atches] on the subject of the Japse. desire to obtain this mark of recognition for the Emperor fr. the Courts of Europe. I am convinced however that upon the decision of this point a good deal may hang, & that a rebuff will have the effect of making the Japse. feel that they cannot hope to be ever regarded as anything but Asiatics, with whom Europe has no part or lot.

Russian influence was pushed in every possible way in 1881 by the Struves, & Mme. de Struve in particular, who was a female diplomatist. Things are very diff. [different? difficult?] now since the intervention of the 3 PP & the flight of the K[ing] of Corea to the Russian Legation.

I told Sannomiya that I intended consulting my Belgian Coll: [Albert d'Anethan] who thereupon telegd. to Brussels, & I think I have done him [d'Anethan] a great service. The Germ[an] Min[ister] as usual took a high tone at first, & wld. not consent to interest himself in the matter, in spite of Court mourning having been ordered for the Emperor Willm. I & Fred. II & for the Empress Augusta, but afterwds. toned down. The Belgian, Spanish & Italian Min[isters] seem to have spoken & acted in a very friendly manner.¹

Believe me

49. Satow to Salisbury

Jan 28/1897

Dr. Ld. S,

This affair of the Germ[an] Min[ister] [Gutschmid] & the 2 students has been made all the more of because he is exceedingly unpopular. I think his own account of it is naturally favourable to himself.² On several occasions I have known him to say & do very rude things to Japse. officials, & he is greatly disliked by his own countrymen. This to a consid[erable] extent acc[oun]ts for the violence of the attacks made on him in the press, tho' the incident was turned to acc[oun]t also in order to attack [the foreign minister] Count

¹ See Satow's diary entries for January 24-28, 1897. (Ruxton, 2003, pp.155-156)

² On December 30, 1896 Gutschmid held the reins of his horses in his carriage in Koji machi and was going up a slope when he met the two students of Seijo Gakko coming down. He struck one with his whip. The students went to the Foreign Office to complain, but nobody was available to deal with the case as it was the end of the year, so they took their complaint to Koji machi police station. The Foreign Office was later attacked by newspapers for avoiding the issue. (Nagaoka, vol. 1, p. 214).

Okuma. I have not interfered at all in the matter, tho' at one moment I was sounded by friends of Ct. O. with a view to my inducing Gutschmid to make some sort of apology.¹ But the day before yester[day] I took the opportunity of saying to Sannomiya that it was not fair to go on attacking a man after he had made amends, & that the press ought to receive a hint to drop the affair.² The fact is the press has got out of hand since Itō resigned.

I am told that the Cabinet is divided agst. itself, that Okuma is intriguing agst. the Satsuma men, who are however too strong for him. The financial position is bad, & the Govt. can hardly carry on without a foreign loan. That wld. be an unpopular measure. My informant [Asaina] says they will prob. go to pieces this summer. I do not like to prophecy. But whatever men are in power, the development of the army & navy will be proceeded with – of that I have no doubt whatever - & the waiting game as regards Corea will be continued. The only point on wch. I feel a little anxiety is whether the arrival of the two new [British-built] battle ships [*Fuji* and *Yashima*, see letter no.2 above] this summer may not make a difference.

I cannot find out anything about the intentions with regard to the B[ank] of Engl[and] but my impression is that prob[ably] one half will be brought here in bullion. I have made inquiries, & am told that betw. £6 & £7 million have been brought here [from London by Japanese steamers, see letter 46 above], in the proportion of 2 of gold to 5 of silver. But the actual amounts shipped fr. London can be perhaps better ascertained in Engl[and] than here. I think the European line of the N.Y.K. was established partly with the object of shipping bullion.

50. Satow to Bigge (enclosed in no. 48 above)

Sir Arthur Bigge K.C.B. [private secretary to Queen Victoria]

Osborne [House, Isle of Wight, Hampshire]³

¹ Asaina Kansui, Satow's paid informant, sounded Satow on January 12, 1897: "Wanted me to try and arrange something that would satisfy the students and Gutschmid at the same time. I said I did not mind the trouble, but must be asked by one of the parties before I interfered." Later on January 20 Asaina told Satow that "As to Gutschmid's affair he said that it would not be pleasant for me to get mixed up in it, and those who thought I might usefully act as a mediator, as he had said on the 12th, had therefore given up the idea." (Satow's diary, Ruxton, 2003, pp. 151 and 154)

² This is not mentioned in Satow's diary for January 26, 1897.

³ In 1845 Queen Victoria and Prince Albert bought Osborne House. After Albert died in 1861 it became the Queen's main residence until her death in 1901. Many of the royal couple's possessions are still at the house.

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Tokio.

Jan. 28/97

Dear Sir Arthur,

The Min[ister] for F[oreign] A[ffairs] [Ōkuma] asked me privately to represent to you this question of mourning for the [Japanese] Empress Dowager. ¹ I said it was a very delicate matter for me to express my opinion on. You will of course see the despp. The Japse. Court was not well advised in so hastily ordering Court mourning for the Emp. Alexander II in 1881. The idea was suggested to them by the Struves, who were then doing everything in their power to capture these people, & I have little doubt without orders fr. St. Petersburg. The next occasion of a crowned head dying was the death of the King of Spain, & after that they saw the necessity of laying down rules for their own guidance. This is the real explanation of no mourning having been ordered for the Duke of Albany. They shld. of course have sounded the Courts of Europe beforehand, & have ascertained whether they cld. obtain reciprocity. But there was no one to advise them in 1881, & they too readily fell in with the Struves' suggestion.

The Gr[and] Master [of Ceremonies of the Imperial Household, the *Shikibuchōkan*] Sannomiya [Yoshitane] ² mentioned in the despp. is well known to the Duke of Connaught. ³ In talking the day before yesterday, he let slip that the life of the Emperor is not a very good one [see Satow's diary], & fr. another source I have heard he is troubled with diabetes. To judge fr. the feeling displayed by the people on the present occasion, there wld. be a very marked outburst of grief if he were to die. He is at any rate laid up with influenza & his lungs are delicate.

If the recognition that they are now asking for came first from H[er] M[ajesty] or thro' her influence, it wld. produce a very great feeling of gratitude towards Engl[an]d, wch. might be of much value. As it is they do not forget that it was the Engl[ish] Min[ister] who first presented his credentials to the present Emperor, after having largely contributed to

¹ See Satow's diary for January 21st and January 28, 1897. (Ruxton, 2003, pp. 154, 156) The Empress Dowager Eishō had died on January 11th, as Satow was informed by Ōkuma the next day in an official note. The funeral took place early in February, and Satow attended a function at the official residence on February 2nd.

² On Baron Sannomiya Yoshitane (1844-1905) and his English-born wife Alethea Yayeno Sannomiya (1846-1919) see 'Three Meiji Marriages between Japanese Men and English Women', Noboru Koyama, Ch. 33, *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits*, vol. IV, 2002, pp. 383-96.

³ Arthur, Duke of Connaught was the third son of Queen Victoria. He arrived with his wife in Tokyo on April 15, 1890 and left on May 8. (Keene, *Meiji and His World*, pp. 433-434)

bring about the Restoration.¹

I feel that I am only fulfilling a duty in putting these cons[ideratio]ns before you, even at the risk of overstepping my proper functions.

Believe me, y.v.s.

51. Satow to W.E. Davidson²

Feb. 5, 1897

My dear Davidson,

Troup, Mowat & Wilkinson seem to have found what seems to me a choice collection of mare's nests [extraordinarily complicated situations]. One is that Troup having been gazetted Consul-Genl. on Dec. 16 is no longer Consul & consequently incapable of discharging the duties of sheriff, altho' his new commission has not reached him, & of course has not yet recd. exequatur [official recognition by a foreign government, in this case by the Japanese Emperor]. The other is that supposing the Consul to be ex-officio [by virtue of his office] Asst. Judge acc[ording] to the O[rder] in C[ouncil] 1878 Art[icle] 6(2) he will no longer be Asst. Judge when he becomes Consul-Genl. unless he receives a warrant.

I have told Troup that if this was to be the effect of his getting the title of Cons. Gen. I felt certain the F.O. wld. never have entertained the proposal, & I wld. never have recommended it. If it really was so, rather than advise the passing of a new O. in C. I wld. teleg. home to suggest that his Gazette shld. be cancelled.

If Troup is not ex-officio Asst Judge all the judicial proceedings presided over by him are null & void fr. the beginning, his committing Mrs. Carew for final trial was illegal, & the trial itself irregular "wch. is absurd".

If successive Judges of the Court for Japan have not discovered this "defect" long ago, whose is the responsibility. Certainly not that of successive Min[ister]s & Ch[argés] d'Aff[aires] who have nothing to do c. the administration of justice.

I hope my commuting Mrs. Carew's sentence will be approved.³ It wld. have been very difficult to carry it out, for want of a hangman & a gallows, to say nothing of Troup's

¹ For Satow's own account of the presentation of Sir Harry Parkes' new credentials at Osaka on May 22, 1868 see 'A Diplomat in Japan', Ch. XXXI.

² See also Satow's letter to Davidson written while he was on leave in England (PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 14 dated June 9, 1897).

³ See Davidson's minute in Cockerell to Satow, PRO 30/33 5/2 no. 13, March 16, 1897. See also Satow's diary for February 2, 1897 (Ruxton, 2003, pp. 157-8)

scruples abt. his position as Consul-Sheriff. And I certainly shld. not have liked to have found myself in the position of taking the initiative in ordering her execution, much as she deserved her sentence.

y. E.[?] S.

52. Satow to Salisbury

25 Feb. 1897

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

Ct. Okuma told me this afternoon that he wld. speak tomorrow in the Diet abt. the negotiations with Russia respecting Corea, & that the 2 written agreements [Yamagata-Lobanov; Komura-Waeber] ¹ will be published at the same time. He dwelt on the intense interest taken by the people of this country in Korean affairs. As soon as the King [Kojong] ² is able to protect himself with the aid of Korean troops, the Japse. garrison of abt. 500 men & the Russian sailors will be withdrawn. The new Prime Minister Kim Pyongsa [Pyong-si?] is the best man that cld. be found for the post. The relations of the King's favourite concubine & the cutthroats who murdered Kim Okkyun ³ & tried to assassinate Pak Yong hyo ⁴ were kept entirely in the dark abt. H.M. leaving the Russian Legn. until the decree was signed, & I feel certain the Japse. agents knew nothing either. So

¹ The open part of the Yamagata-Lobanov agreement of June 1896, together with the Komura-Waeber memorandum of May 1896 was published in the House of Representatives on February 26, 1897. (See Nagaoka, vol. 1, pp. 327-28 for text in Japanese.) See also Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p. 44; quoting *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, 29, nos. 475-8.

² King Kojong (1852-1919) 高宗. The penultimate monarch of the Korean Yi dynasty, ruled 1864-1907. He acceded the throne aged only 12, and his father (the Taewongun) played a dominant role as regent between 1864 and 1873. Kojong's wife, Queen Min, was assassinated by the Japanese in 1895, and Itō Hirobumi used military pressure to force his abdication in July 1907. In 1910 Korea became a Japanese colony. Itō was killed in Harbin by a Korean nationalist in 1909.

³ Kim Ok-kyun (1851-94). 金玉均 Early advocate of Korea's Westernisation. A civil servant sent to Japan in 1881 to study the Meiji government. Influenced by Fukuzawa Yukichi he helped form a political group, the Kaehwap'a, to lead Korea's Westernization. After the failed Kapsin political coup of 1881 Kim fled to Japan. In 1894 he left for Shanghai where he was assassinated by a Korean government agent.

⁴ Pak Yōng-hyo (1861-1939) 朴泳孝 Leading advocate of Korean Westernization, journalist. As a young man joined the Kaehwap'a (Enlightenment Faction) and was a leader in the unsuccessful Kapsin coup of 1884. After that he fled to Japan and the United States. After the Kabo reform of 1894 instituted in Korea at Japan's insistence, he returned to Korea and served as minister for home affairs until July 1895, when he was driven out during a crackdown on pro-Japanese leaders and again fled to Japan. In 1920 he became the founding editor of the newspaper *Tong'a ilbo*, critical of Japan's colonial administration of Korea.

the natural inference wld. seem to be that M. Waeber had recd. peremptory instructions fr[om] St. Petersburg.

The remarks of Genl. Kawakami [Sōroku]¹ abt. Siamese feeling towards G.B. & France respectively do not appear to have been flattering. The Siamese fear the Fr[ench] & hope for nothing fr[om] us. To judge fr. the desp. of wch. Mr. [W.J.] Archer [British Chargé and Consul General, Bangkok] sent me a copy, there is not much likelihood of the Japse. Govt. being able to get a Treaty with Consular jurisdiction. The Fr[ench] are very jealous of what they believe are Japse. machinations in that part of the world.²

The opposition to the proposed adoption of the gold standard is getting stronger, but C[oun]t O[kuma] told me the bill will be introduced into the legislature early next month. In the Lower House the Govt. commanded a majority, having freely bribed members of the opposition. This is freely stated in the press.

I have been told that the commutation of Mrs. Carew's sentence has given great satisfaction in Japanese circles. The trial was a great strain on the Judge [Robert Anderson Mowat, 1843-1925], who went to Nagasaki abt. a fortnight ago on Court business, & now telegr. to me that he has broken down. The doctors order him two months complete rest, & I think it will be necessary to ask Mr. Wilkinson over fr. Shanghai to finish the Judge's work at Nagasaki, as Mr. Troup, who is also not very well, cannot be spared fr. Yokohama.

Baron [Freiherr von] Gutschmid is leaving in a few days. I am told that the Fr[ench] Min[ister] & Russ[ian] Ch. d'Aff[aires] pretend to know that he will not come back here.

y.v.t.

¹ Kawakami Sōroku (1848-99) 川上操六 Army general. Born in the Satsuma domain (now Kagoshima prefecture), the son of a samurai. He fought for the imperial side in the Boshin Civil War of 1868 and helped to quell the Satsuma rebellion of 1877 as commander of the 13th regiment. Kawakami studied military science in Europe. During the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) he served as the senior army staff officer at Imperial General Headquarters (Daihon'ei) and distinguished himself as a brilliant strategist. (Kodansha's *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia*, p.763)

² Dr. Nigel Brailey comments: "...the Japanese seemed at this time to be responding to earlier Siamese (Thai) advances for closer relations, going back to the visits of the Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong (Devawongse), who made an early agreement with Tokyo in 1887, en route home from attending Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee and his tour of Europe and the USA, and Prince Phanurangsi (Bhanurangse), King Chulalongkorn's full brother and Minister of War, in 1890. Thereafter, the Cambridge-educated Inagaki Manjiro [1861-1908] was mainly responsible for promoting Tokyo-Bangkok relations, signing the first treaty between the countries in 1898, and then serving as first Japanese Minister in Bangkok [from March 31, 1897]..." (e-mail received December 24, 2003) Diplomatic contacts between Japan and Siam were established on September 26, 1887.

53. Satow to Bertie

11 Mar. 1897

My dr. Bertie,

Fr[om] S'hai I hear that Mowat who has gone there for a change has written to the Sec[retary] of State applying for leave to retire on the ground of ill-health. I have not seen him for some time, but before the Carew trial he was in a very nervous condition, & he seems to have completely broken down. So I suppose the Treasury will not oppose his application.

I shld. like to say a word in behalf of [Hiram Shaw] Wilkinson.¹ He is the only available man to take Mowat's place, & wld. be a very efficient judge. I trust therefore that he may receive the substantive apptmt on M's retirement. He has been in the service one way & another for 34 yrs. & has done a great deal of excellent work.

If it shld. perh[aps] appear inexpedient to appt. him Judge for Japan when there are only 2 y[ea]rs more to run before the new Treaty comes into operation, I wld. observe that [Nicholas J.] Hannen² will abt. that time be entitled to retire, & W. wld. be his obvious successor at Sh'hai, so that the question of pensioning W[ilkinson] after only 2 yrs. at Yoko[hama] is scarcely likely to arise.

y.v.t.

¹ Wilkinson, Hiram Shaw (1840-1926). Was a B.A. and LL.D. of Queen's University, Ireland. Appointed Student Interpreter in Japan, August 22, 1864. Called to the Bar at the Middle Temple, January 26, 1872. Acting Vice-Consul at Hiogo and Osaka in 1872. Acting Consul at Kanagawa in 1873, 1875, 1876, 1878 and 1879. Acting Assistant Judge at Shanghai from April 23, 1879 to October 15, 1880. Appointed Crown Advocate at Shanghai, December 21, 1881. Was Acting Judge of H.M. Court for Japan from April 1, 1894 to May 31, 1895; and from June 18 to November 10, 1897 when he was appointed Judge of H.M. Court for Japan. Appointed Chief Justice of H.M. Supreme Court for China and Corea, May 26, 1900. Knighted June 26, 1903. Retired on a pension, April 1, 1905. Died at Tobermore, Co. Derry, September 27, 1926. [Extracted from F.O. List, 1927. See also *The Times*, 1926.9.29 and *Who was Who*, 1916-28, cited in Kuwata, 2003, p.484]

² Hannen, Sir Nicholas John (? – 1900). Appointed Acting Deputy Judge at Yokohama, January 10, 1871. Appointed Crown Advocate at Shanghai, October 30, 1878 and Judge of Her Majesty's Court for Japan, December 21, 1881. Was Acting Chief Justice at Shanghai from November 1, 1881 to January 21, 1883. Was one of the British Delegates to the Conference at Tokio for Revision of the Treaties, from December 1886 to July 1887. Was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for China and Japan, and Consul-General at Shanghai, April 1, 1891. Was knighted by the Queen, July 18, 1895. Received the Jubilee Medal, 1897. Died April 26, 1900. (F.O. List, 1901)

54. Satow to Curzon¹

Mar. 23, 1897

Dear Mr. Curzon,

In case a question shld. be asked in the House, I send you privately some papers abt. a memorial addressed to me by some of the leading Br[itish] subjects with respect to an incident in the Carew case. For some reason best known to himself the counsel of Mrs. Carew [John F. Lowder]² charged Miss Jacob the Gov[ern]ess with being the real criminal, and having sworn a deposition before Mr. Troup applied for her arrest. Mr. Troup issued a warrant, and she was brought up before him, but before her examination could be concluded she fell ill, and it was adjourned until the Carew trial was over. Then the counsel withdrew the charge, on the ground that his witnesses had failed him.

The memorial was a complaint of Mr. Troup's action "in his judicial capacity" and as I have no authority over the Court for Japan, I merely acknowledged its receipt, adding that I would "forward it to the proper quarter". My intention was to send it to Mr. Mowat for any observations he might think fit, & then to send it home officially. Mr. Mowat had left for Nagasaki just before, and has not yet returned. In the meanwhile the memorialists discovered that they had not wished to do Mr. Troup an ill turn, & cast abt. for the best means of nullifying their act.³ Finally a deputation of 3 of them [James Dodds, J.A.

¹ George Nathaniel Curzon, Marquess (1859-1925). British statesman, Viceroy of India (1898-1905) and foreign secretary (1919-24). At this time he was Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from June 30, 1895. Author of *Problems of the Far East: Japan, Korea, China* (1894, revised 1896), recently reprinted as Volume 1 of the Palgrave Macmillan Archive edition of *ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 1892-1925*, ed. Ian Nish, 2002.

² Lowder, John Frederic (1843-1902). Appointed a Student Interpreter at Yedo, Japan in 1860. Narrowly escaped losing his life in the attack on the Legation on July 5, 1861. In 1864 he became a third assistant, in 1865 a second assistant, and an interpreter in 1866. Appointed Vice-Consul at Hiogo and Osaka in 1868. Promoted to Consul at Neegata (Niigata) in 1869 and Acting Consul at Kanagawa from August 1869 to July 1870. Admitted as a student to Lincoln's Inn in 1870, and called to the Bar in 1872. In that year he resigned from the Consular service to become an important legal adviser to the Mikado, from whom he later received the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun 4th class, which he had Queen Victoria's permission to accept and wear. As time went by the Japanese Government dispensed with the service of foreigners, and Lowder then practised at Yokohama as a barrister. [Extracted from J.H.F. McEwen's note in *The Times*, February 10, 1902. See also F.O. List, 1904, both cited in Kuwata, 2003, pp. 342-3.]

Satow had been upset when Sir Harry Parkes appointed J.F. Lowder as Acting Consul at Hyogo in 1868, in addition to Vice-Consul. He considered Lowder to be his junior and that Lowder had leapfrogged him in the consular service ranks, as he (Satow) had recently been appointed Japanese Secretary. See Satow's diary for January 24 and 25, 1868, reproduced in Ruxton, 1998, pp. 75-78.

³ See Satow's diary for February 21, 1897. (Ruxton, 2003, p.165) "[James] Dodds came to say that my reply that their letter would be 'forwarded to the proper quarter' was not at all what they desired, and they had thought the matter would be dealt with in the Legation. I pointed out to him that by

Fraser and W.B. Walter] came to me [on 19 March, see diary], & asked me to deal with the affair myself. I had previously obtained fr. Mr. Troup an explanation of what had happened, & read to them some notes on the subject. As seems to happen not infrequently the deputation were not satisfied, but I believe they will drop the affair. However one of the men who signed the memorial sent home a copy to a M.P. with the object of having a question put in the House [of Commons]. It is solely with the object of enabling you to meet this contingency if it arises that I send you these papers, wch. otherwise you need not take the trouble of reading.

I believe Mr. T[roup] acted in accordance with the law, and that no blame attaches to him.

Believe me
y.v.t.

55. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio.

25.3.97

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

I think I have at last got the whole of the facts abt. the new Japse. navy, or at least nearly all. There may be some details abt. various classes of torpedo-craft wch. are not yet quite clear. I am very sorry to send the information in such a piece-meal fashion, but it is rather difficult to procure.

The gold standard business has been put thro', the Govt. bill having been passed without a single alteration. The arguments by wch. it was supported seemed a great deal weaker than those of its opponents, & I think Matsugata had but one motive. Some years ago he brought back the inconvertible paper money fr[om] 80% discount to par, & resumed specie pay[men]ts in silver. But he has always hoped to see Japan emerge fr[om] the band of semi-civilized countries that use silver, & the possession of a large [Sino-Japanese war?] indemnity payable in gold furnished the means. As far as I can gather fr[om] English merchants, they think the measure will be beneficial to our commerce. My Am[erican] coll[eague] did & said all he cld. to dissuade the Gov[ernmen]t but it was of no use.¹

complaining of what Troup had done in his official capacity they took the matter out of my hands and I had no option but to send it to F.O. But if I had an assurance from them that they did not wish it to go any further, I would not send it to F.O. He said he would consult with the others."

¹ See Satow's diary for February 18, 1897. "Dined at [American minister Edwin] Duns...Much talk after

People say that in addition to the two written agree[men]ts ab[ou]t Corea with Russia wch. have been recently publ[ished] here, there is some verbal understanding. I doubt whether there is anything of importance. At any rate, if it were to the advantage of Japan, Ct. Okuma wld. not have failed to let it be known. As his language reported in one of my despp. by this mail shows, he felt rather ashamed of having to defend the Korean policy of his predecessors. I learn that one of the secret agents he sent over to Corea got drunk & let out the nature of his business, but something must have been done in the way of bribing Korean officials, or he wld. not be so loud[?] as he is in favour of the present Korean P.M.

The Sp[anish] Legation here do not believe the reports fr[om] Madrid of Japse. assistance having been promised to the Manila insurgents. I do not entirely share their belief.

I have not been able as yet to get any reply to the ? [question] whether the Emperor will send a repres[entati]ve to offer congratulations to the Queen [on her Diamond Jubilee, celebrating 60 years on the throne]. I asked the Grand Master of Ceremonies [Sannomiya Yoshitane, *Shikibuchōkan*] as if it were a matter of personal curiosity, but a few days later [on March 18th, see diary] Ct. O. told me he had instructed Katō to ask confidentially if an invitation wld. be sent. There seems to be an impression abroad that no repres[entati]ve of the Emperor wld. go to Engl. in consequence of the English Court not having gone into mourning for the Empress Dowager. I told Count Okuma that it wld. be a mistake on their part to mix up the 2 questions [i.e. to engage in tit-for-tat diplomacy].¹

The Diet closed yesterday after a 12 hr. sitting in wch. the remaining bills were rushed through without discussion. The Govt. had a powerful majority in both Houses, & did what they liked. It wld. seem that their position is a good deal stronger than it was. Ito [Hirobumi] is not making any effort to upset them, & the prophecies of a speedy downfall that were indulged in when they came into power have so far been falsified.

Ct. O. told me today that the net pecuniary result to Japan of the war with China, after taking the indemnity into account, wld. be about £13,000,000 of debt and additional taxation to the amount of £4,000,000 annually.

In Formosa things seem to be going better, & I have great hopes that the interests of B[ritish] S[ubject]s residing there will receive due recognition. I think Mr. Bonar & Mr.

dinner about adoption of gold standard. Dun told Ōkuma today that they were plunging themselves into difficulties.” (Ruxton, 2003, p.164) Edwin Dun (1848-1931) was U.S. Minister, 1893-97. He was replaced by Colonel Alfred E. Buck in July 1897. Buck died en poste in December 1902.

¹ See Satow’s diary for March 18, 1897. (Ruxton, 2003, p.170)

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Kenny are doing well as Consuls. The latter has gone on a journey into the camphor districts & will no doubt bring back some useful information.

Believe me &c.

56. Satow to Cockerell

29.3.97

My dear Cockerell,

Young Wawn¹ (who is a few months over 19) has been making a fool of himself about a girl here, a good deal older than himself, the daughter of a Japanese of no particular reputation & a vulgar Englishwoman. I had him in, & after talking to him in a parental manner, asked him to think it over & tell me whether he wld. follow my advice. Instead of being sensible, he wrote me the enclosed letter, & I came to the conclusion that the best thing in the interests of the service and in his own was to remove him fr. the focus of contagion. So I have packed him off to Kobe for a while, holding out to him the prospect of his coming back if I am satisfied that he will not renew his relations with the young lady. I think it would be most undesirable that any man who may eventually be a Consu; shld. marry an Eurasian, who is also a Japse. subject. I did not send him to Nagasaki, as Longford is well suited with a clerk, and he will be better able to pursue his studies in Japanese under [J.C.] Hall.

I hope you will think I have done the right thing.

y.s.

57. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio

1.4.97

Dear Lord Salisbury,

I mentioned in my letter of Mar. 25 [no. 55 above] that I had asked the Grand Master of

¹ Wawn, John Twizell (1877-1948). Passed a competitive examination, April 18, and appointed Student Interpreter in Japan, June 3, 1896. [At Tokyo, List of 1897.] [At Kobe, List of 1898.] Promoted to 2nd Assistant, September 20, 1898. Acting Consul at Tamsui, 1901 and 1902. Promoted to 1st Assistant, May 21, 1903. [At Yokohama, List of 1904.] Assistant in the Japanese Secretary's Office, Tokio, from June 2, 1904 to November 20, 1908. Promoted to be H.M. Vice-Consul for the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula, to reside at Dairen, June 1, 1908. Acting Japanese Secretary from June 11 to October 31, 1908. Transferred to Kobe, January 17, 1910. Acting Consul-General there in 1910. Acting Consul at Nagasaki in 1911 and 1912. Promoted to Consul at Chemulpo, July 20, 1912. Transferred to Nagasaki, January 30, 1915. Retired on a pension, April 1, 1918. [Foreign Office List, 1949 cited in Kuwata, 2003, p. 478]

Ceremonies [Sannomiya Yoshitane] whether the Emperor would send a representative to England, and that Count Ōkuma had told me he had instructed [Japanese Minister in London] Mr. Katō ¹ to make some confidential enquiries at the F.O. As this was a fortnight ago, & I had heard nothing since, I took an opportunity today of inquiring. ² Count Okuma said that to tell the truth the Prince who went to London in 1887 had not been altogether satisfied with his reception. The other Princes had sentries at their doors, while he had none, and so forth. However, Count O. had said to the Emperor that considering the particularly friendly relations between Engl. & Japan, the fact that England had been the first to revise the Treaties, & had refused to join in forcing Japan to give up the Liaotung Peninsula, & had stood [by?] her friend at a moment of great difficulty, it wld. be a great mistake not to send one of the Imperial Princes, and he hoped it wld. soon be arranged.

I have always heard that the Prince who attended the [Golden] Jubilee 10 yrs. ago was hurt by the coldness of his reception ³, & I have believed that he went to London almost without being invited. But in view of the telegram I recd. instructing me to inquire unofficially abt. this matter, I thought there could be no harm in my saying that if one of the Imperial Princes attended on the present occasion in consequence of an invitation being given, he might be certain of being well rec[eive]d.

I cannot help feeling that seeing Japan sent a Prince [Fushimi Sadanaru] ⁴ and a Marshal [Yamagata Aritomo] to Moscow [for Nikolai II's coronation] in spite of the resentment still felt with regard both to the Liaotung Peninsula & Corea, it wld. be much to be regretted if no Prince were sent to congratulate the Queen [on her Diamond Jubilee]. The difference would be very marked, and would be interpreted to our disadvantage. As far as I discreetly can do it, I think I ought to encourage them [the Japanese government] in their present inclination, and perh[aps] even press them a little.

I remember that in 1887 one sore point was that the Queen of Hawaii had one of the

¹ Katō Takaaki (1860-1926) became private secretary to Ōkuma Shigenobu when he was foreign minister in 1888. In 1894 he was appointed Minister to Britain. Later he was ambassador and foreign minister. See Kodansha's Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, p.755. See also Ian Nish, 'Kato Takaaki, 1860-1929: Japanese ambassador to London and Japanese foreign minister', in Hugh Cortazzi, ed., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits* IV, (London: Japan Library, 2002), 14-27.

² Satow's diary merely mentions this letter, with no further details.

³ At the 50th anniversary jubilee celebrations for Queen Victoria's ascending the throne Prince Komatsu no Miya Akihito had been poorly treated. The Prince of Wales was presented with the Grand Cordon of the Chrysanthemum, but had not visited the Japanese prince to thank him. (Nagaoka, vol. 1, p. 240)

⁴ Satow attended an official farewell dinner for Prince Fushimi Sadanaru prior to his going to Moscow on March 3, 1896. He sat between Viscount Hijikata and a blank place reserved for Marshal Yamagata. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.71)

Royal Carriages, and Prince Komatsu [no Miya Akihito] had to put up with something else.¹

Believe me etc.

58. Satow to Cockerell

April 12, 97

My dear Cockerell,

[R.A.] Mowat having returned from Shanghai, I have been able to get an expression of his views, wch. I am sending home abt. the proposed amalgamation of the Tokio V[ice] C[onsul]ar C[ou]rt with the Court for Japan, wch. does not amount to more than he said before. I invited him to Tokio for the purpose of talking the matter over, but he declined to come. I have, however, thoroughly thrashed it out with Troup, whose views are what I have gone upon.

I have done the best I could to define the districts in accordance with [Sir Eyre] Crowe's² memo[andum] & think the geography is now correct. All the outlying islands are included in one or other prefecture or city, & so need not be mentioned, & at the same time to avoid any complication I have avoided saying anything about the Main Island [nowadays usually called Honshu, 本州] (for wch. there is no proper name) Kiushiu or Shikoku. It would be an excellent thing if an uniform practice were adopted in despp. in speaking of the Consular Auth: as "at Yokohama" and "at Kobe", for then travellers, who are legion [very many in number], would know where to find them.

¹ Prince Hirohito received much better treatment, including one of the royal carriages, in 1921. See Ian Nish, *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits*, Vol. II, Ch. 15, (Japan Library, 1997). Satow was on leave 1887-88 after serving in Siam, 1884-87.

² Sir Eyre Crowe (1864-1925), third son of Sir Joseph Crowe, an art historian, entered the British Foreign Office in 1885. His subsequent career was spent almost entirely at Whitehall. Became assistant under secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1912, and permanent under secretary in 1920. Satow and Crowe served together as part of the British delegation to the Hague, June-October 1907.

Other Crowes have served in Japan: (1) Sir Edward T.F. Crowe (1877-1960), son of Alfred Louis Crowe, was appointed student interpreter in Japan, February 1, 1897 and later held appointments at Yokohama, Kobe and Tamsui. On April 1, 1918 he was appointed the first Commercial Counsellor at the Embassy in Tokyo. In 1924 he was recalled to London, and never returned to the Far East. For seven years he was vice-president of the Japan Society in London. (R.L. Nosworthy, D.N.B. 1951-60) (2) Eric Eyre Crowe (1905-52), son of Sir Eyre Crowe. Entered the Diplomatic Service in 1927. Transferred to Sofia, June 13, 1930 and to Tokyo, March 28, 1931. Promoted to 2nd Secretary, November 3, 1932. Granted an allowance for knowledge of Japanese, July 19, 1933. Transferred to Foreign Office, March 3, 1935. Later he served in Prague, Teheran, Cairo, South Africa and Oslo. Appointed Consul-General at Frankfurt, September 12, 1951. Died at his post, June 22, 1952. [F.O. List, 1953] (Kuwata, 2003, pp. 238-241)

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I shld. mention however that there is only one prefecture in Yesso [Hokkaido] ¹, that of Hakodate, the rest of the island forming one administrative division so in this case I thought it better to use the name of the island.

I expect to reach London early in June ², so if there is anything further you wld. like to discuss in connexion with this subject, I shall prob[ably] be in time. y.s. E.S.

59. Satow to Salisbury

15.4.97

Dear Lord Salisbury,

The Japse. are indulging in some very tall talk abt. Hawaii, & its possible annexation by the U.S. They also rely upon what they believe to be the policy of G.B., but have been told at Berlin that Germany takes no interest in the matter. Ct. O's tone was quieter today ³ than when I saw him a week ago, & efforts are being made by the Govt. to induce the emigrants rejected by Hawaii to betake themselves to Brazil. The U.S. are not at all in favour here just at this moment, owing to the heavy duties on Japse. manufactured goods in the new Tariff, & regret is expressed that 2 cruisers were ordered there as a mark of goodwill on the part of Japan wch. has not been duly appreciated.

Japan it seems will not negotiate a loan in London, & negotiations are going on with the Chartered Bank of India, Austral: & China ⁴ for the sale of £4,000,000 of Japse. war bonds. Some time ago Ct. O. said they wld. borrow £6,000,000 at 3½ per cent, the issuing price to be 92, but they seem to have changed their minds. Money they must have one way or another, or face a deficit estimated at £2,000,000.

Col[onel] Waters of the Emb[assy] at Petersburg is passing thro'. As he knows Russian military affairs, I thought it might be useful if he cld. have an opportunity of comparing the

¹ The name was changed from Ezo (here Yesso, sometimes Yezo) to Hokkaidō on the suggestion of Matsuura Takeshirō (1818-88) in 1869. He explored Ezo three times from 1845 and made several maps. He also served as an official in the Hokkaidō Colonization Office (kaitakushi). (Kodansha's Illustrated Encyclopedia) It seems that Satow was conscious that the name change had not filtered through to the British Foreign Office almost 30 years later! See also the Edo/Tokyo naming debate in J.E. Hoare, *Embassies in the East*, p.105.

² Satow left Japan on May 7, and reached London on June 4, 1897. He saw Cockerell at the F.O. on June 8th.

³ See Satow's diary for April 8 and 15, 1897. (Ruxton, 2003, pp.173-175)

⁴ The Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China was founded in 1853 following the grant of a Royal Charter by Queen Victoria. The first overseas branch was opened in Calcutta, and the Shanghai branch was opened in 1857. In 1969 the Chartered Bank merged with Standard Bank of British South Africa to form Standard Chartered Bank.

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Japse. troops with what he has seen in Siberia.¹ I gave him an introduction to Genl. Kawakami, the real head of the Staff, & he has seen something of the Imperial Guards. He does not seem to have been much struck with their physique.

I am inclined to think we are all of us here a little too much disposed to take the Japanese at their own valuation.

Pr[ince] Arisugawa [no Miya Takehito Shinnō, 1862-1913] who has been chosen to represent the Emperor at the Jubilee was in our navy for several years,² speaks a little English & is the most presentable of all the Princes. He was at one time the recognized heir to the throne, & wld. prob[ably] succeed if the Crown Prince [later Emperor Taishō], who is rather sickly were to die.³ His idea is to travel to England in a Japse. man of war [warship]. y.v.t.

60. Satow to Barrington

29 June 1897 [from London]

My dear Barrington,

There are two men in the Japan Consular service who I venture to think deserve some mark of the Queen's favour. I mean Gubbins & Troup. The former has worked hard & usefully in connexion with the negotiation of the new Treaty⁴, the latter was one of the Delegates to whom was entrusted the negotiation of the Tariff Convention of 1895.

Perhaps a fitting occasion might be found when the French & Austrian Treaties are ratified.

Anyhow, I shld. be very glad if you could find an opportunity of bringing their names to

¹ See Satow's diary for April 13 and 15, 1897. (Ruxton, 2003, pp. 174-175). The April 15 entry reads as follows: "[Lt. Col.] Waters had interview with Kawakami, and afterwards went to the guards barracks. Waters says Russians have 50,000 men in Eastern Siberia and 2½ years hence 80,000. Thinks with 25 of them he would knock 136 Japanese guards into a cocked-hat."

² Arisugawa no Miya Takehito Shinnō (son of Taruhito, 1835-95) completed his education as a naval officer in England and was the first prince of the blood to study abroad. (Ian Nish, Ch. 2, *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits* Vol. IV, p.19 citing Ian Nish, 'Ito's Overseas Sojourns' in *Bulletin of the European Association of Japanese Studies*, 55 (2000), pp. 7-15.

³ The Taishō Emperor (1879-1926, personal name Yoshihito) was the third son of Emperor Meiji. Soon after his birth he contracted what appeared to be meningitis. His health remained poor and of constant concern to court and government leaders. By 1919 he was unable to perform basic state ceremonies. In 1921 Crown Prince Hirohito was made regent (sesshō) for his father who died on December 25, 1926. (See Donald Keene, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and his world, 1852-1912*, Columbia Uni. Press, 2002; Stephen S. Large, *Emperors of the Rising Sun: Three Biographies*, Kodansha International, 1997).

⁴ See Ian Nish 'John Harrington Gubbins, 1852-1929', Ch.8, *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits*, Vol. II, pp. 107-119.

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Ld. S's notice. y.v.t.

61. Satow to Cockerell

127 Mount St.

2 July 1897

My dear Cockerell,

I send for your perusal a letter I have recd. fr. Troup, marking in it the part wch. seems important.

I quite agree with Troup that there shld. be some division of the judicial work betw[een] the Judge & the Consul-Gen[era]l. It has been the practice for the judge to take the important cases only, leaving a great deal to be done by the Cons-genl. as asst. judge. This interferes greatly with the proper consular duties of the latter.

Wld. it be possible in sanctioning the apptmt. of H.S. W[ilkinson] as Acting Judge to say that the Asst. judge's share is to be limited to purely magisterial functions [i.e. the functions of a magistrate], except during the judge's absence fr[om] Yoko[hama] when the A[ssistant] J[udge] is to take any judicial work of a pressing nature. That whenever the Consul is absent, unless the apptmt. of an Acting Asst. judge is otherwise imperative, the judge shld. take over magisterial work.

If this arrange[men]t were made the public service wld. in my opinion materially benefit.

y.v.t.

Troup's letter of 31 May 1897 enclosed.

62. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio.

2 12 97

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

The news of Okuma's retirement [as foreign minister] wch. reached me just as I was leaving Vancouver [on November 8, 1897 – see diary], is bad for us.¹ He was always very

¹ Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922) was foreign minister in 1888 and attempted to revise the unequal treaties. The treaty he drafted was perceived as conciliatory to the Western powers by the Japanese public, and in 1889 he was seriously injured in an assassination attempt by a member of the ultranationalist Gen'yōsha (Dark Ocean Society), forcing his temporary retirement.

In 1896 Ōkuma returned to politics, leading the Shimpotō (Progressive Party). He served again as foreign minister from September 22nd, and in 1897 also became minister of agriculture and commerce. In 1898 he merged the Shimpotō with Itagaki Taisuke's Jiyūtō to form the Kenseitō (Constitutional Party).

friendly to England & frank in his communications. The causes of his resignation were correctly given by [Chargé d’Affaires G.A.] Lowther in his desp[atch] on the subject. I have not seen [his successor] Nishi [Tokujirō] yet ¹, as he has influenza. He has been a long time in Russia & speaks Russian fluently. He thought it necessary to state to an interviewer that in spite of these facts he has no Russian bias. His accession to the Cabinet makes it more Satsuma than ever. ² Parties in the Diet, wch. meets on Xmas Day are said to be arrayed agst. the Govt. Some go so far as to say that the Mins. of War & Marine must in future be civilians, & that the army estimates must be cut down. This is an utopian idea altogether. Parliamentary govt. here wld. lead to chaos. It is expected that the Diet will be dissolved, but come what may I do not think the Satsuma clan, wch. has now grasped the exclusive power wch. was its aim in supporting the revolution of 1868, will surrender without a tussle. Fr[om] what I hear Itō is in no hurry to come back to power. He does not want to take responsibility unless he can have his own way altogether.

If the Diet is dissolved it is possible that the Codes will not be sanctioned, & in that case the operation of the new Treaties will be postponed. If the Fr[ench] Senate ratifies the Treaty & Austria signs hers, then the new Tariff may come into force in September next.

The Japse. Govt. takes the recent proceedings of Russia in Corea very quietly, & relies upon the Coreans getting sick of Russian tutelage. If that is their only hope, they are reckoning without their host. Korean affairs have retired into the background since the news of the occupation of Kiao-chou [by Germany]. ³

One of the principal preoccupations of the Japse. is the question whether the alliance of

A few days later Ōkuma and Itagaki were ordered to form the first party cabinet in Japan (the Wai-Han cabinet). Itagaki was appointed home minister, while Ōkuma served concurrently as prime minister and foreign minister. Internal dissension led to the dissolution of the cabinet within four months. In 1900 Ōkuma became head of the Kensei Hontō, a splinter group of the Kenseitō. He resigned in 1907 to become president of Waseda University. Appointed prime minister again, 1914-16. (from Kodansha’s *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia*, pp. 1144-1145).

¹ On December 13, 1897 Nishi returned Satow’s call. Satow remarked “He speaks very little French, and is as taciturn as most Satsuma men.” (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.220) Saionji Kimmochi, court noble born in Kyoto, on the other hand spoke excellent French, having studied there 1871-80.

² Ōkuma was born in Saga city – his birthplace is open to the public – and he was constantly fighting the Satsuma and Chōshū cliques.

³ In September 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung province. The German Navy used this as a pretext to occupy Kiaochow on 14 November. Negotiations between Germany and China began on 20 November and were concluded on 6 March 1898. Germany secured a 99-year lease on Kiaochow and railway and mining concessions in Shantung. For a detailed academic article on the German seizure of Kiaochow and the ramifications see T. G. Otte, *Great Britain, Germany and the Far-Eastern Crisis of 1897-8* (English Historical Review, November 1995, pp. 1157-1179).

the 3 PP [Russia, France & Germany] in the Extreme East still continues. I have told them I think it does. This belief will prob[ably] keep them quiet.

As regards Hawaii they quite appreciate the advice Y[our] L[ordship] gave to Katō, that the way to provoke annexation wld. be to offer objections. Okuma, I am told by Lowther, was of a contrary opinion, but he is gone. I have always thought they wld. husband their strength for more important objects than Hawaii.

The convention for the prohibition of pelagic sealing [see letter no. 64 below] recently signed at Washington by the Russian, Japse. & U.S. delegates is expected here on the 6th. I have suggested to the V-M. [Vice Minister Komura Jutarō] ¹ that Japan will gain nothing by ratifying it. He asked whether there was any chance of G.B. acceding to it. I said emphatically no.

63. Satow to Salisbury

2.12.97

Dr. Ld. S.,

Our military attaché Col. Hemming ² has suggested to me that it wld. be very useful if a young subaltern with a gift for languages cld. be sent here to study Japse, with a view to his becoming military attaché later on. For a man of middle age to commence Japse. wld. be useless, & I agree with him that we shld. be gainers if we had a military man who cld. speak the language. At Tokio there wld. be plenty of facilities for learning, & if it were thought desirable he might be given the title of honorary attaché. ³

¹ Komura was vice-foreign minister until September 1898 when he was named minister to Washington. Satow spoke to him after lunch on November 25, 1897. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 215)

² Col. Frederick Wilson Hemming (1850-1934), C.B. He was Military attaché at Tokyo, from January 14, 1897 to April, 1898. Retired with honorary rank of Major-General, September 22, 1906. (F.O.L. 1921). The Times obituary of December 19, 1934 described him as “a cavalry officer of the old school, whose manners were as perfect as his seat on a horse”. (Kuwata, 2003, pp. 294-5) Hemming was succeeded by Col. Arthur Gillespie Churchill (born 1860) who was appointed military attaché from April 9, 1898 to June, 1903 (F.O.L. 1921) and in Japan from June 1898 to August 1903. He frequently accompanied Satow to Chuzenji, but was ‘entirely out of sympathy with Japan, its people and its Army.’ (MacDonald to Grey, 15 December 1909, Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, Kew, FO 371/687, quoted in Sebastian Dobson, ed. *The Russo-Japanese War*, vol. 1, p. viii, Ganesha Publishing & Edition Synapse, 2000). After Churchill came Col. C.V. Hume who was military attaché from July 7, 1903 to June 9, 1907 (F.O.L. 1916).

³ Hemming’s suggestion supported here by Satow does not appear to have been acted upon until after the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902). The Russo-Japanese War began on February 8, 1904. At about that time an army order appeared calling for volunteers to study the Japanese language for a year and then be attached to the Japanese army. Four officers were sent before the outbreak of war, and four after it. These

The whole German Legation here is composed of military men, v. Treutler the Ch. d’Aff., & Menicke & v. Königsmarck who are “detached”. Menicke speaks Japese. fluently; he has been here altogether abt. 18 mos.

64. Satow to Salisbury

30.12.97

Dr. Ld. S., ¹

The Satsuma cabinet is out after abt. 16 mos. of office, & Itō [Hirobumi] has been summoned to make a govt. As I owed him a visit, I went this afternoon to pay it. He is much troubled with offers of help fr. Okuma [Shigenobu] & Itagaki [Taisuke], each of them the leader of a party in the Diet of 60 or 70 members. Combined they wld. give him a majority, but the two men hate each other so much, as he says, that they cannot work together. The other old political hands like Yamagata [Aritomo] & Saigo [Tsugumichi] despise the idea of governing by the political parties, & think of nothing but war. Inouye [Kaoru] who was once F.M. [foreign minister, 1879-87] & 3 yrs. ago played a part in Corea. ² no longer cares to have anything to do with politics. I suppose Itō, who likes to ape Prince

eight officers were the pioneers of a body which eventually totalled more than 100, and played an important part in Anglo-Japanese relations over the next 40 years. They were J.B. Jardine and W.A. Adam (cavalry); Berkley Vincent and Everard Calthrop (Royal Artillery); Sir Alexander Bannerman and W.A. Harrison (Royal Engineers); C.A.L. Yate and A.H.S. Hart-Synot (infantry). (From Major-General F.S.G. Piggott, *Broken Thread: An Autobiography*, pub. Gale & Polden Ltd., 1950, Ch. III, pp. 24-25. Piggott also mentions meeting Satow in Monmouthshire when he was a young boy of 14 and Satow was on leave in 1897, see Ch. II, pp.14-15)

¹ Part of this letter is quoted in I.Ruxton, ed. *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, Edwin Mellen Press, 1998, p.249. Here it is reproduced in full.

² In 1876 Inoue Kaoru had accompanied Kuroda Kiyotaka to Seoul as vice-plenipotentiary during the negotiation of the unequal Treaty of Kanghwa. “For eight months after his arrival in Seoul in late October 1894, Inoue made a bold but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to turn Korea into a political and economic dependency of Japan, a protectorate in fact if not in name. Abandoning the conciliatory style of Ōtori [Keisuke], he deliberately adopted a lordly manner to impress the Korean leadership with his own importance. Like the recently departed Chinese proconsul, Yuan Shih-kai, Inoue insisted on being treated differently from the other foreign representatives in Seoul, and he demanded immediate audiences with the king whenever he wished. At his first meeting with Kojong – a meeting that no Korean officials other than the foreign minister and the royal household minister were allowed to attend – Inoue bluntly told the king that he was not an ordinary diplomat but had come to Korea at the special request of the Japanese emperor to advise the king on his country’s affairs.” (Peter Duus, *The Abacus & the Sword: The Japanese penetration of Korea, 1895-1910*, pp. 84-85) Inoue was succeeded as minister to Korea by Miura Gorō, appointed by Itō Hirobumi on the urging of the hawkish former general Tani Kanjō (Duus, p.108).

Bismarck ¹ prefers to rule alone, surrounding himself with non-entities. Where he is to find competent Mins. for F.A. & Finance I do not know, unless he take Okuma & some one else more nearly his equals. He laments the want [lack] of statesmen.

We had some talk abt. China & her future fr. wch. I gathered that he is by no means inclined to a strong policy for Japan. And I cannot learn that anything is being done to play a part in the partition of China, tho' no doubt there is a good deal of talk going on among military men. The crews of the 2 new battleships [*Fuji* and *Yashima*] are not sufficiently familiar with their guns & engines, & they have no steam coal. Some has been ordered fr. England, but it cannot be here for a couple of months at least.

They [the Japanese] are much alarmed at the idea that Germany means to take the whole of Shantung [province], & that Russia will lend China the money to pay off the bal[an]ce of the indemnity, about 9 000 000 sterling & so get them [the Japanese] out of Wei hai wei. They are anxiously watching to see what Engld. will do, & rather hope she will take poss[essio]n of Chusan. I am told that Japan wld. do anything Engl[and] asked of her at the present moment to gain our friendship. If this is the case, there ought not to be much difficulty in persuading them not to ratify the Agreement with the U.S. & Russia for the restriction of pelagic sealing. I am doing all I can to stop ratification. ²

¹ Itō was in Germany 1882-83 studying the German constitution, and met Bismarck at that time.

² Bering Sea Dispute. A dispute between the United States on the one hand, and Britain and Canada on the other, over the international status of the Bering Sea. In an attempt to control seal hunting off the Alaskan coast, the United States in 1881 claimed authority over all the Bering Sea waters. Britain refused to recognize this claim. In 1886-89 the U.S. seized a number of vessels found sealing, most of them Canadian ships manned by British subjects. The U.S. claimed that the Bering Sea had become a *mare clausum* (closed sea). In 1893 a Paris tribunal condemned the U.S. seizures, holding that the Bering Sea was part of the high seas, and assessed damages against the U.S. for the seizures at \$ 473,151. Restrictions were placed on sealing during the summer breeding months and around the Pribiloff Islands. In 1911 the U.S., Canada and Japan signed the North Pacific Sealing Convention, which further restricted the area of pelagic sealing. In 1941 Japan withdrew from the agreement. (Summarized from *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 15th edition.)

It was the American Secretary of State Mr. John Watson Foster who proposed a quadripartite conference to sign an agreement between Britain, Russia, Japan and the U.S. to protect seals in May 1897. Japan was at first negative, but Minister Hoshi Tōru in the U.S. told his government that, according to Foster, Russia and Britain were agreeable so Japan should participate in order to preserve good Japan-U.S. relations. The Japanese government did not check the British attitude through Minister Katō, and expressed its intention to participate through Hoshi in August. Two representatives were sent from Tokyo to Washington. But it transpired that Foster was wrong, and that the British were agreeable only to a conference of American, British and Canadian experts, and did not approve Russian or Japanese participation for as long as the Paris arbitration decision was in force. As it would be futile to reach an agreement without British participation, the agreement signed on November 11th in Washington was stipulated to come into effect only when signed by Great Britain. (Nagaoka, vol. 1, p. 284, based on

The Germans I am told applied to Jardine Matheson & Co. for some steam coal, but they refused. They hold all there is in Japan.

We have telegrams that the Russian flag has been hoisted at Port Arthur & Kinchow, & today we are told that the Fr[ench] have occupied Hainan & hoisted their flag there. But these telegs. came fr. Shanghai & are not to be trusted.

I heard fr. Admiral Buller on the 26th that he was at Port Hamilton & wld. shortly be at Chemulpho [a suburb of Inchon].

Itō said to me that if Russia takes Manchuria & the Liaotung Penin[sul]a while Germany occupies Shantung the Chinese Govt. will have to migrate to the S[outh]. I replied that I did not see how the Tartar dynasty cld. expect to be welcomed at Nanking, the seat of the old Ming dynasty, but if they went there it wld. be only to come under the protection of the P[ower] that dominates the Yantze [sic] river [i.e. Great Britain].

I find that the reception given in England to the prince [Arisugawa no Miya Takehito] who attended the Jubilee has given the greatest satisfaction here [see letter 57 above], and the Prince himself is never tired of expressing his gratitude for the attentions shown him. ¹

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On 6 October, 1897 Satow met Lord Salisbury who briefly spoke about the sealing conference: “Lord Salisbury spoke of Bering Sea [fur] seals. U.S. had asked us to join a conference with Japan and Russia, and we had politely declined. Nothing could be done under the Paris [arbitration] award till next year. In the meantime there would be the meeting of experts.”

On October 12th Satow spoke to Sir Francis Villiers, the assistant undersecretary of state for foreign affairs 1896-1905: “Saw Villiers. He talked about Behring Sea. It was partly our fault for not replying at once to American proposal to invite Russia and Japan, that U.S. proceeded to send out invitations. After much to and fro we adhere to our refusal. U.S. will hold conference with Japan and Russia, while the meeting of Canadian, British and U.S. experts takes place. Fact is pelagic sealing is thought by our man [expert] to cause diminution of herd, while Canada refuses to admit this. There has been a misunderstanding, neither side in fault.” On November 1st Satow spoke to Lord Aberdeen, the Governor General of Canada, in Ottawa. On November 25th Satow spoke to Nakada Takanori of the Japanese Foreign Office: “I talked to him about U.S. proposal to us for a quadri-partite conference on sealing, and why we had declined to join. He says Fujita and the other delegate have left Frisco [San Francisco] and will soon be here with the convention.” On December 16, 1897 Satow spoke to Nishi Tokujiro about the agreement: “To Nishi. He says the agreement about seals is to prohibit pelagic sealing for one year, and that it is not to become operative unless Great Britain joins. No time fixed consequently for ratification, and so will probably become null of itself. I explained to him, in reply to an observation of his, that Japan had been invited under a wrong impression as to England having promised to go into conference, how the U.S. had gone on from one proposal to another, and that their invitation to Japan was probably intended to compensate for the ill-feeling caused by the proposed annexation of Hawaii and the increase of the tariff on Japanese imports.” On March 28, 1898 Satow told his private informant Asaina Kansui that he did not like the way the Japanese had joined the U.S. and Russia against Britain in the sealing conference. (Diary entries from Ruxton, 2003)

¹ Satow talked to Hijikata Hisamoto, then Minister of the Imperial Household, on January 14, 1898. “He

The Japse. are easier in their minds abt. Hawaii, as they believe there will not be the requisite majority in the [U.S.] Senate to ensure the ratification of the [annexation] Treaty. ¹ Meanwhile the question of the Japse. claim [for damages] ² is being allowed to

said they were very pleased with the Queen's decision about mourning and grateful to me for my efforts. Also for the splendid reception given to Prince Arisugawa [Arisugawa no Miya Takehito Shinnō] in London. It was the first time a Japanese Prince had been nicely treated. Last time the Japanese were furious (*taihen ni okotte*)." (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.232)

¹ In 1887 the United States obtained the rights for a naval base at Pearl Harbor. A coup fomented by U.S. sugar interests resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a Republic of Hawaii in 1893. The treaty for the annexation of Hawaii was signed on 16 June 1897, and ratified by the U.S. Senate on 6 July 1898. A formal ceremony was held in Honolulu on 12 August 1898.

Satow spoke about Hawaii to Sir Hugh Nelson, the premier of Queensland, on June 19, 1897: "We spoke of Hawaii, where things are very unsettled. Annexation by the United States will be greatly resented by the native population. The present government is supported by bayonets of Western American mercenaries highly paid." On October 4th Satow talked to F. Everett of Reuters: "Fred K. W. Everett of Reuters came to talk Japanese politics. Gave him my ideas, but said he must not publish anything with my name. I thought Japan would not provoke a conflict with U.S. about Hawaii, her position in Corea being a more vital interest." On October 6th Satow noted: "[Eric] Barrington thinks and so does Lord Salisbury that it is better to wait and see whether the U.S. Senate ratifies the [Hawaii] annexation Treaty before appointing Hawes' successor, but [Sir F.] Villiers wants it done at once." He then spoke to Salisbury: "Lord Salisbury on Hawaii. As long as the Japanese did not fight the U.S. about it we need not consider our position. I suggested that perhaps I should counsel the Japanese to give way to the U.S. He smiled grimly, and said there was no harm in their having a little dispute together about it." Back in Japan on November 25th Satow spoke to Nakada Takanori of the Foreign Office: "Also about Hawaii, and told him that if they wanted the U.S. to annex Hawaii, it would be very easy to provoke them to it. He says Hoshi carries instructions to be very cautious. All Japan now aims at is protecting Japanese interests in the islands. Probably sooner or later they will become American. If the Senate does not approve the Treaty, there is some idea that it may be done, as in the case of Kansas, by a joint resolution of the two Houses." On December 16, 1897 Satow spoke to Nishi: "Hawaii No further news, since telegram that President had recommended adoption of the Annexation Treaty. Believes a majority of Senate in favour of it. Told him [U.S. minister Edwin] Dun said last night that Senate would not pass it, also what Admiral Salmon had said to Admiral Miller about our delight at their using it as a strategical point, and locking up a lot of their ships in Pearl Harbour."

² See Okuma's remarks to Satow on April 22, 1897: "Hawaii. He was rather close. The Hawaiian Government pretend that the free [non-contract] labourers are really under contract, and that they had not permission before hand – whereas it was merely a contract to transport. A good deal of money had been lost, and one [immigrant] company had even bought a steamer; he did not wish to be hard on a defenceless little country like Hawaii, but a claim would have to be made for damages." (Ruxton, 2003, p.177) Since about Meiji 18 (1886) Japan had been sending immigrants to Hawaii. In about Meiji 27 (1894) private companies began to act as go-betweens, transporting immigrants under contract to work there. The Hawaiian government therefore began to exclude and remove non-contract immigrants through strict immigration controls. There was a legal case with the landing of immigrants from the *Tōyō Maru* in 1894, and thereafter more than 1,100 people were refused entry and forcibly repatriated to Japan. A Japanese warship, the *Naniwa* was sent and finally in July 1898 Hawaii paid 75,000 dollars compensation. (Taken from Nagaoka, vol. 1, p. 245, summarising from *Meiji Nyu-zu Jiten*, vol. 5). In March 1897 a total of about 1,200 would-be Japanese immigrants to Hawaii on four ships were refused permission to land. The Japanese government protested and demanded compensation (damages) from

sleep.

Japan I think is very hard up, and unless the Chinese are punctual in paying the instalments of the indemnity will have either to borrow money abroad or cut down expenditure. Which course is taken will depend a good deal on the composition of Itō's cabinet. If Ōkuma joins him the former is more prob[able], but if he forms a ministry out of his own particular henchmen, economy is likely to be the order of the day & a mild foreign policy.

Believe me etc.

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

Hawaii. The American government demanded of the Hawaiian government that this problem of compensation be solved prior to annexation. The Japanese demanded 250,000 yen, but received only 150,000 yen. (Nagaoka Vol. 2, p. 119).

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/10

Letter Book. Japanese mission. (7 January 1898 – 25 May 1899)

1. Satow to Bertie

7.1.98

My dear Bertie,¹

I hope the Treasury will not make any difficulty abt. Troup's retirement.² He is really failing, & can hardly get thro' his work. I am quite sure he wld. have gone on for several years more had it been possible. His successor will I suppose be [J.C.] Hall, & I hope there will be no objection to making him Cons.-Genl. in his turn. I do not however propose to make any official recommendations until Troup's retirement is approved.

[G.A.] Lowther has gone to Formosa.³ I have given him instructions to look into things generally there, & to inspect the Consulates at Tamsui & Tainan. On his way back he will inspect Nagasaki & Kobe.

Pray do not send me another student when Troup retires. We have 5 already.⁴ They are somewhat of an anxiety to me with their flirtations that Mothers & Dau[ughters] designedly encourage.

It is still in labour of a new Cabinet, & no one seems to expect a very healthy child. The native [Japanese] papers talk a great deal abt. Russian & Germ. designs in China. [Admiral Lord Charles] Beresford's speech⁵ advocating an alliance with Japan has excited some

¹ Bertie, Sir Francis Leveson (1844-1919), second son of the Earl of Abingdon, entered the Foreign Office in 1863 and served mainly in Whitehall. Head of the Asiatic Department at the F.O., 1898-1902 and a strong supporter of an alliance with Japan. (See I. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, pp. 153-154)

² James Troup retired on a pension on April 1, 1898. James Troup (1840-1925), M.A. of Aberdeen University, was appointed student interpreter in Japan, August 31, 1863. Promoted to be Consul at Nagasaki, April 1, 1877. Transferred to Hiogo and Osaka, April 1, 1882; and to Yokohama, June 23, 1888. Was a British delegate on the Tariff Commission appointed for negotiation of the Supplementary Convention with Japan of July 16, 1895. Promoted to be Consul-General for Kanagawa, and also to be Assistant Judge of H.M. Court in Japan, November 18, 1896. Retired on a pension, April 1, 1898. (F.O. List, 1921, quoted in Kuwata, 2003, pp.473-474)

³ See Lowther's letters to Satow from Formosa, PRO 30/33 5/5 Nos. 32 & 33.

⁴ In the F.O. List for 1898 the five student interpreters are listed: Thomas Joseph Harrington, Edward Thomas F. Crowe, Ernest Hamilton Holmes and Edward L.S. Gordon – all at Tokyo. John Twizell Wawn had previously been sent by Satow to Kobe (see Satow to Cockerell, PRO 30/33 14/9, letter no. 56 dated March 29, 1897).

⁵ As Beresford did not visit Japan until January 1899 [see Satow's diary for January 17th], this speech must have been given in England. Beresford advocated an Anglo-Japanese alliance which might be extended to China in his book *The break-up of China*. (Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p.12)

hopes, but we have explained that he does not direct the foreign policy of H.M.G.

There are some inane newsmongers at Shanghai whose inventions are greedily reproduced here.

2. Satow to Eric Barrington (Lord Salisbury's private secretary)

7.1.98

My dear Barrington,

Troup has applied to retire & I venture to remind you of the suggestion in my private letter of 29 June last on his behalf.¹ He is really a meritorious public servant, & is retiring solely on acct. of failing health.

3. Satow to Curzon

11.1.98

Dear Mr. Curzon,

The giver of the information contained in my desp[atch] of today abt. coal at Vladivostock is a Mr. Russell L. Dunn.² He said he was known to you, having been introduced by Sir Ed[ward] Monson. He left here for San Francisco on the 8th, with the intention of obtaining capital for working the mine he has discovered [near Vladivostock], & seemed anxious to know whether the peace was likely to be disturbed this year. I told him that in my opinion there wld. be no outbreak of war.

Acc[ording] to his account of himself he had been associated with Russian rlwy. engineers surveying for the new trans-Siberian line. Three years ago when in the neighbourhood of Lake Baikal, they told him the real line wld. go to Kiakta & so on to Peking. The line across Manchuria he said wld. not be built, & that the surveying being carried on was merely a blind [decoy]. He was full of the belief that the Russians had taken poss[essio]n of Port Arthur, & wld. before long annex the whole of Manchuria, from the hardy population of wh[ich] province, numbering 25 millions, they wld. be able to raise excellent troops. Some years hence, he added, they wld. be in a position to invade Japan & seize Kiushiu.

I told him that seemed to me less likely than an attempt on Tsushima [between Korea and Japan].

¹ See PRO 30/33 14/9 letter no. 60.

² Satow met Russell L. Dunn on January 8, 1898 (see Ruxton, 2003, p.227).

Siberia he said would never enter into competition with other wheat regions, but he was confident that the coal at Vladivostock & the iron close by wld. make the port the most important in Asia. Possessed of Manchuria and the N[orth] of China, Russia wld. not mind other PP. [Powers] having a commercial port here and there on the coast.

He also expressed the opinion that Japan cld. never become a great manufacturing Power. The same thing has recently been said to me [on December 31, 1897 – see diary] by a Leeds man named Denison, who has been here since the end of Nov[ember] studying the question. He has seen all the factories at & near Tokio. Only one of these, a hat-factory, possessed up-to-date machinery. The idea of Japan competing seriously with the Lancashire cotton mills seemed to him ridiculous. In the whole of Japan, he said, the spindles were only 1/15 in no. [number] of those at Oldham alone. [i.e. one million in Japan, 15 million in Oldham.]

Mr. [Russell] Dunn was introduced to me by a highly respectable Kōbe merchant, Mr. T.W. Hellyer. If what he says is true, the discovery of coal is very important.

y.v.t.

4. Satow to Bertie

27.1.98

My dear Bertie,

The only object of my asking leave to maintain c. [with] the Japse. that they cannot alter the foreign settlements without consulting us us [sic]¹, is to be on the same platform as the others [other Powers] and to have a lever to get compensation for the landholders. We do not propose of [sic. Should be 'to'?] refuse our consent to the harbour improvements.

Lowther is still in Formosa I think. He wrote from Tamsui on the 19th.²

Portions of a report by [William M. H.] Kirkwood³ on the mal-administration of that

¹ Satow may have been writing at speed, hence the unnecessary repetition.

² Letter no. 33, PRO 30/33 5/5.

³ William Montague Hammett Kirkwood (1850-1926). Died at St. Jean de Luz, aged 76. Formerly legal adviser to the Japanese government. Fourth son of Mr. John Townsend Kirkwood, of Yeo Vale, Devon, and Gore Court, Kent. A brother of Sir Walter Kirkwood, late Secretary of the General Post Office for Scotland, of the late Major J.M.H. Kirkwood, formerly MP for South-East Essex, and of Colonel C.H.M. Kirkwood, C.M.G., D.S.O. He was sent to Marlborough College, gained the Old Marlburian scholarship, and was called to the Bar by the Inner Temple in 1873. In 1882 he was appointed H.M. Crown Advocate in Japan, and served from 1885 to 1901 as Legal Adviser to the Japanese Government. In that capacity he assisted in drafting the Japanese Constitution and codes of Law, and for his services received the Japanese Order of the Sacred Treasure, Knight Grand Cross; Rising Sun, Knight Grand Cross; the Japanese Constitution Medal, and the Silver Wedding Medal. Mr. Kirkwood travelled extensively

island have got into print. Too many inexperienced officials and too much red tape seems to be his verdict.

I send you a caricature fr[om] a leading Tokio newspaper published today à propos of the Emperor's birthday, with an inscription of wch. the enclosed is a translation. I cannot quite make out who the men are facing the missionary, prob[ably] they are meant for any kind of savages. This is a measure of Japanese feeling abt. Kiaochou.¹ [Max August Scipio] v[on] Brandt seems to have written another pamphlet on Eastern Affairs & poor v[on] Treutler [First Secretary, German legation] is quite sad abt. it.

y.v.t.

5. Satow to Salisbury

27.1.98

Dr. Lord Salisbury,

Itō has managed to get together a rather stronger cabinet than was expected, his fellow clansman Inouye [Kaoru] having taken finance & Nishi [Tokujiro] remaining at the F.O. The latter is a very reticent person. All the colls: [diplomatic colleagues] say they can get nothing out of him, & he will never admit that he knows anything of what goes on at Peking. But I have heard thro' a private source that Yano [Fumio] the Japse. min[ister] there has been urging his govt. to come to the aid of China. I do not suppose that these representations have had any effect. No stir is to be seen among the troops, & the squadron still lies at Yokosuka. I think the firm intention of the Jap[ane]se is still to remain quiet until their military programme is carried out & the ships being built in Europe and America are delivered here, wch. cannot be for another three years at least. They will not run any risks of encountering European PP [Powers] with their precious squadron, unless it were in

through the Far East. In 1897 he spent several months among the head-hunting tribes of Formosa, and was engaged to organize the administration of the island when it was ceded to Japan. He was also adviser to the first U.S. Philippine Commission and received the thanks of Congress for his services. During the First World War he was employed as an Assistant Censor of Post in the War Office from March 2, 1916. After his retirement he took a keen interest in the Boy Scout movement, and was Commissioner for Kensington. Mr. Kirkwood was twice married, but left no children. (Compiled from F.O. List, 1921; *Times* obituary notice of March 30, 1926; and *Who Was Who*, 1916-28. all quoted in Kuwata, 2003, pp.325-6) Satow spent quite a lot of time with Kirkwood's second wife (née Morris) reading Virgil and other classics, and at Lake Chuzenji. (See Satow's diaries, 1895-1900).

¹ "Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity, Japan did not make any protest against Germany's action [in demanding a lease of Kiaochow]. In deciding thus, the Matsukata cabinet was running in the face of press and public opinion but was probably justified because the ministry was shortly to give up office and was worried by Japan's isolation." Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p.49.

combination c. [with] G.B. For a chance of getting back into Corea with our aid they wld. venture a good deal. They are furious ab[ou]t Kiaochou. A fortnight ago [on January 14, 1898 – see diary] I met the Min[ister] of the Household [Viscount Hijikata Hisamoto] at the Germ[an] Legation. He was the only Jap. & there was no one else but myself who cld. talk to him. After dinner he began to talk abt. the possibilities of an alliance, wch. he had heard being spoken of in Engl[an]d. I said that even if there were nothing in black & white, it wld. do no harm for the outsiders to think we were on especially friendly terms. He said Engl. had materially supported the Imperialist party in 1868, while the Fr[ench] had made the blunder of backing the Tycoon [Shogun]. I asked why the Japse. were so quiet in regard to Corea. His reply was ‘We are fostering our military strength. We shld. not fear the fleet of either Russia, France or Germany alone, but are not sure whether we cld. safely encounter them in combination. But there is one thing quite certain, that our soldiers, if once they begin, will fight to the last breath, as was shown by our torpedo-boats at Weihaiwei’ [in the Sino-Japanese War] ¹, & then he made a lively gesture like a man performing harakiri [ritual suicide, also called ‘seppuku’]. He expressed himself very strongly about the Kiaochou business. I think he had taken too much wine.

Portalès ² the Fr[ench] Ch[argé] d’Aff[aires] said something to me abt. my ‘conciliatory disposition’ ³ wch. he felt sure wld. prevent my giving warlike counsels to the Japse. I replied certainly not, for it wld. be contrary to my instructions.

Nevertheless I have said once or 2ce [twice] unofficially that I think for them to abandon their military programme wld. produce an impression that they were incapable of steadiness, & as they seem to have made up their minds not to curtail any part of it, the advice has jumped[?] with their dispositions.

P. on another occasion [on January 21, 1898] asked me whether Engl. was ready to back up the Japse. in regard to Kiaochou. I replied there was no idea of the kind, but[?] H.M.G. wld. resist by all means in their power the partition of China. Ever since I came here in

¹ “On February 2 [1895] the Second Army occupied the city of Weihaiwei without resistance, and the Japanese Combined Fleet succeeded in bottling up the remainder of the Chinese North Sea Fleet in the bay. There was still severe shelling from Chinese batteries on Liu-kung Island, hampering action against the Chinese fleet. Japanese torpedo boats managed to sneak past the island on the night of February 5 and, approaching to 150 or 300 feet of their targets, were able to sink or heavily damage three of the principal Chinese warships. Another attack, carried out on the night of the sixth, damaged two more warships.” Donald Keene, *Meiji and his World*, pp. 499-500.

² Le Comte de Portalès-Gorgier, First Secretary, French Legation. He visited Satow on January 21, 1898 (see diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.234).

³ See Satow’s diary for January 14, 1898 (Ruxton, 2003, p.232).

1895 the Fr[ench] Leg[atio]n has seemed very uneasy about the possible existence of an understanding betw[een] us & the Japse.

v. Treutler tries to make out that our taking HongKong was of the same character as the seizure of Kiaochou. I remarked to him that it had been ceded to us after a war, not taken in time of peace ¹, & that all nations had profited by it as much as ourselves. We even gave special privileges to Germ[an] & Fr[ench] mail steamers wch. our own mail st[eamers] did not get.

I see a good deal of [Russian minister Baron Roman Romanovich] Rosen [1847-1922], but he never talks politics.

[Austro-Hungarian Minister Count Christoph von] Wydenbruck talked to me of the Kiaochou business as a 'pretty little bit of piracy'.

Nishi thinks the alliance of the Three PP [Powers] in Far Eastern affairs continues. Ito is of the contrary opinion, & believes the Emperor of Germany [Kaiser Wilhelm II] ² to be acting without an understanding with Russia.

Certainly there are no signs of a good understanding betw[een] Russia & Japan as regards Corea, in spite of the assertions of certain Russian papers to that effect. On the contrary I imagine that the appearance of our squadron at Chemulpho & the visit of some of

¹ "The illegal opium trade of Britain in the early 19th century led to its acquisition of Hong Kong. In 1839 an anti-opium campaign was launched in Canton by the Chinese government, resulting in a siege of the British factory there and confiscation of more than 20,000 chests of opium. The British retreated to Macau and demanded either a commercial treaty or a small island from which British operations could be conducted safely. Fighting began in the waters off Hong Kong Island and expanded into the First Opium War (1839-42). The Treaty of Nanking, which ended hostilities, ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British." (Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th edition, 1986)

² Wilhelm II, full name Friedrich Wilhelm Viktor Albert (1859-1941). German emperor (Kaiser) and King of Prussia, 1888-1918. Eldest son of Victoria, the eldest daughter of the British Queen Victoria, and Crown Prince Frederick (later Emperor Frederick III). Known for his militaristic manner. His mother tried to force on him the outlook of a 19th-century British Liberal, with the result that he tried to become a tough Prussian warrior-king. Said to have authored the phrase 'Gelbe Gefahr' (Yellow Peril). In 1897 Wilhelm appointed Bernhard, Fürst von Bülow (1849-1929) as foreign secretary, and in 1900 made him chancellor. It was Prince von Bülow who à propos of the German seizure of Kiaochow said in the Reichstag on December 6, 1897: "In a word, we desire to throw no one into the shade [in East Asia], but we also demand our own place in the sun." (Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, revised fourth edition, 1996).

In 1896 Wilhelm aroused British anger by sending a telegram to President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic congratulating him on the defeat of the British-led Jameson raid. He also aroused anger and alarm by the German Naval Bills of 1897 and 1900. Although he often indignantly denied that Germany was challenging Britain's domination of the seas, there is clear evidence that this was the aim of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, whom he made secretary of the navy in 1897. (Abstracted from Encyclopedia Britannica 15th edition)

our ships to Port Arthur gave a great deal of pleasure here. The newspapers had articles headed ‘the sleeping lion bestirs himself’. They have published lists of the squadrons, showing how greatly those of Engl[and] & Jap[an] together outnumber the ships of the 3 PP [Russia, France & Germany] combined. There is not a dissentient voice in the press as to the desirability of an alliance with Engl[and]. To people who have pressed me on the subject I have said ‘the time is not yet come’.

I hope to be able to send home shortly all the desired information abt. the Japse. ships lately launched, now building and projected in this country.

6. Satow to Salisbury

24 Feb. 1898

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The Japse. standing squadron of 6 or 7 ships including 2 battleships to be joined shortly by the Yashima is still at Shimidzu for target practice, & the rest of the 2 doz[en] [ships] in commission are constantly moving ab[ou]t in Japan & the vicinity.

The Japse. fleet is thus ready for any purpose for wch. it may be required, but there are no signs of any active policy being adopted. Only, in the case of China making default [in indemnity payments] on 8 May, I presume Japan wld. do something, perh. make a demonstration at Wei hai wei. They are far more anxious however to get the money, without wch. they will be put to great straits [i.e. have great difficulty] to balance their Budget. Itō today said ¹ he wld. be much obliged if anything cld. be done to preserve them fr[om] the necessity of putting pressure on China, & I thought the matter important enough to justify my sending a telegram to you & to Sir C.[Claude] Macdonald [British minister at Peking].² Even if Russia & Germany interfered & prevented Japan putting pressure on China, the result wld. be an exacerbation of feeling here, wch. wld. at least be disagreeable for resident Europeans.

I saw Itō again this morning ³, & told him that you were aware of the negotiations of the Hgkg & S’hai Bank for a loan to pay off the bal[an]ce of the indemnity, but that H.M.G. had no idea of guaranteeing it. As Yano [Fumio] had telegraphed to him that the Bank “in consultation with the Br[itish] Min[ister]” proposed to offer a bond, he was anxious to

¹ See Satow’s diary, February 24, 1898 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 246).

² International telegrams were costly in the 1890s.

³ Satow seems to have been writing at speed and under pressure: he has already mentioned seeing Itō that day in the previous paragraph!

know how far H.M.G. were cognisant [aware] of it. He had been told fr[om] Peking that the Russian objection to a loan guaranteed by Engl[and] was that “it wld. endanger the peace of the Far East.” If he could feel sure that the pay[men]t in cash in 3 or 4 mos. time was safe, he wld. accept it as an equivalent to cash on the 8th May for the whole indemnity, but he seems inclined to insist in any case on the pay[men]t of 30 or 40 million dollars (3 or 4 million sterling) on May 8, the Chin[ese] Gov[ernmen]t guaranteeing the pay[men]t of the bond when it matures. He is evidently very anxious to get the money, & not at all desirous of embarking on any fresh adventures of a warlike nature.

But as to the ultimate fate of China he repeated that he did not believe in the possibility of political or administrative reforms, & that sooner or later other PP [Powers] wld. begin to lay hold of portions of territory. When that time comes G.B., he said, however much she may desire the maintenance of China’s territorial integrity, will be unable to resist the current, & will find herself compelled to abandon her present attitude of abstention.¹

In all this however there was no word of Japan claiming her share, a point on wch. his language differs fr[om] the repeated utterances of Count Ōkuma.

Itō is evidently his own foreign min[ister]. He always says “I did this” or “I shall do that”, & Nissi [Nishi Tokujirō²] for all the mention he makes of him might be non-existent.

He is going to app[oin]t a new Gov[ernor] Gen[era]l of Formosa, who it is to be hoped may succeed in introducing order into that badly governed over-administered island. He talks of asking [William M.H.] Kirkw[ood] who has been studying things on the spot for the past four months, to accept the post of councillor to the new Gov[ernor] Gen[era]l. This wd. be a very good arrange[men]t I do not doubt. Itō says he wishes to see foreigners treated with liberality there, so that they may be encouraged to introduce capital & develope [sic] the resources of the island.

I spoke to him abt. the constant reports that reach the diplomatic body of molestation of foreigners by the lower classes, & found him disposed to take up the matter seriously. The foreign residents at Kobe have lately memorialized us on this subject³, & there is a good

¹ Itō’s words were prophetic in that Britain did take Wei-hai-wei by a lease signed on 1 July 1898, giving Britain full jurisdiction for 25 years as long as Port Arthur remained in Russia’s possession. See Ian Nish, ‘The Royal Navy and the Taking of Weihaiwei, 1898-1905’, first published in *Mariner’s Mirror*, No. 54, 1967, pp. 39-54, and reproduced in *The Collected Writings of Ian Nish*, Vol. II, co-published by Japan Library and Edition Synapse, 2001.

² Satow described Nishi as “a very reticent person” in letter no. 5 above. See also letter no. 8, Satow to Salisbury on March 23, 1898 below; and letter no. 62, Satow to Salisbury, December 2, 1897 in PRO 30/33 14/9.

³ See Kobe consul J.C. Hall’s letters to Satow: letter no. 71, January 13, 1898; no. 74, January 25, 1898;

deal in what they say, but I do not want to be obliged to take official action nor do my coll[eague]s. We are all persuaded that the Japse. Govt. can do much to abate the evil complained of, but it is due in a large measure to the loosening of all social discipline by the events of the last 30 years. And the overweening opinion of their own prowess that the Japse. soldiery & coolies gained during the war with China have induced them to regard all foreigners with contempt.

Some days ago [on February 4th – see diary] I was visited by two Koreans [Rui Sei Nan and Shin Ong-hi] who said the time had come for the overthrow of Russian influence in the Peninsula, & they asked me to get [John Newell] Jordan to suggest the recall to power of Pak Yonghyo, an opponent of the late Queen, who some years ago took refuge in Japan. I told them I did not know Pak well enough to do this, but afterw[ar]ds reflecting that he might perh[aps] be a useful man for us, I telegd. to Jordan ¹ what they had said. It appeared however that he was not being consulted as to the formation of the Cabinet that came into being on the fall of Speyer's tool[?] Cho Pyöng-sik, so there was nothing to be done.

Hemming [the British legation's military attaché] has just shown me his report of what the Russian military agent here says abt. troops crossing into Kirin [in Manchuria]. Yanjoul says only 600 have entered the province, but he admits the machine guns. His estimate is just as likely to be under the mark as the Japse. intellig[ence] Depts.' to be over it.

There is a lull in the newspaper talk abt. an alliance betw. Japan & England, but every now and then appears an article dwelling on the evident nature of the understanding betw[een] Russia, Germany & France, & the necessity of opposing it by a combination between the "strongest eastern military power" & the "greatest maritime power in the world". The only man who has mentioned the subject to me lately [see diary for January 12th] is Aoki [Shūzō] the late Min. [Minister] at Berlin, but as he is rather in the shade, I did not think it worth while to say more to him than that Engl[and] only enters into alliances when the moment for action arrives.²

no. 75, January 29, 1898; no. 76, February 1, 1898; no. 77, February 3, 1898; no. 78, February 4, 1898; no. 83, February 19, 1898; no. 84, February 22, 1898; no. 86, March 3, 1898; no. 88, March 7, 1898; no. 97, April 24, 1898 and Satow's answer to Hall in no. 98, April 27, 1898. Hall to Satow, no. 99, May 11, 1898. (All these letters are in PRO 30/33 5/8.)

¹ John Newell Jordan (1852-1925) was Consul-General in Korea, 1896-98, Chargé d'Affaires 1898-1901, Minister Resident at Seoul, 1901 and H.B.M. Minister Resident at the Court of Korea, 1901-6. He succeeded Satow as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Peking, 1906-20. (See *Who Was Who*, 1916-1928, p.567).

² Satow's diary entry for January 12, 1898 includes the following: "Met Aoki, who discovered a great desire to have his finger in Japan's foreign politics. Said he could easily convey to [Finance minister]

Believe me etc.

P.S. I spoke to the Fr[ench] Ch. d’Aff. [Pourtalès] yesterday abt. the rumours with regard to Hainan. He said he had instructions, if he were asked, to deny that the Fr[ench] had any idea of taking poss[essio]n of the island. E.S.

7. Satow to Cockerell¹

Private 24 Feb.98

My dear Cockerell,

Before the time comes for making any recommendations for filling up Troup’s expected vacancy, I shld. like to have your opinion on what follows:

The expectation of the Consular service is that four out of the other five Consuls will be moved, each thereby gaining a small increase of salary, & a V.C. [Vice Consul] be promoted to Hakodate in place of Layard. This means moving all these men from posts where they have each been only one year, & the pay[men]t of five outfits [official clothing allowances]. Once the principle [has been] established, every time the Consul at Yoko[hama] goes, the same general post will have to be repeated.

I see no objection to giving men who have served in Formosa a move to the healthier climate of Japan proper, but I think it wld. be better to keep the men in Japan more stationary. They wld. then know something, as a rule, abt. the past history of affairs. But this could only be done by equalizing the salaries of the posts. At present these are:

Yoko[hama]	£ 1000
Kobe	£ 900
Naga[saki]	850
Tamsui	800
Anping	800

Inouye [Kaoru], who was a great friend of his, anything I wished to tell him. I dwelt upon the natural community of interests between naval Powers as opposed to the possessors of large land forces. If the latter could divide us, so that we neutralized each other, then they could rule the world. Also I thought that any such alteration [i.e. reduction] of Japan’s naval and military programme as was said to be advocated by Inouye and Katsura [Tarō] would be taken as a sign of weakness.” (Ruxton, 2003, p.229) Aoki also told Satow that he was working for an alliance between Japan and England on March 8th. On November 10th Satow attended Aoki’s first reception as foreign minister in the second Yamagata cabinet (November 8, 1898 – October 19, 1900).

¹ W.A. Cockerell’s answer to this letter is letter no. 19 dated March 31, 1898 in PRO 30/33 5/2.

Cockerell stated his preference for a readjustment of current salaries and a reluctance to apply to the Treasury for any increase in the total budget for Japan service salaries.

Hakodate 700

Could you get the Treasury to make the first 3 each £ 950. This would mean an increase of £100 in all.

In view of the abolition of extraterritoriality [effective from July 17, 1899]¹, it has been supposed that the work of the Consuls will decrease. But as it will be more troublesome to secure justice for B.S.s [British Subjects] in a Japse. Court than to dispense it in a consular court, I think they will have more [work] than before. That is a justification for a little extra expenditure.

Kōbe nowadays is quite as important a consular post as Yoko[hama], & in one sense more so, for at the latter place the Consul[ate?] does the greater part of the judicial work. But that will, we expect, come to an end in 18 mos. more. But the trade is as large & it is growing. Kōbe is further off than the Legation, whereas Yoko[hama] is close & can always be helped with advice fr[om] the Leg[atio]n.

The Min[ister] cld. then have the man he thought fittest in the more responsible post, whereas under present arrangements he cannot select without causing considerable heartburning.

Will you think over this & let me know your opinion in time.

[F.W.] Playfair ² has passed half the exam. in Japse, & will prob. be able to pass the rest in a few months. He is a good deal better man than [A.E.] Wileman ³, who is a flighty

¹ Extraterritoriality for British subjects in Japan was finally terminated on July 16, 1894 by a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed in London and subsequently ratified in Japan. The treaty came into force exactly five years later on July 17, 1899. See I. Ruxton, 'The Ending of Extraterritoriality in Japan', Chapter 7, *Turning Points in Japanese History*, ed. Bert Edström, Japan Library, 2002.

² Playfair, Frank William Walter (1859-1915). Appointed Student Interpreter in Japan, March 30, 1880. Acting Consul at Hiogo in 1887, 1888, 1889 and 1894-98. Pro-Consul at Hiogo, 1887-90; Yokohama 1890 and 1891; and Hiogo, 1894-98. Promoted to be Consul for Hakodate consular district, to reside there, August 4, 1898. Transferred to Shimonoseki as Consul, April 1, 1901. Was also in charge of Austro-Hungarian interests at Shimonoseki. Transferred to Tamsui, May 21, 1903; and to Nagasaki, December 22, 1904. Retired on a pension, October 1, 1909. Died at Edinburgh, August 18, 1915. [abstracted from F.O. List, 1916]

³ Alfred Ernest Wileman (1860-1929). Appointed Student Interpreter in Japan, July 4, 1882. Acting Japanese Secretary from June 7, 1892 to October 29, 1894. Assistant in the Japanese Secretary's Office from October 30, 1894 to March 31, 1896. Acting Registrar to the Court for Japan from April 1, 1896 to February 21, 1897. Promoted to be H.M. Vice-Consul for Hiogo and Osaka, to reside at Hiogo, December 28, 1896. Acting Consul at Hiogo on various occasions in 1898. Transferred to Hakodate as Vice-Consul, April 1, 1901. Promoted to be Consul at Tainan, May 21, 1903. Acting Consul-General at Yokohama in 1907. Transferred to Honolulu, June 1, 1908 (did not proceed). Promoted to be Consul-General for the Philippines, to reside at Manila, November 2, 1909. Coronation Medal, 1911. Retired on a pension, October 24, 1914. [extracted from F.O. List, 1930, in Kuwata, 2003, p.481]

creature & I shld. like to recommend him as Layard's successor to Hakodate, sub conditione. Wileman may perh[aps] improve if he is left in tutelage under the consul at Kōbe till the next vacancy occurs.

8. Satow to Salisbury

23 Mar. 1898

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

There is nothing to add to my despatch abt. Wei-hai-wei except that when Itō asked me to go & speak to Nishi [on March 16th – see diary] he added 'Never mind what he says to you', a sufficient indication of the unimportant position he holds in the Cabinet. The only other influential man in the Cabinet is Inouye [Kaoru], the Min[ister] of Finance. He & Itō together decide everything of importance.

Nishi continues to be extremely taciturn. What he knows he keeps to himself. As he knows Russian well, he translates all the Notes fr[om] the Russian legation himself, instead of sending them to the proper dept.

The principal object of the Japse. Cabinet at the present moment is to get the indemnity, as they are seriously hampered in their finance. And next to that is their desire to keep the peace till they obtain all the ships they have ordered. As far as I can find out they did not make much remonstrance agst. the engagement of Russian military instructors & of the financial adviser ¹, as they counted upon the Koreans becoming restive sooner or later, and I have no doubt that they worked to stimulate the anti-Russian feeling wch. has now come to a head.

The last time I saw Itō, wch. was on the 19th [of March – see diary], he said they had recd. no news fr[om] their Minister at Peking [Yano Fumio] abt. the French demands, tho' there was a very full teleg. in one of the morning papers. I did not feel convinced that he knew

¹ In August 1896 the Russian General Staff despatched Colonel Strel'bitski as its military agent and D.D. Pokotilov as its financial agent (adviser), with a small detachment of Russian officers and NCOs to assist in reorganizing the Korean army. In June 1897 K.A. Alexeev, an official of the Russian customs service, was appointed financial agent in Korea. In September Alexis de Speyer, former chargé d'affaires in the Russian legation at Tokyo, arrived in Seoul to replace Karl I. Waeber. When Alexeev arrived in October 1897, Speyer tried to have him appointed director of the Korean Customs Service. When the finance minister refused, Speyer had the pro-Russian foreign minister make the appointment. "Despite his dismissal, the incumbent customs director, McLeavy Brown, a feisty Englishman, refused to leave his post...In late October the impasse was resolved after a squadron of British warships under Admiral Buller put in at Inchon...A compromise was reached: Brown was reinstated, and Alexeev was placed under him." (from Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, pp. 121-123)

nothing, in spite of his denial.

I had written thus far when I recd. Y[our] L[ordship's] teleg[ram] remarking on the coldness of the Japse. ans[wer] abt. Wei-hai-wei, & asking whether it was not possible that they had obtained some understanding as to Port Arthur not being used as a naval port in return for their acquiescence in a Russian occupation of Wei-hai-wei. I regret I did not at the time point out to Baron Nishi that his ans[wer] was not as explicit as our ? [question]. The evening of the 16th, the day on wch. I first spoke to him, G.L. [Legation Secretary Gerard Lowther] was dining with the Russian Secretary Poklevsky [Stanislas Poklevsky-Koziell], who told him the Germans were hankering after W.H.W. [Wei-hai-wei] wch. he said wld. never do, & G.L. fancied P. was trying to draw him [i.e. get Lowther to reveal British intentions regarding Wei-hai-wei]. The same night the Russians were very busy telegraphing, & the next morning P[oklevsky] with Chichkine the 2nd military attaché went off to Nagasaki. It is possible they were teleg[raphin]g abt. the Corean business, but it is also on the cards that Nishi, who is very friendly with [Russian minister] Rosen may have told him of our move abt. Wei-hai-wei. Still I have no reason to think this likely. At Nagasaki P. saw the Russian Admiral, & the new Ch. d'Aff[aires] for Corea, ¹ who I learn has come up to Tokio. It had been announced some time ago that he wld. do this en route for his post. That Rosen shld. particularly wish to see him abt. the change of affairs in Corea wld. be very natural, but I do not quite understand why he sent off P[oklevsky] in such a hurry.

I thought it wld. be well to try and clear up the ambiguity of Nishi's ans[wer] & so went to Ito this afternoon [March 23rd – see diary]. After talking abt. the loan wch. he told me was a great success, & their evacuation of W.H.W. wch. he said wld. take place on the 8 May, I remarked casually that Nishi's ans[wer] was not quite as clear as our question. We had said 'have you any objection to England going there?' He had replied 'no objection to any P[ower] that wld. support the integrity of the Chinese empire.'

He [Itō] laughed & said 'that means England. We were afraid that some day a question might be asked in the House of Commons & that it wld. be replied we had agreed to England going there. That is the reason why we put it in the way we did.'²

¹ Speyer only lasted as Minister at Seoul from September 1897 to March 1898. Nikolai G. Matunin was Russian minister in Korea, April 1898-January 1899. See J.H. Longford's letter to Satow, no. 62, March 21, 1898 in which he describes the movements of the Russians at Nagasaki. (PRO 30/33 5/10)

² On April 1, 1898 Japan was informed of the British intention to take a lease of Weihaiwei and was asked for her official approval. (Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p. 57) The Japanese cabinet's reply on April 2nd was a non-committal approval, expressing 'concurrence' but not 'support'. In a speech

I assured him he need not have been under any anxiety, as Nishi had asked me to treat the matter as confidential, & that I had telegd. his request to Y[our] L[ordship].

On the whole I am inclined to think that he was acting straightforwardly. I cld. not put a direct question abt. Russia, but said: 'I daresay you know that not only Germany, as you told me the other day, but some other power has her eye on W.H.W.' to wch. he smilingly said 'Yes, I know.'

At the outside I think he is not likely to have given the Russians a more explicit ans[wer] than to ourselves. As he says, the concession of r[ai]lw[a]y construction fr[om] Kirin to Port Arthur means practically that Manchuria will be in the hands of Russia. Holding that view I think he wld. not care very much whether Port Arthur were a fortified Russian port or not. He said with apparent indifference that what Russia had told them she wanted was 'a naval base'.

Of course nothing wld. please Japan better than to see England & Russia come to blows, & one must take that into account in estimating the probabilities.

Talking of a rumour – that the Russians [had] advanced into Mongolia, of wch. he said there was no confirmation, he expressed the opinion that Russia wld. not need to keep troops in the interior of Asia, but wld. concentrate them on the eastern seaboard. In a few years she wld. have 100,000 men there.

I asked him if he had any information abt. the Fr[ench] demands, & it appeared that the Fr[ench] Sec[retar]y at Peking had told Yano all about them. He thought the Chinese wld. refuse, but doubted their being able to resist. How far the Russ[ian] negotiations had gone he did not seem to know, except that Russia had refused to treat [negotiate] at Petersburg. The envoy had been politely treated, & sent abt. his business. He remarked that Russia had promised to make Talienwan an open port, after the fashion of the other ports in China, but that implied the exercise of Chinese sovereignty there, wch. of course was impracticable.

As to Corea, the recent turn of events there did not seem to interest him greatly. The Coreans might talk as much as they liked abt. maintaining their independence, but it was

to the House of Commons on April 5th Arthur James Balfour, the Leader of the Conservative Party in the Commons, carefully avoided any reference to negotiations or discussions about Wei-hai-wei with the Japanese government. The Duke of Devonshire however, deputising for Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords on the same day, was much less discreet. Japan had 'wanted to avoid giving offence to Russia and therefore insisted that her limited undertakings over Weihaiwei be kept secret.' (Nish, p. 60.) On April 20th Balfour expressed his regret at the indiscretion through Francis L. Bertie to the Japanese minister in London, Katō Takaaki. (*Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, vol. 31, pp. 432-33, and 437-440). (Nagaoka, vol. 2, pp. 93-94)

impossible for them to sink their differences, & they must always be under the influence of one P[ower] or another.

The last time I saw him [on March 19th – see diary] he [Itō] had said that a conference wld. have to be held abt. China ¹, but the time had not yet come. Recurring to this I asked him his meaning. He said it wld. be when the PP. [Powers] all discovered that China cld. make no resistance, for then they must come to an agreement among themselves, if they did not wish something worse [i.e. a war over China between them] to happen.

The other day I remarked to him that it was a pity Japan had not insisted on the condition they had at first proposed, when surrendering Liaotung [peninsula in 1895], that it shld. not be ceded to any other P[ower]. He said he regretted it now, but at the time he had not expected the recent development [i.e. the Russian occupation by lease of Port Arthur and Dairen on the Liaotung peninsula at the end of March 1898] arising out of the [German] occupation of Kiaochow [on November 14, 1897].

Another thing he said today was that the interests of Russia in Corea were territorial, while those of Japan were commercial.

The Russian Legation gives out as the explanation of the withdrawal fr[om] Corea that now they are sure of getting Manchuria they do not care any longer for Corea. ² Rosen said the other day that Speyer had a mania for establishing the predominance of Russia in Corea, wch. no one else shared.

I think myself that the Japse. will not feel any particular gratitude towards Russia for withdrawal, because they themselves have in a secret manner contributed so much to make the position of the Russians impossible.

Past history seems to show that Corea is not a country that can be effectively dominated by a foreign P[ower] except at great cost, & by keeping up an army of occupation. The Chinese have never been able to do more than maintain a shadowy sort of suzerainty [based

¹ On March 19, 1898 Itō ‘observed that a conference about China seemed to be necessary, and I asked if he had any intention of proposing one. He replied that the time had not yet arrived. I rose to go, and added what a pity it was that Japan had not insisted with China on her stipulating not to cede to any other power [when Japan was obliged to vacate the Liaotung peninsula in 1895], to which he replied that he had not expected the present development to take place.’ (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.256)

² On March 19, 1898 ‘[Foreign minister] Nishi [Tokujirō] proposed to Russia that, if she would entrust Korea to Japan, Japan would in turn recognize Manchuria as being outside her sphere of interest. This was a formula which was to be repeated by Japan at regular intervals down to 1904, and came to be known as Man-Kan Kōkan (literally, the exchange of Manchuria for Korea). On this occasion Russia replied on 2 April that she could not consider excluding Russian power completely from Korea. (Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 31/I, no. 141)’ (From I. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p.58)

on Confucian principles of filial loyalty], tho' they have conquered the country more than once.

As betw[een] ourselves and the Russians, I think the Japse. govt. will always be naturally more inclined towards them. They fear the military power of the Russians, but then Russia leaves them alone in their own country, while Engl[ish] people come here in numbers to trade & are constantly giving the officials trouble of all sorts, establishing interests abt. wch. the Legation & consulates are always worrying them. We are not really welcome, & I do not think we shall find that facilities will be willingly given to our people in the way of commerce or manufactures. ¹ The new Treaties [abolishing extraterritoriality, effective from 1899] will give a much greater power of obstruction than they now possess, & the ideal of the Japse. will continue to be what it has always been, the 'expulsion of the barbarians', not by force any more, but by policy. I do not mean expulsion literally, but in the sense of 'Japan for the Japanese'.

The Corean political exile Pak [Yong-hyo, 1861-1939] ² came to see me on the 2nd. [See diary] I found his idea for putting things on a sound basis was to make the King [Kojong] abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince, who was to be helped, by the Prince now in America (Wi-hwa) & a 'strong' cabinet of patriots. I do not think the Japse. are anxious for him to go back, & that is why he is trying to return by our aid. Since last week his desire has become more lively, but I do not propose to say anything more on his behalf to [John Newell] Jordan [see letter no. 6 above].

¹ How would Lord Salisbury have received this paragraph? He had exhorted Satow to pay great attention to commercial matters in his only letter to him (PRO 30/33 5/2, no.3 dated October 3, 1895). He might well have felt that Satow was giving excuses for neglecting his instructions.

² 'Only thirty-three years old when appointed to the cabinet, Pak Yŏng-hyo had spent much of his adult life outside Korea...he had been adopted into the royal family at the age of eleven as the consort of King Ch'ŏlchong's only daughter. Although Pak's child bride died soon after the betrothal, his ties to the royal family gave him a status and prestige that guaranteed a successful official future. His appointment as the chief envoy of the 1882 mission to Japan was a turning point in his life. Returning home an enthusiastic advocate of Japanese-style modernization, he plunged into a series of reform projects – the creation of a police office, a new road system for Seoul, a newspaper, and a modern-style military unit while serving as a local magistrate in Seoul and Kwangju. Eyed with suspicion by members of the Min faction, he was soon ousted from his official post. Frustrated by the stubborn conservatism of the court, the disgruntled young man joined with Kim Ok-kiun and others in the conspiracy to oust the Min from power in 1884.' (Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, p.88) In 1888 Pak composed an "Eight Point Proposal" addressed to King Kojong, listing 114 suggestions for reform. He was also responsible for setting up a private school with a dormitory for Koreans in Ichiban-chō, Tokyo, called Shinrin Gijuku (Ch'inrin Uisuk) in 1893. In this venture he had the nominal support of Soejima Taneomi, Ōkuma Shigenobu, Itagaki Taisuke, Shinagawa Yajirō and Tani Kanjō. (*Tōkyō nichinichi*, Nov. 22, 1893, quoted in *Meiji nyūsu jiten*, 5, p.744)

The Japanese seem very anxious to engage Kirkwood's services in Formosa, & are discussing with him the terms of a contract.

B[elieve] m[e]

D[ear] L[ord] S[alisbury] y[ours] v[ery] t[ruly] E[rnest] S[atow]

9. Satow to Curzon

Tokio

24 Mar. 1898

Dear Mr. Curzon,

Kirkwood has shown me a letter he has written to you abt. Formosa in wch. he suggests that the new [Anglo-Japanese] Treaty [of Commerce and Navigation, 1894] shld. be brought into operation as regards Japan only, Formosa remaining under the old Treaty for the present. I have mentioned this matter in some of my recent despp. [despatches] & will only say now that I am certain the Br[itish] merchants in Formosa wld. be quite contented, provided that the arrangement respecting the camphor industry wch. Japan has consented to, be continued sine die [i.e. indefinitely]. The Germ[an] Ch. d'Aff[aires] C.G. von Treutler spoke to me lately [on March 10th – see diary] abt. this suggestion of postponing the application of the new Treaty in Formosa, wch. had been mentioned in the Japse. press, & I gathered fr[om] him that if Japan proposed it, he wld. think the opportunity a good one for making a bargain, possibly for an arrangement of the Nagasaki foreshore question, that wld. be advantageous to German landholders.

I have written a long private letter to Lord S. [see previous letter] abt. the Japse. attitude regarding Wei hai wei, & therefore have not extended my telegram of yesterday on the subject. I suppose we may expect that both Germany & Russia will be very much annoyed if we succeed the Japse. there. But looking to the possibility of the Japse. sooner or later imposing a limit on the no. of foreign men-of-war [warships] admitted to their ports, it will be very useful to have a place where the northern portion of our squadron can be during the winter. A Japse. newspaper this morning [margin note: Mainichi] says that Russia, Germany & England are all anxious abt. the future of W.H.W., but as the press some time ago began to talk of our succeeding the Japse, it is unlikely that anything has been let out by the Min[ister] President [Itō] or Min[ister] for F[oreign] A[ffairs] [Nishi] regarding our negotiations.

It is telegraphed fr[om] Söul that [Aleksi de] Speyer has been recalled by his

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Gov[ernmen]t, but a paper this morning w[hi]ch I think has relations with the Russian Legation says it is prob[able] that he is going home to take instructions with regard to the line he is to take at Peking. The gen[era]l opinion here is that he has made a fiasco.

y.v.t.

10. Satow to Eric Barrington (1847-?)

24 Mar. 1898

My dear Barrington,

[Gerard Augustus] Lowther ¹ is going home by this Canadian mail [steamer], but prob[ably] will not reach London for a fortnight or so after this letter. I cannot say enough in his praise, & if you are not able to give him something better when his leave terminates I shall be very glad to see him back again.

[Ralph Spencer] Paget ² has been unwell for some time past, the consequence of a chill, & the doctor advised[?] him a sea-voyage. So he has gone to Nagasaki, & if by the time he gets there his trouble is not at an end, will prob[ably] go on to HongKong. In any case he will not be absent more than 3 wks. or so. Till his return [John Harington/Harrington?] Gubbins ³ will use the Chancery.

Montagu [sic] Kirkwood is writing to Curzon abt. a son of his eldest brother for whom

¹ See entries for Lowther in the Foreign Office List, 1917; the *Times*, April 6, 1916; and Who Was Who, 1916-1928. All of these are cited in Kuwata, 2003, pp. 343-345. Lowther became British ambassador at Constantinople in 1908, a rank which Satow never attained himself. Lowther “was among the first to detect the cloven hoof under the mantle of liberalism with which the young Turks had originally clothed themselves.” (*Times* obituary). Letters from Lowther to Satow are in PRO 30/33 5/5.

² (Sir) Ralph Spencer Paget (1864-1940), Britain’s first ambassador to Brazil 1918-20, KCMG 1909, PC 1919. Retired 1920. “After a year spent in Washington Paget was in July 1893 transferred to the Legation at Tokyo, where he stayed for six years, during the last four of which he served under Sir E. Satow. He saw the Sino-Japanese War [of 1894-95] and the subsequent Russian intervention and occupation of Port Arthur, events that led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Japan still retained the charm of unspoilt remoteness and was known to few Europeans other than sailors and missionaries. Paget delighted in his time there and travelled extensively through the islands. He was happier in the distant posts than in the normal, urban, and urbane diplomatic atmosphere of Europe.” (*Times* obituary, May 13, 1940) Paget was Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo, June 5 to August 20, 1894. Promoted to 2nd Secretary, January 24, 1895 and transferred to Cairo, January 6, 1899. (F.O. List, 1941) [See Kuwata, 2003, pp. 382-384 for full entries.]

³ Both entries from F.O. List 1930 and *Who Was Who*, 1929-1940 cited in Kuwata, 2003, p. 282 give his name as John Harington Gubbins. However, he is called ‘John Harrington Gubbins’ in Ian Nish, *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits*, Volume II, Ch.8, pp. 107-119. The former seems more likely. For letters from J.H. Gubbins to Satow see PRO 30/33 5/4. Gubbins was Japanese Secretary at Tokyo from June 1, 1889. Given local rank of 2nd Secretary to the Tokyo legation, February 13, 1890. Made a CMG, May 21, 1898. Acting Chargé d’Affaires in Korea from May 18, 1900 to November 4, 1901.

he desires the post of honorary attaché. I have told Kirkwood that if you approved of the young gentleman I shld. have no objection.

y.v.t.

11. Satow to Francis L. Bertie (1844-1919)

24 Mar. 1898

My dear Bertie,

I wrote by last mail to Cockerell [letter no. 7 above dated February 24, 1898] suggesting the equalization of the Consular posts at Yoko[hama], Kōbe & Naga[saki], in order to do away with the assumed necessity of making new app[oin]tm[en]ts to all three in consequence of [James] Troup's retirement. Of course it must be some time before I get a reply. In the meantime I propose to appt. [Ralph George Elliott] Forster ¹ acting Consul gen. at Yoko[hama] so as to dislocate the service as little as possible, & he will take charge on April 1. He has been at Yoko. over a year & knows the run of the place.

My proposals wld. be to leave [Joseph Henry] Longford ² & [John Carey] Hall at

¹ Ralph George Elliott Forster (1865-1931). Son of barrister-at-law Ralph William Elliott Forster. Educated at Westminster School (Queen's Scholar). Student Interpreter in Japan, 1886. Acting Consul at Nagasaki on various occasions. Japanese Interpreter to Sir E. Fremantle on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-5. Acting Consul-General at Yokohama on various occasions. H.M. Vice-Consul at Hakodate, 1903. Consul at Honolulu (1909) and Nagasaki (1912). H.B.M. Consul-General, Kobe, Japan, 1914-26 when he retired on a pension. Recreations: lawn tennis, walking. Club: Thatched House. (abstracted from *Who Was Who*, 1929-40)

² Joseph Henry Longford (1849-1925). Emeritus Professor of Japanese, King's College, London University, 1916. Vice-President, Japan Society, London, 1922. Son of Charles Longford of Blackrock, co. Dublin. BA Queen's University in Ireland; Dlit, Queen's University of Ulster, 1919. Entered HM Consular Service in Japan as Student Interpreter, 1869. Served for 33 years, travelling throughout Japanese Empire, from Kurile Islands to Formosa. Successively HM Consul and Judge of HM Consular Courts at Tokio, Hiogo, Hakodate, Tainan, Tamsui, and Nagasaki. Retired on a pension in 1902. Called to Bar, Middle Temple, 1889. Professor of Japanese, King's College, London, 1903-16. Nominated on HM's behalf as one of the suite of Prince Komatsu who represented the Emperor of Japan at King Edward's Coronation (Coronation medal). Received from Emperor of Japan, silver wedding medal, Order of the Rising Sun, and, on occasion of visit to London of Crown Prince, Order of the Sacred Treasure. Chairman of Japan Society, London, 1921-22. Publications: *Penal Code of Japan*, 1877; *Japan (Living Races of Mankind)*, 1905; *The Regeneration of Japan (Cambridge Modern History)*, 1910; *The Story of Old Japan*, 1910; *The Story of Korea*, 1911; *Japan of the Japanese*, 1911; *The Evolution of New Japan*, 1913; *Japan (Spirit of the Allied Nations)*, 1915; *Japan (Harmsworth Encyclopedia)*, 1920; *Japan (Nations of Today)*, 1923; contributions to the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* and of the *Japan Society*, London, and, principally on Japanese subjects, to the *Quarterly*, *Fortnightly* and *National Reviews*, *The Nineteenth Century* and other *Reviews*, and to the *Press*; numerous *Reports*, principally on industrial subjects in Japan, issued by the Foreign Office. Recreations: boating, walking, cricket (spectator), bridge. Address: 10 Esmond Road, Bedford Park W. T: Chiswick 2387. Clubs: Reform; Royal Irish Yacht. Died May 12, 1925. (extracted from *Who Was Who*, 1916-1928)

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Naga[saki] & Kōbe & to bring [H.A.C.] Bonar to Yoko., sending Layard to Tamsui & [F.W.] Playfair to Hakodate, the latter on the condition that he passes the rest of his Japse. exam. [E.A.] Wileman has telegd. asking me to recommend him for Hako[date], but I think Playfair wld. be a better choice.

I shld. propose not to give the title of Consul-genl. to the man at Yoko. It was given to Troup I suppose mainly as a recognition of long service.

If the Treasury will not agree to equalizing the pay at Yoko[hama], Kōbe & Naga[saki], then I shld. propose to take £100 off Yoko. & add it to Kōbe. But I shld. greatly prefer the equalization of the three.

Fr[om] what I have seen of Longford as a Consul during the past two yrs., I think him wanting in temper & discretion. He is very anti-Jap[ane]se, & the larger his field of work the more this disposition wld. show itself. Bonar on the contrary gets on well with them, & has given me entire satisfaction at Tamsui.

If you approve of these suggested apptmts. perh[aps] they could be made direct fr. F.O. & then I need not write an official desp[atch] on the subject.

y.v.t.

12. Satow to Seymour

extr[act] fr[om] letter to Vice Ad[miral] Sir Edw[ard] Seymour.

28/3/98

I am afraid the efforts of H.M.G. to prevent China being taken by the throat are not destined to command either sympathy or success. We gave the whole position away 2 years ago when Mr. Balfour declared in a speech at Bristol [on February 3, 1896] ¹ that there was no objection to Russia obtaining an outlet to the Pacific. We have tried to insist on her being contented with a commercial port, but that is not what she wants, which is a naval base.

y.v.t.

E.S.

13. Satow to Seymour

Admiral Sir Ed. Seymour

April 1. 1898

Dear Sir Ed.

¹ See I. Nish, *Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p.43.

I have heard in a roundabout way thro' Paget, who has just returned fr. Nagasaki, & Longford our consul there, that an idea seems to prevail among the officers of the squadron that relations are unsatisfactory betw. G.B. and Japan & that they think the ships that are coming out are intended to be used agst. the Japse. in case of need. I do not think, as far as I know fr. home, that there is any ground for such an idea, except that Admiral Buller & I had enquiries fr. home abt. the end of the year as to the whereab[ou]ts of the Japse. fleet, the number of ships in commission & their movements. No explanation was given to us why this information was required, but some w[ee]ks afterw[ar]ds when I read the "Times", I found in it a teleg. fr. Yoko[hama] or Shanghai, that the Japse. fleet was cruising off the Gōtō Islands prepared for all eventualities, & suggesting that German doings at Kiaochou were the cause. As you know, there was not a word of truth in all this, & the Japse. fleet has not left Yokosuka except to go to Shimidzu for target practice & manoeuvres, & is now back again. But H.M.G. reading this teleg[ram] & getting no news fr[om] me, evidently was anxious & assuming that I did not keep them properly informed, telegd. out to me to have an eye on the Japse. fleet, & report to them, informing Ad. Buller at the same time. He was as much perplexed at first as I was. It is inconceivable to me that the Japse. shld. be our opponents in this part of the world. The Japse. Govt. want to get the bal[ance] of the indemnity & clear out of Wei Hai Wei, & have no objection to our succeeding them. I have had instructions to put this to them officially & have done so with a satisfactory result.

Today there is a teleg. fr. Peking in the papers that Sir C[laude] M[acdonald] has asked [the Chinese Government] for a lease of W.H.W. when the Japse. leave, so now everyone knows what your concentration in the gulf [of Pechili] is ab[ou]t.

It is possible Longford may have unconsciously exaggerated some talk over the dinner table. He did not know anything abt. the situation & so cld. ans[wer] no questions. It is only within the last few days that I have been told by the F.O. what their policy is.

y.v.t.

14. Satow to Salisbury

6 April 1898

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

I suppose I am not far wrong in concluding that if Japan had replied that our demand for a lease of Wei-hai-wei wld. receive their concurrence and support, this country wd. have thereby committed itself to something like a promise of joint diplomatic action, at least in

the Chinese question.

Fr. various conversations during the past 3 yrs. with men in the Cabinet & outside I have derived the impression that they do not desire to take any active part in the affairs of the Far East till their military & naval preparations are completed, wch. they calculate will be in 1902, and only yesterday Inouye the Minister of Finance repeated this to me. He said that they expected a conflict with Russia then on a considerable scale.

Until that time arrives the present men desire that Japan shld. preserve a watchful attitude, & abstain fr. opposing the plans of Russia by any overt diplomatic action. Unless it took the form of a defensive alliance, I do not think they wld. accept any proposition for joint action of any kind fr. our side. That wld. be a deviation fr. the line of policy they have laid down for themselves, & consistently pursued since the intervention of the 3 PP in 1895. On that occasion I believe they asked Ld. Kimberley for material assistance, wch. was refused. The genl. opinion of Japse. is that they are not yet strong enough to offer us an equivalent for our alliance. Without it they cannot run the risk of offending any of the 3 PP by giving us diplomatic “support”. And at the present moment they are the more unwilling, because they hope to regain their position [in] Corea, abt. wch. I am now sure they are negotiating with Russia. The precise nature of the negotiation I do not yet know, and possibly it may not go beyond the modification of the Russo-Corean convention abt. the management of Corean finance wch. Ct. Mouravieff intimated to Sir Nicholas O’Conor he was willing to make.

At the same time they are I have no doubt very desirous of remaining on good terms with us. It is apparent fr. their confidential utterances, & if the language of the press be taken into acct., they look on us as their friends. The genl. abstention fr. any hostility towards Engl. à propos of W.H.W., coupled with violent denunciations of Russia & Germany, is very marked. France is sometimes coupled with these 2 PP, but is attacked less strongly, as she has not yet shown her hand very openly, & in any case her action is likely to be in a more remote region.

The history of their Verbal note is curious. It was originally drafted by an American named Denison, legal adviser to the For. Dept., & wld. have been in exact conformity with mine. The Cabinet Council met at ten and sat till six in the evening. Early in the afternoon the dft. was brought back to him completely emasculated. He said the ans[wer] was a foolish one, and after much wrangling got his own restored. But when he saw it again after it had been approved by the Cabinet & delivered to me by Komura, he noticed the absence of the word ‘support’ & pointed out to Komura that they were asking more than they were

willing to offer. This was precisely the language I had used myself, but Komura replied to him that I was quite satisfied! This story was given by Denison to Gubbins on the evening of the 4th, & there is no doubt of its correctness.

I have not seen Itō since, who has been away, but yesterday I had a talk with Inouye & said much the same things as I had said to Komura & Itō, only rather stronger. He replied that they were afraid the note verbale might be quoted in the House of Commons, & that it wld. create trouble for them with the 3 PP. I assured him he need not fear its being divulged, but of course I cld. not guarantee that Engl. wld. back them up ag[ain]st the Far Eastern Triple Alliance. But I said to him as fr. myself that I regretted they had omitted ‘support’, for in doing so they had nipped in the bud what might have grown into a goodly tree. It was then that he said they were not ready, & I told him various people had come to me & talked of an alliance, but I always told them ‘the time is not yet’. This, I saw, exactly fell in with his own ideas. Abt. W.H.W. he said both Germany & Russia were after it, & as China was not strong enough to keep it for herself, he was very glad we were going there.

We had a long talk abt. finance & the gold standard, as I had asked him for the information required by the Govt. of India. He said that without the recent loan to China & the payt. of the balance of the indemnity, Japan wld. have been in great straits, & he talked of a loan for productive public works in London next year. He is doing all he can to prevent the outflow of gold, wch. might end, if not stopped, in bringing them back to a forced currency.

Up to the present moment no one here seems to suspect that we have sounded Japan abt. W.H.W. I have told Sir Claude & the Admiral confidentially.

15. Satow to Salisbury

8 April 1898

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

In my No 52 of today I have endeavoured to say what the meaning is of the Japse. suggestion that they may hereafter claim ‘compensation’ for what the PP are taking in China. Fr. Gubbins’ conversations with Denison it is not quite clear whether the suggestion came fr. the latter or not, but I incline to think it did. At any rate he drafted the verbal note. The amended draft as it came to him fr. the Cabinet said nothing abt. the defences or interests of Japan. I conclude therefore that the Japse. Govt. have no serious intention of acquiring a port on the Chinese coast, & that the paragraph is “une blague”.

What is going on in China will, it seems to me, tend to intensify the anti foreign feeling wch. prevails so widely in this country.

16. Satow to Bertie

9 April/98

My dear Bertie,

I shld. like to add to my recommendations in my last letter to you abt. the distribution of consular posts in consequence of Troup's retirement that Rentiers sh[ou]ld be promoted to be First Assistant.

In the event of new commissions being issued for Tamsui and Tainan, the consular districts shld. be defined as in the enclosure to this.

y.v.t.

H.M. Cons[ul] for the Prefectures of Taihoku (Taipeh), Shuichiku, Taichiu and the subpref[ectu]re of Ginan, to reside at Tamsui.

H.M. Cons. for the Prefectures of Kagi, Tainan & Hōzan, the subprefre. of Taitō and the Pecadores, to reside at Anping.

17. Satow to Salisbury

14/4/98

Dear Ld. S,

My private source of information ¹ tells me that Russia appears to have said that Japan may do what she likes in Corea, but that she is unlikely to be in a hurry to take advantage of the permission. Itō, if [he] has any idea of obtaining compensation in China, has not let any one guess what is passing in his mind. In his opinion those who wld. urge a strong foreign policy have no knowledge of the relative strength of Japan & Europ. PP. War with one of the latter wld. be a very different business fr. war with China. As long as Japan herself is not attacked, the only policy for her is to remain quiet. Perh. the PP. may fall out among themselves. The Cabinet is delighted at our going to W.H.W., & it is that wch. keeps the Army & Navy quiet. It is the intention to withdraw their troops punctually, on receiving payt. in acc. with the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

I think the foregoing may be relied on as correct.

The press has discovered, as it thinks, that there is an understanding as to W.H.W. betw.

¹ Asaina Kansui, whom Satow met on April 12, 1898 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 266).

England & Japan, & the opposition papers continue to urge that Japan shld. obtain compensation somewhere on the Chinese coast. But nobody has hinted at anything of the kind to me, & I have refrained fr[om] asking what is meant by the “similar measures” hinted at in the Japse. verbal note.

Nishi’s complaint abt. the language reported to have been used in Parlt. in speaking of his desire that the Japse. reply shld. be treated confidentially is due partly to his somewhat imperfect knowledge of Engl. & partly to the Japse. habit of teleg[raphin]g in a language they are not masters of. I have tried to soothe him, & I hope that I may get an ans. that will clear the matter up. Komura, who told me the deciphering clerk put in the commas where he thought they were needed, seemed much more reasonable. I fancy he & Nishi are not quite pulling together.

With regard to the teleg. fr. Petersburg abt. Rosen having proposed to Nishi to join Russia in a protest abt. our lease of W.H.W., I suspect that Rosen did in reality make some such proposal, tho’ Nishi denied it. Komura admitted to me that there had been a conversation abt. WHW, tho’ he professed not to know its tenor. In that case something may have been telegd. to Hayashi, to give him an idea of how the land lay – if as I conjecture Sir N. O’Conor’s informant was Hayashi.

18. Satow to Seymour

3.5.98

Dr. Sir Edward,

Many thanks for your note of April 21, wch. reached me last night. It will I suppose be quite impossible for you to visit Japan until Wei hai wei has been taken over, & that I suppose can hardly come to pass much before the end of this month. Sir Claude telegs. to me that the Japse. Govt. had informed their Min. at Peking that evacuation wld. take place within 4 w[ee]ks after the pay[men]t of the indemnity, & acc[ording] to the acc[oun]ts we have pay[men]t is to be made on the 6th inst. The Japse. Prime Min. [Itō] told me on April 19 that it wld. take a little time, & asked if we were in a hurry. ¹ I replied by referring him to the language I had been instructed to use to him, namely that H.M.G. had no desire to hasten the date of evacuation by Japan. Since then I have not seen him to talk business, & have thought it better not to appear in a hurry abt. the matter.

He also suggested that Japan had spent a good deal on barracks & other buildings, &

¹ See Satow’s diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.269.

asked whether I thought H.M.G. would take them over. Not having any information on this point, I said he had better approach H.M.G. thro' the Japse. Min. in London.

The Russians & Japse. have signed some sort of new agreement abt. Corea, but I gather it does not amount to more than a confirmation of the agreements made in 1896, & that Russia has no intention of abandoning her condominium in that country. And the Japse. quite see this. They do not expect to gain a preponderating position there.

Some of the opposition papers are urging Japan to lease a port somewhere in Fuhkien, on the ground that it is necessary to have a station fr. which they can control the export of arms & ammunition to Formosa. To my mind this wld. be a mere pretext, but I do not feel sure that the Govt., anxious to show a diplomatic success to the Diet, may not take this step. I do not think they consulted H.M.G. before asking China for the engagement not to cede Fuhkien to any other Power. The Min. for F.A. [Nishi] is particularly secretive, & I never get anything out of him. He has been long in Russia, speaks Russian & is très lié [very closely linked] with my R. coll:

The [Spanish-American] war has caused much activity among the ships of the standing squadron. It is given out that the Fuji, Yashima & 1 or 2 others are to cruise in the vicinity of Formosa for the purpose of watching over Japse. neutrality. As there is no Formosan port where they cld. anchor (except Keelung) I shld. not be surprised to hear they had called at Samsha. At this moment the Fuji, Yashima, Hashidate & Itsukushima are at Susaki on the S. coast of Shikoku. 3 cruisers it is said are on their way to Manila to protect Japanese interests.

Since the beginning of the year we have kept a daily record of the movements of the Japse. fleet, wch. it might perh. be of interest to you to know fr. time to time, & I am acc[ording]ly sending you a short statement of their distribution. I instructed our consul to teleg. to you the movements of the flying squadron as far as he cld. ascertain them.

The Diet meets on the 14th, & the Cabinet will prob. be severely criticised. It is said to be shaky, but I think it is likely to hold together for the present. The financial condition is bad.

19. Satow to Bertie¹

3 May 98

My dear Bertie,

¹ Bertie's reply is in PRO 30/33 5/2, item no. 21, June 6, 1898, private. See I. Ruxton, *The Correspondence of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Japan (1895-1900)*, Volume One.

PRO 30/33 14/10 Japan (1-70)
(January 7, 1898 – May 25, 1899)

Troup has asked me whether the Treasury wld. be likely to make him a grant in recognition of his labours on the Tariff Commission in 1895, wch. were outside of & in addition to his ordinary duties as consul. The commission held 20 sittings betw. Nov. 1894 & May 1895, & there was a good deal of work in the way of obtaining information.

It appears that Hannen who was apptd. 2nd Delegate to the Conference on Treaty Revision in 1887 recd. a grant of £300 or £400.

I said I wld. mention the matter to you in case you might think it possible to do something for him.

y.v.t.

P.S. He goes home by this mail.

20. Satow to Salisbury

5.5.98

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

It seems that the Japse. at one time had an idea of asking us for a refund of all they had spent at Wei hai wei beyond the Chinese contribution towards the expenses of the occupation. But fr. what Komura told me yesterday they have quite given up this idea. The amount is abt. £150,000. Perh. they saw that the money must be brought into the public accts. & the political foes of the Cabinet wld. have accused them of selling WHW. for a contemptible sum, while on the other hand it wld. have been a clear proof to the Rs. of their agreeet. with us. And as above all things they desire to conciliate Russia, they wish this kept a secret.

They meant to make political capital out of the protest they signed on the 25th regarding Corea, & to give out that Alexeieff & the military instructors were withdrawn in consequence of their representations, but the existence of the [Nishi-Rosen] protocol leaked out sooner than they had intended. Still the Cabinet will doubtless take some credit to themselves for the achievement. The V.M. [Komura] remarked to me that I shld. be disappointed when I came to see it, & explained this by saying it amounted to nothing at all.¹ I think he is right, & that it does not go beyond the existing agreements negotiated in 1896, but as it is the work of Nishi, who made a great mystery of his talks with Rosen, Komura is bound to treat it as insignificant.

I am sending home a curious newspaper paragraph wch. pretends that Itō has manœvred

¹ See diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 272.

very cleverly to get us into W.H.W. instead of the Japse.

I think it is pretty sure that they have no idea of leasing a port on the coast of China, & that the passage referring to such a probability in their verbal Note meant nothing. It was introduced for the sake of symmetry. I did not like to put a direct question, until yesterday a newspaper para. said they were thinking of Amoy, & gave me an opportunity of asking Komura. He said without a moment's hesitation that they had no such intention. I observed that as we had told them of our intentions abt. WHW before making a demand on China, no doubt they wld. follow our example & communicate with us before doing anything similar, & this he answered in the same straightfor[war]d way. But he asked me if I knew why Prince Henry [of Prussia] had gone S. fr. Shanghai instead of to Kiaochou, evidently thinking that the Germans have some idea of a port on the coast of Fuhkien in place of Kiaochou. This wld. annoy them very much after having got a promise fr. China not to alienate Fuhkien to any foreign P. I asked him whether Japan itself was included in this term, to wch. he replied it might & might not be. The word telegraphed to them by Yano [Fumio, Minister in Peking] was "other" for they teleg. in English.

They are manifesting a rather unnecessary degree of interest in the Philippine islands, to wch. group the Russians have I think directed their attention. If the result of the American action in Manila shld. be the overthrow of the Spanish authority by the rebels, who I am told are chiefly mestizo of Chinese blood, the Japse. may think the opportunity a good one for conquering some more islands; more particularly that the idea has been put into their heads that the Tagals are of the same race as themselves, & there are a few descendants of Japse. Xtian exiles of the 17th century in Luzon. But as long as Itō & Inouye are in the Cabinet nothing is likely to be done in this direction. Itō is not enterprising enough & Inouye is alarmed abt. finance.

2 things seem to me to be elements of weakness here; the instability of Cabinets during the transition fr. clans to party govt., & the unsatisfactory state of the finances, wch. only a foreign loan can set right. In the report on the gold standard I am sending by this mail I have given some figs. the seriousness of wch. can hardly be exaggerated. Under these circs. I doubt Japan being a power for mischief for several years to come.

E.S.

21. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio 19/5/98

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

I had an interview by apptmt. today with the Chief of the Staff, the Min. for F.A. having suggested that this wld. be the best way of obtaining information as to the naval, military & strategical capacities of Weihaiwei wh. I was instructed to ask for. The Chief of Staff is Genl. Kawakami, who planned the campaign of 1894-5 agst. China. He said he was very glad we were going to W.H.W., since it was not convenient to Japan to remain there & China cld. not hold it.

We soon came to the conclusion that the information cld. be best imparted to a military man, & agreed that as soon as Major Churchill arrived he shld. be placed in communication with the general staff.

Meanwhile the commanders of H.M.S. will in a few days, I presume, get hold of all the naval information required.

Talking abt. Port Arthur he said it wld. be impregnable with 10,000 Jap[ane]se troops inside, & that the Russians wld. have no difficulty in holding it. But they wld. require a very much larger force to hold the province of Manchuria. As a naval port it was greatly inferior to WHW, as it accommodates only a few (he said 6) ships. There is one dock capable of receiving a 7000 ton ship. The rlwy. he thinks cannot be completed to Talienwan under 10 years, & will be very costly. The Russian scheme of military organisation for Eastern Siberia will not be complete till 1903, while Japan will be ready in 1902. At the end of the present year all the men required for the Japse. scheme will have joined, & at the end of 1902 they will have 500,000 men fully equipped & thoroughly instructed on a war footing. Great Progress has already been made with arms, ammunition & equipment. When working full time at the Tokio small arms factory they can turn out 300 magazine rifles per diem. At the present moment Japan cld. put 200,000 men into the field.

Then he said "Ah! If only there were a real alliance betw. Engl. & Japan, the 2 fleets cld. sweep the sea, & we could destroy the Russian power in Eastern Siberia with our troops. England need not send a single man. I have been in Siberia & seen everything there, have been in Cambodia, Annam, Tonquin, Cochin China & I tell you we are greatly stronger than both France & Russia combined. Stronger even than the Three PP. Fr. Odessa it takes 50 days to transport troops by sea, & by land across Siberia at the present moment 6 mos. Besides the men, all their food & ammunition must be transported hither. Siberia supplies nothing. The resources of Vladivostock as a naval port are insignificant. At the outside they are not adequate to the construction of anything larger than a vessel of 1000 tons, & Port

Arthur is not much better. After a naval fight where cld. they repair damages. Ah! If only England & Japan were really allies. The shipbuilding yards at Nagasaki, Sasebo, Kure & Hongkong would suffice for everything. And then you need not bring a single soldier here. We wld. do all that. Russia's real power is infinitely less than her reputation."

I asked him abt. China. He said it was of vital importance to Japan that the independence of China shld. be maintained. If only she had 100,000 troops drilled in European fashion, half as good as the Japse. she cld. protect herself. When the Germans occupied Kiaochow the Chinese cld., even with their then existing resources, have easily forced them to retire. He had himself urged them to do it, but fruitlessly. When Russia demanded Port Arthur & Talienwan Bay under a threat of marching troops into Manchuria, if the Chinese had resisted a little strenuously, they need never have given way. The Russian threat cld. not have been carried into effect. But the Chin. Govt. had no backbone. He had been 'working' Chang-chi-tung & the present Viceroy of Chihli Wang; the latter was a literary man, not of much use, but Chang had sent over some officers to the Japse. manoeuvres last autumn, & again this spring, & was ready to do all he cld. He did not think Chang wld. go to Peking. Let China work on Japse. lines, give her ten years time, & she wld. be quite strong enough to maintain her independence.

I asked abt. Korea. He said the recent protocol was no better than waste paper. In 2 or 3 years time, as soon as Russia had armed the forts at P.A. & established herself finally in Manchuria, she wld. turn her attention again to Korea. She wld. get up an insurrection somewhere, & declare that it was necessary to intervene. Just the same policy as that she had pursued in the Balkan Peninsula. If Japan imagined that all wld. go well because of this protocol & simply rest on her oars, she wld. find out her mistake later on. She must take the present opportunity of establishing her influence in Korea. What that country wanted was properly trained men. When he was there in 1893 he had told the Koreans it wld. be a mistake to try & set up an administration on the European model. It was too expensive for them, & beyond their needs. They shld. send over students to Japan, & have them trained there. As a fact a good many had already been trained in Japan, & had gone back to occupy official positions, & others were still studying here. Korea did not require a navy, wch. wld. be taken possn. of the moment war broke out by her attacker, but a battalion in each of the 8 provinces properly drilled wld. suffice. He blamed Ct. Inouye for trying to introduce all sorts of European ideas. Korea was not advanced enough for that. Such institutions as Japan possessed 30 years ago wld. have been quite good enough. Inouye had tried to go ahead too

fast, & the result had been to set all the people agst. their Korean advisers.

I did not respond to his suggestions abt. an alliance, nor did I throw cold water on them. All that he said came out quite spontaneously, & I draw two inferences, (1) that tho' Japan does not expect to be fully ready till 1902, she wld. be prepared to move at once if we wanted her assistance, and

(2) that the general staff looks on Russia as the enemy to be resisted by every possible means.

22. Satow to Eric Barrington¹

24.5.98

My dr. Barrington,

Gubbins is very pleased with his C.M.G. & I am much obliged to you for having got it for him.

There is a question abt. precedence wch. I shld. be glad to see settled, as I see fr. the F.O. List has been done at Constantinople. Shld. not the local 2nd Sec. rank with the other 2nd Sec., who is almost certain to be much his junior in years, acc. to the dates of their resp[ective] apptmt. to that rank?

y.v.t.

23. Satow to Salisbury

26.5.98

Dr. Ld. S.,

The receipt of the "Times" of Apr. 6 has enabled me to prove to Marq. Itō & B[aro]n Nissi that Mr. Kato had not correctly telegd. the language of the D[uke] of Devonshire with regard to the Japse. wish that their ans. abt. W.H.W. shld. be treated confidentially. I think they are now quite satisfied that it was by a mere accident that the Duke omitted to mention that we had asked that the matter might be treated confidentially.²

A teleg. has reached the Japse. Govt. fr. Katō reporting Y[our] L[ordship's] language in reply to Ld. Kimberley on or abt. the 20th inst. A much transformed version of this teleg. found its way into the papers, & finally an English newspaper made out that a 'convention' betw. Engl. & Japan had been spoken of.

¹ Barrington's reply dated July 15, 1898 is in PRO 30/33 5/2, item no. 23.

² See Satow's diary, April 14, 1898 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 267) and *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho* vol. 31, pp. 432-3, 437-440.

I have seen the original teleg. wch. says that you spoke of Japan as “a power with wch. we have so many grounds of sympathy & cooperation.” Supposing Mr. K. to have reported correctly, this language has given very great satisfaction, as I learnt yesterday fr. Marq. Itō. He said, what he has never said before, that he was most anxious to be on the most friendly terms with England. We have hitherto believed him to have had marked German sympathies. But the Liaotung intervention & the seizure of Kiaochou have changed all that, & my Germ. coll. complains of the unfriendly feeling towards Germany on the part of Japan. It makes him feel very anxious lest some disagreeable incident shld. occur when Prince Henry visits Japan. Nothing is yet settled abt. his visit, but Leyden expects him to come. He has written to Berlin & to the German admiral to say that when the Prince comes he shld. adhere to a definite programme & never go out incog[nito]. As he says, the attack on the Emperor Nicolas II [the Ōtsu Incident of May 11, 1891] by one of the policemen specially detailed for his protection, shows that individual fanaticism is what is most to be feared in this country.

I asked Marq. Itō what he thought abt. the future of China, & also told him what Genl. Kawakami had said to me on the subject of an alliance with Engl. [see no. 21 above] remarking that while such a combination wld. be very effective in the Far East, it wld. not help in Europe. He quite agreed with this.

As to China, he evidently does not believe in her spontaneous regeneration, & looks forward to the day when the assurances given to various PP with regard to non-alienation of territory will be transformed into ‘spheres of influence’ & perh. into a partition of China. When that event happens, it wld. be ‘unreasonable’ of the PP to object to Japan taking a small share.

I said that it wld. perh. not be so much a question of what Japan might consider reasonable, but what the feelings entertained by the PP towards Japan might lead them to consider desirable. He had been a great deal in Europe, & cld. gauge that feeling. Much must depend on Japan herself. There was no doubt of the liberal attitude of the leading men of Japan, but it might be questioned whether they were not in advance of the general sentiment of their nation as regards foreigners. We all hoped that the new Treaties wld. have a beneficial effect on the disposition of the Japse. people towards foreigners, but shld. it unfortunately prove otherwise then the hope of the leading statesmen of the country that Japan wld. be regarded by European PP as they regarded each other wld. prob. be disappointed, & the PP that had combined agst. Japan in 1895 [Russia, Germany & France]

might combine agst. her in regard to Fuhkien.

I ended by the consolatory observation that if Japan continued to work with G.B. as she had done in the past, no combination of other PP wld. be able to dictate what shld. be done in China.

On this he assured me of his earnest desire to cooperate with us.

E.S.

P.S. Itō told me that my Fr[ench] coll[eague] had asked him whether they had objected to our lease of W.H.W., but he had answered ‘Suppose I occupied a room at a hotel, & some one else had asked the hotel keeper to let him have it when I left, could I make any objection.’¹

He had suggested to Harmand that the PP ought to agree among themselves abt. China, otherwise there is a great danger of their quarrelling abt. the division. Harmand replied that for the PP to agree was impossible. He thought China wld. last, just like Turkey, wch. had been for a century on the apparent brink of destruction. Itō replied to him that the cases were different. The Sultan had infinitely more authority than the Emperor of China. The latter rested only on sentiment, & if once the Chinese took arms in their hands there wld. be no holding them. It wld. be beyond the power of European states to suppress a rising. Cld. Germany or France for instance bring a sufficient force to quell a popular rebellion.

He was very urgent with me on a recent occasion that the European PP shld. agree among themselves abt. China, but did not see where such a proposal cld. come from. Who could take the initiative? But Engl. he said must take a strong line, & then she cld. secure all she wanted. He thinks there are signs of an attempt being made to upset the present dynasty, but to be successful it must be a popular movement, not one headed by viceroys. Had the Taiping rebellion [1851-64] been allowed to run its course, things wld. have turned out very differently in China. Reform from above was impossible. Only a revolution cld. bring it abt., as in Japan in 1868. (The revolution in Japan was like that of 1789, minus the guillotine.) Luckily for Japan, it was a short struggle, & the interests of foreigners were not injured. But China was of such vast extent, that a revolution wld. take much longer to achieve, & in the meantime the injury to foreign interests wld. lead to intervention.

The Japse. naturally know much more of China & its past history than any European, & so the views of a man like Itō seem to me worth recording.

¹ See Satow's diary for May 10, 1898 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 274).

PRO 30/33 14/10 Japan (1-70)
(January 7, 1898 – May 25, 1899)

24. Satow to Curzon

26.5.98

Dr. Mr. Curzon,

I hope I am not trespassing on ground not my own if I suggest that the occurrence at Shashi shows how difficult it wld. be to rule the populations of the Yangtze valley, unless we can get hold of their leaders & rulers. If Chang chi tung definitely refuses to go to Peking, he will be a power in that part of China, & it occurs to me that if the China consular service possesses 2 or 3 assistants well acquainted with the language & possessing a political head, they might be usefully stationed at Hankow & Chungking, with a confidential mission to keep in touch with the local big mandarins. If there is to be a revolution in China, shld. we not do better by privately backing them up than by supporting the effete Govt. at Peking?

Another point that I suppose will occur to everyone [is] that tho' we may seem to have seen the curtain fall on the first act of the Russian drama in China, the entr'acte will be taken advantage of by our rival to hasten on the 2nd act, unless we keep on the watch. De Witte's conversation with O'Connor abt. the map of northern China seems to me particularly significant.

Itō is beginning to think that after all the Cassini convention [of September 1896] was genuine, tho' the versions published in Shanghai differed, owing to their having been written down fr. memory by those who saw the original document, & he is no doubt sorry that he told Brinkley to pour scorn & contempt upon those who believed in it.

y.v.t.

25. Satow to Sir Edward Seymour

May 30/98

Dear Sir Edward,

Your letter of 14 reached me a few days ago, but not in time for me to write by the C.P.R. str. I am very glad to hear that there is a prospect of your being able to visit Tokio during the early summer, & when yr. movements are finally decided, I shld. be much obliged if you wld. kindly let me know by teleg. the precise date at wch. to expect you & the prob. length of your stay. While you are at Tokio I hope you will stop at the Legation, & besides yourself I can put up 3 of your staff quite easily. There will be an audience of the Emperor to be arranged for, & also a dinner in your honour to the Japse. Min. of Marine & other

officials. They will also wish to give you an entertainment.¹

Prince Henry of Prussia will I believe pay a visit here, but nothing has yet been settled as to date. A still more important question no doubt will be the exchange of visits betw. him & the Emperor. After what has taken place at Peking, the Emp. of Japan can hardly do less than return his visit in person, I shld. think.

The Japse. Govt. have informed me officially that they do not propose to make any claim on acct. of the buildings erected by them at W.H.W., but wld. hand them over to the Chinese on the understanding that they shld. at once be transferred to us.

I don't think the Japse. feeling towards Russia has been favourably affected by what has taken place with regard to Corea. They think it is merely because the Rs. have their hands full in Manchuria, & that a few years hence they will reaffirm their predominance in Corea. As far as I can see the Japse. influence in the peninsula is where it was. Shibusawa who went over there to try for concessions in regard to banks & rlwys. seems to have come back empty-handed.

I hope the plan of WHW we sent you was what you wanted. It seemed to be the latest published here.

y.v.t.

26. Satow to Bertie

15.6.98

My dear Bertie,

I have not heard fr. you abt. my proposals for consular apptmts. contained in my letters of 24 March & 9 April, & suppose therefore that they will be made without my sending an offl. desp. on the subj[ect]. Shld. you however require them to be made officially, please send me a teleg.

Wileman shld. be here in August & if it were possible I shld. be glad to have the commissions out here by that time, so as to begin the necessary moves on his arrival. Can you send me a teleg. to say when the commissions will reach me.

Thirdly, will you appt. Lay Asst. Japse. Sec.? At present he is only acting, but he is entirely satisfactory, & it wld. be a recognition of his merits that he wld. greatly appreciate.

Hemming when leaving here 2 mos. ago told me he wld. return by the Canadian str.

¹ Satow met Seymour on August 6, 1898 and took him to Lake Chuzenji, August 8-12. The audience with the Emperor took place on September 4, 1899. (Satow's diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 384)

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getting here on June 12. He has not come back, nor has he written to me abt. his movements. I presume therefore that he will not come back as military attaché, & that we shall keep Churchill. The latter seems likely to turn out well. Mrs. H. was rather an 'impossible' woman, & will not be missed.

Rosen my Russian coll: is very bad with sciatica. One of the Germans rather neatly remarked that it was natural for a Russian to have A siatica.

I suppose you won't take much notice of the memorial fr. the Kōbe residents. The motive wch. lies at the bottom of these representations & of the articles Mr. Geo. Young sends to Ld. S. (they are written by his bro[ther] Robt. Young editor of the Kōbe Chronicle) is resentment at the Treaty. Yokohama people are much more sensible & try to make the best of things. The Chairman of the Ch[amber] of Commerce [Dick Robison] is a personal friend of my own, wch. is a help in these matters.

The Germn. Leg[atio]n has been rather weak in not insisting on 6 mos. notice being given of the date at wch. the general tariff will be brought into operation. Various B.Ss. [British Subjects] have written to me on the subject of the date, & I have given them what information I can; namely that no date can be fixed until the Austro-Hungarian Treaty is ratified, but that I do not expect it will be before Oct. 1, & may possibly be later.

The Japse. are getting into a fix with their finance, & most of them think the Diet a nuisance & a blunder.

y.v.t.

P.S. I am sending home officially a letter fr. Hall applying for the post of Consul-gen[era]l, wch. I had kept back expecting to hear something abt. the apptmts. I have privately recommended.

E.S.

27. Satow to Salisbury

16 June 1898

Dr. Ld. S.,

It seems that the visit of Prince Henry to Japan is indefinitely postponed. Leyden tells me that Sannomiya, the Emperor's Gr. Master of the Ceremonies, had expressed to him his own anxiety lest anything untoward shld. occur during H.R.H. visit. This warning no doubt has influenced the Germ. Govt. It wld. appear that the Japse. are themselves rather relieved at the prospect of his not coming, as they did not like the responsibility. I hear the prince

will go to Vladivostock, perh. just touching at Nagasaki. The other ships have gone to Manila. Two Japse. cruisers take turn & turn abt. there and at Hongkong. Altho' I see in foreign papers a suggestion that Japan has designs on the Philippines, I do not believe it. There is a vast difference betw. what they wld. like if there were no obstacles, & what they have made up their mind to try for. The U.S. & Germany are in the way. Russia wld. prob. urge them to look to the Philippines rather than to Corea, but the military men here wld. scarcely agree to that. The 10%[?] duty on tea imposed in America has given great annoyance here, & the govt. did all they cld. in the way of remonstrance. I have tried to persuade them that the Am. tea-drinkers will not be deterred by so small a duty, wch. is only abt. 10 per cent of the retail price, but they say it is cent per cent on the wholesale price paid here. They fear the war will cause a great diminution in the export of tea & silk to the U.S.

Some rather riotous scenes took place in the Diet before it was dissolved. Ito himself spoke violently, & all the papers accused him of being under the influence of brandy. It is certain he takes a great deal too much. He said the Cabinet wld. bring in the Constitution[?] bill over & over again until it was passed, but his threats produced no effect. The majority agst. him was overwhelming. It is now said that he & his colls. will try to form a political party of their own, & will shortly begin to stump the country. Nishi, who seldom says much, admitted to me today that it looked as if the parliamentary institutions of Japan were tending to become like those of other countries. Even if Ito becomes a party man, & so gains a temporary triumph, I do not think his majority will last very long, & in the end he will disappear. He is now nearly 60, wch. is old for Japan.

Both the Germans & Fr. seem to admit that they will be contented with 3 months' notice of the new Tariff, tho' I think they might successfully have held out for six. Indeed I have heard fr. a good source that if the Austrian Treaty is ratified in June, 6 mos. notice will be given. At least that is the intention of the Min. of Finance. In that case the 1st Jan. next wld. be the date.

There is some suspicion that the French desire to obtain a lease of the Foochow arsenal, on the ground that the Chinese are incompetent to work it for themselves. As this was told me by Baron Nishi I have thought it worth while telegraphing.

The Japse. Min. of Marine has given me for Ad[miral] Seymour a copy of a chart of W.H.W. made within the last two years.

28. Satow to Salisbury

16.6.98

Dr. Ld. S.,

Robin Jaequemyns, the Belgian adviser of the King of Siam, has been here for the last fortnight, but having been ill with inflammation of the lungs most of the time, has not seen many people. He came here with the Japse. Min. at Bangkok, Inagaki [Manjirō], with whom he seems to be on intimate terms. Jaequemyns considers that the K[ing] of Siam has achieved a great stroke in getting the Emperor Nicolas to befriend him with the French, but Inagaki tells me that the price to be paid is Chantaburi as a Russian coaling station whenever the French clear out.¹

29. Satow to Salisbury

July 7. 1898

Dr. Ld. S.,

Itō's resignation [from his third cabinet, January – June 1898] a fortnight ago [announced on June 26, 1898] took every one by surprise. It had been supposed that he wld. at least wait to see the result of the next elections, and of his chances of forming a party for himself. Contrary to expectation some important capitalists who had promised their support were persuaded to draw back. At the Palace June 24 a meeting took place of Itō, Yamagata, Inouye & 2 or 3 more of the most influential men in and out of office in the presence of the emperor. Itō opened the discussion by saying that the time had now arrd. when govt. must be based on a parliamentary majority. All the others were agst. him, & Yamagata was especially violent. Of course it was a complete volte-face on Itō's part. Yamagata & one or two more are believed to have said that rather than this it wld. be better to suspend the constitution. There was a great row. Itō, as I have been told by one of those who were present, went away to another room & at once sent in his resignation, coupled with the surrender of his title & decorations. The next day he advised the Emperor to send for Okuma & Itagaki, the leaders of the Parliamentary majority in the Diet dissolved a few weeks ago.

The great difficulty was the Army & Navy, wch. are anti-Constitutional, & wld. never submit to be[ing] directed by civilian politicians. So it was settled that Saigō & Katsura shld. remain. I am told it is arranged they shall have a free hand in their depts., & will not

¹ See Satow's diary for June 8, 1898 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 281).

take part in Cabinet discussions on general subjects.

I saw Itō two or three days after his resignation. He said he meant to retire into private life & have nothing more to do with politics. At a diff[erent] period of the conversation however he talked of forming a political party of his own. This was no doubt the object of his surrendering title & decorations. As a peer he c[ou]ld not sit in the Lower House. But Yamagata & his friends got round the Emperor & easily induced him to refuse to accept the surrender of Itō's title & honours.

At one moment there was even an idea of his joining Okuma as Min. for F.A., but that fell thro'. He has left town & will lie low for the present. I am convinced that if he sees a chance of turning out Ōkuma & Itagaki when the next Diet meets, he will come back into politics. But he has broken with his former allies, & will in future rely on party.

What has happened is the most important political event since 1868; & it is the triumph of English constitutional ideas over those imported fr. Germany.

On the whole Itō has blundered badly of late, especially in bringing in a bill to increase the land tax. He was induced by a clever intriguer of Itagaki's party to believe that it wld. be allowed to pass, & as soon as he had brought it in, the others turned round & made a majority agst. it.

It is a good thing for us that Ōkuma is at the head of affairs. His ideas are English, & he plays an open game. I am glad Nishi is out of the F. Dept. His methods were too Russian, & his inclinations also. I do not venture to predict success for the new men. We must wait & see the result of the elections, wch. are to take place on Aug. 10.

A Russian Grandduke Cyril Vladimirof is arriving at Yokohama today in the "Rossia", on board of wch. he is serving as a sub-lieutenant. He will be made much of by the Jap[ane]se, & he will exchange visits with the Emperor. If all goes well Leyden will be disgusted that he has been induced to prevent the proposed visit of Prince Henry. I am postponing my visit to the hills for the G.D's reception of the Corps Diplom. wch. is to take place on the 10th.¹

Ad. Fitzgerald has been here with his division. & the usual presentation to the Emperor and exchange of civilities with the naval authorities have taken place.

Believe me &c.

¹ The reception did take place on July 10, 1898. That same day Satow left for Chuzenji, and he was there July 10-23. (Satow's diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 294; pp. 458-462)

30. Satow to Bertie

July 7/98

My dear Bertie,

We have not had any instructions in reply to Lowther's desp. no. 213 of Oct 7 enclosing a draft consular convention. As Ōkuma is in power again, it wld. be a good opportunity for negotiating if H.M.G. wish it.

y.v.t.

31. Satow to Bertie ¹

28 7 98

My dear Bertie,

Playfair having passed his exams in Japse., I recommend him for the Consulate at Hakodate in succession to Layard. I think him a better man than Wileman who has had no experience of consular work.

Hall is going on local leave for six weeks from the beginning of August, & Playfair will be acting at Kōbe during his absence. If I cld. know the names of the new consuls at Yokohama, Tamsui & Hakodate by the middle of September it wld. be a great convenience, as I cld. then begin to move them.

I did not answer Cockerell's private letter of 31 March ² because I thought my letter of 24 March & subsequent date sufficiently explained my views.

What are you going to do with Kenny now that the U.S. have annexed Hawaii? He was very ill in Formosa & wld. no doubt be very glad to remain at Honolulu if the post is reduced to a consulate.

Griffiths has been 2 years & ½ at Tsinan & has done well there. Altho' he has not passed the interpreter's exam in Japse., I think he wld. be a good man to appt. if Kenny does not return. The apptmt. might be made dependent on his passing the exam within a year.

We cannot find anything abt. Hannen's gratuity for serving as 2nd Deleg. to the Treaty revision conference in 1887, & Gubbins thinks it was arranged when he was at home in 1888. I have written to ask Hannen for the particulars.

I observe fr. the print that Macdonald as well as O'Connor opposed our taking W.H.W.,

¹ See M. Gosselin's response for Bertie in PRO 30/33 5/2, letter no. 24 dated August 25, 1898.

² PRO 30/33 5/2, letter no. 19.

but no doubt your memo. settled the question. I am very glad they were not listened to, & fr. what Ad. Fitzgerald told me the other day when he was here, naval men think well of our acquisition. The Hgkg arrange[men]t is magnificent, the best thing done out here in my memory.

y.v.t.

32. Satow to Salisbury

28/July 98

Dr. Ld. S.,

The position of the Cabinet is thought by some of its opponents to be exposed to danger, because of disagree[men]t abt. the portfolio of F.A. Ct. Ōkuma is disposed to keep it for himself. There are two men being put for[war]d by sections of the Cabinet, one being Hoshi the Minr. at Washington, who is now on his way home, the other Baron Itō, an intriguing and very clever fellow. Both are anti-English. The former many years ago had a row with the late Sir H. Parkes wch. he is unlikely to have forgotten, the latter never loses an opportunity of being discourteous to this Legn. Ōkuma I have seen 2ce since I last wrote. He spoke on the first occasion very hopefully of the future, said the Cabinet wld. have a large majority at the elections, & that for the first time since the establishment of the Diet the Govt. wld. be strong enough to keep order. This he said especially with regard to some observations I made to him on the hostile attitude of the lower classes towards foreigners, especially at Kōbe.

He told me that the notion of Ministers being responsible to the sovereign was well enough in Germany and Russia, where the Emperor really governs, but wld. not do in Japan, where for centuries past he had never exercised any authority. The people knew this, & they held the Cabinet responsible. There was no getting out of that. Consequently cabinets based upon a majority of the RR of the people alone were practicable.

His language abt. the position of the Emperor was more outspoken than anything I have ever heard before from a Japse. It is perfectly true. The present Emperor is a very imperfectly developed intellect, but even if he had an ordinary intelligence he wld. not be allowed to govern.

I saw him again yesterday, & he told me all abt. Itō's intended journey to China, & its object. I mentioned Y.L. speech in the House of Lds. where mention was made of negotiations going on at Peking for the reorganization of the Chinese army & navy, &

suggested it wld. be well if the two schemes cld. be prevented fr. clashing. He talked abt. Mr. Chamberlain's speech wch. has produced a great effect here, because Katō telegd. that he had good reason to think an alliance with Japan was meant. Japan, he said, is the only P. out here that possesses an army, wch. is just what Engl. needs to keep Russia in check.

On a previous occasion he told me that one of my colls: had been to him & suggested that the presence of the U.S. in the Philippines wld. be contrary to the interests of Japan, & that she ought to join with those who will try to prevent their acquisition by America. I suspected my Fr. coll: who is rather meddlesome & on the whole I think so still. However the Japse. do not take that view, especially when put for[war]d by a member of the Far Eastern "Triplice", and as I telegraphed are very anxious that the Americans shld. keep the Philippines; they naturally suspect the presence of so many Germ[an] ships at Manila bodes mischief. Okuma's great desire I believe is to have a complete understanding with England & the U.S, & as long as he is in power there is very little danger of a rapprochement with Russia. It is Itō who is always hankering after that kind of thing, & I never feel safe when he is in office.

There is a good deal of latent resentment agst. Itō for having adopted the principle of party Cabinets, & if Ōkuma & Itagaki shld. fall out, an attempt will possibly be made to establish a dictatorship under Yamagata. A man who came to ask me what I thought of a programme wch. wld. begin with the suspension of the Diet ¹ and involve the suppression of the newspapers, acknowledged that civil war wld. be the result. I told him the time for that had gone by, & it was useless to try & make water run up hill. The fact is Japan is too much permeated with Engl[is]h & American ideas for arbitrary govt. to last.

The finances seem to be bad, a deficit of £4,000,000 annually must be looked for for some years to come. Very likely the Finance Min. will try to place some more bonds on the London market. I am inclined to think Japse. bonds will become rather a speculative investment.

33. Satow to Bertie

17 Aug. 1898

My dr. Bertie,

Hannen replies to me that he recd. no pay[men]t for acting as 2nd Delegate to the 1887 Conference for the revision of the Treaties, & that he neither asked for nor expected

¹ Seki Yoshiomi visited Satow on July 9, 1898. (Satow's diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 292)

anything. I have accordingly written to Troup that under the circs. & after this lapse of time it is not likely that a grant wld. be made to him for his labours on the Tariff convention of 1895.

y.v.t.

34. Satow to Cockerell

18.8.98

My dr. Cockerell,

I hope you will be able to appt. Wawn & Harrington 2nd Assts. fr. the date proposed in my official desp. It will save some correspce. on the question of paying Japse. teachers for them after they finally quitted the legation, wch. fr. some corresp[onden]ce that took place in 1884, they seem to be entitled to as long as they are students.

Wawn, I am told by Gubbins, is a prodigy in the way of quickness & retentive memory. He came straight fr. school. Harrington they say went up for the entrance exam. 3 times before he got thro', & so did Gordon. It seems as if the best men get thro' the 1st time, & that the dull ones require to take several tries before they clear the fence.

My desp. no. 66 abt. the passport fee charged at the consulates is by way of 'acquit de conscience', as it seems to me that what they have been levying is, strictly speaking, illegal. They take \$2 as if the application for a passport were made to the Central Auth., & it really is addressed to a local authority & issued by him. However they are only acting under instructions fr. the Legation, & are free fr. blame. Prob. when Trench wrote in 1894 the locally issued passports bore the signature & seal of the Min. for F.A. & it has been since changed.

y.v.t.

E.S.

35. Satow to Barrington¹

18 Aug. 1898

My dear Barrington,

I took an opportunity of telling the V. Min. for F.A. [Komura Jutaro] the day before yesterday that H.M.G. had heard of the Emperor's kindness to Sir Ch. Mitchell, & were much pleased. If I see the Grand Master of the Ceremonies [Sannomiya Yoshitane]

¹ This letter is Satow's response to Barrington's letter dated July 15, 1898 in PRO 30/33 5/2 item no. 22.

tomorrow when I pass thro' Nikkō on my way to the mountains, I will say the same thing to him, for it was he & his [English] wife that got up everything for the Mitchells.

y.v.t.

36. Satow to Salisbury

18 Aug. 1898

Dr. Ld. S.,

The enclosed parag. abt. the reason for Prince Henry's not coming to Japan has been going the round of the foreign press in China & Japan. So far I have not seen it reproduced in the Japse. press, wch. has merely remarked that the Prince wished to come here, but was prevented by a press of work. Seeing that Archduke Cyril has been here, I imagine the parag. must have given annoyance both to my Germ. coll. & to the Japse. Govt. but I have not ventured to mention it to either.

I had a talk with Ct. Ōkuma yesterday. He is very anxious abt. the future of the Philippines. If the U.S. cld. make up their minds to keep possn. he wld. not object, but if any of the other PP sought to acquire a footing there Japan cld. not remain indifferent. He had heard fr. Katō that Y.L. had expressed similar views to him. However, at present he saw no signs of Russia or France desiring to obtain a portion of the archipelago, perh. not even Germany. It was evident that the inhabitants were not far eno[ugh] advanced to rule themselves, for tho' some of the leaders are well-educated men, the bulk are little removed fr. savagery. The Philippines in the hands of a civilized Power, other than Spain, wld. speedily become an important commercial centre.

He talked a good deal abt. finance, said that Japan was not on the verge of bankruptcy as some people pretended, but she required the remainder of the indemnity to pay for the expansion of the army and navy, and wld. have to borrow in Europe to construct rlwys. & telegraphs. A loan, or loans, amounting to £15,000,000 would be required in the next five or six years. This would be raised in the London market thro' some financial house of repute, in the shape of a sterling loan, not as they did last year by selling Japse. bonds. He thought Japan cld. borrow at four per cent.

Rothschild's agents here, Saml. Samuel & Co. are trying to get this piece of business. The Hongkong & S'hai Bank manager, Thos. Jackson, when he was up here earlier in the year advised the then Min. of Finance not to borrow abroad, but if there is to be a loan I have no doubt he wld. like to undertake it.

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There is a small faction agitating for the suspension of the constitution, and they may give trouble when the Diet meets by causing obstruction in the House of Peers. I am told they are increasing in no. But it will be difficult to foresee the result till the Diet meets. Meanwhile the Cabinet is full of good intentions as regards foreigners under the new Treaties. They read everything written about themselves in the foreign local press, & have profited by criticism, wch. often has been very bitter. At the same time a better tone is observable in the Engl. papers here, & the Engl. community is becoming more reconciled to the prospect of coming under Japanese jurisdiction.

The relations of Tokio with Washington seem to be excellent. It must have been in consequence of pressure fr. Washington that Hawaii agreed to settle the Japanese claim.

Ad[miral] Seymour has been here with Centurion, Victorious & Narcissus. Owing to the heat, it was arranged that I shld. not ask for an audience for him, as the Emperor dislikes putting on his uniform in the dog days.

37. Satow to Bertie

7.9.98

My dear Bertie,

As to my desp. no. 142 of yesterday regarding Mr. Tata, I have assumed that what was required fr. me was information as to the attitude of the Japse. Govt. not a legal opinion. But at the same time I thought you might like to hear what a thoroughly legal mind has to say, & so showed my draft to Wilkinson. His memo. was the result. I send it to show that there is something to be said on the other side.

We are much excited by telegs. abt. the satisfactory progress of Scott's negotiations with Muravief for a delimitation of spheres of interest, of an offensive & defensive alliance between us & Germany, & the taking of Omdurman. The last I suppose is true. The Japse. press think we have sold them to Russia, but Okuma seems superior to the ignorant opinion of newspaper scribblers, & wants to go in with us & the Americans for a joint protectorate over the Philippines.

I am told the present Cabinet will hold together till after the next session of the Diet, & it seems likely.

Reuter's telegs. fr. Yoko[hama] are to be distrusted mostly. The sender is evidently not in touch. The "Times" correspondent is better.

What is the matter with Chirol? He seems to think China is the universe.

y.v.t.

38. Satow to Seymour

8.9.98

Dear Sir Edward,

I have not had an opportunity of answering yours of Aug. 17 since receiving it. The tension was apparently in connexion with the Shanhaikwan – Niuchwang railway. I don't know what the result of the tussle was. A teleg. fr. home about that time said Scott's negotiations for a delimitation of British & Russian spheres of interest in China were going on successfully, but [I] cannot say whether it can be depended on. The proposal to hold a conf[erence] on disarmament, fr. a question out to Balfour abt. the end of July, seems to have been suspected for a month before it came out. I am told the U.S. is unlikely to join. The opinion here seems to be that Russia is hard-up, & desirous of getting off the competition with us in shipbuilding. My Fr. coll: regards it as certain to result in a coalition of the continental PP agst. Engl[an]d. However, a day or 2 ago we had a teleg. that an offensive & defensive alliance had been entered into betw. Engl. & Germany. It is certain fr. what I have heard since that Germany & the U.S. were pointed at in Chamberlain's famous speech. I have that on the highest authority. Then we read of the Emperor W[illia]m giving three cheers for the Queen at a review. So on the whole this does not seem impossible. I think it the best thing, much better than what a coll: suggested to me, namely a renewal of the old 'entente cordiale' with France, wch. was such a snare to us.

y.v.t.

39. Satow to Salisbury

8.9.98

Dear Lord Salisbury,

It seems now to be settled that Prince Henry will pay a visit to Japan, & that the Japse. Govt. have asked that he shld. do so, under pressure applied by Count Leyden.

The principal topic here at present is the Emperor Nicolas' proposal for disarmament. It is difficult to say what the Japse. Govt. think of it. My impression is that Ct. Ōkuma will be very much guided by the Action of Engl. & America, with whom he is anxious to remain on good terms. Russia is very much distrusted, and I do not think the present Cabinet contains any pro-Russian element, except Saigo and he has no political weight.

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My Fr. coll: who is extremely Anglophobe on seeing the teleg. went off at once to the Belgian, & gave it as his opinion that there wld. be no disarmament, but that the result of the conference wld. be an alliance of the continental PP agst. England.

The Belgian [Albert d'Anethan] on the other hand inferred that there was an end of the Franco-Russian alliance, & the next thing wld. be a revival of the 'entente cordiale' betw. England & France. I rather demurred to this. Next morning Reuter sent us a teleg. announcing an offensive & defensive alliance betw. Engl. & Germany & then came another reporting the Emperor William's reference to Waterloo & his giving 3 cheers for the Queen. We have also had a teleg. saying that negotiations at St. Petersburg for a delimitation of the Russian & Engl. spheres of interest in China were proceeding satisfactorily. The Japanese press is not pleased with these 2 items of news. If Engl. & Russia arrive at an understanding, they see that Japan will be left out in the cold, & they detest Germany more than any other P[ower]. Only one newspaper has as yet expressed itself in favour of the Russian proposal. It was rumoured that besides the communication made to the Japse. Ch. d'Aff. at Petersburg, a note of some kind was delivered here by Rosen, in wch. stress was laid on the desirability of ensuring the peace in the Far East. Of this I have been able to obtain no confirmation. The Japanese are hoping to strengthen their position in Corea, by obtaining a concession for the projected railway from Fusan to Seoul, but even should they obtain it, there will be great difficulty in finding the money. Russia could buy their friendship at any time by giving them a free hand in Corea.

The Cabinet is very busy over the Budget for next year. They will have some difficulty in making both ends meet. The new Tariff will afford them no relief till next autumn, as merchants have anticipated its effect by importing large quantities of goods, & the general opinion is that they will after all have to increase the land tax.

40. Satow to Bertie

Tokio

4 Oct. 1898

My dr. Bertie,

The question of prolonging the jurisdiction of our Courts after the Treaty comes into operation in cases that happen to be pending might prove an important one. If the proposal suggested in my desp. no. 158 is approved, I shld. be glad to have telegraphic instructions. In case full PP [powers] to sign a protocol are thought necessary they cld. reach me I

suppose in a couple of months.

I knew the Germans had secured them – had secured themselves in this matter, but thought we shld. be able to claim the same thing under the m.f.n. clause, but on looking more closely into this, I find it is not the case.

De Martino, formerly Italian Min. here, has been stopping a month in Tokio on his way to Peking. As usual he tried to do a little mischief just to keep his hand in. It is certain the Japse. Govt. were asked to receive him here as Min. but they refused point blank.

y.v.t.

41. Satow to Salisbury

6 Oct. 1898

Dr. Ld. S.,

The Russian proposal for disarmament has quite ceased to occupy the public mind here. I find that Rosen did not deliver a note abt. it to the Japse. Govt. He merely sent off a secy. in haste to Tokio fr. the hot baths where he was staying, to inquire what they had heard. My Fr. coll: telegraphed to Paris for informn. to give to the Japse. & recd. the following ans[wer]. “We do not understand your emotion. If the Japse. Govt. wish to know anything they shld. apply to the Russian Min[iste]r.”

The future of the Philippines interests the Japse. a good deal more. They hope the Americans will keep the whole archipelago. If any they must have offered their advice at Washington, for Ōkuma tells me they informed him they wished to settle the question by themselves, but if any difficulties arose then they wld. consult Japan.

Recent events at Peking occupy their attention exclusively. I think there can be little doubt they had been urging the Emperor to undertake administrative reforms, & were pushing their own game energetically, as the statements reported in my desp. 154 seem to show. Ito's arrival at Peking was the signal for the Emperor's overthrow & the arrest of the reforming party. O says that 3 of the 6 who are reported to have been executed were protégés of Chang Chi tung, another a son of the Govr. of Hupei, & that the news will cause a great deal of resentment in the South of China, possibly a rebellion. The Japse. Ch. d'Aff. has been instructed to remonstrate vigorously agst. any further proceedings of the kind, & O. supposes he is consulting with Sir Claude MacD. At present they do not consider it necessary to send a guard to their Legation at Peking, & are contented with having the “Ōshima” at Taku, but shld. the necessity for further action arise, they will have ships in

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readiness to send to the coast of China & will instruct Katō to consult with Y.L. Itō I think has been bamboozled by Li Hungchang.

The Budget O. says is nearly arranged, & the deficit will be made good out of the indemnity [paid by China after the Sino-Japanese war, 1894-5]. This next year will need the largest expenditure for ships; after that the pressure will become easier. They intend however to borrow in Europe for their rlwys. & telegs. This Dec[ember] they will have the whole of the men with the colours necessitated by the Army Expansion scheme, but it will take four years more to complete the reserves. At the end of 5 yrs. fr. next Dec. they will have the 540,000 men contemplated, & sufficient transports for any purpose.

At the military manoeuvres in Nov. they will show betw. 40,000 & 50,000 men. Officers fr. Port Arthur [i.e. Russian], Kiaochou [German] & Tonquin [French] are to attend them.

A Mr. [James A.] Scrymser has just arrived fr. the States to propose to lay a cable betw. Japan & Hawaii, to the expenses of wch. he wants Japan to contribute in the form of a subsidy. He talks of connecting Hawaii with Australia also, & of course with San Francisco. O. seems inclined to entertain the proposal.

The negotiations betw. Beyer Peacock & Co. & the Formosan rlwy. Co. have fallen thro', & the Govt. are now going to undertake the construction themselves. It is to cost abt. £3 million. The expenses of transport in the island are immense. In some places the food of the troops costs three times what it does in Japan owing to this fact.

I told Ōkuma it was absurd of the Formosan Rlwy Co. to expect any British capitalists to lend a large sum of money (£1,500,000 had been asked fr. BP & Co.) without either a govt. guarantee or a mortgage on the line.

The native press speaks of discussions in the coalition that supports the Govt., but on the whole I think the two parties will pull together, as neither could remain in power without the other.

Believe me &c.

42. Satow to Salisbury

3 Nov. 1898

Dr. Ld. S.,

A telegr. has been recd. here today stating that the U.S. have demanded the cession of the whole of the Philippine Is. My Amer. Coll. says he has reported to Washington the favourable attitude of Japan on this point, & he believes that has had something to do with

the decision of his govt.

Okuma's resignation is a misfortune. All his ideas were Engl. & he was very well disposed. I was on the point of settling with him several outstanding questions, & now I shall have to begin all over again. His Engl. proclivities are of course well-known, & he is not persona grata with the court party, wch. is Germ[an] in its preferences. An intrigue agst. him has been going on for some time, led by the anti-constitutional party, of wch. Yamagata is the head. A couple of days ago I had a call fr. the Emperor's Grand Master of the Ceremonies ¹, who wanted to know what I thought of the situation, & he mentioned Y's idea of suspending the constitution. I replied that it was no business of mine to offer advice on their internal politics, they must learn experience for themselves from their own mistakes & failures. The suspension of the constitution wld. be a dangerous experiment. It was useless to try to make water run uphill. I thought it wld. be better to frankly recognize that party govt. had become a necessity, & the other leading statesmen who had hitherto held aloof fr. party shld. join either the Liberals or Progressists, & then there wld. be some chance of a large enough majority to give the country a stable govt.

I sent a message to Okuma by one of his leading supporters expressing my regret at the prospect of our official relations being severed again.

Today at the Palace [for the Emperor's birthday] I had an opportunity of speaking to Itagaki about prison reform. He assured me that even if he went out, he wld. take care that the reform of the prison system wch. he has much at heart shld. be carried out. It is possible that he may be a member of the new Cabinet. The Court party paid him the compliment of sending him 3 messages fr. the Emperor urging him to withdraw his resignation, while Okuma recd. no such mark of attention. This prison question is one which foreigners in this country have made most noise ab[ou]t, & it is most important for the harmony of our relations with Japan under the new Treaties that it shld. be solved satisfactorily.

No decision will be taken as to the formation of the new Cabinet till after Ito's return. He is expected on the 11th. When he went out in June he told me he wld. never take office again, but I do not attach much value to that. He likes power, & wld. certainly come in again if he saw his way to securing a majority in the Diet. But to do that he must become the actual head of the Liberal party, & I do not think he is prepared to do that, & so break with his oldest friends. On the other hand he cld. not lend himself to the suspension of the constitution, wch. is his own pet offspring.

¹ Sannomiya visited Satow on November 1, 1898. (Satow's diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 308)

Believe me &c.

43. Satow to Salisbury

11 Nov. 1898

Dear Lord Salisbury,

My Fr. coll., [Harmand] whom I met yesterday at Aoki's diplomatic reception, said he had intended to come & see me privately abt. the Reuter telegs. recd. here lately, wch. had given an incorrect impression of the facts, disturbed the public mind & caused great losses. He was quite sure France & England had no desire to go to war. He had sent a report on the subject to his Govt., & hoped they wld. make representations in London.

I replied to him that I had nothing to do with Reuter, & cld. not influence the telegs. sent fr. London or fr. Japan. Besides, the same sort of thing happened everywhere. When I was in Morocco letters used to be published in Paris as coming fr. Tangier wch. were really written at Fez, & the Agence Havas published telegs. as fr. Rome that were composed in Paris. He must be aware of the only ans[wer] that cld. be given by H.M.G., namely that they cld. not exercise any control over telegraphic agencies.

In this part of the world we receive only Reuter telegs. fr. London, & I can quite understand that their contents have been disagreeable reading for M. Harmand. But as he has on two occasions asked me in the presence of colls: with a triumphant air whether I had any news fr. Fashoda, I was not inclined to show myself particularly sympathetic. When the news of Marchand's being at Fashoda was recd. he was inclined to swagger.

Our conversation was quite friendly & polite, but Harmand is a great Anglophobe, and never loses the chance of saying & doing something agst. us.

44. Satow to Salisbury

1 Dec. 1898

Dear Ld. S.,

In spite of all the brave words uttered by the people who have pushed Yamagata into the position of Minister President abt. his suspending the constitution & governing without the Diet, they have found that they cld. not carry on by themselves, & have been forced to accept the support of the Liberal party. But I do not feel confident that it will last. When the Budget comes to be discussed, and it cannot long be delayed, the increase of the land tax wch. is a burning question will very likely become the rock on wch. the party will split. If

that happens, I suppose Yamagata, who is indifferent to power, will go out, and Itō will come back stronger than before & govern on party lines. He has come up to the immediate neighbourhood of Tōkiō, so that he is at hand in the event of a crisis.

Perh. now that the situation has quieted down for the moment, I may get some work done, but Aoki's head is full of 'la haute politique' & it is difficult to get him to converse on any current business. As the V[ice] M[inister] and most of the heads of depts. have been changed, the Ministry for F.A. is quite at sea.

45. Satow to Bertie

1 Dec. 1898

My dear Bertie,

My despp. 186 & 188 about the taxation of foreign shipping & insurance companies in Japan.

The advice I have given whenever there was an opportunity has been: Don't ask any questions till the tax-gatherer calls, but in the meantime find out what is done in other countries. If the tax-gatherer demands what is unreasonable, you will have wherewith to answer him.

But this did not content them. They wanted me to get official information fr. the Jap[ane]se Govt. as to the taxes they wld. have to pay.

I declined to do this. It wld. be giving them away. I have told them I wld. send their letter home.¹

My view is that if there is any attempt to treat them unfairly in the matter of taxation, I can interpose on their behalf, basing myself on the Treaty.

But I shld. be very glad to know all abt. the basis on wch. foreign cos. doing business in Engld. are taxed, especially Japsee. Cos. such as I have mentioned in my despp.

The 2 Engl. Banks, namely the Hgkg & S'hai Bank & the Chartered Bank of India A. & C. have not addressed me, & I hear the manager of the former is quite at ease in his own mind. To the agent of the other I gave the advice to find out what is done in S.A. for instance, & not to worry himself, till the time comes, any further.

I think myself that the persons interested will find it much easier to arrange all these ?? [questions] direct with the Japsee. Auth. than by invoking the assistance of the Legation. I have seen several instances of this lately. By addressing the Comr. of Customs at Yokohama

¹ See Satow's diary for November 25, 1898. (Ruxton, 2003, p. 317)

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the Chamber of Commerce found out all abt. who cld. sign certificates of origin five days before I cld. extract the information fr. the Govt., & that in spite of almost daily urging for an ans. that I might reply to the teleg. I had recd. fr. you. It is not that I am unwilling to put myself out for BSs. I have gone down to Yoko. several times to have talks with them, & give them what information & advice I could. But the Japse. are much more willing to deal direct with the European, than thro' his Legation.

y.v.t.

46. Satow to Seymour

19 Dec. 98

Dear Sir Edward,

I am sending you the dimensions of the 2 docks in an official form, so that it may remain on record.

Yesterday for the first time I had the opportunity of asking the new Min. of Marine [Yamamoto Gombei] whether there wld. be any objection on the part of the Japse. Govt. to the "Victorious" being docked at Kure.

He replied that he had not yet recd. the report on its completion, but that he wld. be ready to afford all possible facilities to the Royal Navy.

That seems satisfactory as far as it goes. I see in the papers that the "Yashima" has recently been docked there, & it is the report on her docking that he is prob. expecting.

Perh. you cld. indicate to me the date on wch. you would like the "Victorious" to be docked, & that wld. furnish me with an occasion for further testing the willingness of the Min. of Marine to oblige us in the matter.

My impression is that they will act obligingly.

There is nothing very interesting to tell you. The Govt. is trying to pass a bill for increasing the land tax, & is sanguine of success. If their expectations are realised we shall go on swimmingly. These frequent changes of govt. are a terrible nuisance. As the new Treaties are to come into operation next year it is necessary that the Diet shld. sit long enough to pass various bills that are required to meet the new circs. I hope you got my letter of Nov 17 in reply to yours of Oct 31, explaining the apparent contradiction betw. the telegs. recd. by you fr. Kingsmill & myself.

I am sending this by the hands of the Captain of the C.P.R. str. & wld. beg you to use the P.O. as little as possible, especially for confidential matters, like the telegs. texts you

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sent me. If the Japse. got hold of those telegs. they wld. have furnished a key to the cypher in use betw. us. As a rule the F.O. will not allow me to send by post or even in our closed bags the text of a teleg. but only a paraphrase, & it is much safer.

The papers abt. Fashoda are interesting reading. We were very near war, and the Fr. seem to be very vexed at having to climb down. They threaten us with their future wrath on a more convenient occasion, but I trust we too shall not forget. This trick of trying to get in our rear they have tried on for centuries, & it is the only dodge they have.

y.v.t.

P.S. Our consul at Nagasaki writes to me that after Jan. 1 Welsh coal will have to pay an import duty of \$0.879 per ton, & says that if no arrangement can be made for allowing coal to be stored in bond, the extra cost will drive foreign men-of-war away from the port. This year up to Oct. 31 the quantity imported was 34,504 tons, & the no. of visits of foreign men-of-war was 126, of wch. 48 Br. 31 Russ. 10 Germ. & 37 other nationalities.

Will you kindly tell me whether you think the imposition of the duty will be any cause of inconvenience for your squadron?

E.S.

47. Satow to Bertie

29.12.98

My dear Bertie,

In my No 204 I have reported an amendment to the business tax law wch. places it beyond doubt that only the capital of Br. Cos. Shipping, Banking & Insurance, employed in Japan will be subject to taxation, not the whole capital. Cos. will have to say what the amount so employed is. Some of the agents have been bothering me to know on what basis they are to furnish an estimate. I have told them they had better inquire of their companies, then go to the Japse. for information, as they might then have a hard & fast rule prescribed wch. they wld. not like.

As to the Chartered Bank's case reported in my 203 and 214, I have done all I could, but I feel it is rather a difficult one, and much may be said on both sides. It is a nuisance however to find Japse. Courts beginning to exercise jurisdiction before they are entitled to it. I told Aoki it was like a bridegroom wanting to enjoy his bride before the wedding day.

y.v.t.

48. Satow to Salisbury

29.12.98

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

The Cabinet have come to a compromise abt. the land tax with their allies in the Diet, by wch. the rate is raised fr. $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{3}{10}$ % of the assessed value, instead of 4% on agricultural land, & 5% on town land. This however still leaves them with a deficit of £600,000. There is great talk abt. nationalizing the principal railways for £20,000,000, but I do not know whether that will be carried. It is reported that £17,000 was spent in the purchase of votes, besides private contributions.

Aoki told me the other day ¹ that fr. a 2 hrs. conversation with the new Chinese Minr. & fr. the reports of Japanese who knew China well he had come to the conclusion that there was no hope of reforming either the army, navy or administration. Reform in short was impracticable without a revolution (Ito's opinion also) but no Chinaman was willing to stake his life on the event as was the case in Japan 30 y[ea]rs ago. He was convinced China wld. fall to pieces.

I learn fr. a good source that the Chinaman [Li Shêng toh] was recommended to come to me, as having witnessed all the changes in Japan that he might learn how such things are managed, but he has not yet manifested any desire to seek information on the subject. He looks too jolly & comfortable for a revolutionary hero.

I gather that the Japse. Govt. are apprehensive that the new Treaties will involve them in a mass of trouble with foreign PP if foreigners are not treated in a manner likely to satisfy them. It is good to know that they are in this frame of mind as it may facilitate Buck & myself getting fr. them some concessions as to communications betw. prisoners & their consuls. I think we shld. suggest to Yamagata as a piece of friendly advice that they shld. announce to the Foreign RR. their intention of voluntarily making this concession by way of calming people's minds. Dr. Greene whose letter I have sent home in a desp. is an American missionary who has been long in the country & is highly esteemed. I have complimented him on his letter, & regretted that he was not a diplomatist.

My Fr. coll. amiably informed me when dining here a couple of nights ago that France was so incensed abt. the Fashoda affair that war wld. break out within 6 mos. I replied that it was all de Comcel's[?] fault, who had wanted to signalize his retirement fr. the Embassy by a brilliant triumph. He rejoined that France wld. have for her allies Russia & Germany,

¹ See Satow's diary for December 22, 1898 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 322).

abandoning the hope of recovering Alsace & Lorraine. He was persuaded that Engl. had wished to provoke a war, in order to assume a protectorate in Egypt. I referred him to Y.L. speech at the Mansion House, after wch., I said, no one cld. suppose for a moment that Engl. desired to change the position in Egypt. That, he said, cannot be allowed to continue indefinite[ly]. He also told me he had several times been offered the post of Govr. Genl. of Indo-China, but refused unless with permission to control the press as in the early days of Napoleon III. One is almost tempted to wish he might accept unconditionally, but prob. he does less mischief where he is. It is said he was sent here because his tongue is indiscreet.

49. Satow to Sanderson

[Secret – duplicate by mail of April 14]

31 Dec 98

My dear Sanderson,

I enclose my account for S.S. fr. my return here in Nov 1897 up to the end of this year, with the dates on wch. I have made pay[men]ts to my agent.¹ The sums are stated in yen, wch. I have converted at their par value of 2s ½d. They are never below that, sometimes a fraction above it.

If you find this correct will you kindly have the amount paid to my credit with Parr's Bank, Ltd. 77 Lombard St.

y.v.t.

1897	Nov 26	100	<u>yen</u>	
1898	Jan 12	100	“	@ 2s½d = £79.12.6
“	Mar 12	100	“	
“	May 10	100	“	
“	July 5	150	“	
“	Oct 4	100	“	
“	Nov 22	100	“	
“	Dec 16	<u>30</u>	“	
		<u>780</u>		

¹ The agent's name was Asaina Kansui. The dates are all mentioned in Satow's diary as days when Asaina was paid by Satow. On Asaina see G. A. Lensen, *Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904: The Observations of Sir Ernest Satow*, Sophia Uni. Tokyo, 1966, pp. 21-24.

50. Satow to Gosselin

25. 1. 99

Dear Sir Martin,

My desp. No. 25 Cons. enclosing a dft. of new instructions to the consuls in Japan à propos of the new Treaties will I think explain itself. As soon as the protocol abt. jurisdiction in cases pending on July 17 & the little consular convention are signed, I shall send them home & they can then be inserted in their proper places. [Margin: by mail of April 14]

I wld. suggest that the "Instructions" shld. be issued as fr. the Secy. of State, as they will have more weight than if they appeared to come fr. myself.

A consul for Honolulu has I see been appted., & will I suppose relieve Kenny before long. I am writing to the latter today to inquire whether he is coming here or going on sick leave. Fr. rumours that have reached me I fear he is very much out of health, & hardly fit to go back to Formosa. But if Longford shld. go on leave in April, as it is reported privately he wishes to do, Kenny might safely go to act at Nagasaki.

y.v.t.

E.S.

51. Satow to Salisbury

Duplicate by mail of 14 April

25/1/99

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

The visit of Ld. Charles Beresford has been a great success. He was already favourably known for the speech at York in wch. he advocated an alliance betw. Engl. & Japan, & his coming was eagerly anticipated by both officials & private individuals. B. Ss. Also hoped he wld. do something for them in connexion with the revised Treaties.

At Kōbe he lunched with a large party of Engl[ish] to whom he made a speech recommending them to accept the situation with good temper, & try to make friends with the Jap[ane]se, wch. had a good effect. It is true he promised to ask a question in the House of Commons abt. the Memorial they sent home last year, but I rather hope he will forget to do so. At Yoko. he was entertained at dinner by the leading Br. merchants, & spoke more decidedly in the same tone. He also enlarged upon the unreasonableness of being jealous of

the commercial progress of other countries. The speeches on that occasion made by the Govr. & the Chairman of the Japse. Chamber of Commerce were of a very friendly character, but I do not send them, as I think I have already done enough in that direction.

Here he was welcomed very cordially by the Cabinet as well as by outside politicians and Japse. repres'ves of commerce. The Emperor gave him an audience, & said that he & the Japse. people believed that his visit to the Far East wld. have the effect of "changing the opinion of the world" (in regard to China) & draw closer the ties betw. Engl. & Japan. He was shown the model prison, the law courts & the arsenal at Yokosuka, seeing more at the latter place than anyone I know of. I introduced him to my American, Belgian & Russian colls: & he had a long talk with Leyden whom he knew before. The Russians have been very anxious abt. the effect of his visit to Japan, supposing him to have a secret political mission.

As regards our relations with Japan he has done much good. He has spoken the language of reason & moderation to British residents who are apt to be hostile to the new Treaty, & has pleased many Japse. by his remarks respecting the tenure of land by foreigners & the desirability of the criminal procedure being made to bear less severely on accused persons. In these two directions he has I am sure greatly facilitated my own task in connexion with the new Treaties.

His advocacy of a quadruple 'commercial alliance' betw. Engl. America Germ. & Japan has certainly pleased the Japse., both official & non-official, & quickened [quicken?] the desire they already entertain for a close understanding with us as to China. I have let him speak for himself & have helped him as far as possible to have opportunities of explaining his ideas to others, but I have followed the line he has himself taken with regard to his mission, namely that he represents the Associated Chambers of Commerce, & is not in any way an emissary of H.M.G. I gather indirectly that my Germ. & American colls: approve of his ideas about a 'commercial alliance'.

As he has explained to me, he considers nothing can be done for China without an army organized and commanded by Engl. officers. Aoki said to me that Chang Chi-tung had told the Japse. consul at Hankow of Beresford's plans, that it was quite out of the question to give the command to a foreigner, & wld. never be sanctioned by the Peking Govt. Aoki added that Chang had sent 40 young Chinese to receive a military education here, & had asked for some Japanese officers to go over to Hankow. He enlarged upon the desirability of Japan & Engl. not crossing each other's path. Why shld. not Engl. undertake a portion of

this work, say at Nanking, & let Japan do it at Hankow, or perh. Japan might later on have the Tientsin army. He begged me to urge this on Ld. Chas. I replied that I knew what Y.L. [Your Lordship] had said to Kato on this subject, & personally thought it w[ou]ld be an excellent plan for Japan to have the organization of the N. army.

I spoke to B. in this sense, & the result was that in his public speech at Tokio on the 21st [January], he said all four members of the 'commercial alliance' must help in this work.

Beyond this I have not talked to any one abt. his objects in coming out to the East, of wch. I knew nothing but what is in the papers & what he has told me himself.

If I may venture to express an opinion, it is that whoever commands the Chinese army, if a single force is organized, will rule China, & if there are separate armies under separate commanders, then we have spheres of influence. Looking at things from the point of view of an outsider, as matters are tending at present, I shld. be inclined to say that 'sphere of influence' is likely to beat 'integrity of China'.

The foreign press out here still fr. time to time reproduces the story that Prince Henry will not visit Japan because it is considered that he wld. be running serious personal risk in coming here. Leyden must be very annoyed about it all, for as soon as it was settled that Japan was not safe for Prince Henry, the Russians brought the Gr. Duke Cyril here, & showed to the world that there was no danger, at least for him. I am afraid it is quite true that Germany is unpopular, tho' less so than Russia, but the Japse. only dislike the first and fear the latter.

My Fr. coll[eague] is now quite friendly. He brought me the other day ¹ a jar of black olives. As the tree is not cultivated, a branch was not available.

52. Satow to Campbell ²

14 Feb. 99

My dear Campbell,

I have written to [J.C.] Hall, in whose district [Kōbe] the Wills Trademark case is being tried, to put a para. abt. the trial & its result in his next Trade Report.

I acknowledge that my mail that you recd. on Jan. 2 was a heavy one. I don't trouble you much with political despp. but these questions arising out of Treaty Revision are very troublesome. It was hinted to me that the SS.Cos & insurance people wld. move their

¹ January 4, 1899. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 325)

² Satow is here responding to F. Campbell's letter dated January 6, 1899 in PRO 30/33 5/2, item no. 25. Francis Campbell's reply to this letter is item no. 31, dated June 1, 1899.

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directors at home to address the F.O. direct, so I thought it better to send you the whole story.

If it could be arranged that whenever the London Chamber of Commerce or any other people write to the F.O. they shld. be told that the matter shld. be referred to me for a report, I think a good deal of writing wld. be saved & my hand wld. be strengthened.

As an instance of this, the complaint abt. the inequality of the consular fee for certificates of origin in London & Antwerp may be taken. The teleg. I recd. was not quite clear & I misunderstood it. But now a firm in Yokohama has written me a long letter enclosing corresp'ce with the Japse. consul at Antwerp, wch. makes the whole matter as clear as daylight. I hope not to inflict it on you officially.

As it is in the interest of Belgium much more than in ours, to see that difficulties in the way of the export of Belgian goods are removed, I have incited my Belgian coll. to take the matter up & I hope he will put it thro'.

I know how you are overwhelmed with despp. & try to "limit my output" as much as possible.

y.v.t.

53. Satow to Seymour

17 Feb. 1899

My dear Sir Edward,

I trust the delay in forwarding you the desired information about the docks will not have inconvenienced you. I hesitated for some time abt. asking Ad. Yamamoto directly, & it seems that he is unwilling to give the necessary facilities [see letter no. 46 above].

Things are quieter at Peking owing to the negotiations that are going on in St. Petersburg. From the copies of corresp'ce that have reached me I gather that Russia is not willing to bind herself to anything definite. The only result will be that H.M.G. will have a clear conscience in the matter. Ld. Salisbury recently explained in no unambiguous language that his reason for not acting vigorously in China was the very serious state of our relations with France. And fr. all I read it seems that we are not yet sure that a row may not occur with her.

y.v.t.

54. Satow to Salisbury

Feb. 21 1899

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

Since Beresford's departure we have heard very little more of his proposed quadruple alliance, but Aoki said to me not long ago that he did not think it was quite practical, tho' he had not liked to throw cold water on it at the time.¹ He is of opinion that a single Chinese army is not possible, at least at present.² There is no money in China for a big scheme. The Empress wld. be very jealous of any general who had a large army, & even Jung-lu has only 15,000 men. 100,000 properly trained is all that is needed. These must be raised in different provinces, some under Jap[ane]se, others under Engl. or Germans; & when the necessity arises, they can be brought together.

I confess I do not think much of this plan. The men wld. only obey the officers who had trained them, & 3 sets of officers of different nationalities wld. scarcely be got to work together.

I had a talk one evening [February 6 – see diary] with Genl. Katsura the Min. of War. He said the Peking Govt. has still sufficient prestige to make the Viceroys, even such men as Chang Chi-t'ung, shake in their shoes. He agrees with Beresford that the defence of China agst. encroachment is a military, not a naval problem. But even more than for defence agst. a foreign enemy, a properly organized force of troops & police is required. He wld. like to see a division of 15,000 men raised for each of the provinces. In Japan such a division costs £150,000 a year, but in China it wld. cost more, as conscription is impossible. The great difficulty wld. be the officers. There is excellent material for the rank & file, but the officers must be Japse. or foreigners. He had hoped to make a beginning with the 30 young Chinese who have been sent over here, but they have not sufficient "go" in them, & grumble at the hardships of school life. He did not see where the money was to come from for a large scheme. What China needs is a Budget, & strict supervision of the expenditure. He calculated that 10 times as much is wrung out of the people in one way or another as is officially accounted for. Whatever is done must be done by the Empress and Jung-lo.

Katsura is a practical soldier. He thinks the commercial interests of Germany in China are large enough to make it worth her while to support the policy of the "open door" agst. Russia, in spite of her difficult position in the centre of Europe.

Aoki reported to me [on February 14 – see diary] conversations he says he had with Prince Bismarck & the German Emperor, in wch. he tried to impress on them that the true

¹ Satow asked Katsura about the quadruple commercial alliance on February 6, 1899. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 334)

² Satow's diary, February 14, 1899 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 335)

policy for Germany was to have England for an ally in Europe and Japan for an ally in Asia. “You have conquered the Latin race” he said to the former “and one day you will have to conquer the Slaves. If while you are engaged with them on your eastern frontier we launch all our available troops agst. them from behind, they will get the worst of it. But we cannot be your allies in Asia unless you are friends with England, for at any moment if England forbids us to move, we cannot help you.”

I told him that before it came to that England wld. first try to settle the Chinese question with Russia by diplomatic methods.

I have also seen Ito [on February 15 – see diary]. He told me it was not true that he had said reform was impossible in China without a revolution. There was no one in China, not Chang Chi-tung nor Liu Kun-yi strong enough to make a revolution. The political condition there was altogether diff[erent] fr. what it was in Japan before 1868. Here a complete revolution had been made by sweeping away the feudal system, but in China there was no feudal system to get rid of. There is only a bureaucracy. If you got rid of that you wld. have to substitute another. So the problem is merely to reform what exists. There lies the difficulty. China he remarked is like an old man dying. The Emperor had asked him to give advice to the Tsungli Yamên, & he wld. have stayed there for that purpose, but for the coup d’etat. He had tried to get an audience of the Empress, but she declined to see him. She is the only person thro’ whom anything can be done. The latest news fr. Peking was that a tendency towards reform was manifesting itself. Unfortunately there were no “men”. Li Hung-chang is the only man of brains. He ought to be placed at the head of the administration, with some younger men to help him. He told Li that Manchuria wld. become Russian, to wch. Li replied that Russia only had permission to build a rlwy. & that Manchuria wld. remain Chinese.

Ito then fetched the draft of a letter he had written to Beresford. The only thing in it beyond vague generalities was a warning that the Chinese cld. not be governed except by men of their own race. I objected that this was not historically correct. They had been conquered & ruled by the Golden Horde, by the Mongols, by the Manchus. “Yes” he said, “but after all they were of the same stock.” I said Russia meant to have all China north of the Yellow river. “Dreams” he replied. “Where are they to find the millions of people to settle all that territory”. He admitted that they wld. absorb Manchuria, but it wld. take a long time. But he added that the dense population of the South, meaning of the Yangtze valley, wld. be ungovernable, for it wld. be impossible to bring troops enough fr. Europe to

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keep them under. I said that acc. to Beresford 3000 good troops with a few Maxims cld. march thro' China. No, he replied, I shld. be sorry to undertake it with 10,000. Think of the difficulty of obtaining supplies & transport, & how the people wld. harass the lines of communication.

I asked him what he thought wld. be the future of China. He said it was impossible to predict, but he did not mind saying that she wld. hold together for another couple of years.

I am still convinced that Japan will not wish to move, or to throw in her lot with any other Power, until her military & naval preparations are complete, say in 1903. She has to rearm the whole of her artillery and to get the ships now building in England delivered. The last battleship [the *Mikasa*?] has only just been ordered of Vickers [sic. Vickers?], Son & Maxim. Meanwhile she hopes to strengthen her position in Corea, & has to settle the numerous little questions that will arise in consequence of the abolition of consular jurisdiction.

I think, & most of my colls: are of the same opinion, that everything augurs well for the transfer of jurisdiction in July next. A variety of bills required for this purpose have been introduced into the Diet, & one important one, wch. enables foreigners to conduct newspapers has been promulgated. There is a growing desire on the part of the lawyers to see the criminal procedure reformed, & I think it will not be long before prisoners are allowed to have counsel at their preliminary exam. The ideas of Anglo-Saxondom will prevail over those that have been imported fr. France & Germany. There's good reason to hope that in 2 or 3 years time foreigners will be allowed to own land. The chief difficulties will I think arise fr. the fact that the foreign residents will find themselves in a novel position, for wch. they have taken no trouble to prepare themselves, & fr. their being unable to see that the Revised Treaties mean the international emancipation of Japan.

Believe me &c.

55. Satow to Bertie

22 Feb. 99

My dear Bertie,

My authority (my no. 41) for the belief that the Japse. intend to deprive British shipping of the coasting trade betw. Japan & Formosa is Gubbins, who heard it fr. Denison, the legal adviser of the Japse. F. Dept. So it is not a mare'snest.

Sugar fr. Takow is shipped by British merchants in Br. st[eame]rs. Since the almost total

decay of the camphor trade, the sugar business is all that is left to our people in South Formosa.

Prob. the rumour that Japse. strs. will not be allowed to carry cargo betw. Hawaii & San Francisco has suggested to the Japse. Govt. that it wld. be agreeable to apply the same principle to Formosa & Japan agst. foreign strs.

As to coal at Nagasaki (my no. 40) for foreign men of war, I wrote to Ad. Seymour for his opinion [see no. 46 above], & he replied that “the slight coal tax will not matter practically to men-of-war.” If it did have the effect of lessening their visits, it wld. contribute to the tranquillity of the foreign residents.

I think the change of jurisdiction will pass off quietly on the whole, & the Japse. Govt. seem well-disposed. There is some ground for hoping that prisoners will be allowed to have counsel, fr. the very first, & in that case the consul will not have to intervene. I hope to arrange for our consular prison at Yoko. being taken over by the local authorities & used for such foreign prisoners as they may have.

In regard to the adhesion of India to the Treaty, Aoki told me the last time I saw him [February 16 – see diary] that the Cabinet agreed to the reservations & I am going to him tomorrow with a final draft.

Fr. the Japse. papers I see the legislature of Br. Columbia has been passing laws agst. Japse. immigrants & that protests have been addressed to Ottawa. I have thought it best to hold my tongue abt. the matter.

y.v.t.

56. Satow to Gosselin¹

22 Feb. 99

Dear Sir Martin,

I am sending you a desp[atch] abt. the Court for Japan & the consulates after the revised treaty comes into operation, wch. I have tried to make as short as possible.

The practice of employing constables as shipping clerks was the subject of much corresp'ce during Plunkett's time in 1886, & seems to have recd. the tacit sanction of the F.O., so I have not referred to that question. I am inclined to think it has been allowed in the course of time to go a little too far, but do not see my way to checking it. Dealing with sailors is disagreeable business, & prob. at consulates all over the world is left to a

¹ Gosselin's reply is in PRO 30/33 5/2, item no. 28 dated April 25, 1899.

subordinate.

The saving on the abolition of the [consular] court will be £2400 a year besides the wages of a constable & 2 turnkeys, so that £100 a year for increasing the salaries of the Yokohama & Nagasaki consulate to £950, & an extra hundred for the Vice-consul whom Bonar asks for could easily be afforded.

If Wilkinson is able to finish all his civil & criminal cases before the end of the year, perh. Bonar might be appted. acting judge to finish the bankruptcy case mentioned in the desp.

Lay has asked me to put his case before you again. When the idea first occurred to me to ask that his apptmt. might be made permanent, I was not aware that the Asst. Chin. Secy. was also only acting. I wrote privately on June 15 [1898] to Bertie [see no. 26 above], & got a teleg. "write abt. Lay", wch. I supposed meant that if I asked officially it would be done. So when I recd. no. 42 Cons. of Sept. 29 I was much disapptd. Lay is a good hardworking little fellow, & if it cld. be arranged in connexion with other things for wch. Treasury consent is needed, I shld. be very glad. I do not however write officially, but I shld. get an official refusal.

If a Vice-consul is allowed for Yoko. I shld. recommend Chalmers, who is a nice fellow, & will get on well with Bonar.

It is unfortunate that Forster & Griffiths, who are both good consular officers, have not passed in Japse. Plunkett ¹ many years ago reported that the language was of less importance now that so many officials speak English, & I think this acted as a discouragement to its study. But I do not find that Japanese is less wanted, particularly the written language, & a consul who can speak & read is a much more useful man.

y.v.t.

57. Satow to Sanderson ²

3.3.99

My dear Sanderson,

Baron Sannomiya, Gd. Master of Ceremonies to the Emperor, called on me today ³ to say that Italy had agreed to observe Court mourning reciprocally for the respective

¹ See 'Sir Francis Plunkett: Minister to Japan 1884-87' by Sir Hugh Cortazzi in *British Envoys in Japan 1859-1972*, Global Oriental, 2004.

² The response to this letter came from Villiers. See PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 29, May 14, 1899.

³ Sannomiya also approached Satow about mourning on January 26, 1897. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.155)

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sover[eign]s of the 2 countries, & he asked me whether I cld. tell him how many days mourning wld. be observed by the Engl. Court in case of the death of the Emperor of Japan. He added that the idea here is to observe mourning for 3 wks. In the case of sovereigns of the Gt. PP., & 19 days for those of other PP, of those who have agreed to go into mourning. These are, up to the present, G.B., Italy, Spain & Belgium.

I said I cld. not tell him the English rule, but wld. inquire.

My reason for troubling you with this letter is that it was fr. you that I learnt when I came home in May 1897 abt. mourning for the E. of Japan, & the subject does not seem to come within the scope of the letters I ordinarily write to Ld. Salisbury or Bertie.

y.v.t.

58. Satow to Gosselin

Tokio

13 March 99

Dear Sir Martin,

Another ground for wishing to have Lay appted. Asst. Jap. Sec. is the following.

Gubbins is going on leave next Nov. It wld. be very difficult for me to do without a 2nd man in the Japse. chancery, as during the session of the Diet, not to speak of other times, there is an immense deal of work to be done in the way of watching legislation that may affect B. Ss.

There is a desp. No. 6 Cons. of 26 May/93 fr. wch. it is to be inferred that if Lay were left alone in the Japse. chancery he wld. draw £700 a year, but that if an assistant is brought in the latter wld. get the allowance as “Asst. employed in the Japse. Sec’s. office”, so that Lay wld. only get £600, wch. is what he receives in the subordinate position.

But if Lay were permt. Asst. Jap. Sec. he wld. get £700 and the other man £600.

I shld. add that the A.J.S. draws up the Report on the whole trade of Japan, & any other report that may be specially called for by the F.O., besides the Legn. accts. At Peking I see an asst. gets £150 a year for the latter piece of work, while nothing is allowed here, so the 2 legations do not stand precisely on the same footing as regards their asst. secs. for the language.

y.v.t.

59. Satow to Salisbury

23/3/99

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The Italian demand for the lease of Sanmun caused a good deal of excitement here, but it has greatly calmed down since the announcement of De Martino's recall, in spite of the telegs. that Italy will persist in the negotiations by peaceable means. The Japse. have sent a couple of small cruisers over to China, but I have seen no signs of their wishing to oppose Italy, even if force had been resorted to in order to acquire Sanmun. I was prepared to give them a warning that to even threaten hostilities wld. unite Europe agst. them, but it was not necessary, and I do not believe that any such notion was entertained by the Govt. whatever the newspapers might say.

A little excitement also arose fr. a Jap. member of a Club to wch. all the dip[lomat]s belong giving a dinner to Ponce & another adherent of Aguinaldo, at wch. a no. of journalists were present, & speeches were made indicating sympathy with the Filipino insurgents. But the committee promptly held a meeting & expelled the offender, so there the matter ended.¹

The session of the Diet has come to an end, & things are generally quiet. The allowances of the members have been increased to £200 a year, so that they will be more than ever reluctant to run any risk of being dissolved, & the position of the Govt. is much more secure. Yamagata looks ill, & wld. like to give up, but Ito does not seem to care to take his place. I hope they will remain in at least until the new Treaties are brought into operation. It wld. be very inconvenient if a change were to take place just now, & we are all very contented with Aoki as Min. for F.A.

He tells me that he hears fr. Peking that Heyking gives a good deal of trouble, & is constantly working agst. Sir Claude, thus frustrating Aoki's own policy, wch. is to act in accord in China with both Engl. & Germ. He told me a story abt. Heyking refusing to let his wife sign a letter wch. Lady MacD. had proposed shld. be sent by the diplomatic ladies to the Dowager Empress thanking her for their reception. Also that Heyking declined to send away his guard of sailors until all his own pending questions were settled, altho' all are being withdrawn at this moment. I have good reason to think Aoki is much more Engl. than he was; at one time he was entirely devoted to the Germans.

¹ See diary, March 16 and 18, 1899.

60. Satow to Salisbury

23.3.99

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

I think I ought to tell you that Aoki spoke to me a week or two ago [on February 27 – see diary] abt. an idea that was mooted when Okuma was at the F.Dept. of raising the Japse. Legns. to the Great Powers to Embassies. O. gave him to understand that the necessary appropriations had been made in the Budget that had been prepared before he left office, but he found it was not so. However he thought the time was coming when the proposal shld. be made, beginning with H.M.G. He accordingly wished to ask me a question, of a delicate nature he said, & it proved to be this; wld. H.M.G. in case the change were made send some one here instead of myself.

I said I did not know of any precedent for the man on the spot being removed in such circs. Personally I shld. be very sorry if any such change were made as long as my friend d'Anethan, the Belgian Min. remained doyen, & that of course it was a matter on wch. I cld. not offer any suggestions to H.M.G. He said he was quite satisfied, & that of course he wld. not ask me to say anything abt. it.

Aoki for a long time has been credited with the desire of going as Ambassador to Engl. His wife is a German lady, & he himself prefers Europe to Japan.

I did not like to tell him frankly my opinion that the proposition wld. not be favourably looked on at home, but I confess it looks to me rather presumptuous.

61. Satow to Barrington

23.3.99

My dr. Barrington,

I am very glad to be able to keep Paget here till Whitehead comes.

I have written to Ld. S. what Aoki, who is ambitious of going to England as Ambassador, said to me the other day abt. raising the missions on both sides to the rank of embassies. He professed that the only thing that made him hesitate was the uncertainty whether under such circs. I shld. be allowed to remain here. I replied that as far as I knew there was no precedent for removing the man who happened to be on the spot, with wch. ans. he declared himself quite reassured.

I have not said to Ld. S. what perh. wld. have looked like an impertinence, that if the idea were entertained by H.M.G. I shld. be quite willing to make way for another, but I can say it

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to you without any fear of being misunderstood. However the proposition seems to me so preposterous that I can scarcely conceive its being seriously made. There is no doubt however that to be Amb[assador] in Engl[and] is Aoki's cherished object, & it has been freely spoken abt.

De Martino seems to have got into a nice mess. I think I told you he made great efforts to come back here last year, but the Japse. refused him. After he got to Peking he made a pretext of going on a shooting expedition and came over to procure a Japanese lady or a companion. Having quarrelled with her, he sent her about her business, & she then wrote a letter, wch. has been published in a Japanese paper, warning the sisterhood against him. The paper added his character was such that even Orfini, his coll. here, would not shake hands with him.

62. Satow to Barrington (précis)

12/4 To Barrington abt. duplicate letter to B.S.

63. Satow to Bertie

13 April 99

My dear Bertie,

I am troubling you with a tedious desp[atch] reporting progress concerning the adhesion of India to the Treaty. The difficulties have all been made by the objectionable Tsudzuki mentioned in it. He was, it seems, put in along [as Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs] with Aoki to check the supposed pro-European tendencies of the latter. The result has been general dissatisfaction on the part of the foreign legations, & finally Aoki has kicked, and it is said that Tsudzuki is to go. He is a pet of Yamagata's, having accompanied him to Moscow, & rather fancies himself as a diplomatist. To him it is also due that I have not been able long ago to sign a reasonable consular convention, & I suspect him also of making difficulties abt. the continuation of consular jurisdiction in cases that may be pending when the Treaty comes into force.

We have had here a capt. Leinhaas of the Empress Frederick's Household. He told me Prince Henry, à propos of his not being allowed to visit Japan, said "Confound those diplomatists", wch. was meant for Leyden.

It was unfortunate our Jany. bag did not reach the F.O. I suppose there is no doubt it went to the bottom in the "Labrador". There were letters of Beresford in it, I rather think to Ld.

Salisbury.

y.v.t.

64. Satow to Salisbury

13 April 99

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

My Italian coll: says that Raggi [Giuseppe Salvago-Raggi], who was sec. in charge at Peking before de Martino went out and is now returning in the same capacity, was the originator of the idea of acquiring Sanmun.¹ He thinks de Martino, finding his position difficult on acct. of his irregular private life, determined to rehabilitate it by making a great coup, and that some one must have led him on to believe that the Chinese wld. not resist.

I said that fr. all I had heard neither Engl. nor Germany were in favour of the scheme, but had not liked to refuse their countenance to a friend.

He told me he supposed de Martino had been backed up by Sir Cl. Macdonald, so I said nothing cld. be inferred fr. the fact of his taking charge of the Italian archives till Raggi's arrival, and that if any one had led de Martino on, it was more likely to be a coll: at Peking who was known to be a brouillon [troublemaker]. I thought the Fr. Govt. had encouraged Italy more than any other.

Aoki spoke very strongly abt. Russia on March 30 [see diary]. He thinks she has far reaching designs on Corea, & that Japan ought to resist her at all hazards. I believe he has had long talks with Kawakami the chief of the Staff, who is also very warlike and anti-Russian. But that has always been his tone, and in 1894 he [Aoki] seems to have assured Ld. Kimberley that Japan went to war with China merely to keep Russia out of Corea.

A week later [on April 6 – see diary] he told me he heard the Chinese viceroys did not pull well together, & that there were signs of a civil war being imminent. He also said Yamagata had begged him to say to me that it was his earnest desire to work conjointly with Engld. & Germany in regard to China.

The papers (Japse) are full of an impending entente betw. Engl. & Russia on Chinese affairs. The last idea seems to be that Russians' object is to square Engl., & then pick a quarrel with Japan before she has time to complete her armaments. A series of extravagant articles has appeared the last few days on this topic, attributing deep laid designs for the

¹ See diary for March 25, 1899. (Ruxton, 2003, p. 347)

destruction of Japan to Russia.

The transfer of foreigners to Japse. jurisdiction next July promises to pass off smoothly. The Yokohama International Committee invited the principal members of the Cabinet to dinner a few days ago [on April 10th at the Oriental Hotel], & conciliatory speeches were made on both sides. The only question not satisfactorily agreed upon is the ownership of land by foreigners, wch. the Govt. do not wish to concede. Capitalists who have land to sell are in favour of it. I daresay it will come in time.

y.v.t.

65. Satow to Salisbury

3 May 99

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

I had been rather anxious abt. Aoki's position, as he was at loggerheads c. his V[ice]-M[inister] [Tsuzuki Keiroku] who was an influential repres've of young Japan, & he had been violently attacked by the press. But the conflict betw. them has ended by the V-M resigning, & perh. there is now a better chance of my being able to arrange for the adhesion of India to the Treaty. Takahira, the Min. to Austria, has been sent for to be V-M.

I do not think the Japse. Govt. are likely to take the advice of the newspapers & try to get a port ceded to them in Fuhkien. If they shld. ever be established there they wld. be a thorn in the side of European PP possessing spheres of influence in adjacent provinces, as they c[ou]ld easily send much larger garrisons to China than we or the Italians could. But my impression is that Corea is much more interesting to them than Fuhkien. Aoki told me Katō had been told at the F.O. that the Italian demands wld. end in smoke, & that seems to have reassured him. The main preoccupation of the Japse. is with Russia. I am told that the Army & most of the leading men of Cabinet rank are firmly persuaded that they will be forced into a collision with Russia in the next 5 or 6 years. If that is the case, they naturally will husband their resources & be unwilling to undertake anything in China. The question however suggests itself whether Russia wld. be induced to offer the Japse. a free hand in Corea in return for neutrality in a war with Engld. out here. I do not think the Japse. wld. desire such an arrangement, and Aoki seems the last man in the world to adopt such a policy. In any case I do not think anything of the kind can happen before 1903, & if a crisis occurred then I believe the Japse. wld. rather go with us than with the Russians if they had the choice.

My Am: coll: Buck who has just come back fr. a visit to Peking, says dissolution seemed to be in the air. No one had any hope of China's future was the impression he derived fr. his conversations with Chinese officials.

My Belgian coll: [d'Anethan] has 2 or 3 times tried to draw me abt. our opposition to the ratification of the Peking-Hankow rlwy. concession, speaking of their success agst. us with a somewhat triumphant air. I tell him I do not understand the matter, least of all why Belgium chose Russia & France as her backers instead of England.

Some of the missionaries are afraid the Govt. means to make an attack on their schools by prohibiting the teaching of religion & religious services in all privileged educational establishments. The Americans are more interested in the matter than our people are.¹ To those who have spoken to me on the subject I have said that in the absence of any Treaty stipulations, the British Govt. wld. hold missionaries were entitled to protection only quâ B.Ss. not quâ missionaries, & that I did not see how I cld. interfere. As a private individual I give our missionaries whatever help I can, & I think they are disposed to be satisfied with that.

I notice that the Inns of Court have been talking abt. refusing to let foreigners be called to the bar. It is a pity I think, as far as Japan is concerned. A fair number of Japanese have been called in Engl[an]d, and they are proud of the fact. Recently they have founded an annual dinner, of wch. the English barristers here are also members. We had a very successful meeting the other day [April 27 – see diary], & got the Min. of Justice [Kiyoura Keigo] to come & speak. It is an easy way of keeping in touch with the native lawyers, & spreading the influence of Engl. ideas.

Believe me &c. E.S.

66. Satow to Campbell (précis)

To Francis Campbell stirring him up abt. comparative memo. on Treaties sent home in No 153 of Sept. 30 last.

67. Satow to Seymour

13.5.99

My Dear Sir Ed.,

¹ Satow told Leyden he had received a letter from Dr. Greene the American congregational missionary (diary, April 23) and discussed the regulation with U.S. Minister Buck on May 2nd: "I said neither Dr. Greene nor Bishop Awdry had produced the text of the obnoxious regulation..."

The Min. of Marine [Yamamoto Gombei] is very anxious to send an officer of the rank of Lieut. to reside at Hongkong, attached to the Jap. Consulate there, to perform the duties that in Engl. devolve upon a naval attaché. He called upon me to say this [on April 24 – diary], & added that he preferred to act straightforwardly in the matter, & to have the consent of the Br. Auth. beforehand. He said Japse. officers were allowed the run of Portsmouth Dockyd, & had picked up much valuable information. He wld. like to do the same at Hongkong. Moreover if it were necessary to send a man down to Manila, it wld. be a great saving of time if they had a man at Hongk[on]g already.

I said Ad. Fitzgerald wld. be here shortly, & he had better talk to him abt. it.

They met at dinner at my house, but I do not think any conversation took place betw. them. But Ad. Fitz told me he cld. not offer an opinion being only 2nd in command.

A few days ago the Min. recurred to the matter again at an official luncheon given to Ad. Fitz, & I said I wld. write to you.

I shld. consequently be much obliged if you wld. tell me what likelihood there is of this request being acceded to, & what is the best channel thro' wch. it shld. be put for[war]d.

E.S.

68. Satow to Salisbury

23 May 1899

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

Aoki thinks the Germans are hankering after Amoy. He told me about 10 days ago [on May 14 – diary] that Leyden went to him & said: "Have you heard that the Engl. have taken possession of an island off Amoy?" "No" replied Aoki, "and I do not think it possible, because China has undertaken not to lease or alienate any part of Fuhkien to any other P. We shld. have to assert our rights." Thereupon Leyden inquired whether Japan attached great value to the island (I suppose Kulangtao was meant), to wch. A. replied that Japan wld. not remain indifferent if her rights were interfered with, & retorted "I suppose it is you who want to take it." Aoki added to me that German ships have been hanging about there lately, & he suspected they had some designs on the place.

I told Aoki he might rest assured that H.M.G. had no intention of the kind, & I cld. not imagine where Leyden had got the idea from, as it had not been mentioned in the papers.

Yesterday Leyden & I were talking abt. the uselessness of the Italians establishing a trading settlement at Sanmên, as commerce must always remain centred at the existing

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chief ports; he said he had lately tried to find out whether the Japanese had any intention of claiming Amoy as part of their 'sphere of interest' in Fuhkien, & found they did not. It wld. remain an international port. But he had gathered fr. Aoki that if any one laid hands on it, the Japse. wld. make themselves nasty.

I incline to think Aoki's acct. of the conversation was correct.

69. Satow to Barrington¹

23 May 99

My dear Barrington,

Can you do anything for my young friend Archibald Madden, the V-C at Tangier. He is a good hardworking fellow, & I fancy knows a fair amount of Arabic. He is very anxious to get an apptmt. under the F.O. somewhere. At present he is only paid out of the office allowance, & so is not doing anything towards a pension. He came to the Tangier legation in Oct. 1894, & before that had temporary employment in the Librarian's dept.

y.v.t.

70. Satow to Salisbury

25 May 99

Dr. Ld. S.,

On the 18th [see diary] Visct. Aoki asked me to go to the Foreign Dept., as he particularly wanted to see me. It turned out to be a request fr. the Min. of Finance [Matsukata] for help in getting the Banks that are negotiating a loan for Japan to give better terms. Aoki said his coll: talked of going to the Fr. bankers, if he cld. not make satisfactory arrangements in London. The nominal amount is £10,000,000 divided betw. the Hongkong & S'hai Banking Corpn., the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Parr's Bank & the London branch of the Yokohama Specie B[an]k, of wch. the last is a Japse. institution.² What he wanted was that I shld. teleg. to Y.L. suggesting that a hint shld. be given to the B[an]ks to make some concession, so as to keep the business fr. crossing the [English] channel.

I told him I thought H.M.G. were scarcely in a position to ask the Bks. to modify their conditions, as the Bks. might turn round & ask whether H.M.G. wld. guarantee the

¹ The reply to this letter was given by Henry Foley, as Barrington was ill. See PRO 30/33 5/2, item no. 33, June 28, 1899.

² The Japanese Government applied for the loan on May 31st. It was approved by the 4-bank syndicate on June 6th.

solubility of Japan. Moreover I had a personal objection. The Japse. & Engl. papers in Tokio & Yoko. some months ago had given out that I had recommended Parr's Bank to the Japse. Govt. The fact was that Parr's Bk. had swallowed up the small private bank with wch. I had kept my acct. for the past 23 years, but I had never taken any interest in the Bank's affairs, and was reluctant to do anything wch. might bring my name before the public in connexion with loan negotiations. I did not think I cld. do what he asked. A. was very persistent, and at last proposed that I shld. receive Matsugata in person, so that he might explain the whole affair & to this I consented.

M. at my garden party [for Queen Victoria's 80th birthday] yesterday said he wanted me to take a friendly and altogether unofficial interest in the success of their loan. I said to him much the same as previously to Aoki, & gave him no encouragement. He said the Hgkg & S'hai Bank were doing all they c[ou]ld for the Japse. Govt. & he knew London was the only place where the loan cld. be successfully carried out. He wld. telegraph once more to London, & after getting an ans. wld. perh. come & tell me all abt. it. I replied that I shld. be very pleased to see him.

At the beginning of this month the Banks concerned had offered to contract for a 4% loan at 84, & these I suppose were the terms wch. M. considers unsatisfactory.

I see an elaborate article in the "Times" of Apr. 10, written by their Tokio correspondent Brinkley, with the object of proving that Japse. finance is thoroughly sound. But I imagine that the Chartered Bank does not take quite so rosy a view of the situation, as its Hongkong manager recently published a pamphlet in wch. he expressed the opinion that Japan had injured her credit and her future borrowing powers in 1897 by borrowing £4,300,000 thro' agencies in Yoko. These 'agencies' were Samuel, Samuel & Co., a firm connected with Rothschilds, and I imagine that this indiscreet utterance is not likely to facilitate the bringing out of a Japse. loan in wch. the Chartered Bank is so largely interested.

Of course the Japse. Govt. wld. be much obliged if something cld. be done by H.M.G. to procure easier terms for them, but whether they wld. show their gratitude in a concrete form is to me doubtful.

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

PRO 30/33 14/11 Japan (1-34); London (35); China (36-68)
(June 10, 1899 – March 14, 1901)

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/11

**Letter Book. Japanese mission (end) & Chinese mission (start).
(10 June 1899 – 14 March 1901)**

1. Satow to Campbell (précis)

10 June 1899

Wrote to F. Campbell explaining reasons for delay in acting upon Teleg 11 of April 1 about wording of Arts. I & III of proposed Consular Convention.

2. Satow to Villiers (précis)

15 June 99

to Villiers urging speedy reply about the consular jail at Yokohama.

3. Satow to Salisbury

15 June 99

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The Japse. loan seems to have fallen rather flat, if it is true as reported that the subscriptions scarcely covered 1/3 of the amount offered, & the underwriters have had to take up the remainder. I have no doubt the interest will be paid, but Japan is not well-known as a borrower, & the four banks that brought on the loan are scarcely of sufficient standing.

The Japse. Govt. are thinking of nothing except the new Treaties coming into force. There is a little hitch in consequence of the French & Austrian date being 4 Aug. while all the other Treaties come into force July 17. I have I think secured that as far as taxation and tonnage dues are concerned our people will be in as good a position as the French, and that that [sic] the consular jurisdiction shall be left to us in the main during these three weeks. On the whole the transfer of jurisdiction seems likely to take place without any friction.

4. Satow to Salisbury

June 12 1899

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

After all it seems likely that Prince Henry of Prussia will pay a visit to this country. He recently expressed a wish to do so, & the Emperor was asked whether it wld. be convenient to receive him early next month. The reply was that it wld. give the Emperor very great

pleasure to see him at any time. A hint was however conveyed to Leyden that October wld. be preferred by the Emperor, as July is very hot, & H.M. prefers to avoid State functions in the height of summer. Moreover, he and the Empress project a trip to Kioto in the latter part of July.

This has all been telegraphed to Berlin by Leyden, but no ans. has yet been recd.

De Martino has just left Nagasaki for H[on]gk[on]g. He gave out that he was going there to confer with Raggi, after wch. he wld. go to Peking & Raggi return to Europe. This I imagine to be a fable.

5. Satow to Villiers¹

30 June '99

My dear Villiers,

I am horrified to find that if my suggestion (in No 12 Cons. of 22 Feb.) of making the salaries of the Consuls at Nagasaki & Yokohama £950 instead of £900 is adopted, they will lose £87.10-. a year while they are on leave in Europe. I hope however that the proposal I am now making that the rules as to deductions fr. salaries of consuls on leave shld. be amended may recommend itself to your approval and obtain your support.

Hall has been here since he last came out over 8½ years, Longford over 10. The former has 6 childr. the latter 4. Consequently, having no private means at all, and quite unable to put by a penny, they cannot go home on leave. I think it is a bad thing for men to be here for such long periods. Their health deteriorates and their minds get narrow. Even 5 yrs. is a long time for a man to remain at his post, especially in a service like this, wch. is restricted to one country.

Of course what I have written abt. the consuls in Japan & their pay while on leave applies equally to the China consular service, but I hope that the largeness of the question will not deter you fr. favourably considering my proposal.

Longford & Hall have asked me to recommend a personal allowance of £100 a year to each of them.²

Hall has 31½ yrs. service, Longford over 30. They are both poor men with large families. Betw. them & the next batch of men there is a gap of over 10 yrs. Bonar is very well off, both he & his wife having money, and these two are the only men whose circumstances are

¹ Villiers' reply is in PRO 30/33 5/2, item no. 37 dated September 29, 1899.

² See PRO 30 33 5/9, Hall to Satow, no. 62 (June 12, 1899) and no. 68 (June 21, 1899). Also PRO 30 33 5/10, Longford to Satow, no. 91 (June 21, 1899) enclosing a memorandum on the subject.

narrow. Do you think that there is any chance of the Treasury being moved to give such personal allowances, if I wrote officially, setting forth the grounds on wch. they are asked for. There are precedents in China & elsewhere.

y.v.t.

6. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio

July 6, 1899

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

Prince Henry's official visit has taken place, & everything has passed off very satisfactorily. The native press has been very cordial, & has taken the opportunity of recalling the debt Japan owes to Germany for assistance in military organization, medical instruction & in many other ways. He has been very well recd. by the Imperial Family, & every possible form of entertainment was crowded into the few days of his official visit. HRH. expressed to me his great satisfaction with his reception, & said that he found a marked improvement in every direction since his last visit in 1881. HRH. did me the honour to accept an invitation to a cottage I have in the mountains at Chiuzenji, ¹ & has now returned on board the "Deutschland". He leaves on the 8th for Kōbe, whence he will visit Kioto, staying there a few days, & then cross over with the German squadron to Corea. There can be no doubt that HRH. has produced a very favourable impression upon every one with whom he has come in contact. It wld. be impossible to be more amiable or gracious.

The Japse. are exceedingly busy abt. the new Treaties coming into operation, and are manifesting an excellent disposition. I think there is every reason to expect that things will go smoothly.

7. Satow to Campbell

27 July 1899

My dear Campbell,

We have not recd. any bound vols. of Treaty Revision Print since that for 1896. If you have any later ones, pray let us be provided with copies, for the loose sheets are very inconvenient for purposes of consultation.

¹ See PRO 30/33 17/16, Satow's Chuzenji diary for July 3-15, 1899 (Ruxton, 2003, p.474).

The transfer of jurisdiction is going on pretty smoothly. Unluckily the Jap[ane]se seem to have taken Germany for their model in matters relating to the treatment of resident foreigners, & as our people have been accustomed in the past to a more than English freedom, they find the regulations rather irksome.

y.v.t.

8. Satow to Salisbury

Tokio

27.7.99

Dear Lord Salisbury,

Fr. various sources I gather that the Chinese mission here is not likely to achieve much of importance. Japan does not wish to be tied to a corpse, nor to undertake the defence of China agst. Russia. Her chief care is for the maintenance of her position in Corea, and nothing but a Russian attempt to swallow up the Peninsula will in my opinion turn her aside fr. her present policy of lying low till her armaments are completed in 1903.

On the whole the inauguration of the new Treaties is proceeding smoothly. The only hitch has been the difference of date betw. ours and some others. The French, A-H and the German (practically) come into operation on the 4 Aug. & the rest on July 17. My American coll: [Buck] issued a rather high flown notification to his people recommending them to behave well towards the Japse. people. The first practical result of this was the murder of 2 Japse. women by an American discharged sailor early on the morning of the 17th.¹

Japan seems to have gone to Germany to find out how to treat resident foreigners, & the result has been a set of minute regulations prescribing reports to the police with regard to residence, inmates of each household, & so forth, wch. are particularly irksome to Engl. people. It was impossible to raise any objection as the Japse. themselves are subject to equally, if not more, harassing regulations. I hope our people will in time become accustomed to the new regime, but it is difficult at first after having been living for the last 40 years with greater freedom from every kind of control than in England.

¹ Robert Miller was an American sailor who deserted from his ship and killed two Japanese women and one American man in a Yokohama liquor shop called the Rising Sun before dawn on 17 July. This case on the first day of the new Treaties coming into operation was tried in the Yokohama district court on 20 August and Miller was sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out on 17 January 1900. (Nagaoka, vol. 2, p. 270). See Satow's diary for July 19, 1899 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 373).

The Japse. on their side are a little too eager to exercise their newly acquired authority, & are disposed to make a diff[erence] betw. the subjects of Treaty PP & others. If they are not cured of this, it will show that the antiforeign spirit is very strong still, & when the new Treaties come to an end in 1911 they will put more restrictions on foreigners than are now possible. I lose no opportunity of impressing on them that now they are admitted into the comity of nations, they must behave accordingly, modelling their international conduct on that of the most liberal countries, such as England & America.

Schurman, a member of the Commission sent to the Philippines to effect a pacification came to see me [on July 22 – see diary]. He was of opinion that the U.S. must resolutely put down the resistance of the Tag’alogs, who alone are in opposition to American rule, & then the islands will be easily governed.

If he speaks of ultimately giving the Philippines independence under American protection, I take it that is only for home consumption. With the exception possibly of the Tag’alogs, none of the other numerous races that inhabit the islands are capable of self-govt.

Mr. Joseph Walton ¹, who I see has been talking a good deal abt. China in the House of Commons, has just arrived here on his way to Corea, China & possibly Manchuria, to acquaint himself with the facts. I have introduced him to Aoki & Itō. He was got hold of by some English people in Yokohama, who informed him the new Treaty was all that is horrible, a sacrifice of British interests, & so forth. As he calls himself an Imperialistic radical, I had much pleasure in telling him the Treaty was negotiated when his party was in office, & that I wld. put him in possn. of the whole history when time allowed. He talks of going to Ichang with Mr. A. Little & the “Times” correspondent at Peking, & afterwds. to Nanning on the W. river. As he has started with a mind full of prejudices on Chinese matters, I am afraid with such companions he has little chance of shaking them off.

9. Satow to Dallas

27 July 1899

My dear Dallas,

I hope you will be able to give Cheetham his rent allowance fr. the date of his apptmt. Paget had a very nice house in the close neighbourhood of the Legation, wch. I kept on for Cheetham, as otherwise it wld. have been snapped up, & he might have had to take up his

¹ See Satow’s diary for July 25, 1899 (Ruxton, 2003, p.376).

quarter several miles from the Leg[atio]n. That wld. have been extremely inconvenient, as he is head of the Chancery.

y.v.t.

10. Satow to Villiers

27 July 1899

My dear Villiers,

I wrote a note to Baron Sannomiya on the receipt of your letter of May 14 abt. Court Mourning for the Emperor of Japan ¹, telling him what H.M. had decided, and now enclose a copy of his reply.

It appears that the Emperor was particularly touched, especially on learning that it was the Queen's personal act.

y.v.t.

11. Satow to Villiers

Chiuzenji

16 Aug. 1899 ²

My dear Villiers,

I communicated the contents of your letter of May 14 to Baron Sannomiya, who asked me to put it in writing. This I did July 24, heading my letter private & confl. To this he replied as if it were official. I took his letter back & explained that it was only a private note that I had written to him, & he altered it accordingly (July 26).

A few days ago I got a second letter fr. him (Aug. 9) asking if he might consider mine of July 24 as an official communication. I wrote back and said my difficulty was that said letter was based on a private one fr. you, but that I wld. inform you of his wish. (Aug 12)

I do not think it usual here for the Minr. to write officially to any one but the Minr. for F.A. & this question of Court Mourning has not hitherto been treated officially.

y.v.t. E.S.

P.S. These four letters, of wch. I enclose copies, have been registered and placed in our

¹ See PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 29, May 14, Villiers to Satow. Queen Victoria personally approved three weeks of mourning in the case of the death of the Emperor of Japan.

² On this day a sailing race was organised at Lake Chuzenji, and Satow sent off a bag with this letter to Villiers in it. (PRO 30/33 17/16; Ruxton, 2003, p. 477) Villiers replied in a letter dated September 25, 1899, PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 36.

archives. Perh. it might be sufficient to tell him that. E.S.

12. Satow to Salisbury

16 Aug. 1899

Dear Ld. S.,

If the telegs. fr. Peking and the reports in the papers are to be believed, the Russian Govt. has been much disturbed by the idea that China hankers after a defensive alliance with Japan. As I have said before, I do not think Japan has any wish to undertake any quixotic enterprise. Churchill says in one of his recent reports that the army has reached its full complement in acc. with the “military programme”, but 3 yrs. more must elapse before the reserve reaches its full nos. The naval programme will also be completed by that time, and all the forts are expected to be fully armed. Even then it is doubtful to me whether Japan wld. do more than stand on the defensive, unless she had our alliance.

Leyden talked to me at great length the other day [August 9 – see diary] abt. the progress of Japse. influence in the Yangtze region, and no doubt there is some truth in it. I did not tell him what had passed betw. the 2 govts. with regard to the reorganization of the Chinese army and navy. In connexion with this subject Churchill’s report no. 39 wch. goes by this mail is interesting. Leyden’s information was all derived fr. the German officer who talked so freely to Churchill.

My Russian coll. who is stopping some 16 miles fr. our nearest rlwy. station had to go down to Tokio a week ago, & told me he had recd. telegs. fr. Petersburg wch. necessitated a visit to the capital. The papers talk of long telegs. fr. the Japse. Minr. at Petersburg, so that I am led to the conjecture that the Russian govt. is anxious, to say the least of it, to find out whether Japan is responding to Chinese advances. Yamagata has been recently attacked in the papers for his subservience to Russia. I feel sure that he is far too prudent to do anything Russia wld. not like.

On the occasion of the Treaties coming into operation decorations were given to those of the F.R.R. who had not previously received one, and a photo of the Emperor has been sent to my American coll: & myself. I was afraid they wld. want to give me a pair of vases, & when Aoki spoke to me on the subject, suggested a portrait.¹ I believe it is the intention to send portraits to Lord Kimberley, Bertie and Mrs. Fraser the widow of my predecessor.

I think the Japanese want to keep Formosa to themselves. They have established a

¹ See Satow’s talk with Aoki on July 31, 1899. (Ruxton, 2003, p. 378)

camphor monopoly, are putting differential export duties on tea, so as to divert the trade in that article to their own merchants and ships, and have issued an order that no one is to lease trade to a foreigner without obtaining official sanction. I propose to protest agst. this last measure. Altho' Formosa is a dependency of Japan, yet the Treaties apply to it as well as to Japan, nearly all having been negotiated after its acquisition.

Believe me &c.

13. Satow to Salisbury

7 Sept. 99

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The Chinese special mission has just left this country. On their way home they took special care to tell every one that they came here only to study the commercial situation, in marked contrast to the important aims they assumed on their way over. Aoki told me today [see diary] that he had seen them 2ce, but had not talked politics, & he thought they were disappointed with the result of their journey. He also said that he had sent a long teleg. to Europe to explain that there was nothing in the talk of an alliance. It seems therefore highly probable that the public belief that the Russian Govt. had spoken on the subject is true. I could not get anything fr. him as to the rumour that an agreement was on the tapis for the reorganization of the Chinese army and navy by Japanese officers, but he did not deny it.

The Russian Govt. have informed that of Japan that Talienwan will be opened to the commerce of all nations.

Aoki's position does not seem to be very secure, & he is quite unable to induce his colls: to carry out his promises to the foreign RR. Tho' they agreed with him not to take taxes fr. B.Ss. nor to exercise jurisdiction over them betw. 17 July & 4 Aug., they have never given the necessary instructions. My desp. no. 150 abt. the registration of foreigners' leases in perpetuity shows what they are capable of doing agst. foreigners' interests. I am informed by our consul that at Yoko. alone the value of land and buildings in possn. of B.S. alone amounts to £1,200,000, & with the property held by our people at other ports, I daresay the whole is not far short of Two millions sterling.

I see that a question was asked in the House of Commons lately abt. the adhesion of India to the Treaty, & the reply was given that negotiations were going on. I have good reason to believe that this Cabinet will not allow Aoki to agree to the conditions laid down by the Indian Govt. in spite of having at the outset accepted them. Under the circs. I am not

pressing the matter. It seems to me undesirable to say or do anything that wld. confirm the prevailing impression that foreigners who are unprotected by a Treaty have no rights. The Japse., most of them, wld. be prepared to deny to foreigners in such a position the ordinary rights conferred by international law and practice. Our new treaty has 12 years to run. At the end of the 11 years I am convinced the Japse. Govt. will give notice to terminate the Treaties, & that they will enter into none after that. And they think that when they are free fr. Treaty obligations, they will be able to treat foreigners as they like. In place therefore of urging them to agree to India joining, I think it is better, even now, to preach to them on every occasion the doctrine that they must treat all foreigners, whether protected by Treaty or not, with the liberality with wch. they themselves have always been treated in Europe and America, tho' up to the present they have had no Treaty rights but that of appted. diplomatic and consular agents. In that way we may perh[aps] convert the leading men fr. their present illiberal tendencies. At the same time I think it is equally necessary to insist upon them observing the present Treaty as long as it lasts, tho' I should avoid as much as possible rendering its existence more irksome to them by constantly referring to its provisions.

Ad. Seymour has been here, & I have presented him to the Emperor [on September 4 – see diary].

There was recently a disturbance at Amoy when the Japse. consul with some Chinese officials went to mark out the site of the new Japse. settlement. Full reports have not yet arrived, but I think the least the Japse. Govt. will require will be the dismissal of the Taotai [local governor], who they exceedingly dislike.

Aoki told me he had telegd. to Yano to take the same line as Bax-Ironside with respect to the Italian demands. He had heard apparently that they were not being very strongly supported by us.

14. Satow to Salisbury

12 Sept. 1899

Dear Lord Salisbury,

With ref. to my desp. of today abt. the Crown Prince's wedding, I had a conversation with Marq. Itō 3 days ago. I found that he had not yet set to work on the commission charged with the arrangements, & that he had no definite ideas at all. ¹ It was evident that if

¹ See diary for September 9, 1899. (Ruxton, 2003, p. 387)

he looked into foreign precedents he wld. find members of Royal families, Special Ambassadors & local diplomats specially accredited attending such weddings. I told him they could hardly expect the first, as the Japse. Imperial family has no relations with European reigning houses, and that the 2nd were hardly likely to be sent. So that the form recognition of the event wld. prob. take might be expected to be the 3rd.

The F.R.R. will no doubt be invited to the ceremony, whatever it is, & I think it wld. be inconvenient if one were specially accredited & another merely charged with a message of congratulation.

I remember that at Bangkok on the occasion of the installation of the Siamese Crown Prince, the Govr. of Saigon arrived with a large suite, after my Fr. coll[eague] had assured me nothing of the kind wld. happen. I wld. suggest that the Japse. Emperor wld. not feel flatter[ed] if Govrs. of colonies were sent to congratulate him on the occasion, but if the Fr. Russians & Germs. send the Govs. of Saigon, Port Arthur & Kiaochou it wld. be better if the Govr. of Hongkong came. Still I think the Japse. wld. hardly like Colonial Govs. being charged with the duty.

I think we may feel confident that the Russians & Fr. will try to make some political capital out of the occasion.

As to presents I am ignorant if they are usually sent on these occasions, & also whether the Japse. wld. expect them.

I shall try to find out what conclusions are come to by the commission, & report. My colls: are mostly away, & I have had no opportunity of finding out their ideas.

15. Satow to Villiers

2 Oct. 99

My dear Villiers,

I understand that Hannen is abt. to apply for leave of absence, to take effect in May next.

Wilkinson will be able to wind up his business here abt. the end of the year, & wld. like then to take 3 months in Europe. If after that a locum-tenens for Hannen were required, he would of course like to have the apptmt. & I shld. like to say a word in his favour. He has been very helpful to me while he has been here as Judge of the Court for Japan, giving his assistance in drafting notes to the Jap. Govt. on various contentious matters. I do not know how I shall get on without him.

I am sending a desp. recommending the establisht. of a Consulate at Shimonoseki wch. is

already an important shipping port. I do not think the proposed cost is extravagant. ¹

At Hakodate the British tonnage in 1898 was only 6000, agst. over 800,000 at Shimon. & Moji. But there are a good many Engl. missionaries there, & the squadron spends there some mos. every summer. It is a point of observation for the doings of the Russians in that part of Japan. So I hope the Treasury will allow a V-C. to be kept there.

y.v.t.

16. Satow to Bertie

2 Oct. 1899

My dear Bertie,

I understand that Hannen proposes to ask for leave in May next, & he prob. hopes to extend his stay in Engl. long enough to get his pension. If Wilkinson were to get the acting apptmt., & to succeed Hannen when he retires, I shld. be very pleased. He is a thorough lawyer, & has been very helpful to me since he became Judge at Yoko. He knows Chinese affairs well, & I do not think it wld. be possible to find a better man to be C.J. at Shanghai.

y.v.t.

17. Satow to Salisbury

5 Oct. 1899

Dr. Ld. Salisbury,

Aoki talked to me today ² in a very aggrieved tone abt. the proceedings of the 2 Chinese Comrs. who were recently here. By the way in wch. they went on they had made it impossible to have any serious negotiations with them. He added that of course there had been no question of an alliance, but only of a friendly understanding, wch. was frustrated by their conduct here. One of them had even entered into relations with Sun Yatsen, the revolutionist who was kidnapped by the Chinese Legation in London, & is now in Japan. He brought this out quite spontaneously, so I am confirmed in my idea that the Russians have said something to him on the subject of the rumoured alliance. Another topic on wch. Rosen has lately spoken to him is the acquisition by Japanese of a piece of foreshore at Masanpho in Corea wch. the Russians wanted. Count Mouravieff telegd. that the Japse.

¹ Satow noted in his diary for May 31, 1900 while in England on leave that "The Shimonoseki consulate & medical officer in Nagasaki are to be sanctioned."

² Satow's diary for October 5, 1899 states: "Went to Aoki and had an interesting talk on 'la haute politique', which I put in a private letter to Lord Salisbury." (Ruxton, 2003, p.395)

Consul was implicated, which Aoki denied, & he assured me he had refused to make the Japse. buyers surrender their rights. The Russians talk of wishing to move their naval hospital from Nagasaki to Masanpho & no doubt have offered the Japse. Govt. an exchange.

Another matter that has only just come out is that a Russian of Vladivostock has obtained fr. the Corean Govt. a lease of the island called Matsushima or Dagelet (Ulyung in Corean ¹) wch. lies betw. Japan & Corea, rather nearer to the latter. For many years it was a sort of noman's land, and a good many years ago the Chōshiū people (Aoki's own clan) had an idea of sending a gunboat to take possession. It was in the days of the daimiōs, and the Chōshiū daimiō did not approve of the proposal. So the opportunity was lost. But Japse. subjects for several years past have been in the habit of going there to cut timber, & had practical possession. The Coreans, Aoki says, have officials there now, so the Russian lease cannot be disputed.

I had some talk with him abt. a para. in a Japse. paper stating among other things that Engl. had urged Japan to continue the occupation of W.H.W. but she refused to do so; that then the Br. Govt. proposed to Japan a joint policy as regards China, but again her statesmen missed the opportunity. I said if he wld. look at the Notes exchanged abt. the lease of W.H.W. he wld. see that as a fact Japan had not responded to the advances we made to her on that occasion, & I wld. tell him privately that H.M.G. were struck by the coldness of the Japse. answer. At that time the Min. for F.A. was believed to have pro-Russian views.

Aoki answered rather eagerly[?] that Nishi had confided to him his concern at the opinion so generally expressed that he had Russian sympathies. It was true he knew nothing of Western Europe having spent all his time in Petersburg, but if people cld. see into his heart, they wld. perceive the injustice of the accusation. Aoki added that I must never mention what he was about to say, but the truth was that Itō himself was in favour of making a friend of Russia. But, Aoki went on, I take quite a different view. The idea that Japan shld. make friends of all the PP. is of course absurd, but I am always impressing on Yamagata that we must have a friend. Germany cannot help us out here. America is too busy with the Imperialist policy she has copied from England, & besides who knows if it will be a success. The only P. that can be a useful friend to us is England, & it was on the condition that this shld. be made our policy that I entered the present Cabinet. (On a

¹ Ullungdo.

previous occasion he told me the condition was that Japan shld. conciliate the friendship of Germany and England.) He thought something might be done to make our relations more intimate.

I told him of a story I had recently heard that at Peking the common belief is that there will be a war betw. Russia & Japan in the spring, & that Japan wld. land 250,000 men in China. I said that much as we appreciated the friendship of Japan, we cld. see that at the present moment peace was a necessity for the development of her economical condition & the strengthening of her army & navy.

A teleg. has appeared in the paper as coming fr. Paris, to the effect that while England is occupied in South Africa, Russia will make a great coup in China. The teleg. really came to Itō, who had drawn his attention to it. He had told Itō that he did not believe war in South Africa would lead to the recall even of the jolly-boat of one of the Engl. men-of-war.

There is evidently no love lost betw. him & Itō. He is also very hostile to Ōkuma. Attacks on him in the press still continue, & report says he has no influence with his colls: in the Cabinet. His most active enemy is Tsudzuki, formerly V-M. for F.A. whom he caused to resign, & who has been the cause of the shipwreck of the protocol for the adhesion of India to the Treaties, & of the little consular convention.

Believe me &c.

E.S.

18. Satow to Barrington¹

2 Nov. 99

My dear Barrington,

Churchill is writing privately to ask to be employed in South Africa. He tells me that if his request is granted, and the F.O. require him to resign his apptmt. as Mil. Attaché he would cheerfully do so, but if it shld. be possible to keep his billet here open for him it wld. be a personal gratification to myself. He and his wife are both very much liked by everybody.

y.v.t.

19. Satow to Salisbury

2 Nov. 99

¹ Barrington's reply is in PRO 30/33 5/2 dated December 18, 1899, item no. 40.

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

In my desp. no. 170 I have reported a conversation with Visct. Aoki abt. the demands made by the Japse. Govt. upon China for satisfaction in connexion c. a riot at Amoy. I do not believe that the Japse. Cabinet has any idea of occupying a point on the coast of Fuhkien. That was merely a passing fancy of Aoki's, & being his, none of his colls: wld. entertain it, even if he broached it to them, wch. I rather doubt. A fortnight later he told me he had no intention of doing anything in a hurry.

Of course I never told him that H.M.G. wld. have no objection to Japan occupying a point on the Chinese coast. What passed betw. us was this: On the 19th Nov. last year I asked whether it was true, as reported in the papers, that Japan had secured an anchorage on the coast of Fuhkien.¹ He said "No." I then told him what had happened in connexion with our taking a lease of W.H.W. & that Komura had promised me that if Japan tried to obtain anything of a similar kind, they wld. let us know beforehand.

As far as I can see, the Masanpho incident is at an end for the present, the Russian Ch. d'Aff. having leased or bought another site instead of the one of wch. a Japanese subj[ect] had purchased the foreshore. Kojé island, wch. the Japse. Ch. d'Aff. seems to have mentioned at the F.O. lies opposite Masampho. Aoki told me he had made inquiries at St. Petersburg & had been answered that the Russian Govt. said they had no intentions, wch. he thought was an assurance that could not be altogether relied on. That was on Oct. 15. Ten days later he told me for the 1st time that he had inquired in London whether anything was known of Russian plans in regard to Kojé, & added that Count Mouravief had given a most positive denial. This time his tone was much less suspicious.

I find Aoki often forgets what he has previously told me, & that his views vary.

He declares that Nishi is by no means pro-Russian, & that he is going to Peking because he knows the Russians well, & will therefore be better able to divine their plans. This is possible. I found Nishi untruthful when he was Min. for F.A. & he was persona grata at the Russian Legation. It is announced today that Nanbara[?], whom Y.L. may have heard of as visiting Peking in the early summer on a confidential mission fr. Marq. Itō, is to go with him as secretary.

Some of the papers continue to say that Russia, in concert with another power, will attempt a great 'coup' in the Far East, if we have serious difficulties in South Africa, & one of them today suggests that the other Power will be Germany. I suppose that at least is not

¹ See Ruxton, 2003, p. 315.

very likely.

Aoki's position is still very weak. His only supporter in the Cabinet is Yamagata the Minr. President. Fr. all sides I hear that his Colls: oppose him on every point, merely out of spite, and want to turn him out. But there is no one to take his place. It is the foreigners who suffer. We cannot get anything settled, not even the questions relating to foreigners' leases of land in the foreign settlements, in wch. all the Dipl. Body takes the same view as to our rights under Treaty, & I cannot make any progress with the adhesion of India, altho' I communicated my last instructions to him three weeks ago. My Germ. Coll: & I have consequently (at Aoki's own request) complained personally to Yamagata, so that possibly the land question at least may receive a solution before long.

Believe me &c.

20. Satow to Bertie

28.11.99

My dr. Bertie,

I hope my observations on the undesirability of unduly pressing the Japse. to agree to the adhesion of India, made in my despp. Nos. 153 & 160, will be allowed to have some weight. Also that the Indian Foreign Dept. will not send me telegs. en clair showing impatience.

After the manner in wch. the Japse. Govt. went back fr. Aoki's original acceptance of our proposal, I think it is scarcely dignified to urge them to sign a protocol. There is absolutely no advantage to British Indians in the fact of the Indian Govt. adhering, as their only imports to this country that cld. possibly benefit wld. be cotton yarn. Last year however, when Indian yarn was subject to the same duty as English, the quantity imported was only 105,915 lbs. agst. 15,809,157 lbs. fr. England.

Prob. the For. Secy. at Calcutta has forgotten that negotiations are going on for Commercial Treaties with Germany & Belgium, in regard to wch. India will make similar reservations, & these govts. will naturally look at what we arrange with the Japse.

I am sending the draft notes handed to me by Aoki, wch. seem to me extremely objectionable, & counter drafts wch. I had prepared to give him. Suddenly comes a teleg. fr. Calcutta wch. being en clair Aoki of course reads, & my hands are much weakened.

I hope you will back up my view of the matter. The Japse. are extremely tenacious people to negotiate with.

y.v.t.

21. Satow to Salisbury

30 Nov. 1899

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

I have been much struck by the way in wch. several members of the Japse. Cabinet, including the Ministers of War & Finance, besides other persons highly placed, have expressed to me their anxiety that the war in South Africa may soon be over.¹ I have also learnt from a private source that the small arms factory at Tokio is working night & day, and that provisions are being collected.² A report came recently fr. the Yokosuka dockyard that great activity was noticeable there.

Col. Churchill has seen an officer of the general staff who fr. time to time tells him things, & finds that he confirms this information abt. the small arms factory. That he said had now been going on for some months, & was directed to the completion of their stock of the new rifle. But he tacitly admitted that provisions are being collected. He also said that the Japse. Govt. believe that about May next the Russians will make a move in Corea, if at that time we are still busy in S. Africa, & that these preparations are in view of that contingency. The reason for fixing May is that Vladivostock will then be open. The Japanese expectation is that they will then be in a position to put a quarter of a million of combatants in the field.

This accts. for the anxiety abt. S. Africa displayed by the personages I have spoken of.

Col. Churchill scarcely thinks that they will be able to put so many as ¼ million men into the field in May, & adds that they are not really ready, because their artillery is in a very backward state & much inferior to the Russian, & they have not yet recd. any of the new type of gun that is being manufactured for them in Germany. But this fact wld. not make them flinch fr. the contest, provided always that they are victorious at sea, for they wld. not land troops in Corea, as long as they had not the command of the sea.

During the war of 1894-5 they sent abroad fr. first to last something betw. 150,000 & 200,000 troops, but what is meant by their present estimate is a force numbering 250,000 at the outset & maintained at that figure.

In table 4 attached to Churchill's desp. No. 50 by this bag there is a calculation of the force Japan will be able to put into the field in the near future, namely 6720 officers &

¹ See diary for November 29, 1899: "Dinner [at the Legation] to Yamagata and all the Cabinet, except Aoki, Katsura and Matsugata expressed to me their special interest in the speedy termination of the Boer war..."

² Asaina told this to Satow on November 25th. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p.409)

240,000 men.

Of battleships they now have 3 of the 6 they mean to get, & two of their 9000-ton armoured cruisers out of 6, two of their new 2nd class cruisers of 5600 tons, five t.p.d. & 3 on their way out.

I told Visct. Aoki today that various important people had spoken to me of their anxiety, & asked him if he could give me an explanation of their meaning.¹

His reply was to this effect: "I have already a short time ago told you that I do not expect any complications out here, & that I said to Itō that Engl. wld. not need to withdraw so much as a jollyboat fr. the China seas; & I was half inclined to say if you want the support of England why did you strike that word out of your answer abt. Wei-hai-wei. Yamagata has the same idea. The fact is that some one has reported to Petersburg that we are making preparations, & they are irritated agst. us there. But some days ago, before the news of Rosen's being transferred to Munich came, I gave him a solemn assurance that we were not making preparations. The Russians are also offended with us abt. Masanpho, wch. they evidently intend to convert into a naval station, & they accuse us of having put Japse. subjects up to buying the land wch. they wanted. I told Baron Rosen we had no money for such purposes, for we had to give account to the Diet for everything we spent, while in Russia it is not so."

It wld. appear fr. this that the expectation of Russia making a move is widely spread, and that Aoki's cue is to deny that Japan is making preparations to meet the contingency. He told me that Yamagata had also expressed his anxiety about Russia taking advantage of our hands being full.

I suppose that she wld. profit by our embarrassments in the direction of least resistance, because she is aware that Korea is not directly interesting to us, & Japan feels that too.

y.v.t.

P.S. The news that he was to change places with Isvolsky of München came to Rosen quite unexpectedly on the 20th. Putting everything together I conclude that Rosen is not considered energetic enough. He completely failed to get satisfaction abt. the Masanpho affair. Baroness Rosen told me Isvolsky is one of the modern school of Russian diplomatists and a Pan-slavist. Aoki's statement abt. his solemn assurance to Rosen being given some days before the news of the change arrived seemed to imply surprise at his

¹ Diary, November 30, 1899: "Russia & Japan. Told him how many persons of importance had expressed to me their anxiety that the Transvaal business should soon end, and he gave explanations which I put in a private letter to Lord Salisbury." (Ruxton, 2003, p. 411)

being recalled after obtaining such a satisfactory assurance. It wld. appear also that the negotiations with the Corean Govt. abt. Masanpho are postponed until the return of Pavloff, who seems to be of the same kidney as Isvolsky.

E.S.

22. Satow to Barrington

30.11.99

My dear Barrington,

I am sending an official desp. asking for leave in Apr. next, subject of course to the usual proviso. If there were to be a row however in this part of the world betw. the Russians & Japse. wch. seems not altogether impossible, I shld. not mind staying here to see it out, if that were thought necessary. At the same time I have entire confidence in Whitehead's capacity, & he will get on well with Aoki as long as the latter remains in office.

I suppose I may count on returning here after my leave, as I have a quantity of goods & chattels abiut the house.

y.v.t.

23. Satow to Bertie

28.12.99

My dear Bertie,

Aoki has agreed to my counterdrft. of the exchange of Notes abt. the adhesion of India, wch. I sent home in a desp. last mail. One or two verbal alterations have been suggested by him wch. are of no importance. But I have not yet signed, as my desp. will reach you in a few days, & there is no great hurry. Perh. before the Japse. New Year holidays are over I may get a teleg. fr. you. The dft. of the consular convention is agreed betw. Aoki and myself, but has to be approved by the Privy Council before we can sign it.

I am sending you a long desp. abt. a foolish judgment of a Japse. Court wch. gave an Engl. mate of a Japse. str. 6 mos. [prison sentence] for administering a black eye to a drunken 2. Mrr. [2nd class mariner?] who cheeked him. It is to be hoped the judge[men]t will be upset on appeal, if not I shall have to make a row.¹

Aoki abt. 3 weeks ago [December 6 – see diary] again brought up his plan of apptg.

¹ For details of the case see Ruxton, 2003, p. 397 (footnote). On January 29, 1900 the sentence was reduced to ten days by the Tokyo Appeal Court.

ambassadors to the G.P.P. I asked him whether he had any reason to suppose the proposal wld. be accepted. He said he felt pretty sure abt. Germany & America, but not abt. Russia & France. He inquired whether I had any reason to think H.M.G. wld. not agree. I replied that I knew nothing at all, but it seemed to me Japan wld. be placed in a very disagreeable position if the P.P. declined. So he said he shld. teleg. to his Ch. d’Aff. to sound you privately.

y.v.t.

E.S.

24. Satow to Salisbury

28.12.99

Dr. Ld. Salisbury

The Japse. Govt. are still not altogether reassured as to the possibility of a Russian move in the spring, in the direction of Masanpho, the excellent harbour where the Japse. forestalled them in the purchase of land. But all the newspapers that support the Govt. declare that there is no cause for alarm, that the Masanpho question does not concern the Govt. At the same time I believe the preparations of the War Dept. are not being relaxed. I feel confident that the Japse. Govt. will not attack. They are only taking precautions agst. eventualities. The truth lies betw. the “Times” correspondent at Soul & the correspondent here. The former exaggerates, the latter minimizes the chances of a misunderstanding.

On the whole I think the Japse. will stand a good deal before they draw the sword agst. Russia, & that even if they saw Corea being absorbed they wld. be too timid to act alone. Only material aid from us wld. nerve them to the task.. They are not ready.

Marquis Itō has been making some useful speeches lately abt. the necessity of treating foreigners with liberality & courtesy. In the present Cabinet there are one or two influential men who are anti foreign, & Yamagata is one of these. I hope his advice will have a good effect. He said to me à propos of the land question at the open ports that as long as foreigners in Japan were contented, foreign Govts. wld. not worry, & he cld. not see why the Cabinet cld. not make up their minds to settle this comparatively insignificant business. It was foolish of them to be afraid of an antiforeign spirit in the country, & they must pluck up courage to do what was necessary.

The result of this plain speaking was the publication today of an ordinance wch. I hope will settle the question relating to foreigners’ land, namely the confirmation of their

perpetual leases, & when I get instructions in reply to my despp. abt. the housetax, I hope that may also be settled. Tho' of course I cannot hope that everybody will be satisfied.

y.v.t.

25. Satow to Salisbury

23 Jan. 1900

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

Last night I met the President of the Council [Yamagata] at dinner, & he expressed to me his anxiety at learning that the Russians were sending troops to the Yalu river, wch. is the boundary of Corea towards Manchuria, under the pretext of keeping the pest off. He said there was no plague in Corea. On my suggesting that the teleg. reporting this move was not true, he replied that it was quite certain. Fr. his manner & the fact that he is usually very reticent on political matters, I gather that he is very anxious.

Aoki told me on the 5th that he had recd. 2 telegs. fr. his Ch. d'Aff. at Petersburg 1° That the Russians were sending troops to Riga and Libau [both in Latvia], & concentrating their Baltic fleet, the latter ostensibly agst. English but really as a menace to Germany, in case of the latter contemplating joint action with us: 2° That Sir Ch. Scott had been to Mouravieff & then to the Emperor to ask for the loan of £10,000,000 to the Bank of Engl.

It looks as if the latter story had been conveyed by the Russians to the Japse. Ch. d'Aff. with the object of insinuating that Engl. was in [dire financial] straits.

I said prob. the Russian Govt. had funds deposited in the Bank of E[ngland] & that the ambassador was trying to find out what likelihood there was of their being withdrawn in gold. The notion of our borrowing money fr. Russia was, I said, absurd.

The last story fr. St. Petersburg thro' the same channel was that troops were advancing upon Khushk to be ready for any opportunity.

It seems to be the Russian policy to inspire the Japse. with a belief in our weakness, to lull to sleep their suspicions with regard to Russian plans in Corea, & then to move forward in the line of least resistance.

When Pavloff was here recently, the Japse. had over their Minister fr. Seoul to give him verbal instructions. As he has the reputation of being very anti-Russian, it seems prob. that he was told to moderate his tone. The pacific attitude of Aoki, who is very Russo-phobe, is remarkable.

The question of foreigners' leaseholds at the open ports continues to give a great deal of

work. British residents are not quite reasonable, and ask for what is impracticable. On the other hand the Japse. are not quite straightforward, & wld. like to wriggle out of their Treaty obligations.

There is a native Society in Tokio, called the Eastern Countries Union ¹, wch. has for its main object the defence of Eastern Asiatic States agst. European colonizing & commercial encroachments. They gave a dinner to Ld. Ch. Beresford when he was here a year ago, and they have now conceived the idea of asking the foreign ministers to become members. They began with me, & further requested me to make a speech at their annual meeting on the changes in Japan during the last 30 years. After reading thro' their regns. I sent a letter excusing myself on the ground that I am too busy. Whether after this they will ask my colls: to join, especially the Russian, Fr. & German, is perh. doubtful. They went so far as to announce in the papers that I wld. speak at the meeting before they had my answer.

The Yokohama English had a concert last week [on January 16 – see diary] on behalf of the Widows & Orphans [of the Boer war] wch. produced £150 & I am lending my drawing room for a concert in wch. Americans & Germans will take part ², at wch. we can hope to get abt. ½ that sum. The Engl. at all the ports have raised considerable sums by private subscription, Nagasaki over £230, Kobe £800, and Yoko. with Tokio £1170. The Ams. have shown the greatest heartiness on our side. Their experiences in Cuba & Manila seem to have created a fellow-feeling. On the other hand I hear of the Fr. coll. going abt. to dissuade others from coming to the concert here, & the Russian is of course not cordial abt. it.

26. Satow to Salisbury

25 Jan 1900

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

Fr. Aoki I learnt today that the “troops” mentioned in my letter of 23 J[an.] are said to be a body of Russian Red Cross people, who came out fr. Marseilles to Shanghai, went thence

¹ See Satow's diary for January 23, 1900. “Yoshida Yōsaku came with a private request from Prince Konoye [Atsumaro], that I would join the Tōhō Kiōkai, which he said was not a political association. Told him that one Suyenaga came to me a few days ago from Soyejima [Taneomi] with a similar request, and that I would make a speech at the annual meeting. Told him that I had after reading the programme of the society, declined to become a member, as however much I might personally sympathize with its objects, I could not manifest it publicly, and that I had yesterday written to Soyeshima declining. I should take no notice of the statement in the papers that I was going to speak at the meeting.” (Ruxton, 2003, p. 420)

² The concert was held at the Legation on January 24, 1900 and was a great success. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, p. 421)

to Port Arthur, & are now it is said, to cross to the Korean frontier in a Russian gunboat. Their number is as yet unknown. Aoki added that he did not think there was at present any ground for alarm, but that the Russians could not be trusted, & it was safer to suspect them of anything.¹

A couple of days ago, however, he seems to have employed a much more alarmed tone in talking to my Germ. coll. and to have said that the Russians were always nagging at them.

Rosen told him (Leyden) that in Nov. last things looked very black here, & that the post of Russian Min. was a very difficult one. He hoped his successor, who was a clever man, would have more success. The chief cause of ill-feeling was a row at Fusan betw. some Russian men of wars men & Japse., wch. had come to the knowledge of the Emperor Nicholas. The latter then had instructions sent out to Rosen to express his deep personal displeasure. It was, Leyden thinks, owing to this, that the Japse. began making preparations, a report of wch. was telegd. to Petersburg, & caused the irritation agst. Japan wch. existed last Nov.

Things are quieter now, it wld. seem. The only remarkable feature is that so many Russians have left lately, the First Sec. of Legation, the Financial Agent Alexeief, the Military & Naval attachés, & the consul at Yoko.

27. Satow to Bigge

13 Feb. 1900

Dear Sir Arthur,

I am sending an official desp. to the F.O. reporting that H.I.H. Prince Kannin is just starting for the Paris Exhib[itio]n, & will prob. cross over to Engl. for a week at the end of May and beginning of June. He is a very smart cavalry officer, and has good manners; speaks French nicely. If some notice were taken of him it wld. do good here. The feeling in Japan towards England is excellent, and the tone of the press on the war is an agreeable contrast to that of countries nearer home.

The chief man in his suite is Prince Iwakura [Tomosada]², a man of old noble family, who speaks English perfectly and is worth taking some trouble for. Next comes Colonel Ōshima, who was educated in Germany. Mr. Matsui the 3rd member of the suite I do not

¹ See diary for January 25, 1900: "Went to Aoki, who seemed to regard Yamagata's story of the Russians on Korean frontier as a bit of a maresnest [illusion]."

² Iwakura Tomosada (1851-1910) was the nephew of Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883).

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know personally.

I have given Prince Iwakura a letter of introduction to Eric Barrington.

Prince Kannin was once in England abt. the time the Duke of York was in Japan, so they have never met, and on that occasion the Prince did not come in contact with any of the Royal Family.

y.v.t.

28. Satow to Barrington (précis)

13 Feb. '00

To Barrington to the same effect.

29. Satow to Barrington

21 Feb. [1900]

My dear Barrington,

My brother [Sam] has recd. the apptmt. of Master in Chancery about wch. you were so kind as to interest yourself, & I am very greatly obliged to you for what you did.

I propose to leave here by the Canadian str. of 4 May, & shld. reach England in the first days of June. ¹ There is a rumour that all the berths in steamers fr. New York are already taken, so perh. I may have to come by the Allan line from Montreal.

I had a letter fr. Colonel Ijichi by last mail in wch. he explained his gratitude for your kindness to him, & says he is trying to learn English.

Hayashi [Tadasu] the new Japse. Min. to England will I think be liked. He is a big man for a Japse. & has the merit of speaking English quite well. He talks of leaving abt. May by way of Suez. ²

y.v.t.

30. Satow to Salisbury

21 Feb. 1900

Dear Lord Salisbury,

Abt. 3 wks. ago [on January 28 – see diary] I had a talk with Marq. Itō, who tho' out of

¹ Satow left Japan as planned on May 4th, reached Liverpool on May 31, 1900.

² Satow called on Hayashi to wish him good luck and congratulate him on his appointment on February 13, 1900. He learned of the appointment from Aoki on February 9th. (Diary, Ruxton, 2003, pp. 424 & 425)

office, is kept fully informed, & has a great deal to say to the foreign policy of the Govt. He showed me official telegs. fr. Peking & Shanghai, fr. wch. he concluded that at present there was no likelihood of the Chinese Emperor's deposition, tho' it might come later on.

He then told me all abt. recent difficulties with Russia, especially the Russian Emperor's message mentioned in my private letter of Jan. 25 [see no. 26 above]. The Russian men-of-war's men were in the wrong, & not the Japse. who had simply defended themselves. It was a blunder on Aoki's part not to forestal the complaints fr. St. Petersburg. There had also been a difficulty betw. the Russian naval attaché & the Japse. Min. of Marine, but that had been smoothed over. Then he talked abt. Rosen's removal, wch. he evidently wished to think was at Rosen's own request; but he went on to say that tho' Isvolsky had the reputation of being a man of specially energetic character, it wld. not make any difference. Hitrovo had been preceded by a similar report. It was true the latter had warned the Japse. that they ran great risks in attacking a power like China wch. possessed such immense resources, & urged them to confine their operations (in 1894) to Corea; & when they disregarded his advice he showed great annoyance. But afterwards, explanations having been given at Petersburg, Hitrovo changed his tone &v said his govt. was perfectly satisfied.

It is Itō's cue to take a rosy view of their relations with Russia, as he has no desire to enter on a trial of strength & his vote will always be in favour of giving way instead of fighting. I still see no reason to think that a conflict is impending.

Rosen's departure is again put off, & he does not now expect to go before June.

Prince Waldemar of Denmark is arriving here in a few days in command of a man-of-war. The Dutch Minister [Testa], who is in charge of Danish interests, naturally takes charge of him, but both Rosen & the French Minister have recd. telegraphic instructions to show him special civility. He is to stay 5 days in Tokio as the guest of the Emperor, & there will be a banquet at the Palace in his honour, & the 3 colls: concerned give official dinners for him.

31. Satow to Salisbury

22 Mar. 1900

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The session of the Diet has passed off without any attacks on the Govt., wch. seems unlikely to be changed for some time to come. Some of their Parliamentary supporters are no doubt hankering after portfolios, but I see no chance of their wishes being gratified, at

least until the Diet meets again at the end of the year. There are no burning questions, & the Army & Navy have got all the money they want voted.

As soon as I recd. the teleg. of Cronje's surrender I wrote privately to tell Visct. Aoki ¹, & he at once informed the Emperor. H.M. teleg. to the Queen must have been sent off with very little delay. Then a press teleg. came fr. London reporting the Emperor's congratulations, & the press at once expressed its approval. I have recd. also congratulatory letters fr. different parts of the country fr. people I do not know. The reply wch. by your instructions I wrote to a member of the House of Peers who had sent a teleg. to the Queen was given to him by the press.

Aoki tells me he has heard of the new site outside Masanpho wch. the Russians have selected, & he supposes they will force the Koreans to cede it to them, as they have sent a squadron of eight vessels there.

I cld. not gather that Japan wld. offer any overt opposition, but no doubt the Koreans will be secretly encouraged to resist, as I know that a confidential agent was sent over to Corea a short time ago.

Aoki told me today that acc. to a teleg. he had recd. fr. the Specie Bank in London, the Russ. Govt. has ordered a million tons of English coal to be shipped to Odessa. I pointed out that this quantity wld. require fr. 200 to 400 steam colliers of large size to transport it, & that this wld. take a long time. He seemed to be much impressed however by the news, but added "Perh. it is only for fictitious manoeuvres." to wch. I replied "Like yours."

The Japse. navy is to carry out manoeuvres fr. the 29 March to 26 April on a large scale, at their three Arsenals, Nagasaki, & the island of Tsushima, wch. lies in the strait betw. Japan & Corea. The whole of their available force, amounting to some 60 in all, including everything they have got, fr. their newest battleship down to the torpedo boat destroyers just arrived fr. Engld., will take part. Mines are to be laid everywhere, & vessels are prohibited fr. going within the places where they are laid.

If the mines are only dummies, there wld. seem to be no reason for prohibiting the passage of vessels.

My Belgian coll: [d'Anethan] has just come back fr. a tour to the southwest, & has seen the 2 principal arsenals [Sasebo & Kure], where he found the greatest activity prevailing, & quantities of stores of every kind accumulated. He seems to infer that the Japse. are

¹ Cronje surrendered on February 27th. Aoki congratulated Satow on March 1st (diary).

prepared for every eventuality.¹

On the other hand, I know that the Russians have been recently importing large quantities of beef in casks fr. Australia into Port Arthur.

In China, I gather fr. Ad. Bruce who has just arrd. here, there seems to be a belief that war betw. Japan and Russia is imminent.

I admit that the feeling is very unfriendly, & the semi-official press has quite recently used rather strong language abt. the preparations going on in Russia for the purposes of strengthening her forces in the Far East. In particular it is said that she will increase the garrisons out here to 120,000 men. Unless both govts. are prudent there may be a casus belli.

As far as Japan is concerned, I am as persuaded as I ever was that she has no intention of provoking a conflict, at least at present. The Japse. in 1895 came to the conclusion that it would take them till 1903 to prepare to resist such another combination as was formed agst. them that spring. Their preparations are going on, & will be finished by the date assigned. They do not change their plans easily, for their intellect is not supple enough. Even when 1903 comes, if Russia does not violate her agreements relating to Corea, I do not think they will attack her.

Of course one must not entirely leave out of account the opinions wch. are now and then expressed to them, that it is now or never. That they must attack Russia before the completion of the Siberian railway, & that Russia's strength out here increases in larger proportion than theirs.

Morrison the "Times" correspondent at Peking, who was here lately, expressed this opinion to me. He saw many Japanese leaders of politics. Possibly he may have said the same thing to them. If he did not, others have.

Then there is the Chinese question. It is stated that China is ripe for rebellion. I suppose

¹ "Russia now has more than 100,000 men in Manchuria...It is noted also that Russia plans to increase her Far Eastern squadron considerably. The Government believes that this great display of force is directed against Japan. The latter on her part consequently does everything to prepare her defenses. When I visited the state arsenals recently, I ascertained how busy they were. One works day and night to forge cannons, make cartridges, cast bullets and bombs, build and equip torpedo boats etc. On all sides of the Inland Sea new forts are being built and batteries established. Much ammunition and many cannons also come from Europe. Large quantities of coal have recently been purchased from Cardiff and stored in the arsenals of Kun [Kure?] and Sasebo. Japan shrinks from no expenditure and spares no effort to prepare for any eventuality. The great naval manoeuvres, decided upon a year ago, have just begun." Albert d'Anethan, despatch to de Favereau, No. 46/22, 26 March 1900. (G.A. Lensen trans. & ed., *The d'Anethan Dispatches*, Sophia University, Tokyo 1967, pp. 119-120)

that should a rebellion break out, Russia will occupy Peking to protect the dynasty. In that case Japan wld. be strongly disposed to help the Reformers. It is said that the reform party rely on this country, & believe that China is to be regenerated by the aid of Japan. But possibly the chances of a rebellion in China have been exaggerated. I cannot judge.

There was a little dispute recently betw. the Russian rear admiral & the captain of the U.S. ship "New Orleans", about a salute. The "N. O." came into Nagasaki early one Sunday, & the Russian was huffy because his flag was not saluted forthwith. The American spent the day in trying to find out whether he had to salute the Japse. flag, but eventually sent to say he wld. salute the Russian flag at 8 on Monday morning. The Russian replied that he wld. not return it, & also refused a visit fr. the American Capt. My Am. coll: tells me that the affair has been referred by agreement betw. him & Baron Rosen to the respective Vice Ads.

32. Satow to Admiral Custance

11 April 1900

Dear Admiral Custance,

Capt. Otley I understand proposes writing to you by this mail suggesting that he shld. be left here for some time longer, say till the spring of 1901, in order to make himself more fully acquainted with naval affairs in this country.

I shld. like to say that this idea has my warm support. As you doubtless know, the U.S., Russia, Germany & France have each of them a naval attaché exclusively for this country. A similar arrangement on our part, were it possible, seems to me very desirable, as a mere passing visit is not sufficient to enable an attaché to grasp the situation. Besides the arsenals & naval stations, the ships of wch. the Japse. navy is composed, & above all the capabilities of the officers & men require attentive study. In this country secretiveness is the rule, & prolonged observation & profiting by every opportunity are necessary for the attaché in order to find out what the value of the Japse. fleet may be as a combatant. I hope that no adverse decision will be hastily arrived at, & as I expect to be in London soon after you receive this letter, I shld. like to have an opportunity of explaining my views to you by word of mouth.¹

¹ Satow saw Custance on June 15, 1900 in London. "Called on Admiral Custance, who told me he had made use of my letter to him abt. Ottley, & that it had been arranged for O. to remain in Japan till next year, and the Treasury was being applied to for funds to appt. a separate naval attaché to Washington." (Satow's diary)

y.v..t.

33. Satow to Salisbury

12 April 1900

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

The Masanpho affair does not seem to be quite settled yet, but Visct. Aoki says he does not know much abt. the negotiations betw. M. Pavloff & the Corean Govt. as they are kept secret. He admits however that Pavloff asked for an undertaking [that] the Kojedo [island] shld. not be ceded to any other P. & that recently he has put forward a demand for exclusive mining rights, amongst other things.

I am inclined to believe that the Japse. Govt. is secretly supporting Corea in refusing the Russian demands, but that they are anxious to keep this fr. the knowledge of the diplomatic body at Tokio; I have reason to believe that he is not a whit more open to Count Leyden than to myself.

During the last fortnight I have been endeavouring but without success to obtain permission for Ad. Bruce to bring his flagship the “Barfleur” inside the breakwater at Yokohama while some repairs are being made to her funnels. There is plenty of room, & the Admiral considers it not safe to lie outside while he is unable to get up steam. Hitherto I have met with a refusal on various pretexts. Considering the facilities are accorded to Japse. men of war at Portsmouth for docking their battleships and getting their guns on board, this unwillingness to accommodate one of the Queen’s ships seems to Ad. Bruce and myself inexplicable on any ordinary grounds.¹

It does not seem as if I shld. be able to arrange for the adhesion of India to the Treaty, as Aoki is powerless agst. the obstructive attitude of the Bureau for Drafting Laws [Hōsei Kioku]². As far as he is concerned he was ready to sign long ago, but they will not let him. In that Dept. there are many ‘barbarian-expellers’, as the ultra-illiberal Japanese are called by their countrymen. I think it wld. be extremely undesirable to give way to them, & to

¹ See Satow’s interview with Aoki in the former’s diary for April 12, 1900 (Ruxton, 2003, p. 440).

² “India. The Hōsei Kioku still objecting. Wanted to know whether Germany and Belgium had accepted the reservations. So he telegraphed to London to inquire, and found the treaties had not been negotiated. I rejoined that the delay had nothing to do with the Indian reservations, but was a question of commercial advantages. As I was leaving in three weeks, it seemed unlikely that we could sign, but whenever he informed Whitehead that he was ready to sign, we should be prepared. I let him know clearly that we would make no further alteration, and manifested complete indifference.” Diary, April 12, 1900.

concede that they have a right to exclude any foreigners. They have the right, no doubt, just as much as Germany or any other power, but I think we ought to avoid signing anything by wch. that right is definitely recognized. Indians are just as well off in Japan without the adhesion of the Indian Govt. as they wld. be with it. The only advantage they wld. gain wld. be the benefit of the conventional tariff for perh. 100,000 lb. of cotton yarn.

When Prince Waldemar was here the other day he paid great attention to the officials of the Dept. of Communications, & told Visct. Aoki that the only motive of his visit to Japan was to facilitate the extension of the Northern Teleg. Concession. I have it on excellent authority that the Danish Treasury provided the cost of the Valkyrien's voyage only as far as Siam, & that the balance for the voyage to Japan was provided by the Telegraph Co.

My German colleague Leyden is occupying the attention of the native press, in consequence of a row at a railway station when some Japse. merrymakers tried to force their way into a compartment already too full, where he was in company c. two ladies & another gentleman. ¹ Very distorted accounts are given of the occurrence. Unluckily his predecessor [Gutschmid] had a similar affair, & the remark is made that the German legation has a mystical affinity for rows of this sort. ² The fact is that it is not safe for foreigners to mix in crowds of holiday makers, any more than it wld. be in England on a bank holiday.

34. Satow to Salisbury ³

12 April 1900

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

Permit me to say how grateful I am for the kind language of your teleg. ⁴ proposing that I shld. go to Peking when Sir Claude MacDonald vacates the post. I am conscious that the work there is difficult, & I can only say that I shld. do my best, & try to deserve your confidence.

¹ The affair was settled amicably and Satow wrote in his diary on April 15: "The railway people are now very polite to Leyden."

² On December 30, 1896 Gutschmid struck one of two students with his whip. The students complained to the Koji machi police station.

³ This is Satow's last letter from Japan. He left there on May 4, 1900.

⁴ Salisbury's telegram was sent on March 29. A handwritten copy is in PRO 30/33 5/2, item no. 43.

PRO 30/33 14/11 Japan (1-34); London (35); China (36-68)
(June 10, 1899 – March 14, 1901)

35. Satow to Sanderson (the only letter from London)

11 Portland Place W.

14 June 1900

My dear Sanderson,

In confirmation of my Secret letter of 31 December 1898¹, I enclose my account for S.S. up to the date of my leaving Japan, showing the dates on wch. I paid my agent [Asaina Kansui], & also a memo. of what I have given to Churchill. The sums are stated in yen & reconverted at the rate of 2s/½d.

If you find this correct, will you kindly have the amount paid to my credit with Parr's Bank Ltd., 77 Lombard St.

y.v.t.

1899 11 Mar. 100 yen

11 May 100 “

7 July 100 “

11 Sept. 100 “

7 Nov. 100 “

1900 9 Jan. 100 “

1 March 100 “

10 April paid to military attaché as per memo. attached 258

Total 958 yen

14 June 1900

@2s/½d. = £97.15.11

[Note: Before leaving I gave him 300 yen, but this I have not charged to H.M.G. as he has performed several private jobs for me, for wch. I regard this as a present. E.S. N.B. Not sent to S.]

¹ See PRO 30/33 14/10, no. 49, Satow to Sanderson, December 31, 1898.

36. Satow to Salisbury – the first letter from China

Shanghai 8/10/00

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

Shortly after I went to Tokio in 1895 you were so good as to give me some hints as to the line I shld. take wch. were of the greatest help to me, ¹ & now that I am going to a much more anxious & difficult post, I feel the need of similar indications as to policy, if you can spare the time to bestow them on me.

The Taotai, Shêng, Bredon, the Chairman of the China Association, the heads of the China Inland Mission & others have been to see me. I have taken great care to impress on them that I am at present without any authority to speak, & that anything I say is only the expression of a personal opinion.

To the 2 Chinese I have endeavoured to convey a sense of the enormity committed in trying to massacre the diplomatic body & of the atrocities agst. innocent women & children: That atonement for this must come before anything else. I said I did not believe the Emperor had anything to do with the crimes of Tuan, Kangyi, Yü Hsien & others, but I refrained from mentioning the Empress. I also told them I believed H.M.G. wld. assist & protect all well-intentioned Chinese officials who had observed the obligations of international duty & humanity.

Shêng informed me that he can communicate by teleg. with Hsi-an-Fu in a few hours. I shld. distrust everything else he said to me.

Bredon's idea abt. punisht. of Tuan & Co. was that a demand for the return of the Court to Peking shld. precede that for the extradition of offenders. ² I told him I thought we shld. be much embarrassed if they were handed over, & that it wld. be easier to get the Chinese Court to chastise its naughty ones itself. To my mind the first thing on the programme was to bring home to the mind of those concerned the heinousness of their proceedings.

We also referred to likin [regional tax], tonnage dues, revision of tariff & such-like things, but agreed that in any convention for the restoration of good relations they shld. be relegated to a future commercial convention. He said the PP. wld. prob. propose an international commission to administer the finances of China, but argued that if this work were to be undertaken by foreigners it wld. be best performed by them as servants of the Chin. Govt. not as its masters.

¹ See Salisbury's only letter to Satow, PRO 30/33 5/2, no. 3, private, October 3, 1895 reproduced in I. Ruxton (ed.) *The Correspondence of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Japan*, Lulu Press, 2005..

² Satow was visited by Bredon on October 1, 1900 (diary).

The chairman of the China Assocn. [F. Anderson] wishes to suggest to H.M.G. the policy to be pursued by England in a series of cut & dried propositions.¹ I tried to persuade him that if they wished to exercise any influence upon events they wld. succeed better by supporting H.M.G. in a general way, by dwelling on the fact that we have great interests in China, & that they ought to be maintained. I am afraid I was unsuccessful. Shanghai seems penetrated with a sense of superior knowledge & wisdom that ignores everybody & everything outside its own circumference. People here think Liu muddle-headed, & they have pretty much the same opinion of Hewitt, who is chairman of the Municipal Council.

The heads of the C.I.M. [China Inland Mission] are good & earnest men who only desire to do what is right. I think they will not put forward any claims for compensation for the destruction of property, or loss of life. They wld. accept what was voluntarily offered them by the Chinese. I told them that in my individual opinion they ought to have protection quâ B.S. but not quâ missionary, as is the case in Morocco & Japan. They declared that was the guiding principle of their organization.

It seems clear, & most sensible people here are of the opinion, that the recent massacres are not due to Anti-Christian, but to anti-foreign prejudice. If there are any imprudent or tactless missionaries their number is few. The splendid services of the missionaries in the defence of the Legations seem to be working a reaction in their favour among the prejudiced residents of the open ports.

I earnestly hope that justice will be done on the men who murdered women & children with circs. of unmentionable atrocity, as well as upon the would-be murderers of the legations.

Bishop Cassels and the Rev. Mr. Stevenson assured me [on October 6 – see diary] that they knew of no case of any missionary woman being violated. The indignities were committed after they were dead. I believe they speak the truth, & that rape by way of insult is not a Chinese practice.

I expect to reach Peking abt. the 17th inst. It wld. I am convinced be a great help to me if I cld. have Warren with me there, if it is not thought necessary that he should remain on the Yangtze in personal contact with the Viceroys.

b.m. y.v.t.

¹ See Satow's diary for October 7 and 8, 1900. in I. Ruxton (ed.), *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Envoy in Peking (1900-06)*, Volume One, Lulu Press, 2006.

37. Satow to Salisbury

8 Oct. 1900

Dr. Ld. S.,

Rockhill, the Am. Spec. Comr. Left a couple of days ago to visit the Viceroy.

His opinion is that the 1st thing is to urge the return of the Emperor to Peking, & then to talk abt. the punisht. of the guilty, wch. shld. be carried out by the Chin. Govt. instead of their being handed over. Empress ought to be placed in retirement, & we might well assure the viceroys that we had no wish to do anything agst. her person. That the heinousness of the attack on the Legations, their guests, & the murder of missionaries with circs. of unmitigated atrocity, ought to be brought home to the Chinese Govt. At the same time they shld. be given fully to understand that an entire & prosperous China was the object of our policy. He was agst. the withdrawal of troops fr. Peking, wch. wld. produce on the Chinese the opinion that we had run away. He added that the U.S. Govt. is in a difficulty because the army of 100,000 regulars has been voted only up to 30 June 1901, & they must begin shortly to send men home to be discharged.

I imagine that he will report in this sense to his govt. & that he will speak to the Viceroys in a similar tone.

I told him that was abt. what I wld. say myself to the Viceroys if I were authorized to see them.

I am afraid the Viceroys will never consent to any action directed agst. the person of the Empress. The relationship in wch. she stands to the Emperor by adoption has in Chinese eyes the same value as relationship by blood. He cld. not therefore consent to any violence being offered to her. It is doubtful whether he will agree to depose her. Possibly if we insist she may be induced to go into retirement.

It seems possible that we may find ourselves confronted next spring with the necessity of sending an expedition to Hsi-an-Fu. Possibly that might not be so difficult as it seems. It could be supported by an expedition up the Han river fr. Hankow. Shêng said to me that the threat wld. be sufficient. I told him if England threatened, she would perform.¹

The Viceroys might perh. be induced to see that it is necessary for the safety of China that they shld. undertake what in Chinese euphemism is called “removing evil counsellors from the vicinity of the throne”. If they did not fall in with an insistent recommendation to

¹ See diary for October 6, 1900.

take this course, we shld. then appear justified in doing it ourselves. The Court receives its supplies by way of the Han river. It prob. wld. be easy to stop them at Hankow.

I am bearing in mind what I believe to be the policy of H.M.G., namely to act in concert with the rest of the PP & to save as much of an independent China as is possible under the circs. I trust I am correct in supposing this.

38. Satow to Bertie

7 Oct. 1900 [Shanghai]

My dear Bertie,

I am leaving here in the “Orlando” the day after tomorrow and hope to get to Tientsin on the 12th,¹ after seeing Admiral Seymour at Taku. I see MacDonald has suggested that he shld. go to Tientsin to talk to Count Waldersee abt. the rlwy., so I may perhaps see him there. As to that question I need not say much, except that the Agent of the Bank showed me a teleg. he got from Tientsin complaining that the Russians had given over the rlwy. to the Germans. I pointed out that the control & policing of the rlwy. required a considerable military force, wch. possibly Genl. Gaselee might not be in a position to furnish, & that at any rate it was better for it to be in German than in Russian hands. That the rlwy. was not the property of the bondholders, who have only a lien upon it. In short I tried to soothe him.

I think Warren is a first rate man, & that he wld. be extremely useful to me if I could have him at Peking, to work the Viceroy's thro' him & also to superintend the Chinese side of the Chancery. Fr. several sides I hear that more importance might be given to that branch, & that it is undermanned. Of course I shall be better able to judge for myself when I reach Peking, but it seems obvious to me even fr. this distance that the head of the Chinese chancery should be a senior man, with knowledge & experience of Chinese affairs, & having under him the best interpreter & translators that can be got. His position as regards rank & salary shld. be so good that he wld. prefer it to any other in China, except that of Consul-general at Shanghai. I shld. like him to have local rank of Second Secy. next to the Secy. of Legn. & his pay to be £1500 a year. In Warren I think we have got precisely the most suitable man for the post. I need not say anything about the judicious manner in wch. he has conducted affairs here during these troubles. He wld. work well with Tower, & I am sure he wld. like the post. The communications with the Viceroy's cld. be conducted

¹ Satow left Shanghai on October 9th and saw Seymour at Taku on the 12th. He reached Tientsin about midday on the 13th. (Diary)

telegraphically fr. Peking thro' Sundius[?] & Everard Fraser, the diff. in time as compared with Shanghai being about a day. He wld. also be able to give me advice as to apptmts. in the consular service. I shld. hope fr. what I have heard of Cockburn that he wld. work in with such an arrangement as I have sketched out, as he wld. continue to be the principal interpreter & intermediary betw. the minister & the Chinese Auth. Then I shld. pick out the most promising of the younger men to be asstt. in the Chin[ese] chancery.

If this proposal is approved of perh. you can send me a private telegram.

Bredon has talked to me abt. his position, & I have assured him that if Hart retires, H.M.G. will do everything to secure his apptmt. Shld. that event take place, he suggests that it wld. be inexpedient to have a Deputy-Inspector-Genl. in wch. I agree with him. Especially wld. a foreigner be undesirable as Deputy, because he wld. regard himself as entitled to succeed to the Inspector-Generalate.

People say that Bredon is not a "strong man". If that means that he is not autocratic, perh. that wld. be no disadvantage. But possibly he might turn out like that Pope who walked on crutches before his election, or want of strength may mean obstinacy.

I think we ought to face the possibility of having to pursue the Court to Hsi-an-fu. It is objected that the Court wld. retreat further west. The further it went, the greater wld. be its difficulties, & it wld. lose touch with the Yangtze if it left Hsi-an-Fu, so I shld. not feel much anxiety abt. that.

Czikann the Austrian crossed the Pacific with me [see diary], & has now gone to Tientsin. He said he thought de Giers had encouraged the Boxers & reactionaries pour embêter les Allemands et les Anglais [to annoy the Germans and British] , but then found he had gone too far; that he is supposed to have vexed the Emperor, & to be on the eve of being replaced by Pavlov.

Knobel the Dutch coll: is here. He proposes to stay in S'hai thro' the winter, having no house to go to at Peking.

de Cartier of the Belgian Legn. is here still. He told me Pokotilov of the Russo-Chinese bank in Peking gives out that the Russians mean to keep the rlwy. & last night he spoke of a rumour that Count Waldersee is to declare war agst. China, & seize the Wusung & Kiang-yin forts. You know better than I do whether the Kaiser is likely to break away.

I do not see why we shld. not stay at Peking during the winter, & I am taking up 6 mos. provisions.

I wish I had Churchill with me as the military attaché. There is no doubt he wld. like it.

PRO 30/33 14/11 Japan (1-34); London (35); China (36-68)
(June 10, 1899 – March 14, 1901)

y.v.t.

P.S. If the Empress goes on apptg. reactionary Manchus to posts in the Yangtze region, we ought to tell the Viceroys that we will not recognize them. Especially if the man she has apptd. here were to try to take up his post we shld. tell Liu Kun-yi that we will keep him out by force. There will be no peace in China till the Manchu crew is got rid of.

E.S.

39. Satow to Salisbury

Peking. Nov. 1/00

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

I suppose one of the most important questions for us is whether the Emperor & Empress-Dowager will come back to Peking permanently or set up a Court at Si-ngan-Fu. My Jap. coll. [Nishi] ¹ thinks that they will not come back here so long as foreign troops continue to occupy the city, & that seems on the whole the general opinion. As the place is in ruins, the Empress Dowager's own Palace has been partly looted by the Russians & is now occupied by Count Waldersee, & the Temple of Heaven by our own troops, I shld. incline to think that the Court will not return to reside here until, after the evacuation, both Palace & city have been put in order again. The Jap. Min. thinks that we might arrange for a gradual withdrawal of the troops, accompanied by a gradual approach of the Court to Peking, & this appears to me a sensible idea. I quote him, because after all the Japanese understand Chinese feelings & motives better than we do.

As to the question of a permanent capital at Si-ngan, I am disposed to think the Empress-Dowager wld. find it impracticable, & I doubt whether she wld. be very zealously supported in such a decision by the Yangtze viceroys & Li Hung-chang. I have not yet found a fitting opportunity of speaking to the Chinese Plenipos. on either point, & at present it seems unadvisable. The presentation of our Note containing terms of demand must precede every other subject of discussion.

The desecration of the Engl. cemetery at Peking was the most insulting act in Chinese eyes that could possibly be committed. I have spoken my mind shortly to Li on the subject ², & he absolutely groaned. I expect shortly to have a report ready on this subject. I also had an opportunity of saying for myself a few pointed words abt. the attempt to destroy

¹ See Satow's diary, October 23, 1900.

² See diary for October 29, 1900.

the Legations & the massacre of missionary women & children. Nevertheless I think he feels I am no enemy, & he thanked me for my outspokenness.

There seems to be a good deal of personal feeling among the colls: ag[ain]st [Russian Minister Baron Mikhail] de Giers. I am told that at the time Sir Claude & other Mins. were urging the Ts. Yamên to put down the Boxers, he was saying to the Chinese that they need not mind, as the PP wld. do nothing. They also resent his somewhat dictatorial manners in our conferences, & his apparent desire to pose as the friend of China. They suspect him of communicating to Li the details of our conference. With the other colls: I find myself practically in agreement, & am especially friendly with the Am., Austrian & Italian. The attitude of the German towards us has been much improved by the Anglo-German convention, & we have not differed on any essential point in the Conference. M. Pichon I have not yet seen, as he is down with fever.

De Giers dropped his proposal for an immediate cessation of military operations on the advice of the German Minr., on finding that he wld. have a majority agst. him. As a matter of fact Count v. Waldersee says he does not intend any offensive operations agst. Chin. troops but where necessary in the territory under his command he will put down boxers. I am told there are plenty of these on foot still in the provinces.

The Paotingfu expedition originated with the French, who were determined on it. Ct. Waldersee delayed them as long as he could to give time to the Germ. troops to arrive & take part. Doubtless he thought it necessary that the later shld. do something. It was a bloodless affair. Genl. Gaselee has now returned to Peking with the Anglo-Indian contingent close behind. No looting took place in the quarter occupied by them, but possibly our allies were less strict.

y.v.t.

40. Satow to Barrington (précis)

1 Nov.

To Barrington. All old staff gone on acct. of health, rest quite new. If I make mistakes with no one to show me the ropes I hope they will be regarded with indulgence. E.S.

41. Satow to Cockerell (précis)

Cockerell for Willis' allowance.

PRO 30/33 14/11 Japan (1-34); London (35); China (36-68)
(June 10, 1899 – March 14, 1901)

42. Satow to Bertie

Nov. [no precise date]

My dr. Bertie,

With regard to missionaries I am taking the line that they are only protected as far as B.Ss., not missionaries. With regard to their converts, they must look out for themselves, except they be actually in service, receiving wages. As to mission chapels I am told by the Rev. J. Stonehouse that they were built chiefly with native money. For them no compensation can be claimed by us fr. the Chin. Govt. I have insinuated to Mr. Stonehouse as my personal view that the missionary Socs. shld. find the money to rebuild their dwellings & schools, but I am sure they will not see things in that light.

However I hope I may be able to pursue my own line in respect of missionaries, & to say to my colls: as I did yesterday that tho' I have no prejudices agst. the missionaries, I regard the insertion in the Tientsin Treaty of clauses abt. mission work as the most impolitic thing ever done in China.

43. Satow to Bertie

Priv. & conf.

8 Nov. 1900

My dear Bertie,

Of Sir Claude's staff, Cockburn & Tower, who seemed to have managed everything, have broken down in health & gone on home leave. I expect Ker, the Asst. in the Chinese Secretariat, up here shortly, & I am told he has a good knowledge of written Chinese, but does not speak well. For the moment I have detained J.W. Jamieson the commercial attaché, to do Cockburn's work. He is a very competent Chinese scholar, & I absolutely need a man of his standing for the Chinese part of the negotiations, but he is not popular with the men of his own service, & in fact appears to be the object of universal dislike among his equals. If we negotiate afterwards for a revision of the commercial Treaty, it will be necessary for him to go to the Ports, collect every kind of information, and learn the wishes of the merchants. If I cannot get Warren up here to advise me on purely Chinese matters, I must keep him here, nevertheless, as Ker cannot be of much use. He entered in 1888, & after going thro' his studies went to ports till May 1899; he cannot possibly know much of political matters.

When I hear fr. you abt. Warren I shall be able to come to a decision abt. Jamieson

remaining here. But a month hence the Taku river will be closed, & no changes in the staff will then be possible until next spring.

If the worst comes to the worst, I must bring Campbell from Tientsin, as he is competent to do the Chinese Sec's work, & send Jamieson to Tientsin to act there. I don't regard that as an ideal arrangement, for Campbell happens to be the best man to have there also.

Unluckily the good men in the Chinese consular service do not appear to be many.

Dering has been away on leave at S'hai & Tower has been running the chancery with the aid of a couple of students who have to be shown how to end a despatch, register, docket, in fact everything. I have ordered up young Sly fr. S'hai, & he will prob. get here by the end of the month. Dering I hope will do the 'head of the chancery' work when he returns.

I don't say all this as a complaint abt. the amount of work thrown on the Secy. of Legn., but to explain why it is that things sometimes go a little wrong.

As Asst. I have Willis, a capital fellow, but he has not been at the Legation since he left it as a student.

So with a completely new legation from top to bottom, you will not be surprised if we are not always 'on the spot'.

I have moved the genl. chancery into my own house, wch. saves a great deal of time to everyone, and Tower has put in order what I have heard called his Augean stable. To have the chancery right away on the opposite side of the compound is a ridiculous arrangement dating fr. an early period.

y..v..t.

44. Satow to Admiral [Seymour?]

8 Nov. 1900

My dear Admiral,

I will send the usual official acknowledgement of yr. desp. abt. stowing [showing?] the British flag on the west river, but today I have no time to do more than telegraph to you my concurrence in what you propose.

We have had four meetings of the F.R.R to discuss the conditions of peace proposed by France, & have finished for the present. All our additions & amendments have been submitted to our Govts. & we shall be ready to go on as soon as we get their replies authorizing us to proceed. One idea of the people in Europe was that each power shld. fortify if it liked a point accessible fr. the sea to wch. its Legation might retire in case of

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need. But 1° we ought not to admit the future possibility of such a necessity arising, 2° what wld. be the use of it to a Minr. already in danger at Peking. I talked over with Waldersee, Gaselee & Barrow what was proper, & they agreed that a garrison at Tientsin & occupation of some principal stations on the rlwy. fr. Peking to Shanhaikwan was necessary to secure communications to & fro at all times of the year. This found favour & we have recommended it to our Govts. Also the Taku & all other forts that could interfere with communications are to be demolished, acc. to us. Of course our people at home do not know the topography. I have the support of all but the Russian & Fr. in a proposal I made to add as a condition of peace that the commercial treaties shall be revised, & this is likely to receive strong support at Berlin & Washington. The Paotingfu expedn. has returned, & 3 leading officials who were convicted of responsibility for murder & ill treatment of foreigners have been executed by Count Waldersee's orders. I have not heard officially that this has been done, but I know he gave the orders. It will produce an excellent effect.

The country has been scoured, and various penalties inflicted on "Boxers".
(hollow nosed bullets marked R.L. found near Langfang on person of a 'village ruffian').

Anglo-Germ. convention satisfactory.

45. Satow to Salisbury

8 Nov. 1900

Dear Ld. Salisbury,

It is possible that stories may have reached home abt. looting the Manchu Emperors tombs to the S.W. of Peking.

The facts are these: a mixed force of German, Italian, & Anglo-Indian troops called there on their way back fr. Paotingfu, under the command of a German officer Col. Naumann. The tombs were visited & nothing done at first, but afterwards Col. N. apptd. a commission consisting of 1 English, 1 Italian & 1 German officer to distribute among the 32 German 24 Italian & 8 Engl. officers in the column the cloisonné vases & other ornamental objects in front of the shrines; they did not disturb the mortuary tablets. This operation was performed on two tombs only. Afterwds. some French troops arrived & without either orders fr. General Gaselee or Count Waldersee's staff officer with the expedition, & they are supposed to have rifled the remaining tombs.

I have said to every Englishman I have met in Peking that he can have no idea of the amazement with wch. people in England, to judge by what I read in the press before I left,

regard the stories of looting that have reached them, & wch. seem to them incredible. But the plague infection has seized upon everybody, tho' some have been only mild cases. Whatever anyone finds unguarded he feels it is his duty to appropriate lest some one else shld. take it after he has passed by. The Russians at the Summer Palace seem to be the worst. It reminds one of the Papal Bulls that gave all the property of heathen nations to the Kings of Spain & Portugal. No Chinese is recognized as being capable of ownership of moveables.

46. Satow to Admiral Seymour

12 Nov. 00

Dear Sir Ed,

(Congratulations on G.C.B.)

Your letter of 27 Oct. reached me today.

1st Chungking. I am afraid I must teleg. first to the madcap there, & I will tell him that unless necessary for the protection of foreign residents, he must send the guard back to rejoin their ship, & arrange with the senior officer at Shanghai how this is to be done. I am teleg. so that Warren will know.

I only wish I cld. lay my hands on a good man to replace Fraser & send him to some outside place where he cld. do no harm.

2nd. Pier & rlwy. at Chiu-wang-tao. I strenuously maintained what you & I had agreed to abt. this matter, tho' I found MacD. & Barrow took an opposite view. I do not quite know how the matter stands at present. Genl. Barrow has gone to Shanhaikwan, & will perh. modify his ideas when he has been on the ground. After all, it concerns the military people most.

3 Yangtze. In a few days I hope to be able to teleg. to you as to Warren accompanying you to see the viceroys. If he is not ordered here to join me, I quite think it wld. be a good thing for him to go with you.

We are getting on with our discussions among ourselves as to the demands, & are only awaiting the decision of the Govts. as to the additions & amendments of the five Fr[ench] bases. I told you a good deal abt. this in my letter of the 8th. There is some doubt as to whether it is wise to insist on decapitation of Tung Fuh-siang, who commanded the troops that attacked the legations & opposed yr. advance, lest we shld. drive him to desperation. Things are going fairly well among our colls: & I think we shall finally come to an agreeet.

in a few days.

47. Satow to Lansdowne

15 Nov. 1900

Dr. Lord Lansdowne,

Allow me to say how pleased I am that you have become my chief, & I hope that you will allow me to write to you fully on all matters that I cannot conveniently put into despp.

Since I arrd. in China I have written privately to Ld. Salisbury several times on Chinese aff. & so it is perh. not necessary that I shld. repeat what I have already said.

The discussion among the FRR as to the demands to be presented & the wording of the Note in wch. we are to present them are concluded, all but one pt. This is Salvago's proposal that China shld. undertake to adopt such financial measures as may be pointed out by the PP to provide for the payt. of the indemnities & the service of the loans.

This has purposely been put ford. in general terms because we are not at present in possn. of information wch. will enable us to say precisely what is needed. But the idea is that if the Salt tax & the inland duty on Chinese-grown opium were handed over to a foreign commission to be collected & administered by them, enough wld. be obtained to pay interest on existing loans as well as on new loans that will have to be raised to meet the indemnities. I am told that the salt tax produces now 2½ millions Stg. & cld. be made to produce at least 5 millions if not more, while native opium produces abt. £300,000. These two items wld. suffice to pay 5% on £100,000,000, but I shld. hope the total amount of the indemnities wld. not come to nearly that sum.

Li Hung-chang has however got it into his head that there is an idea among foreigners that the whole revenue system shld. be put into the hands of a foreign commission, & that he strenuously rejects. I attribute to his feeling on this point the resistance of our Russian coll: to Salvago's modest proposal, for there is no doubt that they are in consultation. And our Russian coll: wld. no doubt like China to be unable to pay the indemnities, so that he cld. put the screw on fr. time to time, as at Constantinople. The rest of us think it is most necessary to prevent a tête-à-tête betw. Russia & China on this matter, and all agree that we must insist on the PP having a voice in determining the "financial measures" that China is to take.

I propose for my own part to say, when we next discuss Salvago's proposal, that I will not without specific instructions fr. my Govt. agree to any draft Note fr. wch. it is excluded.

At the same time I shall try to work upon Li & upon my Russian coll:

When the commercial treaties are revised, if we get so far as that, there wld. prob. be no difficulty in raising the customs duties on imports from 5% to 10, wch. wld. increase the power of China to meet her liabilities. I believe the mercantile community wld. consent to this without difficulty.

Another point on wch. there is privately some difference of opinion among us is the inclusion of T'ung Fuhsiang among those agst. whom the penalty of death is to be demanded. He is the general whose troops murdered the Germ. Minr., resisted the advance of Ad. Seymour's relief col. & principally attacked the legations. But he is in command of the bodyguard protecting the Court. Both Mr. Conger & I think he may take the bit betw. his teeth if this demand is pressed, & we have said so in conference; but our colls: insist. The point therefore must be decided by our govts.

Altho' fr. time to time one hears it said that the Court will never come back to Peking, the real opinion of my colls: is that it will. They constantly talk of facilitating it. As far as I can judge the Yangtze viceroys, Li & Prince Ch'ing also look forward to it as natural & therefore to be expected. I also speak to my colls: in the same tone, & warn them that some of their plans & proceedings may have the contrary effect. I have carefully avoided expressing an opinion in favour of any other possible dénouement, because if it is desired that the capital shld. be fixed elsewhere, I think the means are at hand without our seeming to employ them. The enormous extension of the Legn. quarter advocated by most of my colls:, bringing the rlwy. right into the Tartar city & placing the terminus close to the South gate of the palace wch. our engineers desire as a defensive measure, & the new Germ. expedn. to Kalgan will all tend to keep the Court away, & I feel sure it will not return till the foreign troops are withdrawn.

The Russians are still hesitating abt. handing over the rlwy. to us. It is greatly to be desired that they wld. make haste to do it, if only for the satisfaction of Engl. public opinion in China.

The American Comr. Rockhill has arrived & is to stay all winter as an unofficial prompter to Mr. Conger. I find him an excellent man to get on with, as is Conger also, but Rockhill is more of a true diplomatist.

48. Satow to Lansdowne

21 Nov. 00

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Genl. Gaselee is writing privately to the Sect. of State for India to suggest that some of the regiments wch. will in the ordinary course of things return home next spring might be advantageously sent to North China for a few months, & that if necessary an equal no. of Indian troops might be withdrawn. It is not that the latter are unsuited for service here, but he feels that the absence of Engl. troops fr. our expeditionary force places us at a certain disadvantage as compared with other nations, & that we have not the same moral influence here as other PP in consequence.

I beg to say that I concur with Sir A. Gaselee on this point, all the more that I do not at present think it likely that the troops can be withdrawn fr. North China in the spring. Even supposing that the Court manifests its readiness to return to Peking, & that the negotiations are so far advanced that the capital can be evacuated, we shall still need troops here in order to secure obtaining all that we want, & for protecting in conjunction with other PP our communications with the sea.

Believe me &c.

49. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking

23 Nov. 1900

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

Sir Robt. Hart has shown me a letter he recd. a few days ago fr. Wang Wên shao, one of the 3 leading ministers who are with the Court at Hsi-ngan-fu. It was 19 days in coming, & dated 31 Octr. Wang is reputed to be friendly to foreigners, wch. means I suppose that he is moderate in his opinions & condemns the recent follies of the ruling powers.

Sir Robt. had evidently written to urge the return of the Court to Peking. Wang's ans. is that there are 3 things wch. prevent this, tho' it is the anxious wish of Th. MM. [Their Majesties] to come back.

- 1) With the exception of the Russians & Americans who had temporarily agreed to withdraw, Peking was full of foreign soldiery of all nations, who hold the gates & patrol the streets.
- 2) That foreign troops had passed Paotingfu & gone as far as Chêng-ting, to rescue

missionaries. If the Court were to return, there would be danger of a collision betw. the imperial bodyguard & foreign troops.

- 3) The Emperor has issued an edict blaming himself for what has occurred, & has published a list of the penalties inflicted on the wrongdoers. Nevertheless peace negotiations are still delayed.

The writer goes on to urge Sir Robt. to assist Prince Ch'ing & Li Hung-chang in coming to an arrangement c. the PP. by wch. peace will be secured, the withdrawal of foreign troops be provided for, & the autonomy of China be regained.

When this has been done Wang & his friends will endeavour to persuade Their MM. to return to Peking, as it is indeed the daily hope of the latter to be able to do so.

This is a genuine document, & seems to settle the question for the present. It confirms the general opinion here, in wch. I also share.

There is a rumour that the Court finds Hsi-ngan-Fu very inconvenient, & contemplates a return to Taiyuenfu, abt. halfway here, but I do not believe it.

I learnt fr. Genl. Voyron yesterday that he has occupied Chêng-ting & has parties scouring the country west of Paoting-fu, & it is pretty certain that the alarm expressed in the letter fr. Wang 3 wks. ago must increase. The German expedition to Kalgan, wch. was within a day's march of that place on the 18th inst. will help to frighten the Court.

50. Satow to Warren

1 Dec. 1900

My dr. Warren,

I recd. your letter of Nov 21 a couple of days ago fr. wch. I gather that you think it wld. be useless trying to get up here before the spring, & I have also your teleg. in wch. you say that you do not understand whether it was to be a permanent post, nor what I telegd. to you abt. the salary.

As to the last the teleg. fr. home was that you wld. continue to draw your (£1000 a year) salary as Consul-Genl. at Hankow. In my private letter fr. S'hai I had asked the F.O. to give you £1500 as head of the Chinese chancery; & that I fear they have not been able to get the Treasury to agree to.

As to its being a permanent apptt. I cannot say for certain, as the F.O. teleg. was that I might employ your services at Peking & I must wait until I got an ans[wer] in writing fr. home. But it of course was my proposal to the F.O. that it shld. be a permanent apptmt.

I shld. like to hear fr. you whether in the event of the F.O. being willing to make it a permanent apptmt., with the rank of 2nd Secy. & two assts. under you, the smallness of the salary they at present propose wld. be an obstacle to your accepting it. Please let me have your ans. at as early a date as possible, for in case you decline I must look round for some one to do the work of Acting Chin. Secy. (when Jamieson leaves me, as it is understood he will in the spring) during Cockburn's absence, & in case Cockburn does not return to the Legn., to be his successor.

y.v.t.

51. Satow to Lansdowne

6 Dec. 1900

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Abt. 10 days ago the Russian Minr. recd. instructions to sign the Note if for 'peine de mort' was substituted 'la peine la plus severe'. ¹ The U.S. Minr. [E.H. Conger] a day or two later got a teleg. saying that the President "disapproved" of the expression "conditions irrévocables" as implying an ultimatum; "gravely doubted" the advisability of insisting on the death penalty, & "questioned" the possibility of prohibiting the importation of materials used in the manufacture of ammunition. Conger came to consult with me. I agreed with him that in English the word 'irrevocable' was not necessary, that as long as Tung Fuhsiang remained with the Court we cld. not safely ask for his head, & as that was so we had better not explicitly mention the death penalty, & as to the materials, all I had intended by my suggestion was to exclude articles used only for manufacturing ammunition. I ought also to say that the death penalty was proposed by me at the meeting that took place [on October 26 – see diary] the day after I took charge of the Legation, when I was still under the impression of hearing the account of the siege & reading narratives of the fiendish cruelty with wch. the missionaries, their wives and children had been done to death. If we cld. have the heads of a few of the ringleaders, we ought to insist, especially as a warning to Chinese officials for the future, but I recognize that we must not insist on the unattainable. At Conger's request I saw Mumm, who was disposed to agree partly, & the three of us met again on the 30th, when we arrived at an agreement on all three points. On Dec. 2 de Giers

¹ See Satow's diary for December 2, 1900. "[Russian minister] De Giers came to say that he had teleg. authority (dated 27) to sign the note if 'peine de mort' were taken out, & he wanted to know what my opinion was. I said that I had no instructions yet, but personally I had no objection, nor to Conger's desire to omit 'irrevocable' wch. was not necessary to the English sense."

came to me, & said he had instructions to sign if 'peine de mort' were left out. I told him I had no instructions, but personally I had no objection. On the 4th we had a meeting of the FRR at wch. seven voted in favourof 'la peine la plus sévère' & the omission of 'irrévocable'. The Germ. A-H & Italian Mins. dissented, but said they wld. sign the note with these alterations, in order to attain unanimity. We also agreed to meet the objection of the U.S. & Japan abt. materials for the manufacture of ammunition by inserting the words "exclusively used". Finally we persuaded the Japse. Min. to abate his govt's demand for the despatch of a special mission to apologize for the death of his chancellor [Sugiyama] & to accept 'honourable reparation' instead. Only the American Min. & myself are still without authority to sign. We are very anxious to get the Note sent in, so that one step towards our arrangement may be thus attained. I do not anticipate much difficulty in getting the Chinese Plenipos. to accept the terms, but our troubles will arise when we come to discuss some of the details. Such are the punishments, & the drawing up of a list of culpable persons, the arrangements for securing free communications by the rlwy. with Taku in the summer & Shanhaikwan in winter; the formation of a legation quarter & its defence, the financial guarantees for payment of the indemnities, & the amount of the indemnities themselves.

I suppose the Russians will present a large bill for damage to the Manchurian railway, & my Germ. coll. talks of £8,000,000 as the minimum cost of their share of the relief expedition. He has suggested to me that the private claims for compensation shld. be paid in full, & a lump sum exacted fr. China for the indemnities due to the Govts, to be divided betw. the 6 PP that sent large forces, Italy & A-H each receiving a much smaller share. Obviously this question of indemnities is one that must be settled in Europe. So also the combination of forces to be furnished by diff PP for keeping open communications, the amendments needed to the commercial treaties, & the allocation of certain revenues to meet the indemnities. I hope that on these points the allied govts. will come to an agreeet., & give us precise instructions in writing. If we have to offer suggestions by teleg. after fighting out each of these questions among ourselves, I fear that the negotiations will take a very long time, if one may judge fr. the fact that it has taken 2 months to turn the Fr. proposals into a Note for presentation to the Chinese Govt.

A majority of my colls: are in favour of a legation quarter 1 mile in l. by ½ mile in width, 5 or 6 times as large as the area defended during the siege, & requiring some 2000 or 300[0?] men to defend it. I am trying to moderate their military ardour, for I suppose that while stipulating for the right to maintain a permanent legation guard, no govt. can wish to

go to any great expense, & that 50 men is the outside number they can spare for the purpose.

y.v.t.

P.S. Mr. Conger has just been here to say that he has recd. authority to sign the Note in its most recent form, & that there is no insuperable objection to the retention of “irrevocable”.

52. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking

13 Dec. 1900

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

By a teleg. of Nov. 8 from Ld. Salisbury I was asked to give my reasons for desiring the return of the Court to Peking & the reestablishment of the administration of China at a spot so exposed to Russian geographical pressure. In my secret teleg. of the 12th I tried to give the pros & con. The natural inference from the teleg. I recd. is that H.M.G. would prefer to see the Court removed from the danger of constant pressure from Russia, but as I have no instructions on this point I continue to speak & act as if the return of the Court here were desired by us at the proper time, as you will see from my despatch about the proposed defensible legation quarter, & various things I have said at the meetings of the colls:

We have now held 11 meetings, beginning on Oct. 10, to discuss the French bases of negotiation & to frame a note for presentation for the Chinese Govt. And yet we are not all agreed. If so much time is spent by the F. Mins. at Peking over the preliminaries, I tremble to think what it will be when we come to negotiate upon the details. It is unfortunate too that we have in the conference here representatives of Powers like Belgium, Spain, Italy & Austria, who contributed nothing or little at most to the expeditions for the relief of Peking, & would be of no help in any further operations. Yet their votes count on every question, even on the question whether in the Note we should speak of “irrevocable conditions” of pacification. If they had been eliminated, the votes for the excision of irrevocable would have been in the majority from the beginning.

All this leads me to suggest that the seat of negotiations should be transferred to Europe, where the Powers who have sent no forces could be eliminated, & those only invited to attend who really mean business. ¹ H.M.G. would in Mr. Cockburn, Sir Walter Hillier & Mr. Geo.

¹ See Sanderson to Satow (private), 1 March 1901, PRO 30/33 7/1.

“You made the blood freeze in the veins of some of us by the suggestion of turning the whole matter over to a European conference...Doomsday would find [the conference] still sitting.”

Jamieson have experts who cld. give them every kind of information upon Chinese matters, whether political or commercial; and any further details that might be required cld. be easily furnished fr. here or fr. S'hai. I put forward this suggestion, not in order to shirk work or responsibility, but because I think the end aimed at could be more easily attained by its adoption.

53. Satow to Lansdowne

25 Dec. 1900

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

No one cld. possibly have any idea beforehand of the manner in wch. the discussions of the diplomatic body are conducted here. They are presided over by Mⁿ. Cologan the Spanish Minr., a man of no capacity, quite unable to maintain order, speaking Fr. only passably, & hand in glove with the Russian Minr. de Giers. The consequence is that subjects are frequently started of wch. no notice has been given beforehand, 2 or 3 speak at once, interrupt each other in the middle of a sentence, & what takes place resembles a conversation at a round dinner table where everyone cares more to make himself heard than to listen to the others. One Secy. attends fr. the Fr. Legn. who takes notes & afterwards circulates a draft of the process-verbal, & often ten days or a fortnight elapse before one can obtain the loan of it to take a copy. I have been usually reduced to taking my own notes, wch. are very incomplete owing to the irregular method of discussing the subjects that are brought for[war]d. When I have had anything of importance to communicate I have always taken the precaution to put it in writing & hand it to the Secretary.

I tried a short time ago to bring abt. a change for the better, by suggesting that as soon as we began to hold meetings with the Chinese Plenipos., it was no longer a meeting of the Diplomatic Body, where the Doyen naturally takes the chair, but a conference, wch. wld. begin by choosing a chairman & wld. adopt rules of procedure. I suggested (privately) that we shld. choose Mon. Pichon, the Fr. Minr., a clearheaded man who judges questions on their merits, & having been a deputy knows how public debates shld. be constructed. I said there was a precedent for choosing the R. of the country that had put forward the bases of discussion in the case of the Peace Congress at the Hague, where M. de Staal was chosen. To avoid international jealousies I proposed the meetings shld. be alternately at the German, Russian & British Legations, wch. alone possess the necessary accommodation.

The proposal to choose Pichon was disliked by my Germ. colleague, because he says the

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proposals came originally fr. Berlin, & not fr. Paris, & by the Russian Minr. who finds Cologan a convenient tool. Besides Pichon hates de Giers personally, & the feeling is doubtless reciprocated.

The 2nd proposal suited only the Germ. Minr. & myself, but it found no favour with those whose legations had been destroyed or wch. were too small to accommodate us.

Consequently the meeting with Prince Ching took place at the Spanish Legn. with M. Cologan as our spokesman.

The dipl. body having at the instance of the Germ. Min. & myself demanded that Prince Ch'ing & Li shld. obtain full powers to treat fr. the Emperor, have in turn been asked by the Chinese plenipos. to produce their full powers. [See diary for December 24.] This places them in a rather difficult position, as they have no proper pleins-pouvoirs & I do not know how they will get out of it. My commission I think cannot possibly be disputed, but the Germ. Minr. has only a copy of the decree apptg. him En Ex & Min Plen., & a letter fr. Count Bülow to all Chinese Auth. whom it may concern stating that he is empowered to negotiate.

The Germs. have lately been making punitive expeditions in various parts of the province fr. wch. there seems to be no excuse, especially to Yung-ching, the town already punished by us for the murder of Messrs Norman & Robinson, missionaries of the S.P.G. Count v. Waldersee recently told Col. Grierson that he had only 2 principles of action, namely to treat all Chinese like dogs, & to refuse everything asked of him by the Russian Minister. I hear that he is dividing the country round Peking into districts, to be held by Germ., Japse., Fr. & British troops respectively, wch. if carried out is not a bad idea.

The new Jap. Min. [Komura] is expected here in a few days. He has recently been at Washington & Petersburg in succession, & speaks English quite readily. I knew him 3 years ago as V.M. for F.A. at Tokio. He is probably more American than English in his sympathies, & certainly will be less pro-Russian than his predecessor.

Now that the river is closed our bag does not reach us regularly. One got as far as Tientsin, & was sent back to Shanghai by a blundering military postmaster because it was addressed to Sir Claude MacDonald, who had left for Japan. I have not had a line of writing fr. the F.O. since I left England Aug. 25.

y.v.t.

54. Satow to Bertie

26 Dec. 1900

My dear Bertie,

On receiving the teleg. on Nov. 13 authorizing me to employ Warren here, I telegd. to him to come up here, & that he wld. continue to draw his salary as Cons-Genl. To that I got a reply that he could not manage to get here before the river closed, & that he did not understand abt. the salary. He wrote to me on the 21 Novr. dwelling on the difficulty of getting his gear together in time, but said nothing abt. the salary.

I inferred that he did not care to come here on £1000 a year only, & that he wanted to go up the Yangtze with Ad. Seymour. I had told him he might go provided he could get here before the river closed.

I wrote to him Dec. 1 asking him whether the question of salary deterred him, & have no reply up to this date, possibly there had not been time enough. But he appears to have told Dering & Sly that he did not care to come here unless he got more than £1000 a year.

I have not heard fr. him since his return to Shanghai more than 3 weeks ago, nor fr. Sir Ed. Seymour, so have no notion of what they said or did at Nanking or Hankow.

Prob. I shall have to get Campbell here as Acting Chin. Sec. in the spring, & release Jamieson to his duties as commercial attaché. y.v.t.

55. Satow to Bertie

27 Dec. 1900

My dear Bertie,

I hope the telegs. I have sent lately have been more satisfactory on points of detail. Till I got your private teleg. I had rather tried to keep down the expense.

The genl. opinion among the colls: seems to be that the final addition to the Note was an excellent thing. When I went to de Giers with it, he produced the wording proposing [proposed?] in the teleg. of Dec. 9. I told him that it was superseded & that it wld. be useless to discuss that now. It was a narrow escape. In my humble opinion the Note has got just what it needed in the way of a wind-up.

I saw de Giers just before dinner. On the following day a correspondent brought to the American coll: something translated fr. a Chinese text. It was identical with the addition. This proves the Russian Legn. to have been the channel of communication. It does not really matter that these things shld. get out, provided one knows it, & even Chinese must

feel a certain contempt for traitors.

The mistake on Conger's side was curious. He telegd. to Washington that the majority wanted to keep in "irrévocable". The ans. as he decyphered it was "sign Note as majorities". There was a mistake of 6 for 4. It should have been "sign Note as telegd", i.e. with "irrévocables" left out. He had a bad time of it the last 3 days before he got leave to sign the final text.

I had to give different reasons to diff. colls. to induce them to agree to the addition, but after all the important thing was that they shld. accept.

I really should be grateful for a tip as to the real objects of H.M.G., especially about the capital. I have been reduced entirely to my own conjectures, & doubtless have often said the thing I shld. not. I was very grateful to get a teleg. to say that the small powers shld. not be taken into account in deciding the text of the Note. I had said to the Dutchman & one or two others that if ever Belgium & Spain put me in a minority again, as they did on "irrevocable" I wld. protest agst. them in the presence of the whole conference. However, that has not been necessary.

y.v.t.

56. Satow to Sanderson

Peking

27 Dec. 1900

My dear Sanderson,

Let me offer you in the first place my very sincere congratulations on your Grand Cross.

Yr. letter of Oct. 12 wch. reached me yesterday was the first of any kind that has reached me fr. the F.O. since I got here. The bag was stupidly sent back to S'hai fr. Tientsin by a military postmaster who observed that it was addressed to MacD. I have been left very much to guesswork as to what was really wanted, for telegs. don't tell one secrets, & for a long time I was left in the Chancery with only Tower & a young asst. Jamieson as acting Chinese Secy. who is not persona grata to anyone. Tower fell ill at this juncture for nearly a week. Cockburn & Toms who knew all the archives and the past history had gone home. I am sure that you will sympathize with my difficulties. We are now going on all right, as I have got Dering, Sly & Ker in addition. But if the "traité définitif" is to be negotiated here, I don't see how we can get on without an additional 2nd Sec. for the time.

I think Warren had an idea that he was a sort of Comr. for the Yangtze, & indeed he was

desirous, as he told me, of having that title. I think he did exceedingly well during the Siege of the Legations, & that he deserves a mark of H.M. approbation, but whenever the Chinese accept our “bases of negotiation” he might have a couple of months leave, wch. he says he desires for his health, & then go back to his post at Hankow. I have not suggested this before, as it has seemed to me that in the event of our negotiations failing, H.M.G. might like to have a man of his stolid character on the Yangtze.

I suppose it is good policy to be very friendly with Mumm, & to tell him everything except what I suppose H.M.G. think abt. the future capital. e.g. I told him I was telegraphing the text of the Note in Chinese to the two Viceroy, & to make it easier for him, directed Warren & Fraser to give a copy to the Germ. Consl.-Genl. at S’hai & the Vice-Consul at Hankow. It is a good text made in this Legation, & in Chinese it is a forcible document.

It does not seem at present that the Court has made up its mind to stay at Sian. There is even a rumour among Chinese officials that the Emperor (alone) has left there for Taiyuenfu, & means to go thence to Kaifêng, in Honan, an ancient capital near the Yellow River. I give this for what it is worth.

Waldersee’s plan seems to be principally to frighten the Chinese, so that they shall not look askance at Germans, and to refuse anything the Russians want.

The Russians I believe mean to get the Chinese officials back to administer Manchuria, while they occupy the most important points. Something like our position in Egypt, without declaring a protectorate. This will bring them into very intimate relations with the central Govt. They are said to have discovered the impossibility of administration by massacre & not to feel themselves competent for anything else; so they will leave it to the Chinese.

I have kept quiet abt. the rlwy., as I think it better to leave the soldiers to settle it among themselves; & that we shld. not let ourselves be induced by Chinese manoeuvring & the zeal of Hillier for his own policy to quarrel with the Russians abt. it

y.v.t.

57. Satow to Seymour

16 Jan. 1901

Dear Sir Edward,

Many thanks for your letter of 5 Dec. wch. reached me on the 30th when I was laid up with pneumonia & quite unable to attend to business. It was during this time that Tower

wrote to you on my behalf, enclosing a copy of a circular of 1869 for Sir R. Alcock.

Entre nous. I was rather surprised by the tone of Mr. Scott's letter to you. If he had any objections to make, it seems to me that he shld. have acknowledged the receipt of yr. letter, & informed you that he was referring the matter for my instructions. However, I have no doubt you have put him in his proper place. That circular of 1869 was evidently based on instructions fr. the F.O. drawn up with the object of putting an end to a practice rather prevalent then, of consuls appealing to officers in command of a gunboat to bombard a taotai's yamên whenever he was recalcitrant. I remember a case that occurred abt. that time in Formosa, when Consul Gibson induced a Lt. Gordon to do this for him, & they both came to fearful grief in consequence.¹

We have today recd. the ans. of the Chinese Plenipos. accepting the conditions contained in our joint Note of 22 December. Now will come the discussion of the details, wch. will no doubt take some time. The indemnities will be our chief difficulty.

We hope that all difficulties in connexion with the rlwy. are now removed, & that before long it will be practically handed over to us. y.v.t.

58. Satow to Lansdowne

17.1.01

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

I am exceedingly obliged for your kind offer to give me the assistance of Sir W. Hillier. He is a man of the very highest character, & having been for several years Chinese Secy. before he went to Corea wld. be invaluable as an adviser upon Chinese matters. What I fear is that the severity of the winter climate in Peking may deter him fr. accepting your proposal.

The Germ. Minr. continues to work in complete harmony with us, & so wld. the Amer. Coll: if his govt. wld. let him. The Fr. Min. sympathizes with us agst. the Russian, but is generally obliged to give his official support to the latter, & he is beginning to lose interest in Chinese affairs, because he is longing to get away to his new post at Tunis.

y.v.t.

¹ Gibson died soon afterwards, "it was said, of a broken heart." (*A Diplomat in Japan*, p.20)

59. Satow to Bertie

Peking 17.1.01

My dear Bertie,

I am now quite well again, & have been taking my share of work since the 12th. The dr. tells me it will be some time yet before the lung wch. was affected will resume its normal condition.

Tower managed affairs admirably while I was laid up, & deserves especial credit for preventing the colls: fr. adopting either of their absurd propositions (1) to amend the Fr. text of our joint Note, & withdraw that delivered to the Chinese Plenipos. (2) to have 2 texts, namely the one delivered and an amended one to be published by our govts. They carried agst. him the proposal to invite the Chinese plenipos. to furnish us in writing with their observations on the Note. They might just as well have left the initiative in this matter to have come fr. the Chinese. To my mind Tower was the only sensible man among the clever.

Rumours are going about that the Chinese Emperor is on his way back to Tai yuen-fu, & that he has gone off his head & amuses himself with eating tallow candles.

The manner in wch. Morrison of the "Times" manages to obtain such accurate information continues to excite my admiration & surprise. I strongly suspect leakage thro' the Secy. of the U.S. legn., Squiers, who buys curios with the aid of Pethick, the well-know hanger-on of Li Hung chang & who gets political information fr. S. in return for expert advice as to the merits of cloisonné, porcelain & lacquer.

Li has been ill since his visit to me of 13 Dec., [see diary] suffering fr. indigestion & bladder troubles. Velde the German doctor who attends him says it is merely old age. Morrison, who is a doctor by profession, thinks he will not recover. If he were to die, I do not quite know who could replace him. In spite of his liaison with the Russians, he is necessary to us. Neither of the Yangtze Viceroy's wld. do, & they are better where they are. Tê Shou the Gov. of Kwangtung, who is Acting Viceroy of Canton, has been suggested to me as a good man to replace Li, but I know nothing of him.

y.v.t.

60. Satow to Bredon

Peking 17/1/01

Dear Mr. Bredon,

Your interesting letter of 24 Dec. reached me a few days ago, & I am greatly obliged to

you for the valuable suggestions it contains.

My own opinion, as far as I have been able to form one, is that the simpler the means adopted to provide for the new indemnities the better, as it will be easier to obtain its acceptance by the Chinese. I do not think that anything in the nature of an international control of Chinese finances is either practicable, or likely to be adopted by the Powers. It may seem selfish, but it appears to me that what we have to think of in the first place is how to provide for the interest and gradual payment of the indemnities.

Firstly. I calculate that a sum of fr. 50 to 60 millions sterling ought to suffice for the “equitable indemnities” spoken of by M. Delcassé in his proposal.

Secondly That the indemnities shld. be regarded as a debt due fr. China to the respective Powers, bearing interest (say at 4%, but on this point other people may have larger ideas) & to be extinguished by annual instalments.

Thirdly That the Chinese native customs shld. be administered by the I.M.C.

Fourthly That the revenues (such as salt, tribute rice & whatever else may be needed) shld. be administered either by the I.M.C. or by a similar service, the chief members of wch. shld. be transferred fr. the I.M.C. The additional personnel required shld. be obtained by filling up the lower ranks, rather than by taking in new men to the higher ranks. I agree with you that trained financiers fr. Europe, ignorant of China & its ways, wld. be worse than useless.

Please remember that these are only my personal ideas, and that they have not been submitted to nor received the approval of H.M.G.

I hope to write again when I have had more leisure to consider your letter, & in the meantime shld. be grateful for suggestions as to how to raise the necessary revenue, & how to arrange the amortization of the new debt. It is a question, this, for an actuary. y.v.t.

P.S. I have said nothing here about a prospective increase of revenue fr. the Maritime Customs: 1st because we cannot increase the tariff except in connexion with the revision of the commercial treaties, & that subject by general consent is to be considered separately from the arrangements for a resumption of friendly relations, & subsequently to the present negotiations. In them we merely intend to reserve to ourselves the right of proposing the revision of the commercial treaties hereafter, with the object of providing for such matters as the Wusung & Taku bars, the improvement of the Peiho, of the upper Yangtze, & several other similar matters. 2ndly I am informed that opium wld. not bear an enhanced duty, that

it wld. not be advisable to raise export duties, & that the remaining revenue wch. might be subjected to augmentation yields at present about 8 million of tael only. E.S.

61. Satow to Sanderson

Jan. 23, 1901

My dear Sanderson,

I have recd. your private letter enclosing a teleg. fr. Reuter's agent here, Mr. Whittall. The fact is he called one day when I was very busy, so I referred him to Tower, but it is quite true that I gave it to be understood that I did not wish to see correspondents. I have seen Morrison of the "Times", Gilbert Reid (an American missionary) of the "Morning Post" and Angus Hamilton of the "Pall Mall", but I have politely declined to tell them what I was doing or what the views of the British Govt. were. Doubtless Lofêngluh telegraphs back here whatever he thinks would be of use to Li Hungchang. We have given a hint to Morrison not to attack Germany, and I hope he has profited by it. Whittall is away at present, but when he comes back I will let him come and see me, if that will give him any satisfaction. But as a rule I avoid having anything to do with newspaper men. y.v.t.

62. Satow to Lansdowne

30 Jan. 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The rlwy. I am told has been entirely transferred to the German military authorities fr. Peking to Shanhaikwan by the Russians (except what the Germans, Japse. & we already hold) & the Germs. are arranging with our engineer officers to hand it over to them. Kinder, the original engineer-in-chief told our Consul-genl. at Tientsin that by order of the Emperor the Russians were bringing back part at least of the rlwy. property they had carried off.

What we shall now have to work agst. will be the Russians constructing a line of their own direct fr. Shanhaikwan to Peking. I believe that immediately after the signature of Sir Ch. Scott's agreement, they claimed the right to do this.

Li told me the other day [January 25 – see diary] that the Russians had offered to take over the Chinese lines outside the Great Wall, the revenues of wch. are pledged to the British & Chinese corporation, as part satisfaction for the damage done to the Manchurian line by the "Boxers", but that he had refused.

He also told me with brutal frankness that his object in refusing to pay the interest due on

1st Feb. was to force the bondholders to foreclose, & so interpose a Br. interest betw. Peking & the Russians. He went further, & said that the construction of lines outside the great Wall c. Engl. money was to prevent the Russians coming down there. I always suspected this, but had never heard it authenticated before. Of course I told him he might find his policy not a complete success. He went away, vowing he never wld. pay the interest now due. On the following day however, Sir Robt. Hart went to see him, & persuaded him to teleg. to Hsian for permission to use the funds lying at Berlin for this purpose, & the day before yesterday I recd. a message fr. Li that he had made the necessary arrangements. Sir Robt. Hart told me he thought it pretty certain that the money will be paid.

The Moreing contracts for the transfer of the coal mines to an Engl. Co. fr. the Chinese official owners is doubtless also intended to serve the purpose of making us pull Chinese chesnuts out of the fire, for the contract was signed on 30 July at Tientsin, when there was no prospect of Peking being relieved. I now hear that the Russo-Chinese Bk is offering to buy out Moreing, just as they offered a short time ago to buy up the interests of the Bondholders. They seem ready to buy anything in order to remove British obstacles out of their path.

We have some difficulty in getting a joint opinion of the different Generals as to the maintenance of communications betw. Peking & the sea for ensuring the safety of the Legations. Ct. Waldersee has communicated to the Fr. American & Japse. generals copies of the documents he sent to General Gaselee (copies are going in a desp. by this mail). He does not wish to ask the opinion of those military officers, like the Russian, Italian & Austrian who are not above the rank of Lieut.-Cols. & have scarcely any troops here. My Germ. coll: & I unite in thinking that our govts. must agree with those of other PP who are willing to station troops in China for this purpose. Austria we think is not likely to do more than send a contingent of 250 men to form a legation guard. Perh. Italy & Russia likewise might not care to share in this particular piece of work. It does not seem a point on wch. the Diplomatic Body as a whole can be consulted.

The Field marshal in his letter to M. de Mumm wch. is among the papers I have mentioned suggests that the evacuation shld. not be commenced before the war indemnities are agreed to by China. But it seems to me that the war expenditure cannot be known until the evacuation is completed, & it is always said by my Germ. coll: that his Govt. does not ask the Reichstag for a single penny, & must recover the whole of this expenditure fr. China. If so it is a vicious circle.

Would it not be possible for the PP to agree together that each shld. declare its expenditure up to 31 March, & its estimated expenditure for another 3 months, & then name the nearest round sum as its claim? If that cld. be done our task out here cld. be concluded much more rapidly than if we have to wait till the expenditure of each is actually ascertained.

Up to the present moment the claims I have recd. fr. residents in Peking, missionaries in Manchuria, members of the Legation, the O. of W. [Office of Works] for the destruction of the summer residence & damage to our buildings in Peking, & fr. British merchants at Tientsin, do not come to more than £315,000. I am inclined to anticipate that the whole may not exceed £400,000. Judging by the few I have examined, I consider that 25% will have to be taken off this. I shld. like to suggest proceeding at once to examine all that have been sent in, & to name a round sum, without waiting to calculate tens & units. Some such procedure must have been followed in 1860, when we imposed an indemnity of £2,000,000 for war expenses & Taels 2,000,000 for the British merchants at Canton. Prob. before this letter gets home I shall have found things far enough advanced for me to be able to ask by teleg. for instructions on these points.

The last few meetings of the Diplomatic Body have been held at this house out of consideration for myself, but as I am now quite well I suppose we shall go back to the Spanish legation.

63. Satow to Brennan

31 Jan. 01

My dear Brennan,

I am sorry to hear that on account of your eyes & for other reasons you want to give up. You have always seemed to me to be so strong & energetic that it had never occurred to me that you cld. have any wish to retire. But if you really wish it, the Treasury cld. not possibly offer any opposition under the circs. I shall be very sorry to lose you, as I had counted on yr. continuance in what is the most important post in this part of the world. I suppose Warren wld. naturally be your successor, & if you wish to hand over say in June he cld. have the sea voyage he wishes for before that, & be back in time to relieve you.

As to your wish to be apptd. on a commission for settling the claims, or for the revision of the tariff, I cannot say anything at present. The larger part of the indemnities will of course be the war expenses, wch. the diff. govts. will settle for themselves. There remain

the claims of the merchants & missionaries, & those again I expect will be examined not by any kind of international commission but by each legation separately. They do not amount to much, & fr. my experience in such matters I shld. say they will not give us much trouble. I have already made various proposals to the F.O. for dealing c. them, but have not learnt what their decision is to be. So I cannot say whether there wld. be any room for you on that.

As regards revision of the tariff, I do not think it will be necessary to undertake that for the purpose of obtaining money for the indemnities, wch. seems likely to be procurable elsewhere. On this I have submitted my ideas to the F.O., and if they are approved the revision of the Tariff will only be brought forward in connexion with the negotiations in pursuance of Art. XI of the Joint Note, wch. I anticipate cannot be entered on before next year. Of course Jamieson as commercial attaché is the official adviser of the legation on points connected with his department, and will be employed during the next twelvemonth in getting up all the questions that may be discussed when we try to get the commercial treaties revised. So there also I do not see very well how you could be brought in to your advantage. You know that the F.O. have offered me the assistance of Walter Hillier for communications with the Chinese since the date of your letter, & the whole field seems to be pretty well filled up.

Were I in your place I think I shld. stop on until my three years came to an end, but possibly your eyes may not permit of your doing that. It seems to me however much to be regretted that you should go this summer. y.v.t.

64. Satow to Bertie

1 Feb. 1901

My dear Bertie,

Yesterday we had a meeting of the colls: & arranged the little comedy to be played, in wch. clemency is shown to the worst criminals Tuan & Lan, & sentence of death is passed on 4 or 5 of whom the only eminent ruffian is Yuhsien, exterminator of missionaries. The doyen is to be strictly limited to the speeches denouncing the criminals wch. we have composed for him, & a para. or two in wch. we say we shld. like the accused to be put to death and that there is another list of offenders forthcoming later.

It is then anticipated that the Chinese actors will make a speech in reply admitting that Tuan is a criminal of the deepest dye, but that the fact of his being descended fr. an Emperor is an extenuating circumstance, and the same for Lan. I suppose de Giers will

coach them in their parts.

Then we shall reply that these observations will be taken into cons'n & we shall let the curtain fall on the entr'acte.

This all has been contrived to "save the face" of the F. RR., who have really no reason for making any difference betw. Tuan & the rest. But you know how Chinese everyone's mind becomes here. We are always thinking of "saving our face" & we write semi-official notes to Li and Ch'ing on pink paper according to the custom of the country.

For at least two months past it has been evident that all the colls: great & small, had made up their minds not to insist on the death of Tuan & Lan, tho' some of them went on saying the contrary. I of course had to stick to my instructions, and declare always that I must insist on the death penalty for the whole crew.

The truth is that de Giers at the outset arranged with Li that the lives of the Empress' pets Tuan & Lan shld. be spared, for wch. I suppose Russia gets her quid pro quo. Then the American followed suit, & next the Japanese. The Germans also cooled down rapidly.

It is very funny that de Giers now accuses the Germans of wanting to pose as the friends of China, & so usurp Russia's role. It is very likely, as Mumm is quite the man to be pleased with such a scheme.

I begin to fear we shall have difficulty with the Diplomatic Body abt. obtaining severe eno' punish[men]t for provincial officials who have murdered missionaries. Russia, Germany, Japan, Spain & Austria have lost none. The other 6 of us have held 2 meetings to draw up lists, when it was found Pichon had not recd. detailed reports. Conger had copied the preliminary list I put in a couple of months ago, but had none of his own. The Italian, Belgian & Dutchman had but meagre information. The result is that instead of giving the Chinese a complete list of all the guilty officials, we have to separate it into two, one of those who directed attacks on the legations, the other of murderers of missionaries men women & children, & with diminished force. So the public verdict will be that we have thought more of our own precious skins than of murdered women & children. As I can't say all this in a desp. I am obliged to vent my feelings to you privately.

y.v.t.

65. Satow to Lansdowne

8/2/01

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I hear confidentially from an excellent source that the President telegd. lately to my Am. coll: offering to have him slated as a candidate for Gov.ship of Iowa, his native state. Conger replied that he was not disposed to accept a nomination, but wld. take the Governorship if it were assured to him. In that case Mr. Hay wld. no doubt ask Rockhill to stay here, wch. wld. be a great change for the better.

On the 5th after our conference with the Chinese PIPl. Conger gave the correspondent of the Associated Press the contents of the indictment read by the Doyen, & later on in the day told him all that occurred at our afternoon meeting. The "Times" correspondent repeated to me what I and some of my colls: had said, quite correctly. I suspect Conger of having given Count v. Waldersee's letters to Laffan's agency. He is evidently bent on making friends of the American press, with a view no doubt to his Governorship. I do not suppose much real harm is done by all these indiscretions, as long as only the truth gets out, but it [is] not agreeable that the whole world shld. be invited to inspect us in the midst of our diplomatic toilette.

My Germ. coll. is being urged by his Govt. to hasten the negotiations, & is beginning to have some ideas. Usually it has been this legation that has had to find them for the whole diplomatic Body. Most of the colls: are behindhand with their information, whether it be about massacres or claims for compensation. I hope that now he has taken up the subject of the indemnities we shall begin to make some progress, & I have given him to read privately some memoranda on the available resources of China & methods of dealing with the indemnities. I have told him that these are merely notions of my own, not in any way endorsed by yourself.

It is reported that the Engl. & American missionaries intend addressing to Conger & myself a memorial complaining of the omission fr. the Joint Note of all reference to anti-missionary proceedings of the Boxers; it is said they want the PP. to claim indemnities on behalf of native Xtians, & to put something stronger into the final treaty than Art 8 of the Treaty of Tientsin, wch. stipulates for toleration & protection of native Christians and missionaries by the Chinese Auth.

The F.R.R purposely abstained fr. mentioning missionaries & converts in the Joint Note. They considered that the Boxer movement ought to be regarded as directed agst. foreigners

in general, not agst. missionaries & converts. If we had admitted that all these troubles had their origin in the hostility excited by the missionaries, it wld. have been greatly to their disadvantage.

There is no doubt that the missionaries have wrested [? i.e. distorted] the meaning of the article referred to. Both R.C. & Protestant missionaries, the former more, the latter to a less extent, are in the habit of regarding themselves as entitled to claim directly fr. the Chinese officials the observance of the Article. When a convert complains to them that he has suffered injustice they conclude it is on acct. of his religion, & they interfere on his behalf. If in a riot the property of missionary societies or of converts is destroyed or pillaged they negotiate directly with the local auth. the amount of compensation. Some of the despp. I have sent home lately, or wch. have gone direct to the F.O. fr. the ports, exhibit consuls, missionaries & officials conferring together to settle these claims.

It seems to me however that if Art. 8 of the Treaty, or any other article, is violated it is the Br. Govt. that has the right to complain thro' its accredited agents & to demand redress, & that the missionary is not such an accredited agent. One of two things: either the missionary comes to us to get his wrongs & those of his converts redressed, or, if he chooses to act independently he is not entitled to our assistance. But there ought to be one rule for all of them. My own opinion is that they should. not be allowed to take the law into their own hands, & that if the native officials replied that they cld. not listen to any representations unless made thro' the consuls, they shld. be upheld. Since I have been here, on more than one occasion missionaries have obtained armed escorts fr. the military authorities, & visited distant localities to exact redress. I have consequently asked General Gaselee to refuse such escorts in future.

I do not wish to restrict the initiative of the consuls unduly. The distances are so great and the time required for communication by letter with Peking so long that it is often better that they shld. act without delay. Besides even in normal times the authority of the Court over the Viceroys is somewhat feeble. China is not a centralized state but a congerie of satrapies. I believe that our attempt to treat China as the former over the last 40 yrs. has often frustrated our endeavours to obtain redress, & that it has been more or less of a mistake. The idea prob. was that by treating the Peking Govt. as if it cld. impose its will on the provinces, we shld. strengthen it, & prevent the country from falling to pieces. But our aim has fortunately not been realized, for otherwise instead of the outbreak of last summer being confined to the north, it wld. have spread all over the country. So I wld. leave a great

deal of discretion to the consuls, subject to instructions to keep the minister fully informed of their proceedings by telegraph & to furnish him with full reports. There has manifested itself of late a disposition to act independently of the legation & it has been necessary for me to call for reports wch. shld. have been furnished to me spontaneously. In the course of time I hope by steady pressure to remedy all this.

We are making more progress now than at the beginning of our negotiations, & especially in getting written communications sent in to the Chinese PIPI. It has now come to be recognized that our Acting Chinese Secty. is the best translator, & the work has been left to him, with result that our last notes (2) were translated & sent in in forty hours, whereas the previous note took a week owing to its being in the hands of 4 men. This is how it happened that your teleg. instructing me to obtain certain additions to the Note about punishts. arrived after it had been sent off to the Chinese; but if we can go on at this rate we shall greatly expedite the negotiations.

66. Satow to Barrington (précis)

14 Feb. To Barrington. Dering wants to go on leave in Aug.; his successor shld. arrive before.

Brenan talks of resigning. Warren to have local leave, & then act at S'hai if B. sticks to his idea.

67. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking

21 Feb. 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I am sending the Report of the military commission on the proposed defences of the new legation quarter in an official desp., but shld. like to make one or two remarks privately.

Several days before the siege commenced the Germ. Min. von Ketteler took a party of his legation guard on to the city wall, & seeing a dozen "Boxers" drilling below, ordered his men to fire & killed 8 or 9.

Four days later a party of English, American & Japse. marines finding some 50 Boxers engaged in torturing native Christians killed them all.

On the 16th at Tientsin armed parties crossed the river & advanced in the direction

of the Chinese military coll: fr. wch. fire was opened.

On the early morning of the 17th the Taku forts were taken, the commandment [commandant?] having opened fire in response to the summons to surrender.

It was, in the opinion of those who are qualified to judge, this last event wch. brought abt. the attack on the legations, & the opposition to Ad. Seymour's advance. At least this was the sequence of events.

This being so, the expectation that the foreign legations will have to defend themselves again agst. such an attack as that of last summer seems a very remote possibility; & the measures proposed in the way of defence are in my opinion altogether in excess of what can ever prove necessary. The soldiers were asked to solve a military problem, not to estimate the chances of a recurrence of a combination of events.

It is the Germans who are most eager in all this business of converting the legation quarter into a stronghold. They have already obtained a great [amount?] of money, have cleared a site, & are putting in the foundations of their barracks. No one else has yet commenced.

I doubt very much whether Austria, Italy, Holland, Belgium or the United States will wish to spend large sums in creating palaces & barracks. But the colls: are naturally urged on by a spirit of emulation when they see how much larger & better our legation grounds are than anything they can hope to obtain.

The opinion of Col. Browne, our military attaché, is agst. any extensive defensive works. I shall send his observations next week.

Col. Grierson thinks that it is the desire of Genl. Schwartzhoff, the Germ. chief of staff, to carry out the proposed expedition at Shansi, even if, as there is every reason to expect, the Chinese Court accedes to our demands for punishments.

I look upon the extension of the jurisdiction of the Tientsin provl. Govt., abt. wch. I telegd. today, as another suspicious fact. It was decided a month ago. The Germ. Minr. knew all abt. it, but said nothing to his colls. The suggestion came fr. von Falkenhayn, the represve of Germ. on the provl. Govt., the most active member of that body.

It is members of the Germ. Legn. who are most given to disseminating the belief that the Court will never return here.

Whether there is any ground for believing that prior to the Anglo-German agreement, wch. people say was suggested by Germany, there was a secret agreement betw. Russia & Germany that the latter in the event of partition shld. have the province of Chihli

in addition to Shantung I cannot say.

Conger's protest agst. Count von Waldersee's Army order for mobilization, which I telegd., was suggested to him by Rockhill. It took us all by surprise & was rather ill-timed. As Genl. Gaselee had not communicated the Army order to me, all I cld. say was that I had no official knowledge of it. But I must do the general the justice to say that on the 10th he verbally informed me that something of the sort was thought of, & I agreed with him that a little scare of the kind wld. help forward our negotiations.

The Germs. are settling claims for damage to their railways in Shantung direct with the Govr. of that province, wch. will give the Russians an excuse for doing the same as regards the Manchurian rlwy.

The Fr. Min. without consulting any of us who are interested, has asked the Chinese Plenipos. to have the compensation for missionary property destroyed in Peking settled betw. a delegate appointed by them & the Vicar-general. My U.S. & Italian colls: & I have recd. letters fr. the PIPl. proposing a similar arranget. & I find them both disposed to agree. I am still uncertain what line to take, as the PIPl. have coupled with this offer a proposal wch. amounts to re-opening the whole missionary question. That I think ought to be avoided. I am not in favour of extending the privileges of missionaries, & any attempt to deprive them of what they already enjoy, or to exercise any restraint in regard to their proceedings wld. prob. result in failure.

I hope it will prove that we have forced the Chinese to agree to the punishments. It has not been agreeable to have to bargain abt. degrees of capital punishment.

68. Satow to Lansdowne

14 March. 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I am very much obliged to you for suggesting that I shld. have Sir W. Hillier's assistance here, as he is a man of great experience and personally liked by the Chinese. His eyesight unfortunately is rather impaired, & he does not wish to stay here for reasons wch. seem to me irresistible. So he will leave again abt. a month hence.

Last winter he wrote to me fr. Shanhaikwan where he was acting as political officer to Genl. Reid, offering to go to Hsi-an & try to find out what the attitude & intentions of the Court were. I replied that I thought it wld. be a great risk to run, & that such a mission of an Engl.man to the Court wld. excite great suspicion in the minds of my colleagues. So the

matter dropped. When he went to see Li a few days ago, & had the conversation reported in a desp. that goes by this bag, Li was so pleased by his remarks that he said: "Why don't you go to Hsi-an, & tell them the same things as you have said to me. I will teleg. to the Emperor, & ensure your receiving good treatment."

Sir Wm. told me of this proposal of Li's, wch. seemed to him an extraordinary coincidence, amounting to a providential call to do something for China, & he was very urgent with me that I shld. teleg. for permission to go. I put before him my previous arguments agst. the scheme, but he felt such a strong desire to try what he cld. effect that I undertook to send you a teleg. if it proved that Li's proposal was serious. But as Li has not recurred to it again, it is evident that he did not mean what he said, & so the proposal has fallen thro'. I shld. not in any case have declared myself in favour of it, for a paid agent of ours at Hsi-an wld. be looked on with great suspicion, & an unpaid agent over whom we had no control wld. be worse. I shld. mention that Sir W's proposal to me was that he shld. resign, & go there entirely as a private person. That I told him wld. make no difference. My colls: wld. know of his mission, & wld. infer that his visit to Peking was merely to receive his instructions.

I telegd. yesterday that I shld. greatly like an additional 2nd Secy., for there is a good deal of routine work & corresp[onden]ce with consuls that we find it rather difficult to cope with.

The Austrian & Italian Mins. recd. instructions to make protests abt. the proposed Manchurian agreeet shortly after the German, Japanese & I had protested. As China does not attach the slightest importance to what these 2 Powers say, their joining in only weakened the effect of what we had said. In the same manner the Diplom. Body acting thro' the Doyen has far less weight than 4 or 5 Powers who act together & can give effect to their words.

I am afraid that this Manchurian business means the breakup of the 'entente' as far as Russia is concerned. The refusal to go on any longer with the rest of the RR in demanding the punishment of provincial officials is one symptom, & what de Giers hinted today of the intention of Russia to present her indemnity claims separately is another. In the first of these two matters the remaining colls: will prob. hold together, tho' perh. Mr. Hay may think the maintenance of the 'entente' more important than avenging the murder of 240 men, women & children. In the 2nd I think the Fr. Min. will prob. go with the Russians. As regards the defensive Legn. Qr. again the Amers. will certainly be unwilling to do anything,

& I do not think they will take any part in holding the rlwy. communications. As to the prohibition of the importation of arms the Gemans, Americans & Japse. are decidedly opposed to the Fr. proposal. I took a share in preparing a report on the arrangements that wld. be required to carry it out, but I have expressly said that I do not intend that H.M.G. are in any way bound by the report, & that I take only a platonic interest in it.

Li, Prince Ching, Liu Kunyi & Chang Chihtung are at cross purposes. The first is failing physically, but as a political force he outweighs all the others, & his devotion to the Russian cause is a great danger. Thro'out the negotiations he & the Russian Min. have worked hand in hand. I suppose we cld. not avoid receiving him as a negotiator, but to play the game under such circs. is difficult. De Giers as it were is standing behind one's chair & signalling to Li the cards one holds & how they are going to be played. Prince Ching is a nobody. His only merit is that he distrusts Li. Chang Chih tung has [hates?] Li & the compliment is returned. Liu is a confirmed opium smoker.

Whether the Court will ever return is more than one can tell. For myself I think its establishment elsewhere wld. be better. Then there might be a fight betw. Russia & France on one side, Germany & Japan on the other for the possession of Chihli, and I wld. back the first pair in the long run. All I can say is that the outlook at present is more discouraging than ever, & I can foresee no termination to our negotiations. The private claims will be a mere fleabite in comparison with the war indemnities, & I begin to doubt whether the latter will not mount up to a sum beyond China's capacity to provide for.

Chirol of the "Times" is here, & Morrison the sender of inflammatory telegrams has gone away for a fortnight's change. I hope he will come back in a less exciteable mood.

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/12

Letter Book. Chinese mission. (23 March 1901 – April 28, 1902)

1. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking, 23 March 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Now that the Tientsin incident is happily at an end, ¹ I think I ought to say that in my opinion the action of the Mil. Auth. in commencing to construct a siding across the disputed ground without a previous written understanding with the Russians was extremely imprudent. There is no doubt in my mind that they were aware that the question had been referred to the Govts. for decision. That being the case I do not think they were justified in trying to carry out the proposed work, and I have told Genl. Barrow so.

Genl. Barrow ordered up fr. Takao part of a body of marines stationed at the fort we hold there. The commanding officer of the “Phoenix” telegd. to me to inquire whether this had been done at my request or thro’ the consul-general at Tientsin. I replied that they were ordered up by Genl. Barrow without my having been previously consulted. On the following day I recd. a teleg. fr. the “Phoenix” to say that the marines had been withdrawn, no special request having been recd. fr. myself or fr. the naval commander-in-chief. I have since told Genl. Barrow that the naval officer was in the right; that he must have been quite aware that he cld. not give orders to the marines at Taku, Ad. Seymour having distinctly declined some time back to put them at Genl. Campbell’s disposition. That the proper course would have been to consult me beforehand, & ask me to send a requisition to the senior naval officer at Taku; & I reminded him that I had some time back shown him my commission wch. empowers me to call on both naval & military officers for assistance; & that without such a commission even, the Minister in China can ask the naval authorities for assistance.

Genl. Barrow tried to take the view that by informing me of the orders he had sent he had in fact consulted me, but I replied that he had not even asked my opinion, & under the circs. [circumstances] I did not volunteer it.

The military men have a theory that any of H.M.’s forces on shore above high water mark are under their orders ipso facto, wch. seems rather an extraordinary proposition.

¹ See *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Peking (1900-06)*, Volume One, edited by Ian Ruxton, Lulu Press Inc., 2006, p. 99.

In all this Tientsin business general Barrow has acted independently, sending me only copies of his orders to Tientsin, & at first without consulting me. It was only after the Russians had made a demonstration by placing sentries that he came to ask my opinion. That was on the 15th [March – see diary, p.97], & he has kept me informed thro'-out of what he was doing, but only after his orders to move troops had been issued.

I am told he is going to India shortly to be Military Secretary, & that Col. Nixon will succeed him.

Perh. it wld. have been a good thing if the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding, General Barrow here] had been informed fr. home of the extent to wch. he shld. consult with me, for I imagine he knows nothing officially, except what I have told him of the contents of my commission. I have not seen any official notice even of my being appointed here, & I do not think I have been gazetted either as High Commissioner or as Minr.

2. Satow to Admiral Sir Edward Hobart Seymour

23.3.1901

My dear Sir Edward,

I have told Genl. Barrow that in my opinion he had no authority to order up the marines fr. Taku, & reminded him that you had declined to place them under Genl. Gaselee's orders¹, as the Genl. himself told me. That if he had consulted me beforehand, & I had thought it desirable to ask the senior naval officer to let them come, the latter wld., I did not doubt, have complied with a request from me.

Barrow told me on the evening of the 20th, as we were dining together at the Fr. Legn. that he had ordered up 100 marines & was sending down the New South Welshmen, on wch. I made no comment, but on the following morning I told him I thought he had no authority, to wch. he replied that he had telegd. to you.

Later I got a teleg. fr. the Phoenix inquiring whether the marines had been ordered up at my request or thro' the consul at Tientsin. I replied that Barrow had ordered them up without my having been previously consulted., & on the following day Phoenix telegd. that they had been withdrawn, as no special request had come fr. myself or fr. you. I told Genl. Barrow afterwds. that the Senior Officer at Taku had acted correctly.

The military men I am told have a theory that all HM's forces onshore above highwater mark are under their authority, which seems to me an extraordinary proposition.

¹ See Peking Diary, Volume One, p. 100.

Betw. you & me it was a stupid thing of the military people who have charge of the rlwy. at Tientsin to begin making a siding over ground the ownership of wch. is disputed betw. the Russians & the Railway, while the question is being discussed betw. the govts. Col. Macdonald & Mr. Kinder were certainly quite aware of all this.

I did not regard it as a dangerous affair, as I felt sure the 2 govts. wld. stop it; but there is a good deal of bad blood betw. ourselves & the Russians, & the Fr. troops at Tientsin have also displayed themselves in an unamiable light. The fact is there are too many soldiers of diff. [different] armies idling in that town, & I shall be very glad when they begin to go away.

Barrow is going to India as Military Secy. to the Govt., & his successor is expected shortly. He is certainly an able man, but we do not always pull together. In fact the line betw. what is purely military & what trenches on the political sphere has not been indicated to the G.O.C. by the home auth. They have never as far as I know informed the G.O.C. of my apptmt. & my position in regard to himself; & have never even made any public announcem[en]t as usual nor gazetted me either as High Commr. or as Minister; so that I have sometimes not known what to call myself.

y.v.t.

P.S. We are at loggerheads with the Chinese abt. compensation to the natives who are to be turned out of the legation quarter, we maintaining that the Chinese Govt. must indemnify them, the Chinese replying that it is for the Legations to do so. This wld. prove a costly business for some of the colleagues, not so for us, who have chiefly annexed govt. offices. Then we have a difficulty abt. the punish[men]t of officials in the provinces, who murdered missionaries & other foreigners. For more than a month past the Diplomatic Body have been writing to the Chinese Plenipos. that we were preparing a list to send in, and when it is finally ready behold the Russian Coll: [Baron Mikhail de Giers] by order of his govt. stating to us that he can take no part in any further demand for punish[men]t.¹ The Fr. minister [Stephen Pichon] is in a quandary, because he wishes on the one hand to work with Russia, on the other to protest the missions. The others wld. prob. be ready to join me in a Joint Note, if the Frenchman cld. act with us, but his govt. gives him no instructions. I hope that even without his aid it may be put thro. We are talking about indemnities, but the necessity of referring everything home causes much delay. They neither make up their

¹ See Satow's diary for March 12, 1901. (Ruxton, p. 96)

minds themselves nor leave the business to me.

E.S.

3. Satow to Francis Leveson Bertie

31 Mar. 1901

My dear Bertie,

Many thanks for the printed papers containing ideas of various people on commercial reforms & provision for the indemnities. I notice that my teleg. no. 26 has been greatly shortened, the amount I estimated from salt tax placed under foreign inspectorate having been omitted, besides my suggestion that import duties shld. be increased only in return for settle[men]t of likin¹ & other commercial questions.

Of course “twenty” years is a mistake in transmission. My teleg. said fifty years for the extinction of the debts. By this time you will have recd. the paraphrase & my memo. on the whole subject.

There is a good deal of force however in the contention of Mumm & Pichon that the proposal wld. leave it in the power of any creditor Govt. to put the screw on China separately, in the event of any failure to pay punctually. On the other hand the idea of a loan guaranteed by all the Powers seems likely to encounter Russian & American opposition. Pokotiloff before giving his ideas to the committee had conferred with de Giers, who told me they had conferred together.

y.v.t.

4. Satow to Lansdowne

8 April 1901

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

I trust that it will prove possible to settle the indemnities question without increasing import duties above 5 per cent, as then we shall have a lever in our hands for trying to get rid of likin and for obtaining various things we want, such as an international board of conservancy for S’hai river, reasonable inland navigation rules & if possible reduction or abolition of export duties.

Under the most favourable circs. I do not think the troops can be withdrawn before Septr.,

¹ Likin: 釐金 A Chinese provincial tax levied at many inland stations upon imports or articles in transit, introduced in 1851 and abolished in 1931. (Kojien).

but if the coast is then clear of other questions, I would suggest that I pass the winter at S'hai negotiating an arrangement of all commercial questions on the spot. I shld. of course visit Hgkg & exchange views with the Govr. & the leading merchants there.

Of course the Chinese Govt. wld. have to app[oin]t a plenip. [plenipotentiary] & it wld. be well if some competent man were joined with me on our side. Geo. Jamieson for choice, if he wld. throw over his Pekin syndicate, & failing him Brenan. I shld. have the assistance of J.W. Jamieson the commercial attaché. The advantage of negotiating at S'hai wld. be that I shld. be freed fr. the necessity of discussing Inland navigation or similar questions with Hart, who is an old obstructive.

Mumm in talking about the commercial revision a few days ago ¹ said that he thought his govt. wld. be quite willing to leave the negotiations in our hands, as they could be certain of getting all the facilities they desire by means of the m.f.n. clause, & what contents us wld. be satisfactory to them.

Perh. the Japse. might like to join in the negotiation, & I do not know that I shld. object to that, for they are a practical people, but on the other hand very obstinate & having no spirit of compromise. In any case, the fewer the negotiators the better is the lesson our Peking negotiations [over the Boxer Protocol] teach.

It is perh. a sanguine view to take of the immediate future, & my only object in writing abt. it now is to put my ideas before you in time. Negotiating at S'hai wld. have the further advantage that I shld. be in touch with the friendly viceroys, & be able to consult their views. Recent events seem to have shown that the political centre of gravity is not here, but on the Yangtze [river] & down south.

5. Satow to Cockerell (summary only)

April 9.

To Cockerell about consular promotions.

6. Satow to Bertie

11 April 1901

My dear Bertie,

I am afraid the claims of the various Powers & of their people are not likely to be quite honest, but what can be expected under the circs. ?

¹ See diary for March 31, 1901 (Ruxton 2006, Vol. One, p. 101).

Here we hoped that the govts. wld. have put their heads together, & agreed to the principles on wch. war claims should be estimated. But that does not seem to have been done, & the result is Germany including in her bill medals she is going to distribute & pensions to widows & orphans of soldiers, Japan asking for naval expenditure, Japan do [ditto]. Our expenditure is glaringly moderate, for we only charge £120,000 a month after April 1, while the Japanese who have far less men in the country talk of £200,000.

What good the German & French forces have done that were landed here after the relief of the Legations is difficult to see. Far too many soldiers are crowded together at Tientsin, and the result is much bad blood & incidents of disgraceful violence.

As to private claims being examined by a joint committee fr. the legations, or even being laid before the diplomatic body for approval, the reluctance of most is easily explained. Some of our colls: were burnt out, & they would not like their personal claims to be scrutinized, or even the totals known. e.g. You had telegd. to me objecting to “loyers payés d’avance et non utilisés par suite des événements”. Now Pichon had taken a house for the summer at Peitaiho, and paid rent for it. But, as he could not go there, he wants his money back, & he is much interested in the maintenance of this category of losses amongst those wch. are admitted. The Austrian, Italian, Belgian and Dutch colleagues lost all their personal property, and so did the members of their legations. Were they fit and proper persons to determine what kinds of losses shld. be admitted, and what values shld. be allowed? And willing [sic. will?] they be willing to state to their colls: what they have allowed themselves? They wld. be unlike most people if they were willing to let us criticize their bills.

Even in our own legation what seems to me exorbitant claims on account of illness have been put down, & relatives of those who lost their lives have asked for compensation. I shld. not quite like to let my colls: see these.

Notwithstanding the snub I recd. for suggesting the apptmt. of a few lawyers fr. neutral countries to examine private claims, and for supporting the suggestion of Russia & the U.S. to have recourse to the Hague tribunal for the govt. claims, I believe that my ideas on these two points will be justified by the event.

How sick you must be of China and of negotiations conducted in a manner for which, I imagine, there can be few precedents in the history of diplomacy.

E.S.

7. Satow to Cockerell

26 April 1901

My dear Cockerell,

I think I told you in my letter of the 9th that Michie Fraser is as mad as a March hare, & that I had given him leave to go home; he said he wanted to retire, but I told him to arrange that at the F.O.; I trust no difficulty would be made.

Tower writes to me that Savage has been laid up with fever, & ought to go on leave. He recommends the temporary combination of Pakhoi with Kiung-chow (Hoihow), both places having very little [consular] work, & on the map they seem pretty handy to each other. At Pakhoi moreover there is an intelligent constable.

Both places are horribly out of the world & a prolonged residence in either must be bad for any man's morale.

I believe little Ker, the Asst. Chinese Sec[retar]y here is ambitious of being made consul at Pakhoi, & perh. he might do for such a post. Intellectually he is a child, writes a bad hand & his only virtue is that he knows some Chinese. But he is quite inadequate for the post of Asst. Chinese Secy.¹ For that one wants a man of some character & ability, and I hope to bring up young Mayers in the autumn.

With [C.W.] Campbell as Chinese Secy. I hope to do well, & as he is already a Consul at £800 a year, I shall hope to get him put on the same scale as Cockburn, i.e. rising by £20 a year to £1000, so that there need be no grumbling at his not being sent to a better paid consulate or consulate-general. It is not merely the pay, but the pecuniary value set on a man's service, & also the prospective pension that men look at.

I shall no doubt have the proverb ab[ou]t the "new broom" applied to me², but if the broom does not sweep while it is new, it will soon cease to do any sweeping at all.

Peking is looking its best now with all the trees in new leaf & roses in blossom; but what a horrible place to live in under present circs.

E.S.

¹ But see below, PRO 30/33 14/15, no. 25, Satow to Cartwright, December 15, 1904 and footnote.

² "A new broom sweeps clean."

8. Satow to Lansdowne

[No date given]

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The defeat of de Giers & Li [Hung-chang] over the Manchurian Convention, wch. was to have given Russia a footing in Manchuria & a good deal more, does not seem to have impaired their friendship, for one can see that Li informs de Giers of all that is said to him by other foreign repres[entati]ves, & tells him all that he hears from the Court. On the other hand I do not doubt that de Giers reports to Li the doings at meetings of the diplomatic body. At the same time I think we have gained something from the Southern viceroys by our friendly counsels, and the fact that the threats uttered by de Giers have come to naught, just as we predicted to them.

There seems to be a disposition on the part of the Russian & French ministers [de Giers and Pichon] to fall in with the proposal not to insist on wringing the last farthing from China, but the German and Italian [Salvago] still talk as if they would not abate a single stiver.¹ The German [Mumm] & Austrian [Czikann] assure me that increasing the customs duties to 10% wld. not injure trade, & the latter argues that merchants are unreasonable. That may be, I tell him, but they can make a great deal of clamour.

The colls: [diplomatic colleagues] who were here during the Siege [of the legations] are greatly annoyed by a teleg. fr. here wch. said the Russian & Spaniard said everyone ought to have been replaced immediately after the relief. As the Italian puts it, those who have fed on mule & horse cannot possibly look at things in the same light as those who are ignorant of the flavour of that kind of food; & either all ought to have left, or none changed. There is a good deal in that; also I find it quite difficult to take the same view of rules of compensation as those who were burnt out by the Boxers.

As to the proposal to guarantee an indemnity loan, I feel pretty certain that the Fr. & German colls: have recd. a hint to advocate it, & that de Giers has let Li know. In fact most of my colls: seem to tell Li how generous their respective Govts. desire to be: even Rockhill² could not resist the temptation of imparting to Li the United States idea of

¹ stiver: a nickel coin used in the Netherlands, worth 1/20th of a guilder.

² William Woodville Rockhill (1854-1914). American diplomat, scholar and explorer. Trained at École Spéciale militaire de St. Cyr, entered the French Foreign Legion in 1873. During his St. Cyr days he read about Tibet and became fascinated by the country. Second Secretary at U.S. legation in Peking, 1884. Secretary, 1885. Acting Chargé d’Affaires in Korea, December 1886 – April 1887. Led expeditions to Tibet sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution, which published his *Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet 1891-92* in 1894. In April 1900 he married Miss Edith Howell Perkins. Appointed

cutting down the total demand to 40,000,000. That proposal is however dead & gone. I have great doubts abt. being able to persuade the colleagues to adopt the figure of 50,000,000, wch. practically means a reduction of $\frac{1}{3}$, & I fear the choice lies betw. increasing the customs duties to 10% or a guaranteed loan, with all its consequences.

The U.S. Govt. have sent Rockhill a series of suggestions as to the revision of the commercial treaties, some reasonable, others utopian. One insidious proposal of theirs is that the principal commercial powers shld. exercise some sort of supervision over the Maritime Customs. The idea of selecting a few as “principal Commercial powers” is quite impracticable, and every one of them would insist on having a voice. It cannot be fairly alleged that Sir R. Hart’s administration has been pro-English. He is much more disposed to listen to, for instance, a Russian suggestion than an English one.

If we do not manage to clear out of this before the autumn our difficulties will certainly increase. The Germans are the principal difficulty in the way of withdrawal. They sent far more troops than were at all necessary, and they want to have some ‘fun for their money’. The Fr[ench] are by no means inclined to stay on, if others w[ou]ld go. I am very glad that General Gaselee has been allowed to make a reduction, but I think we had better not withdraw fr. S’hai [Shanghai 上海] until [the Gulf of] Pechili is evacuated.

The proposal to tack on to the evacuation of Peking a demand for the Court’s starting homewards seems to me very objectionable. We have already enumerated Arts. 2 & 10 of the Joint Note & the acceptance of our indemnity demands as the previous condition of evacuation, and we ought not to add a 4th condition. Especially this one. What we are doing here in the way of organizing legation defences & maintaining possession of the r[ai]lway communications is already quite enough to make the Court reluctant, & if we insist on their return they will suspect a trap. Besides, it would in my opinion be highly unwise to impose a condition the non-fulfilment of wch. wld. commit us to an indefinite prolongation of the occupation. At the same time I still incline to the opinion that the return of the Court [from Xian] wld. not be to our advantage, & I believe many men who understand eastern ways of thinking are of opinion that they will not come. Opposed to this however is the undoubted fact that the Court continue to talk as if they intended to return. In any case, I do not see that it is desirable for the Powers to express solicitude on this point.

I am told that the discussion as to Manchuria is deferred to the autumn, when Li will

Special Commissioner and Plenipotentiary to China, he signed the Peace protocol at Peking on September 7, 1901.

help the Russians to get all they want & this will be the quid pro quo for a guaranteed loan.

y.v.f.

9. Satow to Eric Barrington

26. April /01

My dr. Barrington,

I had been hoping I shld. hear you had sent me an additional 2nd Secy., or a 3rd Secy. on promotion, but as no teleg. has come I suppose you can't give me one. Now that all the important work of the Legation is done by teleg. one feels the want of skilled cypherers & still more decypherers greatly, for passed student interpreters who join the chancery have not the necessary experience or aptitude for guessing at the meaning of a wrong group. I assure you I wld. not write more if I had an additional man.

I expect [C.W.] Campbell here in a day or two to be acting Chinese Secy., & then Jamieson will go off to the South to interview Viceroy's abt. commercial & indemnity questions. He has worked capitally during the past six months since [H.] Cockburn went home & I shall annex him again when this mission of his is over.

E.S.

10. Satow to Lansdowne

26 April 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

With regard to the question of app[ointin]g a Commander in chief for the force that will be left behind, when evacuation takes place, to hold the lines of communication, I learn on the best authority that both the Italians & Jap[ane]se are so disgusted with the way in wch. they have been treated that they openly express the hope that they will never be placed again under a German C[ommander]-in-Ch[ief]. What Genl. Gaselee's opinion is you have no doubt been informed. The other day when the expedition to Huolu to drive back the Chinese into Shansi was ordered by Count Waldersee ¹, no information whatever was vouchsafed to either British, Italian or German Com[mande]rs & they are excessively annoyed. I have little doubt that this feeling will create great difficulty with regard to the appt. [appointment] of a C. in Ch. after Count Waldersee goes.

The Field marshal [Waldersee] has been much upset by the burning of his headquarters

¹ See Satow's diary entry for February 19, 1901 (Ruxton, 2006, Volume One, pp. 90-91).

& the death of his chief of the Staff ¹, & is very anxious to leave China.

y.v.f. [Yours very faithfully]

11. Satow to Lansdowne

10 May 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

We seem to be making some progress now, as the various questions are on the point of being settled, except that of the manner in wch. the indemnity loan is to be raised. That I suppose will be settled by the Powers at home. Betw. a guaranteed loan & my proposal for payment by instalments spread over a series of years there does not seem to be much practical difference. It will be some days before we get the answer of the Chinese Plenipos. [Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung-chang], but I have little doubt that they will plead poverty & offer ab[ou]t £2,000,000 a year; & then we shall have to address ourselves to the question of reducing our demand. The most serious opposition to this will come fr. my Germ. coll. [Mumm] I imagine.

The Germs. do not appear to have made any arrangements for sending home any of their troops. Waldersee personally wants to go, & our own soldiers are anxious to leave, for this occupation of Chihli is no amusement to them. But if the Germans stop [i.e. remain, stay], I suppose we ought to also. Their idea seems to be that the Provisional Govt. of Tientsin shld. continue, for a long time to come.

The Fr. withdrawal of troops has I suppose been arranged with the Russians. It seems however that they will leave a battalion or so at Paotingfu to protect the Belgian railway. ² This has been brought in to the city of Peking, but I hear they will be ready to take up the rails inside the walls if the Chinese give them a quid pro quo. It wld. prob. be a concession for a line viâ Tungchou direct to Shanhaikwan.

Our rlwy. seems likely to prove a white elephant to us if we have to keep troops here to guard it, in excess of those contributed by the other PP [Powers] for keeping open the line of communications to the sea.

I hear the Empress Dowager recently sent a favourite eunuch here to find out whether Peking could be made habitable for her again, & that he has just started back to Hsian [Xian 西安] with a favourable report. The story goes that she has a treasure in gold bars hidden in

¹ General von Schwarzhoff lost his life trying to save his pet dog in the fire on the night of April 16-17, 1901. (Diary, Ruxton, 2006, Volume One, p. 104).

² This was first noted in Satow's diary for May 9, 1901. (Ruxton, 2006, Volume One, p. 108)

a part of the Palace, the guard of wch. has today been transferred to us by the Americans, who are leaving.¹ It is estimated at something betw. £1½ millions & £4½ [millions]. I suggested that the transfer shld. take place in the presence of Prince Su, who is supposed to be in charge of the place. Neither the Americans nor we wish to run the risk of being accused of having looted this treasure afterwards. No doubt the Empress Dowager wld. like to come back & dig it up. I incline to think the Court will finally return here, but certainly not until the city is evacuated; so perhaps not for another twelve months. It is said that the Emperor will not return if we insist on the suspension of the metropolitan examinations, but perh. they can be transferred to Nanking. At any rate, as the suspension for five years in all places where foreigners were murdered or cruelly treated has been agreed to, I do not see how we cld. allow any to be held in Peking.

12. Satow to Lansdowne

20 May 01

Dr. Lord Lansdowne,

I am very much obliged for your letter of April 9, for to know your views on the points mentioned in it is most helpful to me.

The new Fr. Min. Beau is much more a supporter of de Giers than Pichon was, & seems a more able man, tho' not so fluent with his pen. He finds the discursive manner in wch. the Dipl. Body discuss questions very unbusiness like, & has usefully called them to order once or twice when they strayed fr. the point. The Russian coll: has long ago become friends again with Li & helps him in every possible way.

The suspension of official exams in places where foreigners had been murdered or maltreated was in my humble opinion an excellent proposal fr. many points of view, but especially as bringing home to the whole lettered class the enormities of wch. the govt. was guilty & the punish[men]t wch. followed. By suspending them for five years in Peking, we cause the whole of China to know now & to remember for many years to come the fact that Peking has been occupied a year or more by foreign armies. We are always told in this country that the effect of our military operations of 1860 has been confined to the localities & forgotten in a year or two. We hoped to prevent it on this occasion. Of course the suspension of the doctorate examinations, for wch. candidates gather together fr. all parts of

¹ Satow's diary entry reads: "Change of guard over the Tai-miao took place, Prince Su having been present."

the country, is very disagreeable for the Chin[ese] Govt. as it emphasizes their humiliation. But that is what they need most. Li has been making great efforts to induce us to allow the exams. to take place in Peking, & up to Pichon's departure the Fr. & Russian Mins. agreed in refusing; but now they are taking a diff[eren]t line, & we shall have trouble. But on this point I have hitherto had the hearty support of Rockhill, wch. is a great thing considering how the U.S. likes to pose as the friend of Asiatic races oppressed by Europe.

Betw. Rockhill & his proposal to reduce the indemnity to £40,000,000 on the one hand, & Mumm with his desire to extract every penny of expenditure fr. China on the other, I have been trying to effect a compromise. I quite understand Mumm's teleg[raphin]g home that I was the chief obstacle in the way of negotiations, because I refused to accept 450 million taels as the total. But I have always been quite open with him abt. the instructions I recd., & he is equally free with his observations, as for instance that the Br. Govt. only talked of a reduction in order to frighten Germany away fr. the 10% duty. What I have endeavoured to do has been to get Rockhill to accept the 450 millions as an effective reduction, & to induce Mumm to accept it definitely as a maximum. If I were successful in this the Germans might begin to reduce their unnecessarily large force. I am told they talk of sending two battalions shortly to Kiaochou, wch. is not much certainly. The Fr. talk about withdrawing 8000 or 9000 men has dwindled down to the number that can be removed in one transport wch. they have at Taku. Genl. Gaselee seems to think that we cannot hope to reduce our force much before Oct. 1. I am doing all I can to expedite matters, but with the encouragement that de Giers & Beau give to the Chinese to hold out as regards examinations & other points in Arts I & X, it is not easy. We shall have difficulty also about getting the Chinese to adopt a reasonable Court ceremonial. They detest the idea of having to admit that foreign sovereign nations are on an equality with them & wld. I feel convinced readily pay us another hundred million taels or so rather than give way.

On the subj[ect] of the indemnities I have duly consulted the Yangtze viceroys, first thro' Fraser & Sundius, & lately thro' Jamieson the commercial attaché. But the result seems to show that they have no practicable suggestions to offer us. It was due to them that they shld. be informed of our ideas, & no doubt they are pleased at it. Ad[miral] Seymour will prob. go up the Yangtze to say goodbye to them before leaving the [China] station, wch. I have no doubt will be an excellent political move.

E.S.

13. Satow to Bertie

24 May 1901

My dear Bertie,

I am not certain whether it was intended that I shld., in talking of 5% ad valorem duties, insist on their being collected with[?] Russian & Fr. overland traffic, but I put it into a little memo. shown to the colls: [colleagues] based on Lord Lansdowne's teleg. No. 148 of 11 May, & emphasized it in the Plenum, much to de Giers' disgust, who said it interfered with the sanctity of Treaties. That enabled me to respond that his proposal to raise the import duties to 10% likewise was contrary to our Treaties. My proposal, I said, was intended as 'un appel à la justice' [an appeal to justice] & I was quite contented with his response to my appeal. I shall be curious to see how this passage is given in the procès-verbal when it is circulated.

I went to him the other day abt. Bullard's proposal that the Gt. Northern & Eastern Extension Co. shld. have permanent control over the land lines fr. Taku to Peking. He said he had expected some proposal of the kind & had bluffed off the repres[entati]ves of the companies. I said he was quite right; for giving over to foreigners the internal communications of a country, such as railways &c. was to sacrifice its territorial integrity. He said he could not admit this with regard to the railways, but was manifestly so in the case of telegs. & there he fully agreed with me as to the pernicious results. He is delicious.[?]

I think de Giers & Beau are less anxious now to insist of a 10% tariff.

E.S.

14. Satow to Sanderson (précis)

7 June.

To Sanderson, suggesting Lt. Col. C.H. Powell as future military attaché.

15. Satow to Lansdowne

8 June 1901

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

A curious story was told me the other day by a Germ. officer ¹ who has just come back fr. Japan. The Japse. Govt. some time back were very desirous of receiving Ct. v. Waldersee c.

¹ Satow visited the German legation on June 3, 1901 on the day Waldersee left Peking. (diary)

great honours & intended to give him the grand cordon of the highest Japse. order. But since Ct. v. Bülow's speech abt. Manchuria, their enthusiasm has greatly abated & they are going to offer him a grand cordon of an inferior order instead.

C. v. Waldersee left on the 3rd. It was expected that he wld. leave behind him a sort of military testament, by wch. the allied generals shld. be guided, but Mumm tells me he did not. The generals therefore have to get on as well as they can together. Fr[om] one point of view his going is not to be regretted, as he was rather given to negotiating with the Chinese over the heads of the diplomatists, doubtless more or less in concert with Mumm. This was particularly shown last Jan[uar]y when the jurisdiction of the Tientsin Provl. Govt. was extended. None of the FMM. [Foreign Ministers] were told what was being done, except Mumm, & he kept it to himself.

The Chinese are aware that we are going to evacuate, & that gives them encouragement to hold out abt. the provincial punish[men]ts & the exams. I have tried hard to get the colls: to support me in insisting on these 2 pts, but of course cannot get any assistance fr. de Giers & but little fr. Beau. On the questions of reform of the O. of F.A. [Office of Foreign Affairs] & of the ceremonial in use when F.MM. are recd. we cannot get the Chinese to agree to our demands.

I fear I shall be forced to give way abt. the metropolitan exams. being held in Peking. To content [Yangtze viceroys] Chang Cht [Chih-tung] & Liu Ky [Kunyi] I have replied to them that personally I will not oppose their proposal to transfer the provincial exams fr. Peking (Shun Tien fu) & T'ai yuanfu to the provinces of Shantung & Honan respectively, & am telling them that the Peking metropolitan exams. ought also to be transferred elsewhere. Li [Hung-chang], it is true, has said to me that the Emp[ero]r would not come back to Peking unless the exams. were allowed to be held here, but I do not believe him. If the other things we are doing, such as bringing 2000 men here as legn. guards, bringing the Hankow & Tientsin rlwys right into the city close to the principal gate of the Tartar city, the demolition of the forts & holding the rlwy. fr. here to Shanhaikwan do not keep him away, the suspension of the metrop. exams. is not likely to either. In any case, to show myself "difficult" abt. this matter enables me to get other things. I have got an order for the release of an important employé of the Peking Syndicate who 3 yrs. ago was unjustly sentenced to life-long imprisonment in a distant province.

I am also holding out abt. the demolition of the wall of an outer court of the Forbidden City, opposite to our north legation wall, fr. wch. a rifle fire was kept up on the legation

during the siege, in hopes of getting something in exchange for finally giving way, as I intend to do. With the Chinese there is a great deal to be done by bargaining. In political matters they will bargain like a 2nd hand dealer.

16. Satow to Bertie

Peking

9.6.01

My dear Bertie,

I accidentally learnt today fr. [General Sir George] Barrow that Genl. [Sir Alfred] Gaselee had written a letter of wch. I am sending a copy by this bag, discussing all sorts of questions connected with the evacuation of Peking. I at once expressed my surprise that such a thing shld. have been done without my being consulted or informed beforehand of what was contemplated, & this drew a copy fr. Headquarters.

I do not believe Sir A. Gaselee wld. have done this of himself, but it is of a piece with all Genl. Barrow's proceedings. As I have said before [see letter 1 above], that row at Tientsin arose because B. did not consult me beforehand.

Indian officers when on expeditions here are I believe accompanied by a "political", who gives them advice, & Gen. Gaselee rather naively informed me the other day that he thought that an excellent arrangement. It is quite possible that everything might have been settled here more speedily if there had been no diplomatists in Peking, but as we are here, & as long as we represent our govts. we ought not to be ignored altogether. I fancy the soldiers think we are the intruders, & that we have no business here, but that is the affair of our govts.

y.v.t.

17. Satow to Bertie

21 June 1901

My dear Bertie,

When de Giers first proposed an eventual 10% on imports as a reserve in case China did not produce enough fr. the salt & other sources. I regarded it as a mere way of covering his retreat, and as I told him at the time he first mentioned it that I must make all my reserves, and repeated that in the meeting of the 11th inst., I thought my formula w[oul]d prove sufficient; namely that the 10% could never be given unless we got what we had mentioned

in connexion with Art. XI of the Joint Note. However when he heard my declaration of the day before yesterday he professed to be very much surprised. ¹ I doubt greatly whether he put that proviso in under instructions. But we shall see. In any case I feel that I can go on refusing to have anything to do with 10% unless likin [tax] is abolished, & as Russia, France & Germany are more interested in the indemnity question being settled than we are they will have to come round to our terms.

But fr. all I hear and read 10% on imports will not compensate for likin. Perh. a way will open hereafter. As far as I can understand at present likin must be abolished root and branch, or not touched at all, as Brenan's letter I sent home by last bag seems to demonstrate.

It really seems certain that the Court is coming back this autumn.

When Ct. Waldersee went off he seems to have said to himself "après moi le déluge." Every commander does as he thinks right in his own eyes, without consulting the other, & an attempt of mine to induce the colls: to confer with the generals abt. evacuating Peking has proved a failure.

y.v.t.

18. Satow to Sanderson

21 6 1901

My dear Sanderson,

You know how often it has been said that this Legn. was not well informed as to what was going on, & that it had no secret service. It seems to me quite natural that it shld. be so. The Chinese Secy. is fully occupied with translations of Notes & interviewing people. He cannot go abt. picking up information, nor can his Assistant, & Chinese will not come to the Leg[atio]n. In future they will be less willing, when they will be visible to everyone as they cross the 150 mètres of glaci[s]!

I think I have found a man who will be useful in getting an insight into what is going on; this is a Dr. Gatrell, who has acted as interpreter to Genl. Gaselee for the past nine mos. [months]. He speaks Pekingese fluently, and has plenty of acquaintances. I propose to give him about £30 a month, & odd sums now and then for special purposes. ² He will ostensibly carry on a hospital started by our police commissioner in the Chinese city &

¹ See diary for June 19, 1901 (Ruxton, 2006, Volume One, p. 118).

² " Dr. Thos. J.N. Gatrell came and we agreed that when Genl. Gaselee goes he should be engaged by me for intelligence purposes at about \$350 a month, and extras for people employed by him to get information." (Diary, June 10, 1901. Ruxton, Volume One, p. 116)

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towards that I shall give something. The arrangement will only begin after Genl. Gaselee's departure, & of course its continuance will depend on the results. I hope you will approve.

When J.W. Jamieson was here he used to furnish me with items of news, wch. generally turned out false. We got a little thro' the compradore of the Hgkg & S'hai Bank & thro' E.G. Hillier, but it is well to have 2 strings to one's bow. [George Ernest] Morrison has given us good information, & it was fr. him that we first heard abt. the Manchurian business. The other newspaper correspondents are beneath contempt. It was one of them that started the cock & bull story of my having been insulted by Germ. soldiers. Unluckily one does not hear of these things until weeks after the mischief has been done.

y.v.s.

19. Satow to Lansdowne

22 June 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I hope some way may be found of making up to Japan the loss she wld. incur by taking 4% bonds at par. It may justly be said that her promptitude in sending troops to North China saved the situation, just as one may fairly say that but for the British-Indian & Japse. contingents, the inmates of the Legations wld. almost certainly have been starved out before the arrival of the relieving col[umn]s.

I have always been hoping that all the Powers wld. agree to 450 millions of taels as the actual limit of the collective demand on China. For then, if the total of the claims put for[war]d by the respective powers exceeded that sum, each wld. have to be reduced in proportion, & then wld. arise perh. a necessity recognized by all for submitting both public & private claims to some kind of revision.

It is now more than 3 wks. since we recd. the note of the Chinese Plenipos. recognizing the necessity of paying interest, & owing to the refusal of Russia & France to agree to that sum we are unable to proceed any further in the negotiations.

But if they can afford to delay, I suppose we can also.

The real explanation of the correspce. abt. admitting Chinese troops at once into Peking for[warde]d in my desp[atch] no. 221 I believe to be this. Li Hung chang wrote to Li H. Ch.[?] abt. an eventual evacuation of Peking, wch. he made haste to interpret into an immediate offer of evacuation. This impression was confirmed by Genl. Gaselee's similar letter to Li. The latter sent one of his confidential men to me to say that it had been

arranged with the Japse. that 3200 men were to be admitted into their quarter, at wch. I expressed my surprise. Then the Fr. Min. [Beau] came to me [on June 17th – see diary] & said he had conversed with Li on the subject & had asked him to draft a proclamation declaring that henceforth Chinese & foreigners were to live at peace, as the troops were leaving. Then I thought it was getting time to speak, so I called a meeting of colls: on the 18th at wch. Li's letter to me of the previous day was discussed, & an ans. [answer] framed to the effect that the Chinese troops must stay where they were for the present, & this was adopted by the whole dipl. body on the 19th.

If we had allowed so large a body of troops inside Peking, we shld. have given up all means of exercising pressure on the Chinese, & I did not see the desirability of doing this before the last moment.

I am told that before he went away Count Waldersee dissolved the military committee that presided over the police arrangements of the city, so that every g.o.c. [General Officer Commanding] was left to act on his own initiative, & the Fr. & Japse. colls: for purposes of their own began to make independent arrangements, the former doubtless in pursuit of a Franco-Russian policy, the latter out of pure unsuspectingness. But I hope they are now brought into line again for the moment.

I have been reading the Russian manifesto enclosed in [British ambassador to Moscow] Sir Ch[arles] Scott's desp[atch] no. 100. It is full of gross misrepresentations. It attributes to the Germ. Minr. [Mumm] the proposal to erect expiatory monuments in the desecrated cemeteries, wch. really came fr. the Fr. [French] side. Neither that nor either of the Germ. demands abt. Baron v. Ketteler [the German Minister killed by the Boxers] caused a moment's delay. But the Russian refusal to join in demanding the punish[men]t of the murderers of missionaries caused at least six weeks' time to be lost & his taking the Chinese side abt. the suspension of examinations caused another delay. The delay in settling the indemnity is due to the Russian attempt to get the interest paid out of an increased duty on imports, to wch. they wld. contribute nothing. And their attempt to conclude a separate arrangement abt. Manchuria completely stopped negotiations until it was finally upset.

De Giers is waging war against the Tientsin Provisional Govt [T.P.G.]. Next time he mentions it I shall be tempted to point out that there is the provisional Russian Govt. of Newchuang first to be set aside, as it is older & came into existence with much less justification, for the Chinese never attacked foreigners at that port.¹

¹ The rest of the letter has apparently been crossed out by Satow, and presumably was not included in the

E.S.

20. Satow to Lansdowne

6 July 1901

Dr. Lord Lansdowne,

Two questions abt. wch. my Russian coll: [De Giers] seems disposed to make trouble for us are the continuance of the Tientsin Provl. Govt. & our administering the rlwy. As regards the former I expressed in a desp. not long ago my concurrence with Ct. Waldersee's view that it shld. be maintained for some time to come.

The rlwy. is more important to us, as it is the security for over £2,000,000 of British money. Vis-à-vis my colls. [colleagues] I say that we administer it as the mandatories of the PP [Powers] who contribute troops for the maintenance of free communications betw. Peking & the sea, & that it has been entrusted to us in preference to any other P[ower] because of our material interests in it. I certainly think we ought to continue to administer it, as long as troops have to be kept in Chihli to guard the line of communications, wch. in fact consists of the rlwy.

Chang, the former Director-General, has given up the seals of office, & I have hopes that our old friend Hu may be reapp[oin]t[e]d. I think the English Military Director ought to pay the surplus over working expenses to the Chinese Govt. to meet the interest on the loan, & not to employ it, as he is at present doing, on the construction of the T'ung-chou extension.

Genl. Gaselee thinks we might perh. hand over the rlwy. to the Chinese administration next spring, if things are quiet, & this wld. enable us to withdraw the troops kept at each station as rlwy. police, while maintaining those at Lutai & Tongshan for the protection of communications. We sh[ou]ld have to get the consent of the other PP. to this, of course.

He is opposed to a policy of locking up troops in North China merely to protect the interests of the bondholders for an indefinite period, & I entirely agree with his view.

Of course, if we consent to give back the rlwy. it must be voluntarily, & at our own convenience, & I ought to say to de Giers that we may be led & not driven.

letter actually sent to Lord Lansdowne, though it is legible and reads as follows: "...& the place [Newchuang] was taken possession of without provocation.

I hope I am not unduly anti-Russian, but they are the most crooked people I have ever had to deal with. People say they are constitutionally lazy; perh. that is why they so seldom take the trouble to tell the truth."

If it is true that [P.M.] Lessar is to succeed him, perh. we may revive the idea of a general modus vivendi with Russia wch. in my humble opinion was so unfortunately frustrated by the Newchuang rlwy loan scheme, in wch. as it wld. seem fr. Li's remarks I sent home in a desp. some time ago, we were made a catspaw of [i.e. used as a tool] by China & the political banker Mr. Hillier of Peking.

Li tells me the Emperor is to return here by rail, & he wants the Diplomatic Body to receive him at the Station. It wld. be a dramatic event, the besieged diplomats as it were readmitting him to the capital fr. which the Foreign Powers had driven him.

21. Satow to Lansdowne

6 July 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Li told me a day or two ago that he had recd. a teleg. fr. [the Chinese minister in London] Lo Fèngluh reporting that the coronation of the King & Queen was to take place next June, & said that the Emperor wld. wish to send an embassy. I told him [on July 4, 1901 – see diary] that the crowned heads of Europe wld. be represented by princes of royal and imperial blood.

I have made the acquaintance of Prince Ch'un,¹ who is going to Berlin to apologize for the assassination of Baron v. Ketteler, & of 2 of his y[ounge]r bro[ther]s. One of these who is abt. 17 yrs. of age wld. do very well; he is well-grown & has plenty to say for himself & has a pleasant manner.

There is also prince Su, not so nearly connected with the Imperial family, whose house & grounds were lent for the defence of the legations last year. He is abt. 40, very talkative & cheerful, short & fat, not such a good manner as the other prince.

I have been careful not to express any ideas of my own to Li, & merely told him I wld. write & ask privately what the King wld. wish.

The name by wch. the young prince goes is Duke Hsün. Like Prince Ch'un, he is a brother of the Emperor.

¹ See diary for June 27th and for the return visit by Satow see July 3, 1901. On June 27th Satow wrote: "The little prince did not seem very intelligent, but one cannot expect much."

22. Satow to Bertie

6 July 1901

My dr. Bertie,

[H.P.] Wilkinson arrd. abt. a fortnight ago [on June 24 – see diary] & is working hard at the claims [arising from the Boxer rebellion]. He will hardly get thro' them for another 3 mos. I do not know what progress has been made by the other legations, but some of them will not be ready before we are, & even if they are will of course hold back their figures till we give ours.

That being the case we cannot tell whether there will be any margin out of wch. the Japse. claim for an extra quantity of bonds can be satisfied, for some time to come.

I tried [on July 4th – see diary] to dissuade [the Japanese minister] Komura [Jutarō] fr[om] bringing it for[war]d at this juncture, but he was obstinate, after the manner of his race.

It seems to me urgent however to fix definitely the total claim on China at 450,000,000 taels, for that is really the starting point. But de Giers still holds out, because of this Japanese claim having been put ford. & so does Beau. Both of them I believe have authority to accept in their pockets.

Fr. the telegs. to Berlin wch. have been repeated to me I gather that you have agreed to 1% sinking fund to begin 3 yrs. fr. the date of issue of the bonds. That will mean that China must find 22½ million taels besides what is needed for the existing guaranteed loans, & that too in the year (1905) in wch. her payts. on that account are the highest. Either of the schemes we have tried our hands at here wld. press lighter on her.

I have looked on these various plans of amortization, some of wch. I have not thought worth troubling you with, rather as academical exercises in arithmetic. Mumm has busied himself exclusively with their production, first for the benefit of the committee on indemnities, & then for submission to the Plenum, but I have not committed you to any of them. He has frankly told me that he has disregarded the wishes of his govt., who seem on the whole to have left him a free hand. Of course the notion of “series” was an absurd one, & when one comes to look [at] it, it was nothing more than a desire for facilitating calculation. None of the other colls: have taken any interest in the matter, or have offered any criticisms.

I have tried in my telegs. to make it clear that the Br. & Chin. Corpn. are not the repres[entati]ves of the bondholders, but if the latter cannot be got together to appoint one

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(& that seems rather a difficult thing to manage), H.M.G. must step into the breach & instruct me to app[oin]t someone preferably [Edmond] Cousins, to undertake the job. I have discussed this matter with H.P. Wilkinson, after inspecting a bond, & he agrees c. me as to the legal aspect. The bond is a contract betw. the Chin. Govt. & the bondholder, & as long as the interest is punctually paid, the latter has no ground for complaint. I happen to know that the Br. & Chin. Corpn. have got an opinion fr. their own lawyers to this effect.

The plan by Turkey wch. I am sending to you today shows a very irregular boundary betw. the rlwy. land & the Russian concession. It wld. be convenient for both parties that this shld. be drawn straight.

Part of the disputed vill[age] about 1/10 in area is still private property of Chinese holders, & prob. a compromise on this pt. also may be necessary with the Russians.

As to evidence I do not think that anyone can furnish more than I have gathered fr. various quarters. [Railway engineer Claude William] Kinder has none to give, & he is not capable of forming a correct estimate of what others produce.

I find the commercial attaché rather a nuisance. He has been meddling with the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce's scheme for the improvement of the river, wch. has been generally approved by H.M.G. & suggested to Bredon the production of a pamphlet agst. it, wch. is likely to do mischief. He has done this contrary to my instructions, wch. expressly excepted this fr. subjects he was to busy himself abt. He seems an indiscreet man & to have an exaggerated belief in the importance of his functions. He certainly was not the best choice for the post. E.S.

23. Satow to Lansdowne

19 July 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Very many thanks for your kind letter of May 31. It is a great satisfaction to know that the difficulties of the situation are realized at home. Several times I have felt that my management of questions has not given satisfaction, & there are many things I wld. do differently if I had to do them over again.

The discussion yesterday of de Giers' famous proposal for a "reserve guarantee" of 10% import duties did not take me altogether by surprise but I was astonished to find him bringing it on the tapis, as we were still in private communication abt. a compromise, & he

had given me no notice that he could not accept my proposal.¹ I partly suspect Mumm [von Schwarzenstein, the German minister] of egging him on, as Mumm cannot forgive us for the failure of Dr. Stübel's mission, and had predicted to me some time ago that an unanimous vote wld. be given ag[ain]st me. Rockhill's only idea is to hasten things so that he may sign the final protocol & then get home for his Pan-American congress. Everybody else is jealous of our greater commerce, & they do not mind combining with Russia to pull us down fr[om] our pre-eminence.

However, having thrown them a draft protocol to play with, I hope they may forget the "reserve guarantee". I have always maintained that the first thing was to fix the amount of our claim & then to arrange for the sinking fund, taking the available resources into consideration. I feel that we can afford to wait till they all become reasonable, & then they will have to come into our terms. Sometimes of course I am compelled to take some responsibility on myself, as I did on June 11, when but for my formula I think everyone wld. have agreed to de Giers' proposal. And I think nothing stronger than my formula of reservation wld. have secured unanimity.

The Chinese have, of course, already been told abt. de Giers' proposal for a reserve guarantee, and I am told are not enthusiastic. They much prefer my treatment of them as people whose word can be relied on for the pay[men]t of their debts.

Mumm I am coming to regard as a snake in the grass & even Rockhill seems to have a shifting eye. But on the whole it is not so much trickiness on his part as uncertainty of purpose. He is apt to be swayed abt. by any new wind of unsound doctrine.

I cannot help thinking that we have sent too many of our troops away, but on the other hand it is a blessing to have got rid of the Germans. I anticipate much good fr. General Creagh's being at Tientsin; he is very clever & knows how to get round the foreigner.

Li exhibits the greatest desire to get back the Peking-Shanhaikwan rlwy. in wch. he is no doubt prompted by de Giers.

Col. Powell's letters abt. his arrest at Tieling show rather a tempestuous temper, & I am afraid he wld. hardly do for military attaché here. Prendergast, who I hear is applying for the post, seems to me far fr. a desirable person. I do not know anyone who is exactly the right man, & perh. we hardly need one just now, with so many soldiers of our own ab[ou]t.

The Shanghai China Association must be beginning to doubt the wisdom of their

¹ "...Evidently there was a conspiracy among most of the colls: to force our hand abt. the "reserve guarantee", for it was brought on the tapis at once. I restated the case of H.M.G. & was left alone.." (Diary, July 18, 1901. Volume One, Ruxton, 2006, p. 124).

clamour to have troops landed this time last year, seeing that the result has been to let in the French & Germans. It certainly hampered Genl. Gaselee very much to be deprived of a brigade of his best troops when they were most needed.

E.S.

24. Satow to Eric Barrington

19 July 1901

My dear Barrington,

I trust the junior whom you are going to send me when [H.G.N.] Dering goes home will be a good worker, because we really have a very busy chancery. Pray don't give me one of whom other heads of mission have desired to get rid. I don't like to mention names, but I have heard of one who is rather a terror in the way of getting into debt.

I am delighted with [J.C.T.] Vaughan.¹ We have now got our paraphrases up to date owing to his exertions. He is making good progress with Chinese.

The papers have been saying that I was going away to the hills on June 1, & my people write to say how much I must be enjoying the fresh air & rest. Needless to say it is an invention of the corresp[onden]ts, like the story they had in May that Lady MacD. [Ethel MacDonald] & another diplomatist's wife had been discussed in a meeting of the colleagues in connexion with the 'acquisition' of Palace curios.

E.S.

25. Satow to Bertie [Summary only]

31 July 1901. To Bertie suggesting suppression of the Paraphrases for the present.

26. Satow to Lansdowne

31 July 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I think it was a bitter pill for de Giers that he had to give up his formula abt. a reserve guarantee, & he was heard to mutter betw. his teeth that the commercial reforms wld. never be obtained. Luckily he is not to stop here more than a few weeks longer, & his successor it may be hoped, will prove less obstructive. The one object he has set before himself fr. the beginning has been to reduce the conditions of peace to M. Delcassé's original proposals &

¹ Vaughan arrived at Peking on June 11, 1901. (Diary)

to frustrate everything we wished for. Mumm setting Bismarck before himself as the model to imitate has tried to play the honest broker, but not without fr. time to time securing a sly advantage for himself.

The disputed points having now been nearly all arranged we hope to sign the final protocol before long. [It was signed at 11 am on September 7, 1901.] The colleagues wld. have agreed to its taking the form of a convention, except de Giers, whose ruling idea has been to treat the whole business as nearly as possible like an ordinary incident, capable of being treated by ordinary methods by meetings of the diplomatic body & notes to the Tsungli Yamên [Foreign Board] now happily abolished. He had proposed that the final settlement should be recorded in an exchange of notes.

The French Minister [Paul Beau] is actively endeavouring to arrange for the Laokai[?] Yünnan-fu¹ railway, and I believe also for one from the latter point to the Yangtze. He also insists on constructing a line fr. Tientsin to Paotingfu, & is reported to have informed Li Hung-chang that it would be built with or without the consent of the Chinese Govt. I am afraid our extension to T'ung-chou has set a bad example but I do not think it is wise to try to prevent the Fr. having their way in the matter, as we shall shortly have to push for the concession desired by the Peking Syndicate.

I confess that the peaceful partition of China by means of railways cannot be avoided, and it looks as if we must strive to obtain our share of the influence wch. rlwy. building will confer. China seems to me fated more & more to fall under foreign domination, & that she can never be bolstered up to maintain her independence.

I have just recd. your teleg. No. 247 asking what are my views abt. a committee to sit at Shanghai or Canton for the preliminary stages of negotiations on commercial subjects. I expect [Legation secretary Reginald] Tower back in a few days, & shld. like to hear what he thinks before telegraphing my reply. The commission for converting the 5% ad valorem duties into specific duties should I think sit at S'hai, & I shld. propose to nominate as our members of it Mr. Warren the Consul-general & Mr. Jamieson the commercial attaché. If there is no special reason for preferring Canton, I shld. be inclined as far as I can see at present, to suggest S'hai; but Canton & Hong Kong are on the other hand deeply interested in the question of Inland Navigation. On that I expect to learn a good deal from Tower.

Mumm has been making a great fuss to me abt. the questions asked in the House of Commons abt. the German garrison at S'hai, as if that place belonged entirely to England. I

¹ Yünnan-fu was opened to foreign trade in 1908 and from 1913 called Kunming.

told him he must be quite aware that H.M.G. had by their ans[we]rs shown that they did not in any way countenance such pretensions. He supports the Fr. Min. in wishing to get an official member on the Shanghai river conservancy board, & pretends that if there are no such official members Germany will not be represented. The calculation is that out of the original ten members of the Board only four, or at most five, would be Engl. & of the rest 3 wld. be divided among other nationalities. As rather more than half the tonnage of Shai is under the Br. flag, & certainly $\frac{1}{2}$ of all other interests is ours, we should not be over-represented.

Li Hung-chang is inclined to be impertinent now that our troops are nearly all withdrawn, & I am afraid he is encouraged by my Russian & Fr. colleagues, who have tried to make out that it is I who always cause delays in the settlement of the indemnity, as well as of other ?? [questions]. It is quite true that I do not pay as much court to him as several of the colls: do, but there is certainly no reason why I shld.

De Giers took care that Li shld. know abt. his proposal to raise the import duties to 10% in China made default on the salt tax, as I felt sure he would.

27. Satow to Lansdowne

15/8/01

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

When I wrote a fortnight ago [see previous letter] I hardly expected we shld. compose our differences & be so nearly agreed with as we are now. The colls: were all agst. me abt. the international commission for converting ad valorem into specific duties. Tho' I had got round Rockhill & Komura to my side, Mumm managed to make them change again, & then it was "you will find it very disagreeable to have an unanimous vote agst. you again", to wch. I naturally replied that personally I did not care, tho' I did not like having them all agst. Engl[an]d. I suppose he must have got a warning fr. Berlin, for when I told him that in case they all insisted on having the commission I shld. have to sign the protocol with a reserve he went round to the colls:, & told them they must give way. wch. they did, all more or less with a bad grace. It has been to them rather humiliating to have to give way all along, & this is one of the pts. on wch. Mumm has harped most frequently.

He says that his people at Berlin have more than once exaggerated to you the telegs. in wch. he reported my action: for instance when he telegd. [that the] protocol had been "accepted by every one except Satow, who has no instructions", they told you that everyone

had accepted it. The fact is, he had canvassed them all privately, & found they all assented; but that was before it had been discussed by the plenum. On its being discussed several of the colls: proposed amendments, & Mumm himself asked to have the basis of conversion of duties sent back to the committee for reconsid. So much for its unanimous acceptance.

I had a tussle with him to get rice & cereals put in, instead of the vague formula “quelques exceptions nécessaires qui seront indiquées plus tard” [some exceptions which will be indicated later], but with the aid of Beau managed to overcome him.

We are to have what we hope is a last meeting this afternoon, to put the finishing touches. The Viceroy of Nanking is making difficulties abt. the S’hai conservancy scheme, but I hope we shall get the better of him. It was an insidious proposal of Li H’ch. [Li Hung-chang] that we shld. consult him, but there was no restraining Mumm’s ardour.

I have had no time to write despp. [despatches] reporting the turnings & windings of this last phase but I daresay they will not be missed.

Genl. Creagh has been stopping with me the last few days. He & I pull together in perfect harmony.

E.S.

28. Satow to Lansdowne

17 Aug. 1901

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

In my letter of 19 July [no. 23 above] I mentioned two soldiers, Powell & Prendergast, who wld. not in my opinion do for military attaché here in succession to Colonel Browne.

Before Genl. Gaselee left he & I agreed that it wld. be well to have an officer of the rank of Lt. Col. to command the Legn. Guard, wch. is made up of Royal Welsh Fusiliers & R.A. [Royal Artillery], & several odds and ends. He sent a teleg. to the Secy. of State for India proposing this arrange[men]t, but I have not heard what was the result. We thought this officer might discharge such duties as are expected of a military attaché in China.

Shld. it be finally decided to adopt our suggestion, may I mention the name of Col[onel Arthur G.] Churchill ¹, the Military Attaché at Tokio? I understand that his work in Japan

¹ Churchill, Col. Arthur Gillespie, C.B., C.B.E. born August 17, 1860. Entered the Army August 11, 1880; became Lieutenant, July, 1881; Captain, May 1, 1886; Major, December 21, 1892; Lieutenant-Colonel May 11, 1898; and Colonel, June 12, 1902. Was Military Attaché at Tokio from April 9, 1898 to June, 1903. Received the China Medal and clasp for the Relief of Peking, 1900; and the coronation Medal, 1902. Has received the 3rd Class of the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun. Made a C.B., 1917; C.B.E., 1918. [F.O. List, 1921]

will be practically finished by the end of this year, & that he wld., if selected, be available shortly afterwards.

I know these apptmts. are made by the Military Authorities, but I trust my taking an interest in the choice to be made will not appear out of place.

29. Satow to Lansdowne

29 Aug. 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

We are all agreed as to the text of the protocol, & the Chinese have recd. authority to sign. The colleagues were all willing, but as I have told Mumm all along, I cannot sign until I have seen the text of the punishments edicts and assured myself that they are satisfactory. We have not yet recd. them, but they might be here in a day or two. Should they prove not to be in accordance with our demands I shall not take on myself the responsibility of signing until I have first laid the matter before you.

By way of enacting Art. V by wch. the prohibition of the importation of arms is to be continued for two years, the Chinese Plenipos. have communicated to us an edict declaring that their importation is contrary to law, but that the merchants at the open ports constantly engage in this trade under the colour of official purchases, and sell them secretly. Considering that of late public order has been troubled by brigandage, & that it is necessary to publish an express prohibition in order to obviate disturbances, all officials are commanded to prohibit for a period of 2 yrs. the importation of arms & ammunition, as well as of materials serving exclusively for their manufacture.

The Diplomatic Body had a meeting yesterday to discuss this precious document. I pointed out that the allegation of smuggling arms for sale to brigands is false, & that M. Delcassé's proposal was aimed at the secret accumulation of arms & ammunition by the Chinese Govt., & I suggested asking for a correction of the edict. My colleagues however while holding the same opinion as myself, decided that it was better to inform the PIPL. [Plenipotentiaries] that the "considerants" of the decree were not in accordance with the facts, that we would only annex to the protocol the enacting portion of the edict & that the prohibition must apply to the Chinese Govt. as well as to its subjects. This rather drastic note was drafted on the spot & sent in yesterday evening.

My colls: have shown so much eagerness to get the date of the signature fixed that the Chinese are trying to profit by it to wriggle out of their literal engagements. I have on the

contrary held aloof and declared myself unable to sign unless the edicts were to the satisfaction of H.M.G. For some time past, as you may perhaps have noticed, the press has been accusing Engld. of interposing delays in order to get free of the S. African entanglement [i.e. the Anglo-Boer War], and some of my colleagues drop hints to the same effect. I have denied this, & pointed out to them that the way to negotiate with Orientals is not to be in a hurry. I think our position is rather a good one just now, for our consent I necessary before any final step can be taken.

Doubtless some of them are anxious to sign, in order to be free each to pursue his own designs. There is every indication that once the present negotiations are over, the policy of demanding concessions fr[om] China, all of wch. tend in the direction of disintegration, will be reverted to. It was this and not any missionary difficulties, that caused the antforeign outburst of last year. I am convinced that the signature of the final protocol, so far fr. ending our troubles, will be but the signal for their commencement.

I hear the Fr[ench] are building very solid quarters for their posts on the line of communications & everything points rather to permanent occupation of Peking and the railway. The Japanese are building barracks in their legation of the most solid description, to last a century or more.

Bourne telegs. to me fr. S'hai that he learns on good authority that the Empress Dowager has finally decided to fix the capital at Haifêng in Honan, & has informed the high provincial authorities to that effect. I have written to ask him who is his authority. All the signs here are to the contrary, & certainly the desire of the Court ought to be to get back as soon as possible to its old seat, although the reactionary members may dislike coming here under existing conditions. They have every reason to believe that we are anxious for their return, & possibly hope that by feigning to hesitate they may induce us to diminish the legation guards and abandon the railway to them. But I hold that they have more to lose than we by prolonged delay in returning, and that we ought to make no reductions until they come back here and give proof of having learnt a lesson from their defeat.

The S'hai branch of the China Association telegd. to me a day or two ago remonstrating agst. the reduction of our force there to one battalion, & urging that we should always keep an officer of superior rank there, to prevent what Bourne in forwarding it calls "German aggressiveness". I have told them that I regret being unable to submit their views to H.M.G. The China Assn. is useful as long as it confines itself to its proper rôle of looking after commercial interests. But I do not like to see them trying to dictate a policy.

Mr. Tower's report on the consular service contains valuable suggestions for improving its efficiency, and I hope they will be sanctioned. I have mentioned in the case of the Southern ports to anticipate their approval by instructing the consuls to send their despp. under flying seal thro' the Consul-general at Canton.

I have not yet been able to complete my report on Chang Chih-tung's proposals with regard to missionaries. It is a very difficult question, & has been rendered still more so by the Chinese having in 1899 officially recognized the Fr. Protectorate over Roman Catholic missions and accorded to the bishops & missionaries the right of discussing the affairs of their converts with the local authorities.

30. Satow to Cockerell

Aug. 29. 1901

My dear Cockerell,

I am sending home by this bag Tower's report on the consular service, all of wch. I heartily agree with. His proposals are excellent. I hope you will not let the Treasury cut down the vote, for the money saved by suppressing or suspending places like Wenchow, Yuchow[?] and a few more will be required for expenditure elsewhere. Our great difficulty is how to dispose of useless men, like [Edward T.C.] Werner, [H.A.] Little and one or two more. There is a man named W.H. [William Henry] Wilkinson acting at Ningpo who has a great gift for concocting long sheaves of corresp'ce abt. missionary matters, and by injudiciously interfering in a quarrel between Bp. Moule ¹ & Mgr. Reynaud has only envenomed the dispute. I have instructed him to send copies of his despp. direct to the F.O. & trust he will receive a proper castigation. [P.E.] O'Brien-Butler who is acting at Foochow seems a credulous ass. I hope you will allow Mr. Michie Fraser to retire; he really is not quite compos mentis [of sound mind].

31. Satow to William Henry Wilkinson

To W.H. Wilkinson, Consul, Ningpo.

extract 30.8.91 [sic. 30.8.01?]

My dear W.,

The missionary question has occupied my mind for many years, and I have had experience of it in other countries, so that in coming to China I am not without an opinion

¹ Bishop George Evans Moule

as to the proper line for our missionaries & consuls to take up. Whether the existing state of things can be altered for the better I do not venture to prophesy, but you have my views in the desp. I wrote to you the other day, and you may rest assured that they are shared by Lord Lansdowne.

I do not wish to say anything abt. the past, except that I am quite contented with the fact that missionary claims in S. China have been settled on the spot. Personally I disagree with the presentation of claims for compensation by Societies & individual missionaries, and all my sympathies are with those, like the C.I.M. [China Inland Mission] & North China Mission, who have made none.

I have read your desp. abt. the differences betw. Bish[o]p Moule & Mgr. Reynaud, & the brochure containing the enclosures. You will I trust not take it amiss if I say that in my opinion there is too much of it, & that tho' in yr. last letter to Bishop Reynaud you seem to have gained a controversial triumph, I greatly doubt whether your well meant endeavours have promoted peace. I do not, either, feel there was any duty cast upon you of communicating Mgr. Reynaud's accusations to Bshp. Moule, or of stating a case to the Crown Advocate for his opinion. The pen is a dangerous implement. The writer uses it with the most innocent intentions, but the reader of the product frequently receives an entirely different impression fr. that wch. was intended.

I hope that may not be the case with this letter.

32. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking 12/9/01

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

The telegrams fr. home for abt. a week before the signature of the final protocol gave out that the Emperor William [Kaiser Wilhelm II] had insisted on Prince Chun performing the kotow ¹, & the Chinese told us the same story. Mumm denied this, but said it was arranged that the Prince should make a low bow. Five or six weeks ago he had written to Berlin advising against the attempt to adopt an Asiatic ceremonial which the Berlin court officials would not be able to carry out. I understood from him that the kotow by the suite was a sine qua non of their being rec[eive]d. The Chinese here said that their countrymen would rather die than perform the ceremony.

Many people here think the idea originated with v. der Goltz, the Legationsrath of Mons.

¹ See also Satow's diary for August 31, and September 2, 1901. (Ruxton, Volume One, pp. 134, 135)

de Mumm; he has been a long time in China and is very anti-Chinese.

Mumm was very anxious to get the protocol signed, and twice proposed to us to sign it on receiving a declaration from the Chinese Plenipos. that the punish[men]ts edicts would turn out to be all that was desired. I refused to do this, and said I must see the edicts first. The Chinese Plenipos. we all thought had the edicts but were keeping them back until the question of the manner in wch. Prince [Chun] shld. be recd. was settled.

As soon as it was announced that the Emperor William would receive him according to German ceremonial the edicts were produced and we signed the protocol.

If it is a true story, the demand was most unfortunate, as it evidently could not be enforced.

[F.S.A.] Bourne, who has recently been Acting Consul-general at Shanghai betw. the departure of Brenan and the arrival of Warren, writes that according to very trustworthy information recd. at S'hai the Court will not reach Peking for another 9 mos., and prob. for much longer, the Empress-Dowager remaining at K'ai-fêng until she can make terms about the fortified legation quarter.

Warren was not able to get anything out of Chang Chih-tung about the Court's return here.

I have always thought that the defence scheme and the occupation of the rlwy. wld. be an obstacle to the Court's returning, and as far as our defences were concerned have tried to keep the engineers within bounds of moderation. But as long as generals Gaselee and Barrow were here I could not get my ideas accepted, & when General Creagh took up the command at Tientsin, tho' he has been most ready to fall in with my views, it was too late to make any alteration. The French have dug a ditch on the east of their legation big enough to float a torpedo-boat, and the Italians have built a wall with open loopholes, and are digging a very imposing ditch. Besides this they have a clear space 150 yards wide along their front, while we are separated by not more than 70 yds. fr. the wall fr. which the Chinese fired on the Legation during the siege. The Germans are going to keep 460 men here during the winter, & are building a solid blockhouse at the end of their part of the Tartar city wall. The Americans & Russians alone have contented themselves with an ordinary brick wall. The Japanese being in the centre of the quarter are not en évidence, but they are constructing barracks for 300 men of the most solid character.

The Germans have built a huge post-office here, and equally imposing ones at Chefoo and S'hai.

[P.M.] Lessar is due here today ¹, having reached Port Arthur fr. St. Petersburg in 21 days, by the route wch. was alleged to be unsafe for Col. Powell, and de Giers leaves on the 15th. He has been a very shifty colleague.

I learn that there are some Russians here looking about for the best country for the construction of a line to Kalgan from Peking. They came from Urga, and were much disconcerted to hear that we had already laid down a line to T'ung-chou, wch. interferes with their plan of a direct line fr. Peking to Shanhaikwan.

We have done all that is possible to content the Viceroy of Nanking [Chang Chih-tung] with regard to the S'hai conservancy board, but I have felt all along that his opposition was encouraged by Mr. [Robert] Bredon, the author of the pamphlet wch. stated that the Chinese did not care whether Shai ceased to be accessible to shipping or not. The publication of this pamphlet by his brother-in-law took the edge off [Sir Robert] Hart's possible opposition to our plan, & in that way it may have done good. There is no love lost betw. them.

E.S.

P.S. I ought to add that the leading Chinese here, notably our friend Hu [Yü-fên], declare that the Court is coming back here, and without making any prolonged stay at K'ai-fêng, & that the [Imperial] Palace is being diligently repaired & put in order.

33. Satow to Lansdowne

25 Sept. 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

It does [not?] seem as if either the Germ., Jap. or U.S. Minister here had recd. any information abt. your conversations with the respective repres[entati]ves in London on the conduct of commercial negotiations in Shanghai, & it was only [from] the receipt of the bag, containing records of your interviews with Baron Eckhardstein, Mr. Choate and Baron Hayashi [the Japanese Minister in London] that I knew what the position was. Mumm who had recd. a teleg. informing him of the announcement in the "Times" of the apptmt. of the commission, was evidently uneasy, but I was able to give him satisfaction this morning.

There may be two reasons for his personal readiness to let us negotiate alone, besides what he gave to me: - he wants to go home, & 2ndly the negotiation abt. likin [provincial tax] must be inevitably a difficult one and take a long time.

¹ Satow met Lessar for the first time on September 26, 1901. (Diary, Volume One, p. 139)

Mr. [C.J.] Dudgeon's selection [as Assistant Commissioner in Shanghai, announced by Reuter on September 24 - see Satow's diary] seems to me excellent; he will be brought face to face with a problem the difficulties of wch. it is naturally his cue to ignore as Chairman of the China Association at Shanghai.

I found Li Hung-chang looking much better when I saw him a couple of days ago ¹; he was confined to the sofa, but talked cheerfully of living many years yet. After talking abt. the commercial negotiations, I asked abt. the French demand for a rlwy. from Tientsin to Paotingfu. He gave me to understand that the matter was hung up for the present, & that what the Fr. wanted was the refusal of a concession for it. Mumm has heard of the proposal & seems strangely upset abt. it, as if Chihli were in the German sphere.

I also spoke abt. the Peking Syndicate's wish to construct a line fr. Pukou to Hwaiching. He expressed some doubt whether the Syndicate [represented by George Jamieson] really intended to work their concessions, & it is not unlikely that a coll., perhaps Salvago, has suggested that all they care for is to have something to speculate with on the Stock Exchange. Li however said he was in favour of the proposed line, as that to Siangyang was evidently of no use, but he said I had better speak to Prince Ch'ing abt. it. I shall do this shortly, after [C.W.] Campbell has prepared the ground with one of the new Vice-ministers what it is that we want.

The Fr[ench] want to build a branch [line] as far as the South gate of the Chinese city, for the Emperor to use in coming here, instead of H.M. [His Majesty] changing lines & coming along ours to the same spot. Li does not want this, & I have arranged with him to send some of his confidential people with Col. [C.A.R.] Brown[e], the Director of the Tientsin railway, & Campbell, by special train tomorrow to show them how easily the Imperial train can be brought over our line to the gate of Peking.

Fr. the way Li talked I cld. not help believing that the Court does not intend to return here by the end of the year. He recurred to his proposal that the Dipl. Body shld. receive the Emperor at the rlwy. station, of which I wrote on a former occasion, & I have also asked the Doyen to sound the colls: Mumm seems to hesitate abt. the desirability of our doing this. I am personally in favour of it, as it is a break with the past. Formerly when the Emperor passed thro' the streets, the Dipl. Body & all other foreigners had to stay at home. It wld. not look well if on such a public occasion the F[oreign] Min[ister]s sulked in their tents. Of course all will depend on the arrangements as to locale & the speeches exchanged betw. the

¹ See diary for September 23, 1901 (Ruxton, Volume One, p. 138).

Doyen & the Emperor.

I cannot help thinking that the India Office does not quite appreciate the value to us here of having a sufficient no. of troops of all arms to hold our own with other nationalities. After agreeing to the retention of a battery of artillery, some cavalry and an extra battalion of infantry, as Genl. Creagh & I concurred in recommending, it seems that they have instructed him to send the two former to India. I really think we ought not to reduce a single man more till the spring at the earliest, either in North China or at Shanghai.

E.S.

34. Summary

26 Oct. Francis Campbell. Complaining that they did not teleg. to me that Ld. L. had spoken to U.S. Germ. & Japse. RR [Representatives] abt. joint commercial negotiations.

35. Summary

26 Cockerell, asking for a reply as to exams.

36. Summary

26 Eric Barrington, as to knighthood for C.J.

37. Satow to Barrington

26 Sept. 1901

My dear Barrington

As [H.G.N.] Dering is leaving me in a few days to proceed on leave of absence, I wish to testify to the diligence & zeal wch. he has displayed as head of the Chancery since I came here in October of last year. I believe that this is almost the first time that he has had to do any work of the kind, and he is entitled to the credit of having done his very best. Of course I cannot say anything abt. his work under the previous régime nor of his services during the Siege [of the Legations], of wch. Sir C. McD. [MacDonald] can alone give an account. y.v.t.

E.S.

38. Satow to Lansdowne

10 Oct. 1901

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

I am very much obliged for your letter of August 25. As regards the cavalry & artillery wch. Genl. Creagh was desirous of retaining, I felt bound to support his representations, as his reasons for preferring guns to pompoms and cavalry to mounted infantry appeared incontrovertible. The ponies & men were both of them untrained. I am glad to say that my relations with him are very cordial, & I think I may say the same of his relations with the commanders of the foreign contingents. That was certainly not the case as long as Genl. Barrow was here.

I have just returned fr. a trip along the line as far as Shanhaikwan with Genl. Creagh [from October 3rd to 5th – see diary]. We visited the proposed winter port of Chin-wang-tao, wch. seems likely to fulfil the expectations formed of it, & to justify Sir Edward Seymour's preference for it over Shanhaikwan a year ago.

To judge by the solidity of the barracks being erected for the troops along the line of communications, it looks as if the military authorities expected the occupation to last many years. The same is the case in Peking with the barracks erected for the Legation guards. We have not followed this example, nor have the Russians as regards their Legation; as you know, they take no part in guarding the line of communications. I think that some of my colls: now begin to think that the works constructed for the defence of the Legations are in excess of what was required by the situation. But none of my colleagues, any more than I, have been able to moderate the zeal of their engineer officers. When I say to mine that I see no reason to expect a repetition of 1900, they retort on me that neither did my predecessor foresee what came to pass.

I had a talk with [Russian minister P.M.] Lessar a day or two ago [on October 8th – see diary], fr. wch. I gather that he supports the Empress Dowager as the only person capable of ruling China, & regards the idea that this country is in reality governed by the Viceroys as exceedingly dangerous. He maintains that the Boxer movement was originally anti-dynastic, and that she diverted it fr. herself agst. foreigners.

I think experience has shown us that the Peking officials do not really rule, and that their will cannot be carried out in the provinces unless the Viceroys and Governors consent. As to the origin of the movement of last year, I am beginning to doubt whether the extermination of foreigners was the first motive, and to conjecture that possibly the

ambition of Prince Tuan & his friends was the moving force, & the agitation agst. foreigners the means by wch. they hoped to create a strong body of partisans. Several things seem to confirm this. It was the explanation given to me by Prince Su, the friendly man whose Palace accommodated the native Christians during the Siege. I remember too that at the beginning of the outbreak telegrams said there had been a palace revolution, & that Prince Tuan was trying to make himself Emperor. And the attitude of all the governors except Yühsien is another point. I am told that the Yangtze riots of the early '90s were regarded as not being primarily directed agst. foreigners, but as originating with people who wished to create difficulties for the dynasty.

It may be however that I am relying too much on the analogy of the anti-foreign movement in Japan in the years 1859-67, wch. was certainly used as a weapon for upsetting the Tycoon [Shogun], and was laid aside as soon as the object had been attained.

If on the other hand the theory is correct, what we have to do is to watch Tuan & his remaining partisans. As long as they remain in political banishment we shld. have no reason to fear a fresh antforeign outbreak.

The air is full of rumours abt. the Manchurian question. It is certainly being actively discussed with Lessar, not only by Li [Hung-chang], but by Prince Ch'ing also, using Hu [Yü-fén] as the go-between. Lessar's dropping the mention of [C.W.] Kinder shows his good sense. I daresay he will not go out of his way unnecessarily to provoke our interfering with the success of his negotiations, & he wld. have a better chance of carrying them thro' if he could avoid incurring our strong opposition. In his place I shld. try to lull the vigilance of H.M.G. to sleep.

39. Satow to Lansdowne

23 Oct. 1901

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The progress of the Court is rather slow, and the idea of getting to Peking in time for the Empress-Dowager's birthday has been given up. It will be celebrated at K'ai fêng instead, and at present it is difficult to forecast when the journey will be renewed. It would not be difficult to create a scare which wld. delay the return here. Lessar of course must desire the return, as his negotiations cannot be carried on by telegraph, if they are to be kept secret.

Junglu is said to have written a [letter?] to Li to promise that he will back up with the Empress-Dowager any arrangements Li may make abt. Manchuria; in return for this

backing, Russia is to protect Junglu agst. the possible hostility of the Powers.

I am going to see whether I cannot put a spoke in this gentleman's wheel. He is no friend of ours, led the attack on the Legations in part, & is responsible for having originally brought Tung Fuhsiang's troops to Peking, without whom last year's antforeign movement cld. not have taken place. Prob. he is not a friend of Li, & he has just done us a bad turn. For some time past I have been trying to get Hu apptd. Director of Northern Railways, of course for the present with only nominal functions. I obtained Genl. Creagh's consent, & Prince Ch'ing & Li sent a teleg. to the Court recommending him for the post, for both extra-mural & intra-mural railway.

Some malicious person in Li's yâmen [office] put in the teleg. a recommendation of Hu on the ground that he was "mixed up with the English". Junglu was away burying his son when the teleg. reached the Court, & the answer was delayed until he rejoined the cortège. When it reached Peking it was found that instead of Hu the Empress-Dowager had apptd. Hsü Shoupêng, who is a member of the new Foreign Dept. [Wai Wu Pu], & Chang Yenmao, who supplanted Hu before on the railway & had many rows with Kinder. I am told Prince Ch'ing & Li are strongly inclined for this to be altered, & I propose to supply them with an additional motive by saying that I cannot possibly consent to the apptmt. of these two men. As I have a written promise fr. them to appt. some one who will be "acceptable" to us, they will understand the force of my objection. If they do not app[oin]t Hu I propose they shld. be given to understand that the restoration of the rlwy. may be delayed, & they can pass this on to the court. I think of inquiring in a casual manner as to Junglu's whereabouts, & of suggesting that a man of his antecedents will not be very popular among the foreign diplomats at Peking.

It seems a pity that the colleagues did not put him on the black list along with his friends Tung Fuhsiang and Yühsien; he need not perh. have been decapitated, but banishment wld. have done him good.

My Germ. coll: [Mumm] has started off on a visit to S'hai & the Yangtze, apparently in too great a hurry to wait for a man of war [warship], & evidently in order to be on the spot before me.

As the Fr. & Am. at Canton & the Russians & Germans at S'hai are credited with designs of acquiring separate concessions at those places. I think of recommending to the Chinese not to grant any more separate concessions to any one, but to make it a condition that fresh grants shall be international. I can get the U.S. Coll's support in taking this line. The teleg.

fr. Warren abt. Russian designs at S'hai for the acquisition of a concession wch. I sent on is perh. a maresnest [an illusory discovery]. If other Powers follow the Fr. example at S'hai, we & the Americans may find ourselves forced to rescind the arrangement by wch. many years ago we combined our respective settlements & gave equal rights to other Powers in them; or at least to resume what we originally possessed before the extension of the so-called "International Settlement" in recent times. Under present circs. however disagreeable the position may be for us in what was at first exclusively ours, we shld., the C.J. [Chief Justice] tells me, have no legal justification for tearing up the compact.

E.S.

40. Satow to Barrington [Summary]

To Barrington. Octr. 24. Hoping 3rd Sec[retary] will soon be sent out. And speculating as to who will be Tower's successor. Am starting for Hongkong 28th. [Note: Satow left Peking for Tientsin on October 26th and reached Hong Kong on November 5, 1901 – see diary].

41. Satow to Lansdowne

Hongk'g 6 Nov. 1901.

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The day before I started fr. Peking I went to see Prince Ch'ing ¹, & as usual found him optimistic abt. the return of the Court. I gave him a memo. abt. the prolongation of the Burmah rlwys. into Yünnan, claiming equal rights with the Fr., wch. seemed to fall in with his views, for he at once said he remembered all the circs. & asked me to turn it into an official note. He denied that the Fr. had a convention conceding the right to build a rlwy. to Yünnanfu, but admitted an exchange of notes. I think that these notes prob. contain a less explicit promise than the Fr. are trying to make out, as the Prince said the terms are being discussed on the spot. He evidently welcomed our claim to equal rights as strengthening his hand in dealing with the Fr[ench].

I am told by Major Wingate, who has travelled in S.W. China & wrote a good report on rlwy. questions, that the intention of continuing the Burmese rlwy. to Kunlong ferry has been given up by the Viceroy, & that there is a suggestion of building one fr. Katha viâ Bhamo to Momein. I do not know how far this project has gone, but for the present at least there can be no question of our claiming the right to prolong our rlwy. into Yünnan, as we

¹ See diary for October 25, 1901. (Ruxton, Volume One, pp.146-7).

have not got to the frontier. I suppose therefore that my line will be rather to prevent the realization of Fr. projects as far as may be possible, rather than to advance our own, wch. are still in nubibus [in the clouds].

Prince Ch'ing volunteered the remark that he had read my Note, advising agst. granting any but international settlements at the open ports, with much satisfaction, & was going to instruct the Viceroy of Canton ac[cordingl]y. This I have heard, since my arrival here, he has already done.

Fr. him I went on to Li. He said that the Empress-Dowager was full of apprehension as to the intentions of the Powers, & that we had not withdrawn sufficient troops. He had recd. secret instructions fr. her to ask for the govt. of Tientsin to be handed over. I said that the PP. [Powers] entertained apprehensions regarding the future attitude of the E-D wch. were perhaps better founded than hers respecting us. There were the events of last year; and she was still surrounded by reactionaries, one of whom had headed troops that besieged the Leg[atio]ns. Until the Court came back & showed by its conduct that it was well-disposed towards the PP, the latter wld. not be justified in relaxing any of their precautions. The T.P.G. [Tientsin Provisional Government] must therefore I thought continue for the present. The same with regard to the Northern rlwys. They secured our communications, & in some measure relieved our apprehensions. To this he replied that he had recd. secret instructions to ask for the rlwy. to be handed over, but he had abstained fr. mentioning them, as he thought it wld. be useless. I reminded him of the promise to appt. a Chinese director who wld. be satisfactory to us.

The whole conversation turned on these two points, the T.P.G. & the Northern rlwys. It is certain that there is a considerable party at Court wch. wishes to keep the E-D away fr. Peking, & urges that it is not safe for her so long as we have troops there on the present scale. It seems not unlikely that she may sit down at K'aifêng & try to wear us out. It is the game wch. the Chinese know best how to play.

I hope that H.M.G. will allow me to continue refusing either demand, until the Court is back & shows that it has turned over a new leaf. If persevering in such a course led to the E-D spending the rest of her life at K'aifêng, I do not see how we cld. be the losers. If we put an end to the P.G. & hand over the rlwy. before the Court returns, we shall have been beaten.

Li talked to me abt. Lo Fengluh having been refused by the Russian Court because the recent bluebook had shown him to be a friend of England. I said that cld. not be true, as

their refusal preceded the publication.¹ Chang [Tê-yi] whom the Chinese propose as Lo's successor [as Chinese envoy in London] is a nullity, but is a henchman of Prince Ch'ing's, & can do no harm, so I have not thought it useful to oppose his nomination.

I am going to Canton this afternoon, and shall be back in time to meet Sir J. Mackay & Cockburn.

42. Satow to Sanderson

Hgkg.

11 Nov. 01.

My dear Sanderson,

Sir H. [Henry] Blake² thinks there is reason to believe that the French entertain a project of connecting Amoy with Canton by railway either direct, or by a line to join the Hankow-Canton railway. They wld. then get hold of Amoy, and convert it into a distributing centre for Southern China, to the great detriment of H'gk'g.

But we do not know whether the country behind Amoy is favourable for the construction of rlwys. & after discussing the means of obtaining information, we have come to the conclusion that the best way would be to send one of his colonial cadets, who knows Cantonese, inland from Amoy. This would attract less notice & prob. be better than sending a consular man, who speaks only Pekinese, on such a journey.

Sir Henry tells me he has no funds at his disposal for such a purpose, & I wld. suggest therefore that I shld. be authorized to fund the expenses out of S.S. as far as £100.

If you approve of this, will you kindly send a private teleg. to Peking.

y.v.t. [yours very truly]

¹ See Satow's diary for October 25, 1901 (Ruxton, Volume One, 2006, p. 148.): "Li also said the Russians had refused Lo Fênglu, who had consequently fallen ill. Demanded to be removed. The Russians had read the blue-book and come to the conclusion that he was too friendly to England. I said there was no ground for saying that. Lo had simply acted as a channel of communication, & shown himself a faithful subject of China. He asked could not England give assurances to Russia, wch. wld. change their opinion, but I replied such a step on our part would do more harm than good. As to the blue-book, it had come out later than the refusal, wch. must have been on general grounds, & I regretted that the fact had been let out. It was no uncommon thing for a man to be refused, & I knew of such cases, where the public never heard of it."

² Sir Henry Blake (1840-1918) was the 12th Governor of Hong Kong, 1898-1903. Five months before he arrived in Hong Kong, the British Government successfully negotiated an agreement with the Imperial Chinese Government, allowing the Hong Kong Government to lease the New Territories for 99 years. During Blake's tenure, he sent in administrators to the New Territories to assert control of the colony.

43. Satow to Lansdowne

Hgkg

11 Nov. 01

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

I have seen Sir James Mackay, & read his instructions with him. We are quite in agreement as to the general lines of the course he will take, and we shall be in constant communication after I return to Peking.

The likin question [see letter no. 3 above and Satow's diary, Ruxton, Volume One, p. 154] is undoubtedly the most difficult of those he has to deal with, but as regards the others I think he will be able to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. I shall give him every assistance in my power.

Li Hung chang's death [on November 6, 1901 – see diary for November 7th] is not altogether to be regretted fr. our point of view, but in one matter it may perh. cause some inconvenience. He was too old & feeble to take the line of trying to establish himself at Tientsin alongside of the P.G., & I think he saw fr. my reply to him that we shld. not easily give way on that matter. But Yuan Shihkai is younger, proby. more vigorous, & has his trained troops. I trust he will not give trouble, but be contented with administrating so much of the province as is left to him outside Tientsin.

44. Satow to Barrington [summary]

4 Decr. 1901

To Barrington, expressing hope that Townley will come out soon, and regrets at losing Tower.

45. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking

5 Dec. 1901

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

When in Shanghai about the middle of last month, I took an opportunity of looking at the accommodation wch. is being constructed for German troops. This has been described by the China Association as "permanent barracks".

The Germ. Auth. are erecting huts, some of timber, others of corrugated iron arranged so as to be easily taken to pieces, on two plots of land. Attached to each collection of huts is a

small low range of buildings of no great size, which looked like kitchens.

I conclude therefore that the expression used by the China Association is a rhetorical flourish.

Passing thro' Tientsin a few days ago I learned fr. General Creagh that there is a feeling among the German officers that their stay in North China may possibly be curtailed. In view of the expense of keeping a force of about 4000 men each on foot in Chihli to garrison Tientsin & guard the line of communications, I suppose most Powers wld. be pleased to diminish the forces they have in China.

Baron v. Richthofen's statement in his note to Sir Fr. Lascelles ¹ of 29 September that Germany did not possess a base like Hongkong seems curious, as Kiaochow is much nearer to any possible field of action. As to the Japse. battalion, I believe Japan has substituted troops of the line for sailors at S'hai merely because the Germans show no signs of going.

At Nanking I anticipated that the Viceroy wld. have urged the removal of the troops fr. S'hai, but he did not mention the subject. Neither he nor the Viceroy of Hankow said anything abt. missionaries, so that rock was avoided. By next bag I hope to send some notes of my conversations with them.

To my teleg. of today abt. Yüan Shihkai's request for the abolition of the T.P.G. [Tientsin Provisional Government] I have only to add that I think we may safely do more for him than wld. have been either necessary or advisable for Li Hung-chang. As I have said before, the only coll: who supports the P.G. is Mumm, I mean of those whose word wld. be of any weight.

I met Sir J. Mackay at Hong Kong & we went thro' his instructions together. His great diffculty will be the abolition of likin.

At S'hai Mr. [Thaddeus S.] Sharretts the American tariff expert came to call on me. ² He says that [E.H.] Conger is joined with him for the commercial negotiations, & that they will both sign whatever agreement or convention is made with China. I have not yet heard what the other PP are thinking of doing with regard to commercial negotiations.

Yüan Shihkai says that he, Prince Ch'ing and the 2 Yangtze Viceroys are in no hurry to sign anything abt. Manchuria unless they can obtain satisfactory terms; if not, they will play a waiting game. Possibly I may hear more details fr. Prince Ch'ing, whom I am to see

¹ Sir Frank Lascelles (1841-1920) was British ambassador to Germany, 1895-1908. His papers are owned by and kept at the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge.

² See Satow's diary for November 29, Ruxton, 2006, Volume One, p. 161. In the diary entry he is incorrectly "General Sharratts".

tomorrow. The declaration of H.M.G. in regard to their policy of supporting the integrity of Chinese territory and opposing any concessions to Russia wch. interfere with our Treaty rights seems to have made a deep impression on Yüan Shihkai.

I reached Peking late the day before yesterday, and have seen only Lessar and the new Japanese Minister. The former seemed chiefly interested in the division of the indemnity, the latter [Uchida Yasuya] said Prince Ch'ing had promised to sign nothing about Manchuria without consulting him.¹

46. Satow to Bertie

17 Dec. 1901.

Dear Bertie,

In reply as to Jamieson & his uniform I do not think I have ever spoken with him abt. it, but I have had it brought to my notice that he wore a diplomatic uniform here on the occasion of the funeral service for the late Queen [Victoria], & that when he called on the Viceroy at Wuchang in company with Warren he decked himself in it.

I was told, I think by Tower, that Jamieson having informed some one in the Dept. that he had provided himself with a diplomatic uniform, had been told in reply that he might continue to wear it till it was worn out. I had thought once or twice of writing to you abt. it, especially as his wearing it in company with a consul-general who has only the uniform of his rank wld. tend to produce a false impression on the Chinese mind. Still it seemed hardly worth while, especially as he seems to have stated here he had F.O. leave to wear it. It certainly is not the case that I have told him he might exchange his consular uniform for the other.

To make him conform to the instructions he has recd. on the point wld. be a pecuniary loss no doubt, but there wld. be no reason to regret a loss of "face"; he has plenty of cheek[?] to make up for that.

E.S.

47. Satow to Lansdowne

19 Dec. 1901

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

After my desp. enclosing Yüan Shihkai's memo. respecting the T.P.G. [Tientsin

¹ See diary, Ruxton, p. 164.

Provisional Government] had been written out, I heard that question is put down for discussion at a meeting of the Dipl. Body to be held the day after tomorrow. But possibly we may not get so far. I shall confine myself to the instructions contained in your teleg. of Dec. 7. Fr[om] informal conversations I gather that most of the colls: are now of the opinion that the Court must first come back & show its changed character. But they do not always say in conference what they have previously in private declared to be their opinion.

I see it is stated in the papers that the surveying party wch. was to lay down the line from Laokai to Yünanfu has been dissolved & that M. Delcassé is disposed not to press the matter at present. You will see fr. my report that the Chinese are very unwilling to give us satisfactory assurances. I presume that we are not ready to bring the Burma railways up to the frontier, & that the principal object is to prevent the French getting anything unless an undertaking to give us equivalent privileges can be obtained. That is what I am aiming at in my conversations with Chinese officials. The Yünnan Co. cannot propose seriously to build a rlwy. in that province until the Burma rlwy's brought so far as to give reasonable prospect of their being able to transport rails and rolling stock by it, & I wld. venture to recommend an answer something to that effect being given to them next time they write to the F.O. The whole matter rests with the Indian Govt.

With respect to the Peking Syndicate's demand for a line to Pukou on the Yangtze fr. their mines, I ought to explain that my first note to the Chinese Govt. was written in consultation with Mr. Geo. Jamieson, the Syndicate's repres[entati]ve after he had assured me he had squared everyone of importance. He was as surprised as myself at the flat refusal. I suggested his coming to Peking, & he is now here. It is highly unlikely that any concessions will be given until the Manchurian difficulty is out of the way, but no harm will be done by asking for them.

People often blame the capitalists, like Jardine's & the H'g K'g Bank for not building the railways for wch. they have obtained concessions. They in their turn say it is the fault of the Brit. Govt. wch. does not support them properly. But Mr. Shaw-Lefevre's article in the Nineteenth Century on Argentina shows that while there is such a splendid field for profitable investment in S. America, capital is not likely to flow towards China. As for the Peking Syndicate & its mines in Shansi, I do not believe that it is more than an 'affaire de bourse', & that if it were brought out, the concessionaries wld. make their pile & then clear out. This is said to have happened in the case of Bewick, Moreing & Co's Chinese Engineering & Mining Co. That was brought out as a British Limited Co. I am told that

Jardine's & the HgKg Bank frowned upon it, & that consequently half or more of the capital was obtained in Belgium, partly also fr. members of the Russian Imperial family. The English employés have been in some instances dismissed, and a crowd of Belgians put in their place.

It is a remarkable fact that, as I have reported in a desp. the British & Chinese Syndicate have in their hands unexpended at least a quarter of the Northern Rlwys Loan, wch. must be earning interest somewhere on deposit, for wch. no credit is given to the Chinese Govt. while every 6 months they successfully claim the full coupon.

My attempt to prevent Junglu from coming back to Peking with the Court seems likely to prove a failure. It was at once let out by the interpreter who was present when I spoke to Prince Ch'ing & Li, and got into the papers. I now see that the U.S. colleague is credited by the latter with having not only joined me in this, but also in having demanded the dismissal of P'u-Chun, who was made heir-apparent in 1898, the execution of Tung-Fuhsiang & the restoration of the Emperor to power. We shall at any rate get the credit of obtaining the downfall of P'u-chun, who is Tuan's son. Both Liu Kunyi and Yüan Shihkai are ardent supporters of Junglu, who they say one [only?] pretended to fire on the Legation because he was afraid for his head, and according to then did little mischief. I think on the whole there is no harm in letting some of the ex-Boxers know that we keep a watchful eye on them, & in one case I have found this [to] have an excellent effect, for Na-t'ung, who was one of them, is now most anxious to be on friendly terms.

48. Satow to Lansdowne

2 Jany. 1902.

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I have not yet been able to arrange anything to my satisfaction abt. the Chinese repres've at the King's coronation. It is however settled that a member of the Imperial family shall be sent. I understand however that Prince Ch'ing thinks Duke Hsün, whom I mentioned in my letter of 6 July is not old enough.¹

In my teleg. abt. Chang Chih-tung's desire that H.M.G. shld. do something to prevent him and Liu Kunyi fr. being moved, I deprecated his suggestion of an official Note to the Chin. Govt. & said that merely speaking had a far-reaching effect. The former wld. in my

¹ Duke Hsün was described as "rather a hobbadehoy" by Prince Ch'ing (Diary, December 30, 1901, Ruxton, Volume One, 2006, p. 174).

opinion be a very serious step to take ; we could not admit any refusal or prevarication, & the effect wld. be to establish our protectorate over the Yangtze Viceroy. When it came to the finish I think they wld. be sorry that Chang had ever moved in the matter. As regards mere speaking & its effect: Rather more than a year ago there was an idea (wch. I did not share) that the 2 Viceroy were going to be removed. I simply inquired of Prince Ch'ing & recd. a reply in the negative, wch. as the event has shown was a sufficient guarantee. A couple of months ago I made some half-jocular allusion to Junglu to Prince Ch'ing & Li Hung-chang. It immediately got into the native newspapers and was made the most of by the 'reform party'. The Am. Min. [E.H. Conger] & I were stated to have demanded four things, as mentioned in my letter of Dec. 19. One of these, the deposition of the heir-apparent, has already been done. I hear very confidentially that Yüan Shihkai is going to tell the Emp[ress] Dowager that she must cut off the head of Tung Fuhsiang. If that is done we shall get the credit of having brought that about also. Fr. both Liu Kunyi & Chang Chihtung I have recd. messages urging that the Empress Dowager must be left to manage affairs & that Junglu's retirement shall not be insisted on. I have not thought it worth while to explain to them that I have no intention of interfering in either matter, but it is clear that the belief that I am doing so has made them anxious. And all this has grown out of my having said to Prince Ch'ing & Li that as Junglu's troops took part in the attack on the Legations he would not be a very agreeable person for the FRR [Foreign Representatives] to meet. Junglu himself is perturbed, & has been having it spread abt. that he in reality was the protector of the Legations.

So I conclude that in such matters a mere word is sufficient to disturb the waters, & that a Note to the Chin. Govt. wld. be what the Chinese call taking a butcher's cleaver to cut up a spring chicken.

There is a rumour that Genl. Creagh is to be transferred in the spring to some other post & will be succeeded by Genl. Dorwood. I sincerely trust this is not correct. Genl. Creagh in my humble opinion has done admirably, & all the ill-feeling that existed before he took over command has entirely disappeared. I have nothing agst. Genl. D. but I don't think it wld. be possible to have a pleasanter man to work with than Creagh.

(Recd. private teleg. dated 3 March fr. Lord Lansdowne that Govt. of India is willing that Genl. Creagh should stay on.)

PRO 30/33 14/12 China (1-72)
(March 23, 1901 – April 28, 1902)

49. Satow to Sanderson

Secret.

6 Jany. 1902.

My dear Sanderson,

I enclose my account for the past year, and beg that after it has been approved, the amount may be paid to my account with Parr's Bank Ltd. 77 Lombard St.

y.v.t.

Encl.

19.01

Jany. 15. Mr. Wilton

Acting Consul at Ichang

for native employed in obtaining
confidential information July-Nov.

1900.

\$105 @2/- = 10.10.0

July 31 (reference to my
private letter to Sir Thos.

Sanderson of 21 June 1901)

410 = 41.0.0

Sept. 4 ditto

410 = 41.0.0

Oct. 8 ditto

(additional for man sent

to Kaifêng)

530@ 1/11 = 50.15.10

Oct. 26 ditto

410 = 39.5.10

Dec. 10 ditto

410 = 39.5.10

£221.17. 6

Two Hundred and Twenty One Pounds Seventeen Shillings and Sixpence. (signed) Ernest Satow

50. Satow to Francis Alexander Campbell (Senior Clerk at Foreign Office, 1896-1902)

8 Jany. 1902

My dear Campbell,

Apropos of my telegram No 5 it has prob[ably] escaped your notice that beyond the telegs. exchanged betw. the F.O. & myself respecting the commercial negotiations & the copy of [Sir James] Mackay's instructions in the conf[identia]l print you have never sent

me any information as to his powers, nor as to the relations betw. us. On his arrival he communicated direct with Shêng, and sent me a copy of his letter afterwards.¹

In the copy of his full powers wch. he has now sent me he is styled Special Com[missione]r in one place and High Comr. in another. This may be a mistake of his copyist, or an error in the original document, but as I am going to send a copy to the Chinese Foreign Board [Foreign Office, Wai Wu Pu], I thought it necessary to inquire of you wch. was correct.

y.v.t.

51. Satow to Lansdowne

16.1.02

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

I hope the press telegrams abt. “friction” at Newchwang have not disturbed the public mind. It seems very unlikely that anything of a serious nature could occur there with such a coolheaded man as [Alexander] Hosie in charge of the consulate.

In my desp. no. 10 I have sent paraphrases of telegs. exchanged with Hankow abt. Chang Chih-tung’s opposition to the rlwy. concession wch. the Peking Syndicate are trying to get. Reading betw. the lines it is not difficult to see that Chang has gone further than he is willing to admit. As to his fears of being removed I do not think they can be very well founded, seeing that he has his brother-in-law in the Grand Council, who wld. tell him if anything of the kind were on foot. But I am going to sound Yüan Shih-kai, who luckily is an old friend of his, & in that way I can convey a very gentle hint to him that we shall back up our friends. Of course I do not admit that we owe as much to him & Chang as S’hai people make out. In not siding with Tuan they were thinking of their own provinces in the first place, and not of the safety of foreigners.

I am having a struggle to get our old friend Hu apptd. Adm’or-genl. of the Northern Rlwy. This was promised to me some months ago by Prince Ch’ing, who now wants to wriggle out of it, & I am trying to keep him to his promise. It seems to me that the time has come to consider some plan for restoring the railway to the Chinese, and I have asked [C.W.] Kinder to furnish me with the heads of an agreement wch. shall reconcile 1 the military

¹ Satow learned of Mackay’s appointment from a Reuter wire on September 24, 1901 (Diary). On November 11th they talked in Hong Kong and Mackay said he had a commission as “Special Commissioner and Plenipo[tentiary].” On December 17th Uchida asked Satow what Mackay’s powers were. (Diary)

requirements in the way of trains for the conveyance of troops; 2 the requirements of the British & Chinese Corporation for the future protection of their interests 3 the interests of China. There must also be some provision for winding up the accounts of the military Director of Rlwys & for applying the proceeds of the Rlwy claims in a proper manner. When I get this into shape I shall lay it before you & ask for instructions.

Genl. Creagh was with me on the 14th & we went to see Mumm together to talk abt. a reduction of the troops in North China, & in connexion with that the termination of the T.P.G. [Tientsin Provisional Government]. Mumm seemed quite in favour of reducing the troops when the river opens, tho' he professed to have no instructions; but he said his Govt. were anxious abt. the vote for 25,000,000 marks for military expenditure in China. As regards the T.P.G. he is weakening, & I think will be ready to abandon that also about the same time. I shall be able to teleg. abt. both matters in a day or two.

The question of apportioning the indemnity still hangs fire. There is a dispute abt. Luhan rlwy. engineers' private claims betw. the Belg. & Fr. Legations - until that is decided we cannot even announce the figs. of the unreduced claims. Personally I am in favour of settling the division on the basis of my telegs. Nos. 2 & 4 of this year. Otherwise I do not see how we can get out of the present impasse.

The foreign bankers on the Comm[issio]n at S'hai are afraid the Hgkg & S'hai Bk. will manage to get the whole of the business of remitting the indemnity to Europe, & I hear fr. Mumm that the Germ. Govt. is particularly anxious for the Deutsch Asiatische Bank to have its share. I have told him that I hope everybody will get a fair share & that I have absolutely nothing to do with those arrangements, wch. are in the hands of the Bankers' Commission.

In my teleg. of yesterday I tried to give expression to my private feeling that the draft convention, especially if it has Prince Ch'ing's phrase abt. trade added, cannot hurt our real interests, & the trouble taken to declare that both parties are bound by the Scott agreement & the N. Rlwys. loan agree[men]t looks as if the Russians had tried their best to avoid treading on their corns. I feel convinced that Yüan Shihkai's policy of trying to tire the Russians out is a mistaken one, & that he is only playing into the hands of the party in Russia wch. is anxious to find a pretext for holding on to Manchuria.

52. Satow to Bertie [summary]

to Bertie in reply to his letter enclosing Rev. Mr. de Courey's letter to Schomberg

McDonnell about his claim on a/c of the death of his son.

53. Satow to Sanderson

21 Jany. 1902

Secret

My dear Sanderson,

In the "Times" of Nov 8. 1900 there is a teleg. abt. a general Fan having been shot during a parley by an Indian trumpeter. The incident was reported at the time by Genl. Richardson, but I have not a copy of his report to Genl. Gaselee. I know it to be quite true.

A few days ago Genl. Mei who commanded in the S.E. of Chihli in June 1900, & assisted several Engl. missionaries to escape, mentioned to me the necessitous circs. of Fan's family, and said he was an excellent officer, who had rendered great services.

I wrote to one of our missionaries from there, offering any sum up to a thousand dollars (say £100) if [it] could be of any use, & recd. the enclosed reply from him (Rev. W. Hopkyn Rees). On that I had no doubt that it was a proper case, and sent him a cheque for the amount.

Under the circs. I think I might fairly put this down in my account with you, but will not press it, if on consideration you are of opinion that it shld. be regarded as a private charity of my own.

y.v.t.

[Margin note: Letter fr. Parr's Bank of 1 April/02 says £100 had been paid to my account by Sanderson.]

54. Satow to Barrington

25 Jany. 1902

My dear Barrington,

Your teleg. saying that [Henry] Cockburn has refused Canton because he desires a diplomatic post did not surprise me, because I had heard the latter just after he left Peking, but I suppose it means that there will be a vacancy in the post of Chinese Secretary. When that happens, I propose to recommend [Charles William] Campbell, who has done admirably since he came to me. But I want the position to be somewhat improved. Giving him rank with but after the Secretary of Legation is a good deal, but I shld. like the value of the post to be better than that of an ordinary consulate at £800 a year. The consul is his own

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master, has lighter work & keeps his own house. The Chinese Secy. has a chief over him, has constant work of an important character and must be ready to work at all hours. Can you not induce the Treasury to start Campbell at £900 a year, rising by increments of £20 to £1000. He is fully worth that, and the longer he holds the apptmt. the more valuable he becomes.

I am delighted to hear of [John H.] Gubbins' great merits being recognized,¹ but I think you shld. know that [Arthur Hyde] Lay, the man who will eventually succeed him is certainly not worth nearly as much either in the way of pay or rank. He is a good little fellow, but of no capacity.

y.v.s.

P.S. Thank you for sending me Claud Russell. He seems a thoroughly nice fellow.

E.S.

55. Satow to William St. John Brodrick [Secretary of State for War, 1900-03]

Private

Peking

27 January 1902.

Dear Mr. Brodrick,

I hear a good deal said by those who took part in the fighting at Tientsin in the summer of 1900 about the non-publication of a desp. of Genl. Dorward's in wch. he mentioned the names of those who had distinguished themselves, and comment has been excited by a Reuter teleg. stating that the China medal will have no clasp for Tientsin.

Will you permit me to offer a few observations wch. present themselves.

If casualties may be taken as a criterion of hard fighting there seems some reason in the contention that Tientsin has been forgotten owing to the brilliancy of the capture of the Taku forts and the fine defence of the Legations.

On the 17th June fire was opened on the foreign settlements at Tientsin, and fr. that date to the capture of the native city on July 14 there was continuous fighting. At the assault of the city our casualties were 6 officers and 112 men, those of the Japanese 18 officers and 384 men. The Americans lost many killed, and the total casualties for all the allies was over

¹ J.H. Gubbins was promoted from Japanese Secretary to Secretary of Legation in the Diplomatic Service at Tokyo on June 26, 1902. However George Barclay was the Secretary of Legation from August 9, 1902. Gubbins remained Japanese Secretary and held that post till his retirement on September 10, 1909. He was succeeded by E.M. Hobart-Hampden.

800 on that day. I am told that the total casualties at Tientsin during the four weeks fighting was over 3000. All this occurred before General Gaselee arrived and took the command.

The importance of these operations would seem to justify some special recognition being accorded to those who took part in them. Tientsin was the pivot of the military position for nearly a month. The loss of the foreign settlements would have entailed that of the Legations, and then prob. the whole of China wld. have been in a blaze; while the capture of the native city broke up the Chinese plan of campaign, made the besiegers of the Legations pause, and even grant the defenders an armistice. In fact their defeat at Tientsin demoralized the Chinese army, and rendered the march on Peking a much easier operation than had been anticipated.

I trust you will pardon these remarks, wch. are drawn from me by the feeling that some, especially the Tientsin volunteers and other civilians who did splendid work, have not received the recognition they deserved, while a large portion of the naval brigade which co-operated in the defence of Tientsin and the 1st Chinese Regiment took no part in the capture of the Taku forts or in the advance on Peking.

It may however be the intention to regard the fighting at Tientsin as merely an episode in the operations for the relief of the Legations, and to confer the clasp for the relief on the men who remained in Tientsin. But this wld. hardly correspond to the view taken here of the defence of the settlements and the capture of the native city, wch. were much more than a mere episode, and seem therefore to be worthy of separate recognition.

y.v.f.

56. Satow to Lansdowne

29 Jany. 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Yesterday's audience at wch. the Empress-Dowager played the chief part [see diary, Ruxton, pp. 192-3] was the visible confirmation to us of what has been going on for some time past in the way of the assumption of the supreme power by Her M[ajesty]. She has of late been issuing edicts in her own name without making any mention of the Emperor.

She arranged matters so that the Diplomatic Body shld. have no time left to them to resist, & I am very doubtful whether even a small minority wld. have consented to refuse seeing her. It is the same with the ladies' reception, wch. I cld. not have tried to hinder without running the risk of being pointed to as her chief enemy.

I can quite understand that all this will be very distasteful to readers of the "Times" in particular. But careful inquiry has convinced me that all the leading officials, including the viceroys of Canton, Nankin & Hankow are devoted supporters of the Dowager. The only way to have prevented what has happened wld. have been to frighten her fr. bringing the Court back to Peking. She wld. not have allowed the Emperor to come alone. But I did not feel myself authorized to adopt any means for frightening her into staying away.

The Emperor is very sickly and timid. No one pays any attention to him. It is possible that he may be intelligent, but of that one cannot detect any signs. When he smiles he seems to have a kindly expression, at other times he looks like a hunted animal.

After the audience I thought it politic to say to Prince Ch'ing & to Chü Hung-chi, who is a member of the Grand Council, that it was very satisfactory to hear such sentiments fr. Her M[ajest]y's lips, & that they would have a reassuring effect at home. This is pretty sure to be repeated to her.

When the Mins. were introduced to her, she looked at me, thinking I was the Germ. Min. & when the mistake was explained, she made him a little reassuring nod. Lessar & I were then pointed out, but she paid us no attention at all. She is evidently an extremely capable woman, mistress of herself and of everyone else.

I confess it was difficult not to feel a certain compassion for her as she uttered what was in intention an apology of a humiliating sort, & perh., had I been Doyen, I would have said a few words of consolation. Her little nod of the head in dismissing us was done as if she had been in the habit of being gracious all her life.

My own opinion has always been that we have no reason to fear a renewal of the outburst of anti-foreign hatred of 1900, and I still think so. It cannot be denied that beginning with the taking of Kiaochow [by Germany in 1897] the rulers of China have recd. a great deal of provocation, and that all the Powers have traded on her weakness.

Chang Chih-tung's asking for our interference on his behalf, and then shrinking back when it came to the point shows that he is not to be relied upon; & the corresp'ce with Hankow abt. the Peking Syndicate's line convinces me that he has been pulling strings agst. us. I have nothing but praise for the way in wch. Mr. [E.H.] Fraser has conducted the talks with Chang thro' his private Secy. He is distinctly one of the very ablest men we have in the Consular service.

My U.S. & Japse. colleagues have been very actively trying to frighten the Chinese abt. the Manchurian Convention, and the former has given a full account of his doings to

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[William M.] Laffan's agency [Laffan News Bureau]. I think it is better to work more quietly, & if possible show the rest of the world as little as possible of what we do.

The excisions I have proposed in the bluebook seem rather extensive, but I wished to keep our friends the Viceroy's fr. harm, and to avoid if possible showing disagreement with Germany & America.

57. Satow to Litton

12.2.02

Dear Mr. Litton,

You will receive some despp. by this opportunity, wch. are addressed to you pro formâ, altho' it will be for Mr. Mackinnon to act upon them. But I think you should read them.

You will perh. not take amiss a word of advice from a man who is a good deal your senior. I think that in some respects it is to be regretted that you have mostly been in remote independent posts since your entrance into the China Consular service, the natural result of wch. is that you prefer your own judgment to that of your seniors' & official superiors. Perh. we are all like that at the beginning. I have been shown a private letter of yours to the Accountant, wch. you requested I shld. see, & therefore it may be taken as if it had been addressed to myself. I observe you style the Treaty as an "egregious document". Language of that kind seems out of place. Routes that now are not the best may well have been good in 1894. You will not have forgotten the impression produced by your telegs. to my predecessor abt. the Fleming murder case. I read them shortly afterwards, & was not surprised at the result. What you write or teleg. officially may perh. have to appear in a bluebook, & it is well to be careful of what one says. Strong language seldom produces the effect hoped for, & it usually creates an adverse opinion regarding the man who uses it.

You are now going to Yünnanfu, where you will have very important work. It is all the more necessary to be careful what you put in official despp. [despatches]. Anything of a personal nature referring to officials of other countries shld. be written separately, either in a "very conf[idential]" desp. or in a private letter. You have a chance of distinguishing yourself. Don't throw it away.

y.v.t.

58. Satow to Lansdowne

13 Feb. 1902

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The news of the Anglo-Japse. Agreeet. only got out here yesterday afternoon, and up to the present the only foreign opinion I have heard is that of my U.S. coll. [Conger] who thinks it the most important political event that has taken place for a long time [see diary, February 12, 1902]. He seems to think too that the Japse. are burning to go to war to turn the Russians out of Manchuria, & says that they cld. easily put 100,000 men there in a month's time. But I do not imagine events will move as swiftly as that.

My Jap. Coll. [Uchida Yasuya] gave Prince Ch'ing a copy yesterday, & I had intended to do so at an interview I had c. him in the afternoon, but the interpreters of of the two legations had not quite agreed upon the exact wording of the translation, & perh. Uchida & I might arrange to send it in officially.

Prince Ch'ing said he looked upon the agree[men]t as new proof of the friendship of Engl. & Japan & he thought it wld. greatly facilitate his negotiations for the evacuation of Manchuria. Quite recently he had observed that there was more willingness on the part of the Russians to come to terms. He lent me a copy of what he said was his last counter draft, & observed with a smile of satisfaction that perh. he might be able to pare it down still more. I advised him to be in no hurry, as there had not been time for the Agreement to produce its full effect.

He added that [Dmitrii] Pokotilof [Manager of the Russo-Chinese Bank] had called on him the previous day, but he had excused himself fr. receiving him, & had deputed Lien-fang, an undersecretary, to say that he could not discuss the proposed agreeet. c., the Russo-Chinese bank for mining & industrial privileges. This I presume was in accordance with the promise he gave to Uchida a few days back not to sign the said agreeet.

I suppose my Germ. coll. must have recd. a teleg. informing him of the Anglo-German agreeet., for he came round a little before six, but I was out. He then wrote to ask me for the loan of the Manchurian Agreeet. & that with the Russo-Chinese Bank, & asked whether I had communicated our Agreeet. to the Chinese. For the former I referred him to Morrison's teleg. in the Times of Nov. 9, & promised to give him the heads of the Russo-Chinese draft; & I told him I had not communicated the A-J. agreeet., tho' I believed the Chinese had it. I don't feel much confidence in Mumm.

Uchida gave a copy to Conger yesterday, whose first idea was to give it to Reuter's agent,

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& the correspt. of the Associated Press. I gently suggested that he should wait at least until we got Reuter's teleg. announcing its communication to Parliament.

I shall teleg. Prince Ch'ing's draft in extenso to save confusion.

I have just learnt that Uchida gave copies to Mumm & Sir Robt. Hart, and at the request of the Belgian Ch. d'Aff. one to him also.

E.S.

59. Satow to Lansdowne

27 Feby. 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

With regard to Prince Ch'ing's counterdraft and[?] my counselling him to persevere in his intention of asking Lessar to fix a day for signing it, I thought that as he had already told Lessar that he was willing to accept the conditions named in it, he could not without incurring a charge of ill faith propose any further modification without first giving Lessar the refusal of it; then when the French text came to be discussed the further modifications you desired might be introduced to a large extent on the ground that they wld. render the intentions of the parties clearer. This I found was also Uchida's view, & he had heard fr. Tokio that his Govt. wld. be satisfied if the Russians accepted the counterdraft.

We both found the Prince a little disposed to be obstinate when we recommend to him what seem to him verbal amendments. But as U. very reasonably said to him, if there is any ambiguity in a convention it is sure to be interpreted in accordance with the wishes of the stronger Power.

The proposal that the communication of the number of troops & their stations shld. be made reciprocal seems to Uchida & myself one that Russia wld. have great difficulty in accepting, & he has referred the point to Tokio. I gave him a paraphrase of your teleg. no. 4 & also sent it on to Sir Claude MacDonald. It arrived here fearfully mangled & with large portions transposed.

Conger has not such definite or such strong instructions as I have, but he is quite disposed to do what he can. Owing to his habit of repeating everything to Reuter's agent, Uchida & I do not think it desirable to tell him all we learn fr. Prince Ch'ing, but we tell him everything we can.

With Mumm I have come to the conclusion that it is best to be rather reticent.

The Russians are busy trying to make the Chinese believe that the object of the

Anglo-Japse. agreement is to let the Japse. in after they evacuate [Manchuria]. This has come to me from 2 sources.

Warren writes to me that the German officers' quarters at Shanghai certainly come under the head of "permanent" constructions, & that the huts for the rank & file are of the type used in standing camps in Germany, but of a more durable character. They have an English officer named Springer, formerly of the 2nd Rajputs, who resigned last year, employed on construction, and that he had to sign an engagement with the architect not to reveal any of the details.

The A-J Agreement seems to have greatly improved our position here, but I am told Yüan Shihkai dislikes it because he thinks it lessens his chance of getting back the Tientsin administration. I have told him & Prince Ch'ing conf.y that H.M.G. wld. be willing to let the P.G. [Provisional Government] come to an end on May 1, & that it is for the Chinese themselves to approach the other colls: who have officers on the Council. Prince Ch'ing has shown me the dft. of the letter wch. he proposes to address to the colls: concerned, to wch. no exception can be taken on the score of wording, provided he makes an alteration that I have recommended. It is stated however that the Fr. Min. is now in favour of maintaining the Council, because Yüan has cashiered an official devoted to Fr. military interests, so I do not anticipate a speedy solution of the question. Certainly all the military men are for holding on to Tientsin.

I have sent Genl. Creagh the draft of the conditions on wch. it seems to me the rlwy. might be handed back to the Chinese, but he has not yet returned it. The Br. & Ch. Corpns. are sending a man fr. S'hai to confer with me abt. the clauses wch. will be inserted to protect their interests, & when I have it ready I propose to teleg. a summary. This is a matter in wch. we shall encounter military opposition likewise.

60. Satow to R.W. Mansfield

27 Feb. 1902

My dear Mansfield,

You will remember that I wrote to you several months ago asking you to go to Canton to act in B.C.G. Scott's place, & saying that I wld. recommend you for the vacancy. You said however that you wld. rather not go till after your home leave, & I had to find someone else to endure the burden & heat of the day. The F.O. were very anxious that the post shld. be carefully looked after, as they had heard that Fr[ench] interests were getting the upper hand,

so I sent James Scott to act. I told the F.O. of the proposal that I had made to you, & found that they had some one else in their mind, so that they were not disposed to give it to you. Things went on for some months until B.C.G. Scott's retirement was arranged, & they asked me to fill up the existing vacancies. In the meantime I had been down South, & seen things for myself. I found James Scott was held by official & unofficial people to have done extremely well, & I have myself had excellent reason to approve of the way he has done his work. Consequently, going on the principle that a man who has approved himself well in an acting apptmt. shld. be confirmed, I have felt obliged to propose James Scott for Canton, in the same way as I recommended E.H. Fraser for Hankow. I am afraid this will be a disappointment to you, & that I shld. very much regret. But I hope to make it up to you in some measure by giving you the acting apptmt. at Shanghai when Warren goes on leave, & my doing so wld. be greatly facilitated if you could make up your mind to shorten your stay at home somewhat. I feel the less reluctance in proposing this to you, as you are getting your home leave almost to a day, and there are plenty of men who have not been so fortunate in that respect. Warren's leave is overdue, but he will scarcely be able to get it this summer, and I am asking him to remain till next spring.

y.v.t.

61. Satow to Lansdowne

5 March 1902

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

Last night I sat by the Japse. Minr. [Uchida] at dinner, and after he had taken a good deal of champagne, I told him there was a report going about among the colls: that the Russians are furious with Ito [Hirobumi] for listening to them when he was at Petersburg abt. an arrangement respecting Corea & Manchuria, while all the time he had the Anglo-Japse. agreeet. in his pocket.

Uchida replied that Ito had always been ready to come to an understanding with Russia on these subjects, and being a good deal of an opportunist did turn a favourable ear to their proposals. But the negotiations betw. Japan & Engl. had already gone too far, & the Japse. Govt. did not support him, & when he came to London, finding how matters stood, he threw himself on the side of England. Hayashi [Tadasu, the Japanese Minister in London] being a sharp fellow, saw that it wld. be well to commit Ito as far as possible, & recommended that a decoration shld. be given to him. On his return to Japan Ito will get

great credit for having brought abt. the alliance, & that will be useful to him in strengthening his political position.

Thus far Mr. Uchida, who perh. draws on his imagination. He was at the Foreign Dept. at Tokio up to the end of October, & must know a good deal about the preliminary negotiations, but I am not aware that he has had any special information abt. their subsequent course. As one of the younger officials (he is only 36) he doubtless regards Marquis Ito as destined shortly to disappear from the political scene with the rest of the latter's contemporaries.

E.S.

62. Satow to Lansdowne

13.3.1902

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

My Port[uguese] coll: [Azevedo] has recd. instructions fr. his Govt. to insist upon the right of Port. subjects to import goods at the rates specified in the tariff of 1858. He came to me this afternoon [see diary] with draft telegrams to his consuls at S'hai & Canton & to the Govt. of Macao, requesting them to make this public to all whom it might concern. He also read to me the dft. of a Note to Prince Ch'ing asserting the rights of Portugal in this matter.

He has been much upset by a Note fr. Prince Ch'ing apparently declining all negotiation abt. the boundaries of Macao & its dependencies, & proposing to send instructions to the Govr. of Canton to delimit the boundary in accordance with actual facts.

I explained to him that this was the usual Chinese way, and that we all recd. similar rebuffs at the outset of a negotiation. I agreed with him that his Note to Prince Ch'ing wld. do no harm, and said that I could support him on that point. But I dissuaded him from sending his telegrams, wch. wld. bring all the colls: the foreign mercantile community & the press upon his back, & perhaps create embarrassment for the Port. Govt. & he promised to act on my advice.

He is much annoyed by Mumm's dictatorial style; of treating him, and is disposed to kick.

I pointed out that if his govt. insisted on keeping the old tariff, the colls: wld. certainly tell him that Portugal wld. have no right to the private indemnities I have claimed for his people, wch. can only be paid out of the resources provided by the Protocol, in wch. are included the 5% effective import duties. He replied that his govt. wld. in any case put

public before private interestst.

Shld. Portugal hold out to the bitter end abt. the import tariff there will be a great row, because her action strikes at the root of the protocol. Mumm is actively urging that all the govts. shld. press Portugal on this subject. I have answered that H.M.G. is seized [aware] of the question.

63. Satow to Sanderson

13 Mar. 1902

My dear Sanderson,

I have read in the papers Dillon's questions abt. the seals. There had been already some mention of them at Peking, & I have gathered that they are of no value or importance. The red seals were in the custody of some old women who remained in the Palace after the flight of the Court, & were used to stamp the credentials of [Chinese plenipotentiaries] Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung chang. I am very glad you spent no public money in buying them to give back. The less we touch the loot question the better. I found in this house some imperial mortuary tablets of deceased emperors, wch. I gave to old Hu, and he got the credit of finding them & restoring them; the Legation did not appear in the affair. I cleared out of my house every article of looted furniture by sending it back to where it came from, but have kept this fact to myself.

How could you write me a letter on such an indifferent matter the very day after the signature of the Anglo-German Agreement and yet say nothing about the latter. By an indiscretion of some one who sent here a teleg. intended for Washington I suspect the existence of something besides the agreement, but I am not going to ask indiscreet questions.

The usual loose talk goes on about Japan declaring war. I tell everybody that Ito is far too knowing to begin by playing out his solitary ace.

y.v.t. [yours very truly]

64. Satow to Lansdowne

Mar. 22. 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

In my private letter of Jany. 16 [see no. 51 above] I said that Genl. Creagh and I had been together to see Mumm about the reduction of troops, & that he seemed quite in favour of

the idea. But as soon as we left him he telegd. to the Germ. general at Tientsin on no account to discuss the matter with the other commanding officers. General Creagh in fact on getting a teleg. fr. me asking him to come to Peking to talk the question over with me, had conversed with his military colls:, who were quite ready to fall in with our views. Genl. Rohrscheidt in particular agreed to everything, including the reduction pari passu . [Latin: at the same pace.] At our interview Creagh frankly told all this to Mumm, who prob. supposed that this was an attempt on my part to get behind him. Genl. Creagh was naturally very surprised on returning to Tientsin the next day to find a note fr. Genl. Rohrscheidt to say that he cld. not attend the conference, as it was on a political subject. The conference was put off for a few days, but finally Genl. Creagh decided to hold it, & then recd. fr. Rohrscheidt the official letter of wch. a copy was enclosed in my desp.

Mumm afterwards complained to me of our precipitation, but I reminded him that C. & I had come to him in the most frank & open manner to tell him exactly what we had done and proposed doing.

I suppose the anxiety of the German ambassador to get a German military officer on the Peiho Board is caused by a wish to afford Count v. Bülow further ground for boasting that he has secured for Germany equal rights on the Peiho river; as if she had not always enjoyed equal rights there with any other Power.

65. Satow to Lansdowne

27 Mar. 1902

Dr. Lord Lansdowne,

I have written a desp. abt. the Br. & Chin. Corpn's new proposals regarding the S'hai-Nanking rlwy. They [do] not appear to have been meant seriously, but rather to furnish the corporation with an excuse for doing nothing, wch. they would be able to allege in self-defence next time next time [sic] you or another member of the Govt. asks them why they do not turn these concessions of theirs to account.

While Belgians, Fr. & Germans go ahead with building rlwys, our people do nothing. The press alleged for them that it was because they were not properly supported by H.M.G. My desp. [despatch] is intended to put the blame on the right shoulders.

I am doing all I can to help the Peking Syndicate, & have made a little progress. Of course as long as the Manchurian question was pending one could not hope for much result, but now that it seems on the point of being settled, largely with our help, perh. the Chinese

will see that they must in turn do something for us.

Three things militate agst. the Peking Syndicate.

1 ° The supineness of the B. & C. Corpn. who have made no serious endeavour to carry out any of their preliminary contracts.

2 ° The belief that the Syndicate's line to Pukóu wld. be injurious to the Peking-Hankow line of the Franco-Belgians.

For this belief there seems to be much ground, at least so I am assured by men who are not by any means partisans of the Peking-Hankow railway people. I think it is admitted by the agent of the Peking Syndicate and by the "Times" correspondent.

3 ° Sheng thinks that the Peking Syndicate is merely an "affaire de bourse", and that it merely seeks for a concession in order to pass it off upon the public, without putting its own money into either mines or railways. Of the correctness of this view I am no judge, but the belief has to be reckoned with.

66. Satow to Lansdowne

27 March 1902.

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

In my desp. abt. the Eastern Extension Teleg. Co's wish to have control of a landline fr. Peking to Taku for connexion with the cables I have tried to explain that either the Gt. Northern Co. have negotiated their agreement No. 3 of 26. August 1900, by wh. they alone are to have this privilege, behind the back of the E. E. & so played them a dirty trick; or else the E.E. Co. knew what was going on & have kept it from the knowledge of H.M.G.. until now.

It is scarcely a week since I was first informed of this agreement's existence, so that for the past year I have been working in the dark, while my Russian colls: were in possn. of all the facts.

67. Satow to F.A. Campbell

Peking

3.4.02

My dear Campbell,

In a note to a desp. of Phipp's printed in [Jany. 27] Section 3, I see you make a correction to my teleg. of Jany. 15 referring to the Fr. Min. of Finance having said that the

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Peking-Hankow line was “one of the most important French political interests”. I was following a report in the Lond: [London] & China Express of Nov. 22, where the words attributed to him are “that line wch. was the centre of Fr. influence in China”. You are quite right; I see from the enclosure in F.O. No. 268 to me that the phrase was “influence industrielle”.

In Lord Lansdowne’s No. 33 to Washington he says he told Mr. Choate that we had resolved to reduce our force in North China during the spring from 6000 to 2000, exclusive of the Legation guard. These are the figures of the international garrison at Tientsin during Waldersee’s “transitional” & “permanent” periods, and there seems to have been some confusion.

Exclusive of the Legn. guard the force in North China, unreduced is

British 437

Indian 3746

4183

Strength of our permanent garrison as laid down by Waldersee

Tientsin 500

Lutai 300

Tongshan 300

Shanhaikwan 300

1400

The T.P.G. [Tientsin Provisional Government] & rlwy. require roughly some 400 more.

The Legn. guard is at present 250. In my teleg. No. 23 I said the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] wld. be able to reduce in the spring to 2000 including Legn. guard, that is if either the T.P.G. or the rlwy. were given up.

So the passage would have been correct if it had said from 4000 to 2000 men. Perh. 600 is a misprint.

P.S. At Shanghai the force, additional to the above, is British 44

Indian 777

821

68. Satow to Campbell

10.4.02

My dear Campbell,

I hear that the Italian Govt. have published a greenbook on Chinese affairs, wch. contains some interesting information bearing on the figures of the Indemnity claimed by the Italians. I shld. be much obliged if you wld. send me a copy. Fr[om] all I can learn various PP [Powers] have claimed more than was right. The Fr[ench] I have already shown up. Now I am told that figs. were given to the German Budget Committee showing that Germany gets a surplus of 34,000,000 marks, agst. wch. she places military expenditure after July 1 1901, wch. all the PP including herself agreed to forgo, & a possible loss in consequence of a fall in silver. This last has no justification, as the indemnity being paid in gold such a fall entails loss on China, not on the PP. Mumm desires all this, but I had it from Beau.

By next mail I hope to send you the exact figures of all our private claims, interest included, with a scheme for paying them off. y.v.t.

69. Satow to Barrington [extract]

To Barrington. 10.4.02

[John Charles Tudor] Vaughan starts today on leave of absence & you may possibly see him before you get this. I part fr. him with great regret on acct. not only of his many amiable qualities, but because he is a most willing & efficient head of the chancery. Unless you want to do him a good turn by sending him to a more important post, I hope you will let him come back to Peking at the end of his leave. E.S.

70. Satow to Lansdowne

10.4.02

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Now that the Manchurian Convention is out of the way for the moment, I hope to be able to get on with other things. Some progress has been made with the “Kowshing” business, & the Chinese seem disposed either to abandon their clause in the reference, or else to acknowledge that they ought to pay compensation. In the latter case the arbitration wld. merely have to fix the amount. They prob. think that in return for our help abt. Manchuria they ought to show some complaisance towards us, but I am not inclined to accept a concession on this matter as an equivalent. First & foremost they must give way on the

commercial treaty wch. Sir Jas. Mackay is negotiating & 2ndly I must get the Peking Syndicate's railway out of them. I hope to see Prince Ch'ing tomorrow, in order to urge his consent to two of Sir J. M.'s clauses wch. the Chinese negotiators have agreed to, & wch. have been referred to them by the Chinese Govt. One is with ref[eren]ce to the establish[men]t of a national coinage, the other is the free movement of rice from port to port.

I had some conversation a day or two ago with Sir Robt. Hart on the former of these. He told me he had as yet seen none of Sir Jas' [i.e. Sir James Mackay's] proposals, but was certain that before concluding the treaty he wld. be consulted on all the provisions. The 3 most important articles were those relating to the abolition of likin, the amendment of the inland navigation rules & residence in the interior & I gathered that he was opposed to all three so far as he has learnt their contents. I told him that I understood a satisfactory compromise had been arrived at on the first two, but that as I only knew what it was confidentially I could not give him any information. I know he looks on the Inland Navigation Regns. as an encroachment on the sovereignty of China, and that he framed them in such a manner as to diminish as much as possible what he regards as the harm likely to result fr. them.

No progress has been made with regard to either the restoration of Tientsin to the Chinese govt. or the transfer of the rlwy. It is 10 days since I gave Hu my draft proposals, & the only thing I have yet heard is that they wld. prefer the 2nd document, that wch. provides for the interest of the bondholders, shld. be signed by myself instead of the B. & C. Corpn. I see no objection to that, provided the clause taking the London agency away fr. Whittall & Co. & giving it to the Corpn., as explained in my desp., is struck out. If the Corp. have a repres've on the Board they will be able to direct a fair share of the agency business towards themselves, & they ought not to ask for more.

My Port[uguese] Coll. [Azevedo] tells me that Na-t'ung and Lien fang the two undersecs. of the Foreign Board are to be apptd. to negotiate with him, not abt. the delimitation of Macao, but on commercial matters, especially with refe[eren]ce to the adherence of Port[uga]l to the final Protocol, & they have hinted that in return for Port'l agreeing to this, China will give way in regard to territory. I shall be curious to see how this is worked out.

71. Satow to Lansdowne

24.4.02

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

As it seems likely that Sir Jas. Mackay will fr. time to time find it necessary to send me articles of his dft. treaty to urge on the Chinese Govt., & as I am obliged to give leave of absence to Mr. [C.W.] Campbell the Actg. Chin. Secy., who really needs it after 9 yrs. continuous residence in China, I have proposed that Mr. Cockburn shld. come up here to explain to me Sir Jas' views & to aid me in convincing Prince Ch'ing. He will continue to be the Asst. Commr., & I shall try to carry on the current work of the Chinese Secretariat with Mr. Mayers, wch. fortunately is not now so heavy as it has been for the past 18 mos. I shall be able to profit by Mr. C's advice abt. Chinese affairs in general. This seems to me to be the best way of arranging matters, as at present I have no one at hand who cld. efficiently replace Mr. [S.F.] Mayers.

My Amer. coll[eague, E.H. Conger] has just returned fr. S'hai where he went to consult his fellow commissioners for the revision of their commercial treaty. He says that his govt. agrees to all Sir Jas' proposals except the one abt. likin. The U.S. will not as at present advised consent to a 15% duty on imports in return for the abolition of all inland taxation on commerce, while he believes the Chinese will ask for an even higher rate. He expects the negotiations to last a long time; I hope that he is taking an unnecessarily pessimistic view of the situation.

I have today settled with the Chinese the terms on wch. the rlwy. is to be handed back to them, both as regards military requirements and securing a voice to the B. & C. Corpn. in the management. But I have had to give up the agency wch. the latter wished to secure. I hope to sign in abt. a week's time, fixing June 1 for the date of transfer, provided the colls: & their military men concur. If they do not, we shall at least have demonstrated our good will in the matter.

It seemed to me that at the present juncture more use cld. be made of the agreeet. to give Russia exclusive mining privileges in Kirin, by using it as a lever for obtaining the P'ukóu rlwy. for the Peking Syndicate. For this reason I did not lecture Prince Ch'ing on its being a violation of our m-f-n clause, but simply drew attention to the very considerate way G.B. had acted. As Conger has been away any combined action betw. him the Japse. & myself wld. have been impossible, & I think I can turn it to better acct. than by recording a formal protest.

The Court returns here on the 29th, & till then we shall not be able to do much in any business matter.

My Port. coll: had yesterday an interview with the two officials depicted to discuss with him amendments to the Port. commercial treaty. He is proceeding on the lines reported in my last desp. on the subject & seems to be producing a favourable impression. There is no time today to report the details as he told them to me.

We have had absurd rumours of every possible sort the last ten days since the departure of the Court, and some of the legations took precautions wch. were rather calculated to excite than to allay panic. In general the state of the country is better than the newspapers make it out to be.

I wish the division of the indemnity could be arranged, as the present uncertainty and the locking up of so much silver bullion is depressing the exchange, & the bankers' commission are getting into a muddle. They do not seem to distinguish betw. their business as bankers & their duties as delegates of their govts.

Fr[om] my Fr[ench] coll:'s conversation I gather that he does not believe greatly in the success of the rlwy. to Yünnanfu. Coal cannot be laid down at Haiphong fr, the mines in Yünnan at less than 40 francs the ton, while Japse. coal can be bought there at 30 francs.

I asked Lt. Leake of the "Bramble" [on April 18th, see diary] who commands that gunboat at Taku to find out whether he cld. bring her safely to Tientsin, but he reports that he cld. only do it by lightening her, & there wld. be the risk of losing a screw. I told him I did not wish him to make the attempt unless he was quite sure of a complete success. Fr. all I hear however the works will before long have made sufficient progress to render it possible, & it is already quite evident that we do not need a military officer on the conservancy board for the purpose.

72. Satow to Mansfield

28 April 1902

My dear Mansfield,

I am much obliged to you for giving up your leave and returning to take charge at S'hai, for Dr. Macleod was emphatic about the necessity of Warren going home before the hot weather, & I had no one else whom I could send there.

I enclose copy of a letter I wrote to you abt. the Canton vacancy [see no. 60 above], wch. must have reached Amoy just after you left. You will find in it the reasons why I felt

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obliged to recommend Jas. Scott. When I saw you at S'hai I was still under the impression that the F.O. did intend to give it to a man of their own choice, & I did not feel at liberty to speak abt. it then. It was only when they telegd. out to me to fill up the vacancies that I learnt their original idea had been abandoned. But if I am here when S'hai next becomes vacant & the F.O. leave the matter in my hands I shall offer it to you first.

As Acting Consul-general you are in any case entitled to take precedence before consuls, that question having been long ago settled by the practice at S'hai & Yokohama & maintained the other day at Canton.

y.v.t.

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/13

Letter Book. Chinese mission. (8 May 1902 – 31 December 1903)

1. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking, 8 May 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

My Portuguese coll: [José Azevedo Castello Branco] tells me he recently had a very satisfactory interview with the Comrs. apptd. to negotiate with him, at wch. he was asked to state what he wanted in return for the concessions he had offered. He gave them a memo. stating that he wanted a concession for a rlwy. fr. Macao to Canton in favour of a Portug. co., the removal of obstacles to trade on the W. river, & permission to construct whatever works might be necessary for the improvement & protection of the port of Macao within a certain zone. He also showed me the dft. of a convention he had drawn up, embodying his offers and demands, worded in such a manner as to avoid hurting Chinese susceptibilities, the zone being marked on a map to be attached thereto. This zone includes all the islands over wch. Portugal desires to exercise control. To the Germ. Minr. [Alfons Mumm, Freiherr von Schwartzenstein] he has said he is making no progress, & to the Fr. Min. [Paul Beau] he has suggested that the negotiations for a Fr[ench] sanatorium at Macao shld. be transferred fr. that place to Peking, without however making any promise as to the eventual result. As far as I can judge he is carrying on his negotiations very judiciously, but I have abstained fr. asking any questions of the Chinese.

It is believed that Gallina, the new Italian Minister, recently mentioned the subject of a lease of Sanmun Bay, & met with a decided refusal. I am inclined to attach credit to this refusal.

The Chinese kept the contents of the two agreements abt. transfer of the Railway very well, & nothing was known outside until they were actually signed. Two days later the Belgian Ch. d'Aff. went to the Foreign Board & protested agst. the stipulation respecting the Tientsin-Paotingfu line, on the ground that Li Hung chang had promised it to the Belgian Co. The manager of the Russo-Chinese Bank is said to have told Hu that he wld. not agree to [C.W.] Kinder constructing the line to Kalgan; China might make it with her own money, but not borrow foreign capital for it. I do not suppose these good people have seen the English text of the B agreement, but may perh. have got hold of translations fr. the Chinese. Morrison tells me that the colls: consider the letter of the Chinese informing the

doyen of the military arrangement “very stupid”. [see diary for May 7th] They are prob. vexed at finding it has been concluded without their knowledge, & that any fresh lines in Chihli are practically reserved for the Br. & C. Corpn. I lent copies of A [agreement] to the German, Russian, American & Jap. Mins. privately for their information, so that it is probably known to every member of the diplomatic body who cares to see it. At our meeting yesterday the Doyen [Czikann von Wahlborn] asked what ans. he shld. return to the Chinese letter, & was told he might reply that he had communicated it to his colls:, who wd. answer separately. The Chinese must have been very eager to sign, or they wld. not have kept the secret so well, & I have explained that it is their business to obtain the consent of the colls:. If the latter refuse, all we can do is to let things remain in statu quo, & this will not harm our interests as B. is entirely independent of A’s being carried out.

Genl. Creagh on behalf of the Military Director has written to me officially asking when the rlwy. indemnity will be paid. I have told him that the first payts. we receive will be devoted to the satisfaction of private claims, & that the half-million for the intramural rlwy. will prob. take the form of bonds, wch. will have to be realized for what they will fetch. It certainly has hampered the Military Director greatly to have no funds for repairs and rolling stock beyond the £90,000 advanced by the Treasury & such surplus revenue as was available.

Fr. the reports that reach me I conclude that the troubles in the South of this province are not of any great importance, & that Yüan Shihkai will be able to suppress them. If he had not been absent with the Court when they broke out, they wld. not have assumed their present magnitude.

Mr. Cockburn has arr[ive]d, & with his assistance I hope to be able to expedite Sir J. Mackay’s negotiations.

2. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking

May 22. 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I am afraid my despp. [despatches] abt. the Russian & Franco-Belgian opposition to the railway agreements are very long, but perh. when they are printed they will look less formidable. I always anticipated an outcry when it became known that we had made such a strenuous effort to prevent the Tientsin-Paotingfu & Peking-Kalgan lines fr. falling under

their control.

The important point to my mind is not so much to secure to the B. & C. Corpn. the financing of these lines if they are constructed, but to secure control of the rlwys. in the metropolitan province to the Chinese Govt. We have heard a good deal of la conquête paisible de la Chine par le chemin de fer [the peaceful conquest of China by the railway] & that is what I am trying to oppose. Moreover I am not quite sure that we cld. have opposed the Russians & Franco-Belgians by merely relying on the wording of para. 3 of the Rlwy. loan agreement of Oct. 98 wch. speaks of branches or extensions connecting with the Northern rlwys. So that strictly speaking it wld. seem that a line fr. Tientsin to Paotingfu or one fr. Peking to Kalgan, so long as it was not connected with the existing lines pledged to the Corporation wld. not be an infringement of their rights.

I shld. not run the risk of amending either agreement in the direction suggested in my teleg. of the 18th, unless I was quite satisfied that the other side wld. be contented. And moreover a mere statement that either line shld. be constructed with Chinese money wld. not suffice to protect our interest. The Peking-Paotingfu section of the Peking-Hankow rlwy. was built with Chinese money under Kinder's direction with the intention that it shld. remain a part of the N[orthern] Rlwys administration's property. The Belgians induced Shêng to memorialize by teleg. in favour of its being handed over to them. Prince Kung was away at the time, & a friend of Shêng's on the Grand Council got it put thro' without his hearing of it. The same thing might be done again. Therefore I added the words in Art. 5 of the B agreement "shall not be allowed to pass into other hands".

To judge from Prince Ch'ing's remarks I conclude that he at least is quite alive to the danger of letting any more railways pass into Russian or French hands, but there are other people like Shêng for instance, who think only of filling their own pockets & very little of protecting China agst. foreign encroachments. So it is necessary for us to be vigilant on behalf of China.

The Russ[ia]ns & French are hugging themselves with the idea that by refusing their consent to the transfer of the rlwy. under the A agreement, they prevent B fr[om] coming into force. But if the latter is carefully examined, it will be found to be independent of their consent. It comes into force whenever the Br. Mil. Admin'n hands the rlwy. over to [the] Chinese. That may be now, or any number of years hence. I think our position is a strong one as far as the agreements are concerned, but any public disgrace inflicted on Yüan & Hu wld. be a blow to our prestige. The Russ[ia]ns & Fr[ench] both hate Yüan, who is not in

their hands as Li [Hung chang] was. I believe Junglu is backing Yüan, & the latter is quite disposed to fight for his own hand, but I have frightened the Waiwupu a little I think by telling them that their memorializing agst. Hu & Yüan is denouncing the repres've of the British Govt.

I have given Lessar a draft of terms of ref'ce to the Mixed Commission apptd. to settle the dispute abt. rlwy. land at Tientsin, but he is apparently in no hurry to discuss it.

I am preparing a desp. abt. our share of the indemnity, but have had no time to finish it for this bag.

The disturbances in the S. of Chihli do not seem to be spreading & I hope Yüan will succeed in suppressing them.

Mr. Cockburn has arrd. & I hope with his assistance to be able to expedite Sir J. Mackay's negotiations. It seems to me very unfortunate that Chambers of Commerce are so opposed to his scheme for the abolition of likin. They do not altogether understand the question, & on some points appear to be very ignorant. Thus the Sec[retar]y of the Manchester Chamber in writing to the F.O. assumes the Customs revenue of 20,000,000 taels to be all derived fr. imports, whereas they do not furnish more than abt. ¼ of that amount, the rest being made up of duties on exports, coasting trade in Chinese goods & opium. It was bad tactics on the part of the S'hai folk to have opposed the scheme. The m.f.n. [most favoured nation] clause wld. have prevented its coming into operation until all the Powers had accepted it, & it wld. have been far better that the Chinese shld. have borne the reproach of rejecting the only statesmanlike scheme for dealing with likin that has been suggested by anyone.

3. Satow to Eric Barrington (summary)

22/5/02

To Barrington, asking for a junior to Russell, who is a good head of chancery, in case Vaughan does not return. The F.O. List gives the world to understand that I have two 2nd Secs. besides Russell.

4. Satow to Sanderson (extract)

29.5.02

Mackay's negotiations don't seem to get on. I have got Cockburn up here, and am trying with his aid to give an impulse to them, but there are many adverse influences, among wch.

without doubt that of Hart is the most difficult to counteract. Few of the colls: take any interest in treaty revision, & some wld. of course be delighted to see us fail. I am sorry Mackay talks of going home. The only way to succeed is to stick at it patiently & persistently.

5. Satow to Lansdowne

4 June 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

It seems within the bounds of possibility that the restoration of the Tientsin administration to Chinese authority and the transfer of the railway may be effected within the next few months, & I shld. hope also that Sir James Mackay's negotiations may come to a successful conclusion. If so, I hope there will be no objection to my taking six months' leave of absence in October next, when I shall have been two complete years in Peking. The work has been more severe than in ordinary times, and I should be very glad to be able to take a rest. My last leave [in 1900] was cut short by my being sent out here in somewhat of a hurry.

6. Satow to Barrington

4.6.02

My dear Barrington,

I have written to Ld. Lansdowne to ask for leave next October, wch. I hope will be allowed, as I shall then have been two full years at my post and the work has been exceptionally heavy the whole time.

7. Satow to Barrington

Peking

5 June 1902

My dear Barrington,

C.W. Campbell who has been acting as Chinese Secy. for the past year has just started on leave of absence. He intends to travel thro' Mongolia & will not be back in England till abt. the beginning of Sept. If you do not know him, I wish you would give him five minutes of your time. It is impossible to speak too highly of his excellent qualities & of his great ability in Chinese matters. I have met few men in the consular service who are so devoid of

self-seeking of every kind. He is very capable in all directions, & when there is a vacancy at any important consulate or consulate-general he will be a proper man to appt. The only man not yet of consul-general rank who wld. by reason of long service & general ability wld. [sic. repeated unnecessarily] be entitled to precede Campbell is Mansfield. Shld. S'hai become vacant, M. ought in my opinion to have it.

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P.S. In saying the above I am assuming that Cockburn, whose pay I see fr. the F.O. list has been raised to £1200 a year, will resume his position as Chinese Secy. when the Special Commission finishes its work. Otherwise I shld. ask for Campbell, of whose capacity I have a higher opinion.

8. Satow to Lansdowne

5 June 1902

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovitch is now in Peking, and is to be received by the Emperor and Empress-Dowager tomorrow. The Emperor will return his visit in another part of the Palace. The Fr. Germ. & U.S. mins. are giving him dinner, and he is coming to me on the 9th.

It seems likely that I shall be able to arrange the rlwy. question as far as the Russians are concerned. I am told by the Chinese that they have told the Belgian Ch. d'Aff. that they will most decidedly not give the Tientsin-Paotingfu line to his company, so Fr. opposition will still have to be counted with. It seems not unlikely that as the prize of giving up the Tientsin-Paotingfu line, in wch. they maintain they have an equal interest with the Belgians, they will extort a concession for the Yünnan railway, wch. they have not yet succeeded in obtaining, although they have a promise of it.

The troubles in the S. of this province & in Kwangsi seem to be dying out.

Lessar with whom I had a long talk yesterday, is of opinion that we need not fear any new attack fr. the Chinese Govt. for 5~6 yrs. While they are making their preparations, the E-D. will continue to conciliate European opinion. He looks on Yüan Shihkai as the most dangerous man, & says the idea prevalent in his entourage is not to attack all the Powers at once when the next time comes, but to make war upon Russia alone. He looks upon a real reorganization of China however as quite impossible, the ruling powers being entirely invertebrate.

Chang Chih-tung as usual is appealing to us to save him from being removed fr. his viceroyalty, & I continue to give him strong hints that he is the principal opponent to our commercial negotiations. Shêng it seems is sulky at the complaints we have made about his conduct of the negotiations, & wants to throw the blame on Chang. The Foreign Bd. cannot do much to help, owing to the peculiar system in wch. affairs are carried on here. Shêng has full powers to treat, & reports to the Throne direct. These reports pass through the hands of the Grand Council, who can make recommendations to the Empress-Dowager, but have no power to order Shêng abt.

It seems highly prob. that the E-D. has been stirred up agst. Hu & Yüan in regard to railway matters by the notorious Chang Yen-mao (otherwise known as Chang-yi), who is an old rival & enemy of Hu's. The latter however has the support of Junglu. Chang Yen-mao works thro' the favourite eunuch, whom no one dare touch.

The proposed monopoly of the retail sale of opium, abt. wch. I have been telegraphing, seems unlikely to succeed.

9. Satow to Lansdowne

19 June 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

It must be a great relief to every one to have got the question of sharing the indemnity among the Powers out of the way. My colls: are rather inquisitive abt. the reasons wch. have induced H.M.G. to give way at last, but I have successfully warded off their questions, & even if they do suspect we have a surplus, they do not know it to be a fact.

The explanation of the £2,000,000 indemnity claimed by the Fr. & Belgians for the Peking-Hankow rlwy. is said to be that they have undertaken to repay Shêng the millions of taels wch. he devoted to the construction of the first section as far as Paotingfu. That will make them practically the whole owners of the line, while at the same time they will have made a friend of Shêng for ever.

I have exchanged notes with Prince Ch'ing abt. the interpretation of the clause in my B agreement abt. the Northern railways, stipulating that lines northward fr. Peking or to Kalgan shall be built by the Chinese with their own money & never be mortgaged for a foreign loan. This they say will content the Russians & that the latter will now withdraw their objections to the rlwy. being handed over, & will proceed to ratify the Manchurian convention. By refusing the ratification they were able to put great pressure on the Chinese

& indirectly on us.

Beau tried to show me yesterday a scheme by wch. the interests of the Peking-Hankow rlwy & the Northern rlwys. in the proposed line fr. Tientsin to Paotingfu cld. be reconciled. I saw it involved a connexion betw. the two at Tientsin. I replied to him, as I have to the Chinese that I knew nothing abt. these technical matters of rlwy. management, & all I wanted to do was to hand over the Northern rlwys. to the Chinese. After that the B. & C. Corpn. & the Société d'Etudes were free to make whatever arrangements they liked.

I learn that the date of Li's letter to the Belgian Min. giving a sort of promise that the line in question, if ever built, shld. be given to them, is dated March 1901. So these miserable Belgians were pursuing their own end in the very height of the negotiations carried on by other PP without wch. they wld. not have got a penny of indemnity. I am afraid the Germans did the same abt. their mines in Shantung [province] but they kept it equally dark.

The way in wch. the Russians announced their intention of taking no part in the negotiations for the restitution of Tientsin, after having acted with us up to the other day can only be paralleled by their conduct last year abt. the provincial punishments.

And yet people are found to advocate in the press our coming to an understanding with the Russians. I suppose the editor of the "Spectator" has never had to do business with a Russian official.

The only colls: I have ever been able to trust have been Spaniards & Americans, but the Russians seem about on a par with Chinese.

Lately in connexion with my endeavours to help on Sir J. M's negotiations, I have found some unblushing lions among the Chinese officials. It is said that formerly they could be relied on, but that the present practice was introduced by a man who had been Minister at Petersburg.

I hope you will find Lady Susan Townley's account of her visit to the Empress-Dowager interesting. She seems to have a great latent [talent?] for narrative.

The Portuguese Minr. is not making much progress with his negotiations. I do what I can to help him, but it wld. not be wise to take up his cause very warmly, when we have such important interests of our own to attend to.

10. Satow to Sir Robert Bredon (extract)

8 July 1902

To R.E. Bredon extract

“I am interested in what you say abt. your possible return to Peking, but you will naturally understand that I cannot say anything definite in reply. I am however consulting the F.O. privately on the matter.”

11. Satow to Bertie

8 July 1902

My dr. Bertie,

I have recd. a letter fr. Bredon in wch. he says

“My return to Peking is looming up and I must say I shall not be satisfied, after having done some useful work independently here to return to a merely subordinate position indefinitely after 5 years waiting on an assurance given in a way to make its reliability at that time unquestionable.”

What am I to say to this?

Sir Robt. [Hart] shows no signs of going away or giving up, & I am convinced that he will lay his bones here. When that will be no one can tell. Age is telling on him, and at times he looks very frail. I suppose it is the work that keeps him going. To my mind Bredon can only expect to succeed Hart by outliving him and being on the spot to take over when the event happens. The corresp'ce I have perused seems to show that H.M.G. are bound to support his claim to succeed. Otherwise I should have been disposed to recommend Hippisley as the best choice. It wld. never do to put in an outsider fr. the Consular Service.

12. Satow to Lansdowne

15 July 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The opinion of the U.S. Minr. on the question whether the indemnity is payable in gold or silver is diametrically opposed to that of the Govt., & he has explained to them in a desp. what the Protocol really means. Sir R. Hart also interprets the Protocol in the same way that we do. The Chinese Govt. had been advised by him to admit it, but to ask for either time to pay the diff. betw. gold & silver, or to let the tariff on imports be on a gold basis; & he furnished them with a draft. They had intended to adopt this, but changed their minds on receiving a teleg. fr. Washington, referring to one of mine to yourself, wch. they quoted in their letter to the Foreign Mins. It was not Wu Ting fang who sent the teleg[ram], but Mr. Rockhill. I observed in his Report on the negotiations that while he was very friendly to

England at the beginning his tone changed very much towards the end. He is a bosom-friend of Mr. [John] Hay's [the U.S. Secretary of State], and is naturally referred to on all Chinese questions.

Conger has more than once expressed to me the opinion that Germany and France wish China to make default, in order that their territorial designs may have an opportunity of being realized, & that Russia having got her claws into Manchuria has no intention of letting go. But we shall see whether his surmise is correct when the Chinese accept the restoration of Tientsin, on the very moderate terms we have proposed.

Tientsin being one of the points on the line of communications wch. we are entitled to occupy, we shld. not be exceeding our rights if we occupied the town itself, instead of quartering our troops outside, as we have done. But we have not even claimed to retain a guard of military police in the town.

I am quite in favour of restoring the civil administration to the Chinese as a matter of policy and justice, but it ought to be clearly understood that we had the right of occupying the town. I think the terms embodied in the Note identique will be recognized as extremely moderate.

My Portug. coll: is more hopeful as to the success of his negotiations, wch. he seems to have conducted with much skill and tact. The Germ. Govt. have sent instructions that he may be supported, but "independently of the tariff", that is to say that his contention that Portugal remains entitled to the tariff of 1858 as long as she does not accede to the Final Protocol, is not to be countenanced. Mumm told me the same thing. The relations betw. them have been far fr. friendly, and Mumm accuses Azevedo of having complained of him (and of me also) to Lisbon. I do not know whether Mumm's assertion as regards myself is correct. I have fr[om] time to time dropped a word in Azevedo's favour without committing H.M.G. too strongly, and I do not think he can have any ground of complaint.

I regret very much the tangle into wch. the N. Rlwys. question has got, & perh. it might have been treated more skilfully. But the requirements of the B. & C. Corpn. were a burden on the negotiations. I do not think they are liked by either Hu or Kinder, and everyone complains of J M [Jardine Matheson] & Co. & particularly of Mr. [William] Keswick [1835-1912] for being too grasping. Their exacting fr. China the full interest of 5% on the whole rlwy. loan & omitting to credit them with the interest earned in London on the unexpended bal[an]ce seems quite indefensible. They complain that they are out of pocket for telegs. & other expenses, but they omit to remember that if the Nanpiao coal mines turn

out to be a success, they will be richly repaid. These coal mines were obtained for themselves, in compensation for a mortgage on the lines outside the wall which was to form part of the security for the bondholders.

Brenan has shown me the new draft contract for the Shanghai-Nanking rlwy. wch. seems to me such as the Chinese might well accept. He will give up the Canton-Kowloon line, wch. cld. not compete with water-carriage. I suppose he means that he will not proceed with it, for we cld. not allow the ubiquitous Belgians to construct it.

I understand that the B. & C. Corp'n. do not look with a friendly eye upon the Peking Syndicate's proposed line from Huai-Ching to Pu-kóu. The Peking Syndicate's agent, Mr. Geo. Jamieson, seems content with the progress made at the Honan mines.

13. Satow to Lansdowne

17.7.02

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

I shld. like to add to what I said in my letter of yesterday abt. the Tientsin Provl. Govt. that my reason for agreeing to the draft note first prepared, wch. contains the severe conditions now got rid of, was that I found myself alone in advocating moderation, and that I wished the question to be brought before the Dipl. Body in order to press my views before the larger circle of disinterested coll[eague]s. I had some difficulty in persuading the other 5 to take this step. They knew my views and were not very willing to give them another chance of being heard. Thus I think no one can accuse me of having acted inconsistently.

E.S.

14. Satow to Lansdowne

31.7.02

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

Nat'ung the man with whom I have been negotiating the new exchange of Notes is a much more important personage than Lien-fang, with whom I arranged the former pair. The latter is really little better than an interpreter for the Fr. language, & was put in his position of Vice-minister because my colls: insisted on having one man who can speak a foreign language put on the new Foreign Board. Nat'ung is a Manchu of considerable importance. He was chosen to go on the special mission to Japan to apologize for the murder of the Japse. chancellor [Akira Sugiyama] in 1900 [on June 11th], & is a confidential supporter of

Prince Ch'ing. [O]f the younger officials I have met he is the most intelligent, & I am disposed to think we may rely on his undertaking to sign the secret notes.

It does not much matter I think whether the exchange of secret notes is fixed to take place before or after the transfer of the rlwy. For when the date of transfer is once fixed & announced to every one, we cld. not have found a plausible pretext for not doing it, & we cld. not have justified any further delay on the ground of an unfulfilled promise, because every one wld. have asked for further explanations, & the whole wld. have come out. So, as we must in any case trust to Nat'ung's good faith & the execution of his written promise, I have recommended making a concession to them on the point. They will be able to tell my colls: that the notes exchanged today are all that there is.

I still have some misgivings abt. the Fr[ench] consenting to the transfer of the rlwy. They and the Belgians have written again quite recently claiming the fulfilment of Li Hung-chang's promise & Hu brought to Mr. [S.F.] Mayers the dft. of a note in reply declaring that China wld. build the Tientsin Paotingfu line herself, & promising in that event to consult the interests of the Belgian Co. as well as those of the B. & C. Corpn. I told Mr. Mayers to say to Hu that he cld. not venture to approach me on the subject.

Hu is a good specimen of the "Heathen Chinese" with a smile that is childlike & bland. He has quite succeeded in impressing every one with the belief that he is simplicity itself. But Chinese wiliness has many forms.

I am very glad to hear fr. Sir Jas. Mackay that his visit to Nanking & Hankow has been attended with success, & I hope his expectation of being shortly able to sign a treaty will be realized. There is no danger in his likin clause. It looks well, & a long time must elapse before it is accepted by all the Treaty Powers. In the meantime G.B. will have the credit of having made a serious effort to solve the problem.

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15. Satow to Sanderson

5 Aug./02

My dear Sanderson,

In reply to your letter of June 10 asking my opinion as to the propriety of making a present to General Mei Tungyi in recognition of his services in preserving the lives of British subjects during the summer of 1900, I have great pleasure in saying that I heartily agree with [British consul at Tientsin] Mr. [W.R.] Carles' recommendation.

I think a gold watch with the Royal Arms & a suitable inscription would be best. The inscription might be worded something like this:

“Presented to Genl. Mei Tung-yi by the King of England in recognition of his having assisted a family of Br. subjects to escape fr. a position of great danger during the troubles of 1900 in North China.”

I am all the more in favour of this being done because in June last I had to intervene in order to prevent Genl. Mei's being cashiered & disgraced in consequence of false accusations brought agst. him by his enemies, as you will see fr. corresp'ce with Yüan Shihkai wch. I am sending home in an official desp.

~

16. Satow to Barrington

8.8.02

My dear Barrington,

My hearty congratulations on the K.C.B., wch. I trust does not mean that you contemplate giving up.

I was rather disappointed not to find the name of the C.J. [Chief Justice] at S'hai [H.S. Wilkinson] in the list of Coronation honours, but perh. it is being reserved to come out by itself, wch. always makes an honour seem so much bigger. To tell you the truth I am inclined to think that something more than a plain Knighthood wld. not be excessive in his case, for outside his judicial work he has been a most valuable counsellor on intricate legal questions to successive ministers in both China & Japan for something like 30 yrs., & his memos. of advice on matters of private international law seem to my humble appreciation as good as anything of the kind that has ever been done.

17. Satow to Lansdowne

13 Aug./02

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The great difficulty abt. the preparation of the secret note was, I was told, this. It must have the official seal of the Foreign Board, so that signature in the Leg[atio]n was not practicable. Finally what they did was this. Prince Ch'ing and Na'tung got a very confidential clerk to write it out & put the seal on, without telling the other officials. It was then brought to his private residence, where it was exchanged for my note by Mr. Mayers,

who[m] I sent up for the purpose. I called on the Prince the day before, when he explained to me that he shld. keep my note in his poss[essio]n until everything had blown over, & then have it placed among the records of the Dept., along with the draft of his reply. If the two ministers Wang & Chü then made any remark, he wld. then tell them they had seen the draft at the time.

I am told told [sic] that if Wang & Chü had known of the secret note, they wld. have gossiped to Junglu, & the latter wld. have let the Russian Legn. know. This is what Nat'ung told me.

Fr[om] another source I learn that Pokotiloff, the manager of the Russo-Chinese bank, sees a good deal of Junglu, to whom he has promised the support of Russia in the case of the Empress-Dowager dying. In return for this Junglu is reported to have promised Russia advantages in Mongolia & Thibet. I have some hopes of finding out how far this affair has gone. The agree. in 12 articles wch. I am sending by the bag prob. bears the same relation to actual fact as the famous Cassini convention. The latter, tho' prob. never formally reduced to writing & signed, yet corresponded in the main to what Russia obtained fr. China.

The question of transferring the rlwy. still hangs fire. On the 31 July, when I met the whole of the Foreign Board to exchange the first pair of notes, I told them I hoped to be able to hand over on the 14 Aug. provided they obtained the consents stipulated for in clause 10 of the agreement of April 29, & provided also that the Russians handed over the portion of Shanhaikwan station & the line up to the Great Wall, stipulated for in clause 9. I made them read over the 2 clauses in the original document, wch. I had taken with me for the purpose. From time to time Hu or Na told me that the consents were coming in, that the Russian Minister said he was ready to hand over on the 14th, & that only the Fr[ench] held out. Two days ago the latter gave his consent, subject to reserves as to the construction of the Tientsin-Paotingfu line with money borrowed fr. the B. & C. Corpn., & the natural inference was that all obstacles had disappeared. To my surprise Hu came to me yesterday with Kinder, to say the Russian Minr. had not recd. instructions, & urge me to hand over tomorrow without clause 9 being carried out. [See diary.] I refused positively to listen to the old man's cajoling, & after an hour & a half's repetition of the same futile arguments he went away, uttering threats of what Yüan Shihkai & Nat'ung wld. do if I did not hand over on 14 Aug. He did not say anything to me, but told Mayers that Yüan wld. appeal to the Powers as he had done in the case of Tientsin, & that Nat'ung wld. let every one know

abt. the secret notes. These threats I regarded as bruta fulmina, but such language is indication of much. I hear Hu is much quieter today, but I am sorry that I have let myself be so much influenced in the past by his stories of the dreadful things that wld. happen to him if I did not give way abt. the military co-directors & the lines to Kalgan & the north of Peking.

18. Satow to Lansdowne

28.8.02

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

I hear fr. a good source that a project is on foot for raising Chinese capital to construct a line to Kalgan fr. Peking, to meet that line wch. acc. [according] to reports that have reached us fr. various sides during the last 12 mos. the Russians are building fr. Khailar S. by way of Dalai Nor & Dolon Nor to Kalgan. Mr. Campbell writes to me fr. Urga that he was proceeding to Dalai Nor, so that if there is any truth in the latter part of [the] story he will be able to tell you all about it on his arrival in London. The Chinese deny both rumours, but I am not satisfied.

I have had a long talk with Hu and Natung this afternoon abt. the possibility of our giving up the rlwy. before the Russians abandon S.H.K. [Shan Hai Kwan] The 2 conditions I proposed in my teleg. 251 of the 23rd are prob. too difficult for them to accept. Hu wld. no doubt be greatly helped if we did give up without waiting for the Russians, & as we have yet to negotiate for the apptmt. of the Br. & C[hinese] Corp. as agents in London for the rlwy. & for the payt. of their agent on the local rlwy. board, it might perh. be politic to do him this service. He tells me Lessar affects to be quite unconcerned as regards cl. 9 of the agreeet. of April 29 stating that it does not affect him. He has nothing to do with agreeets. betw. the Chinese & us. All he has to do, he says, is to see that the rlwy. fr. Newchwang to S H K is given over to the Chinese on or before 9 Octr.

The Fr. Genl. has not yet given his consent in writing to the rlwy. being handed over, but the Fr. Ch. d'Aff. tells me he expects it to be sent to him in a day or two.

I hear that things are going quite satisfactorily at Tientsin under the Chinese régime. It is a great comfort to have got that settled.

Mr. Mansfield writes that Liu Kunyi is fast breaking up, & cannot last long. Fr[om] Mr. Fraser I hear that Chang [Chih-tung] has taken into his service a very pestilent Amr. ex-missionary named Ferguson & a very anti-foreign Chinese named Ku Hungming who

writes in foreign newspapers in support of boxer views. He begins to think Chang is not quite the friend of England he has been painted.

Mr. Scott has done very well at Canton in settling the question of likin on str. [steamer] borne goods in the port area. The credit of it is entirely due to him.

19. Satow to Playfair

G.M.H. Playfair

10.9.02

Dear Mr. Playfair,

In May next there will be an acting vacancy at Hankow, and I shld. very much like to send you there, if it suits you. It is one of the most important posts in China fr. a political point of view, as I need hardly say to you, and I shld. feel quite at ease in my mind if you were there looking after our interests.

20. Satow to Lansdowne

11.9.02

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I have not been able to ascertain whether the document purporting to be an agreement betw. China & Russia regarding Thibet is genuine. If it has been actually signed, it is not an official act of the Chinese Govt., but a secret agreement betw. Junglu and the very active agent of the Russo-Chinese Bank. In my private letter of 13 Aug. I compared it to the "Cassini Convention" [see no. 17 above]. A few days ago Sir Robt. Hart volunteered the same information to me, namely that even if it turned out not to be a regularly signed agreeet, it contained facts as to arrangements confidentially stipulated for. The Chinese authority mentioned in my desp. by this bag is a young Chinese, son of an official who suffered in the troubles of 1900, whose reports have generally proved quite correct. It seems to me therefore that it behoves us to be on the watch, & especially to take measures for observing what happens at Urga betw. the Russians and the head Lama there. I do not know whether it wld. be considered advisable to station an officer there, either fr. India or fr. the China consular service. We have no one in China acquainted with either Thibetan or Mongol [languages], but I might perhaps find a man outside the Consular Service who knows Mongol. In case it was thought desirable to send one of the Consular men to Urga on a temporary mission, I could employ Mr. [G.J.L.] Litton on that service, when Mr. Wilkinson

goes to Yünnanfu, leaving Mr. Mackinnon still as acting consul at Têngyüeh. The Russians can only get at Thibet fr. the North thro' their Lama friends at Urga. On the eastern or Tachienlu route there was until lately an Engl. missionary named Upcraft, who wrote to me now & then fr. Yachau in W. Szechuan, but I believe he has returned to England.

The only pretence on wch. Russia can claim an interest in Thibetan affairs is that she has a number of Lama-ist subjects, but then we have far more, besides our geographical contiguity [in India].

With regard to the sources of information fr. wch. Kang yu wei & Mr. Pau of Yatung derived their knowledge of the supposed agree. I conjecture that the former read it in a Chinese newspaper of Shanghai, where it was published last June, & that Mr. Pau got it fr. an English newspaper also published there. But how the Nepalese resident at Lhasa can have heard of its signature, I am not able to conjecture.

Lessar I hear fr. one or two colls: is criticizing the new commercial treaty on the ground that it gives to the Impl. Maritime Customs complete control over the internal revenue of China, & the Customs he says is an Engl. institution. On the 2nd he had a conversation at the Foreign Board, on the subject, & asked whether it was true that China had agreed that the I.G. shld. be an Englishman as long as the Engl. trade exceeded that of any other nation. They told him they had no record of it in their archives, but he retorted that the statement had appeared in a blue b[oo]k. It is possible that the present ministers for F.A. may not know, & indeed I am told that the arrangement was a secret one, until disclosed in Parliament. Another instance of Lessar's activity is that he informed the Foreign Board that until the Northern Teleg. Co. was granted equal privileges with the Eastern Extension in regard to Peking landlines, it was useless to talk abt. the evacuation of Manchuria or the restoration of the extra-mural rlwy.

Some Chinese officials have been talking abt. proceeding at once to construct a rlwy. to Kalgan without loss of time, & giving out that the capital was to be obtained fr. Chinese in Tientsin. It is difficult to get at the bottom of the story, but I hear that Lessar & the Belgian Ch. d'Aff. have been inquiring of the Foreign Board where the money was to come from, being it wld. seem under the absurd impression that it was to be lent by English capitalists, while I of course supposed that Pokotiloff was to find it. I have expressed my surprise at China entertaining such an idea as a railway to Kalgan & trust it will not be persevered in.

21. Satow to Lansdowne

25.9.02

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

It is possible that my Portug. colleague's expectation of signing his treaty within the next few days may yet be disapp[oin]ted. He has whittled down his demands as low as possible, for he wants to get home in time to take his place in Parliament. I have in the despatch that goes by this bag given as close an account of his conversation c. me as I cld.

He tells me that the Germ. Min. shortly before leaving for home in July made great efforts to induce the Belgians to place their missionaries in Mongolia under German protection, in return I suppose for support in regard to rlwy. concessions, but was unsuccessful. It wld. no doubt suit Germany very well to enter into business relations of that kind with Belgium, for she desires to extend her Shantung system to join the Luhan line some distance South of Peking.

Fr. the Hankow viceroy I have a confirmation of the report that Lessar & the Fr. Ch. d'Aff. protested to the Chinese Govt. abt. §10 of the likin article of the Commercial treaty. Lessar was very violent, & told them they were surrendering Chinese sovereignty. The effect as you know was to induce the Foreign Board to telegraph to Shêng to hasten the signature. Evidently they think the article is advantageous for the Peking Govt.

An intelligent critic (Azevedo) has observed to me that (2) of the conditions in art. 14 on wch. the Br. Govt. enter into the arrangement regarding likin has two disadvantages. Firstly, Powers unfriendly to G.B. will accuse her of getting all she wants, & of then trying to prevent the other PP [Powers] of gaining anything by the arrangements she has made; 2ndly no such stipulation can possibly have the effect intended. PP who object to the abolition of likin, as Russia on the ground that it does not exist to any extent in Manchuria, will certainly require a quid pro quo for their adhesion, wch. they will obtain by hook or by crook.

I told him the use of the article was to advertise to the world our intention of keeping an eye on the proceedings of those who try to get a quid pro quo. But I confess that I am disposed to agree with him. Other PP will receive 'valuable conson' [consideration?] in spite of our endeavours to prevent it, as we see every day.

The Fr[ench] Ch. d'Aff. is much perturbed at the establish[men]t of likin stations at the southern end of the Luhan line, & does not see how he can effectually oppose the measure. It seriously diminishes the revenue of the rlwy. I told him it was an inducement to his Govt.

to join us in agreeing to the abolition of likin.

The Mily. Auth. in Manchuria tried to get the Govr.-Genl. at Moukden to take over the extra-mural rlwy., & at the very moment that Lessar was signing his agreement here on the 22nd for its transfer. They actually got him as far as Newchwang for the purpose. On hearing of this I addressed a Note to Prince Ch'ing protesting, & have just recd. a reply stating that Yüan Shihkai was apptd. by Imperial Decree on the 20th, so there was no question of anyone else taking it over.

They seem to be handing over at Shanhaikwan today to Yüan's deputies, & I have asked Genl. Creagh to do the same as far as Shanhaikwan is concerned, being strongly pressed by Yüan, altho' I have not yet a reply to my teleg. of the 23rd asking for authority. But as our handing over was only delayed for the Russians, I think it wld. have done harm if I had held back any longer, especially as Yüan signed the agreeet. of 29 April, & I felt compelled to take the responsibility on myself. But as to the rest of the line I am waiting for instructions.

I hope to take advantage of the leave you have been so good to give me by starting from Shanghai on Nov. 4.

E.S.

22. Satow to Lansdowne

9 Oct. 02

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

When I first heard that a report had been spread about that Sir J. Mackay had gone to Nanking to negotiate with Liu Kunyi that we shld. have the right of occupying the Kiangyin forts if occasion arose, it seemed so absurd that I thought it not worth mentioning. But fr. what I learn in the strictest confidence fr. the Fr. Ch. d'Aff. [Maurice Casenave, see diary] the German Embassy in Paris has told M. Delcassé that we were endeavouring to obtain some kind of concession in return for the evacuation of S'hai. He & the Germ. Ch. d'Aff. [Goltz] consequently received instructions to declare to the Chinese that tho' ready to join the other powers in evacuating on Oct. 1 it must be clearly understood that if any power hereafter re-occupied S'hai or any other point on the Yangtze, they wld. hold themselves free to follow suit, & further that no Power must be granted any political or economic concession in return for consenting to evacuate.

v.d. Goltz told me the first part of this the day before yesterday, but not the second. I simply replied that we had informed the Chinese of our readiness to withdraw without

making any reserves or conditions. So I was able to repeat this to Casenave, and to add that as the Chinese knew perfectly well that we had asked for nothing, the discredit and dishonour of making such insinuations wld. redound upon their authors. I added that I had already suspected the German Consul-genl. at S'hai [Knappe] & the Germ. Legation of giving currency to these rumours, & my conjecture was confirmed by what Uchida had this morning told me of the communication made at Tokio by Count Arco-Valley.

Casenave did not at once act upon his instructions because he objected to the word "economic" being put in, & disliked the whole affair. He has therefore asked for fresh instructions.

I have said to more than one person that the dignity of H.M.G. prevents their replying to or taking any notice of such insinuations. But I told Casenave in return for his frankness that we had some time ago told the Chinese that after the commercial treaty was signed we wld. propose a date for evacuation.

Prob. Count Bülow will take an opportunity of informing the Reichstag that he made these conditions with the object of defeating the machinations of another Power.

Perh. the old story of 1900 that Liu Kunyi offered to let us occupy the Kiangyin forts then [see no. 26 below] , & a distorted echo of our reference to the commercial treaty may have given rise to rumours, greedily credited by Knappe (of Samoa fame) the German Consul-genl. at S'hai & adopted by the Germ. Govt.

In my last letter I said my Portuguese coll's expectations of signing his treaty might perhaps be disappointed. My teleg. no. 182 will have shown how signature came to be postponed. On Oct. 1st Azevedo called to lament the disastrous turn given to his affairs by the meddlesome proceedings of the American & Japse. officials at S'hai. I begged him to be calm, and promised to see our two colls. From Uchida I learnt that his Govt. had given no instructions & fr. Conger that his had been misled. Both disavowed any desire of frustrating Azevedo's negotiations. So I wrote a Note to the Portuguese to this effect, wch. he produced to the Chinese, & convinced them that there was no danger. Nevertheless, he tells me now that he has taken the rlwy. concession clause out of his Treaty, & turned it into an exchange of notes, & the Chinese have promised to sign on the 14th. I trust he will not be again disapptd. At all events I think he will be bound to tell his Govt. that he has recd. every possible assistance from me in his affairs.

The last teleg. authorizing me to at once hand over the rlwy. arrived at a most opportune moment when Yüan & Hu were badgering me to give it up at once, on the ground that the

Russians had surrendered Shanhaikwan station, & I was losing my temper in arguing with them that they must wait till I got the instructions I had telegraphed for. I have since obtained fr. Hu the promise to give the B. & C. Corporation the rlwy. agency in London vis à vis the bondholders and the remuneration asked for, & I hope that I may regard the rlwy. as finally off my hands.

I am a little afraid that the Chenchou missionary murder case may prevent me from leaving as early as I had anticipated, for Chang Chih-tung has sent to tell Fraser that he thinks the punishments excessive. The Chinese always take that view when it is a question of severely punishing any official. Chang is a difficult person to manage, for he varies fr. one moment to another, asking me to put his ideas before the Govt., & deprecating their guessing that I am inspired by him, all in the same breath. He wants to remain Viceroy at Wuchang and yet be made Superintendent of Southern trade, an apptmt. hitherto annexed to the Viceroyalty of Nanking. He says he gets little or no trustworthy information fr. Peking, & asks me to keep him au courant [informed] of all that passes betw. my colls. and the Foreign Board [Wai Wu Pu]. In short, he is as exigent [French: demanding] as a pretty woman.

23. Satow to Lansdowne

23 Oct. 1902

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

My refusal to go to the Empress Dowager's garden party caused a considerable flutter, and Prince Ch'ing sent to me an emissary [Tsêng on October 17th – see diary] to ask me in spite of everything, either to attend, or to allow him to excuse my absence on the ground of sickness; also to offer to withdraw his foolish Note abt. the missionary murders. I refused all three propositions. Previously I had taken the precaution of informing Mr. Conger of the facts [on October 17th], and my proceeding was warmly approved by him; later on also by the Fr. Ch. d'Aff. I have explained the facts also to the Germ., Japse., Spanish, Dutch & Port. repres'ves, so that the Chinese will have no chance if they try to misrepresent.

The reproaches I have had to address to the Prince abt. his lying with regard to the German conditions for the evacuation of S'hai have upset him a great deal. There is no doubt that he lied, tho' he pretends it was a lapse of memory. He sent Sir Cheng-tung Liang-cheng to me the next day [October 21st - see diary] to protest his innocence, and to ask me what sort of answer wld. satisfy H.M.G. I said that was not my business; but it

seemed to me that nothing less than the cancellation of the notes exchanged cld. repair the mischief, and I advised the Prince to take us into his entire confidence, as he ought to have done at first, and to show the notes to me. I said he had better not be in a hurry. We then conversed abt. the Chên chou murders, wch. he says the Foreign Board do not consider of real importance, and he told them they were mistaken in thinking the matter is not serious.

Both Casenave and v.d. Goltz have been to ask abt. S'hai. I have told them what you had replied to the Germ. Ch. d'Aff. on the 14th, & that I had not heard the result. C. showed some curiosity as to whether I had spoken to Pr. Ch'ing, & he very prob. has heard something thro' Lien-fang, who speaks French. C. is personally a friend of ours, and is vexed at his govt. having been trepanned, as he thinks, into playing a German game. The latter I suppose want to tell the world that they have upset our pretensions to preponderance on the Yangtse.

The Chenchou murders however are quite enough to explain to outsiders that we have reason to be vexed with the Chinese Govt. & I hope so good an opportunity will not be lost. If we occupied Chusan until the Chinese afforded complete reparation, we shld. be able to tack on one or two things more.

I fear it is scarcely possible to achieve much here in a peaceable manner except by giving backsheesh. Chentung told me that Li Hung-chang, [Grand Council member] Wêng Tung-ho and the favourite eunuch each recd. ½ a million taels for the lease of Port Arthur, & a similar sum was offered to Chang Yin hwan, who when he was being conducted into exile regretted he had not taken it, as then he might have had the means of avoiding calamity. Chentung firmly said they none of them actually touched the money, but only the interest thro' the Russo-Chinese Bank, & that of course came out of the 5,000,000 taels capital contributed by China.

It is also said that Lienfang receives tips fr. the French & German Legations. He is poor and therefore likely to need such help.

I have put off my departure, and I think I ought to see the Chênchou case finished first.

24. Satow to Lansdowne

6/11/02

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The Chinese Govt. gave way abt. the punisht. in the Chên-chou case much more readily than I cld. have anticipated, but the probability is that they heard exaggerated reports fr. the

South, taken fr. the newspapers, of what we intended to do. Four gunboats wch. were lying at Woosung were said to be on the point of proceeding to Hankow, the Admiral in command, and at Hongkong half a dozen big cruisers were said to have been ordered north. I took great care to say nothing abt. coercion to any of my colls: or to the Chinese, & the particular plans I suggested have not been hinted at by the press.

It seems to me difficult to believe that the Chinese Govt. confirmed to the French the truth of the story abt. the Kiangyin forts. What may have occurred is this:- there is a Vice-Minr. of F.A. named Lienfang, who speaks & understands French rather imperfectly. It is possible that Casenave after being told the story by Goltz asked this man if we had demanded the forts. Lienfang having heard of what happened in 1900 may have thought he was referring to that, & replied in the affirmative.

Acc.[According] to our version of that incident Liu Kunyi offered to let us occupy the forts if we wld. undertake not to let any other foreign men of war pass up the Yangtze, but Liu's own version of it of course wld. be that the proposal came from us.

I doubt however this story being what induced the Fr. to join the Germans in proposing the 3rd condition for the evacuation of S'hai. After we obtained fr. the Chinese the promise not to cede territory to any foreign Power within the valley of the Yangtze, wch. was given out as a sort of ear-marking that territory as peculiarly ours, we used it as an argument agst. the extension of the Fr. settlement at Shanghai. In 1900 the main reason why the China Association people urged the landing of troops there, ostensibly for the protection of the settlements, was that they hoped we shld. be alone there. The consent of Liu Kunyi was obtained on the condition that no other troops shld. be landed; the others saw this, and determined to assert their claims also. I think this is quite enough to account for the Germans being able to get the Fr. adhesion.

The Fr. Ch. d'Aff. Casenave is away at the Tientsin races & [French minister] Dubail has not yet arrived, so I have been unable to find out the correctness or otherwise of the information the latter gave to my Tokio coll:. The story seems to me incredible. The Chinese are much more given to denying the fact of their having made a promise than to asserting they have been asked for something that has never been mentioned.

Chang Chih tung has asked me to visit him before leaving China, and I propose to call at Nanking on my way to S'hai, if the Admiral can arrange to give me a ship. ¹

¹ Satow was at Nanking November 26-28, 1902. (Diary, Ruxton, 2006, Volume One, pp. 299-303)

25. Satow to Sanderson (extract)

In "Secret" letter to Sanderson of 12 Nov/02

I have read with great interest Sir N. O'Connor's memo. of his conversation with Sir Chên-tung Liang, & am of opinion that the warning given by the latter shld. not be lightly disregarded. He has himself expressed to me the great relief with wch. he goes to Washington as Envoy, & is thus out of harm's way for the next 3 y[ea]rs.

There is no doubt that Junglu is very hostile to western ideas. When Tsaichên returned here he called upon Junglu, among others, & tried to interest him in his suggestions for sending Princes & young Manchu nobles abroad to study, & was met with the observation that students who come back to China were "disloyal subjects & unfilial children".¹

The "grandson" of Junglu mentioned in the memo. is the child who it is hoped will be born of the marriage betw. Pr. Chun (not Cheng) & Junglu's dau[ghter], but he is not yet in existence. If such a son were born, he wld. be capable of being adopted as heir to the late Emperor Tungche, & it is quite possible that an attempt might be made to set aside the present Emperor Kwanghsu, who, as is well-known, was adopted contrary to the rules that govern such matters.

It is said that Junglu has entered into a compact with Russia for his maintenance in power after the death of the Empress-Dowager, & acc. to secret information recd. this undertaking has been put in writing. Russia was to receive in return a free hand in Manchuria, Mongolia & Chinese Turkestan. Certain of the details reported in connexion with this agreement seemed to me to be somewhat suspicious, & I have not been able to attach implicit belief to the story. At the same time it is certain that Junglu is on intimate terms with [Pokotilov] the manager of the Russo-Chinese Bank, & seems to have succeeded to the position in that respect held formerly by Li Hung-chang. Natung told Mr. Mayers that they saw each other frequently & no one cld. tell what passed at those secret meetings. There is however good reason to believe that some arrangement regarding Thibet at least has been discussed betw. them.

This being the case it wld. of course be impossible to unite Russia with other PP in any course of policy directed towards the support of the present Emperor agst. Junglu. It was Junglu, backed by Yüan Shihkai, who thrust the Emperor into the background & brought the Empress-Dowager back to power in 1898. Hence the Russian Legation guard cld. not be counted on in case of a new coup d'état on the decease of the Empress-Dowager. Nor prob.

¹ To be unfilial would of course be a cardinal sin in Confucian thinking with its stress on family values.

cld. the French. I have no means of estimating the probability of Germany falling into line with us on such an occasion, but looking to recent events I shld. not expect her to do so. There remains only Japan as a Power upon whose assistance we could rely. The Japse. Legation has very close relations with Yüan Shihkai & special precautions wld. have to be taken to prevent any joint plan of action agreed to by G.B. & Japan being disclosed to him.

It seems to be believed by the reforming party that the Emperor is biding his time, & keeping as quiet as he can. It is said that he is forming a library of translations of foreign books. Sir Chentung recently, when I asked him what was the character of the Emperor, replied: "He is intelligent and very patient", wch. confirms the general idea of him. I shld. myself be inclined to say that he is mentally by no means deficient, but naturally must be wanting in information & experience of affairs.

Apart fr. Sir Chêntung's warning, I think that for the next two years at least we shld. maintain the Legation guards & the troops in Northern China at their present strength, & it will probably be prudent to keep them longer, say at least until the E-D dies & the Emperor resumes the reigns of power.

12. Nov. 1902

E.S.

[Note: Cockburn is of opinion that Junglu wld. find it difficult to carry out the programme attributed to him by Sir Chentung, at least except gradually. As to the deposition fo the Emperor he wld. have to proceed very cautiously, as he wld. have to count [reckon, deal] with the Viceroy & the South of China. He cld. not proceed straightway to attack the Legations & exterminate foreigners.

Agst. this it may be replied that in 1900 also the chances of success were not great, yet Tuan & Kangyi attempted to carry out such a plan. If they had succeeded in overwhelming the Legations, they doubtless wld. have put an end to the Emperor and the E-D.]

26. Concerning the assertion that Liu Kunyi in 1900 offered a joint occupation of the Kiang-yin forts and that H.M.G. refused the offer.¹

June 17. 1900

Telg. fr. Warren to F.O.

Following recd. fr. H.M. Consul at Nanking

¹ This seems to have been abstracted by Satow from the Peking Legation archives.

“Secret. Viceroy considers the Empress Dowager is finished. He is most anxious for Great Britain to undertake defence of Yangtze without delay. Although I did not mention Kiangyin, he said he hopes that we shall not insist on occupation of fortress [sic]. What is your opinion as to suggesting a joint occupation.” I think that if necessary a joint British & Chinese occupation might be arranged.

June 22

Teleg. fr. Warren to F.O.

Following fr. H.M. Consul at Nanking: “Secret. Is H.M. Govt. willing to notify Foreign Powers that no military operations must take place on the Yangtze & that Gt. Britain and Viceroy shall alone maintain order? Under these conditions Viceroy consents to joint occupation of Wusung and Kiangyin, if necessary. Details to be arranged betw. you & Shanghai Taot’ai. Secret instructions to be sent to Taot’ai by post.” As far as I understand the situation out here I think the Viceroy’s proposal admirable and await your instructions.

F.O. reply to this was:

June 22

With reference to your teleg. No. 11 of today. Inform Viceroy that in any efforts he may make to restore order he may count upon fullest support of H.M. ships. We are confident that if his efforts to support order are timely and adequate there is not the least probability that any other Power will interfere.

After this the idea becomes fixed in Warren’s mind that the Viceroy had “proposed” a joint occupation. In a teleg. of 24 June he says “I think the time has even now gone by for carrying out the joint occupation suggested by the Viceroy at Nanking, unless a very strong force was present here and at Woosung, as otherwise the Chinese soldiers would in all probability attack Shanghai as in the case of Tientsin after the taking of the Taku forts.”

In a desp. of June 27 he repeats this teleg. saying “and that the time had, I thought, already passed for the joint occupation of the Wusung & Kiangyin forts suggested by the Viceroy Liu Kunyi, unless a very strong naval force were present here, as otherwise the Chinese soldiers &c.” as in the teleg.

27. Satow to Lansdowne

19 Nov. 02

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The difference betw. Prince Ch'ing's demeanour yesterday when replying to my questions abt. Russian relations with Thibet, wch. was extremely frank & outspoken, & his reticence some weeks ago when asked abt. the German Note laying down the conditions for the evacuation of S'hai was very marked. It has confirmed my previous belief that in regard to the latter question he had been specially requested to keep it secret from me.

We have obtained a no. of documents on the subject of Russian doings in Thibet, wch. appear to be genuine. I am inclined to think that the information supplied by Kang Yüwei & Capt. Parr of Yatung cannot be altogether relied on. Capt. Parr is not, Sir R. Hart tells me, a very competent scholar in written Chinese, & I think it cannot possibly be true that Yüan Shihkai supplies information to Kang Yüwei, seeing that it was Yüan who in 1898 revealed Kang's plans to Junglu & so to the Empress Dowager.

I am leaving Peking tomorrow for S'hai taking Nanking on my way, & expect to be in London abt. a week after this letter.

28. Townley to Satow (telegram)

Teleg. Peking 23/11/02 Recd. Nanking.

Kowshing. Na [Nat'ung] called yesterday to explain Prince Ch'ing in agreeing to accept a half original claim wished you to be reminded of a private conversation you had with him in the spring when [C.W.] Campbell and Lienfang were present, at wch. he avers that you held out some hopes that the claim might be paid out of a possible surplus on the general indemnity. Prince wld. like to know whether there is any hope of this being done & wld. be very grateful if it were possible. Na laid great stress on this being considered as a private question quite outside general one and seemed half ashamed that what he considered could only have been the pious wish of a friendly soul shld. be bro[ugh]t for[war]d. I said that I wld. telegraph you but that you had never hinted at any such possibility in discussing the question with me.

Townley

29. Satow to Townley

27 Nov. 1902 [from Nanking]

My dear Townley,

I have not my journals [diaries] at hand, but my impression is that Prince Ch'ing is mistaken in thinking that I held out the hope of the Kowshing claim ¹ being paid out of a possible surplus on the indemnity. I rather think it was Campbell who discussed the Kowshing case with a Mr. Ku [Chao-hsin, secretary] of the Waiwupu, and hinted that there would possibly be a surplus to be returned hereafter & that the Chinese Govt. would eventually not be out of pocket if they settled the Kowshing case. You will find that as nothing came of Campbell's negotiations, I sent in a note to say that if China did not accept the terms of reference H.M.G. wld. take their own means of getting the claim satisfied, & that the WWP wrote back that they would rather settle it amicably than go before an arbitrator. Shortly after that I gave Lienfang a note of the claim for principal and interest, but as nothing came of this I sent Cockburn to Na, who proposed to pay one-half, and on this my teleg. to F.O. was based. When the reply came Na was away at the Summer Palace, & the only opportunity I had of discussing it with him was when he came to bid me goodbye. Cockburn knows all that passed then. I said that if at Tientsin I recd. Prince Ch'ing's consent to pay one-half I wld. settle the matter, otherwise it wld. be off, and we must go to arbitration.

As the Chinese have paid only one half year's interest on the indemnity, and still refuse to acknowledge their gold indebtedness, there neither is, nor is likely to be any surplus when our demands are satisfied. Whatever therefore may have been said at the time the Prince is thinking of cannot possibly hold good any longer.

My impression is that Lienfang has told Na what Campbell said, as if I had said it to Prince Ch'ing in his presence. But any how, we cannot way [?] for the Kowshing payt. until the supposed surplus 'materializes'.

y.v.s. [yours very sincerely]

P.S. When I can get hold of Campbell and my journals I will unravel the matter. In the meantime the last para. but one seems to me the best reply to give to Na.

¹ The Kowshing case arose out of the sinking of a British-registered ship, the SS *Kowshing*, which was acting as a Chinese troop carrier and which was sunk by the Japanese in July 1894, just before the Sino-Japanese War began. (With thanks to Dr. Jim Hoare for this footnote.)

30. Satow to Bertie

S.S. "Parramatta"

10 Dec. 1902

My dear Bertie,

When I was at Shanghai on the 1st, Bredon came to see me. He said that some time ago Hart wrote to ask him to go to Peking, & he replied that he wld. do so if his position were made a real one. To that he got no reply.

I suppose this referred to what I told you in my letter of July 8 [see no. 11 above].

He went over the old ground of the circs. that induced him to come out to China after having retired, how you had promised on behalf of H.M.G. that he shld. succeed Hart, who had given MacD. to understand that he would resign. On Bredon's getting to Peking he was assured at first by MacD. that Hart had really undertaken to resign, & MacD. had even declared that he had this in writing. But afterwards he said that after searching for it, he had not been able to find Hart's letter. His own position had therefore been quite anomalous. Since he came to Shanghai after the siege he had no authority, & had been kept quite in the dark by Hart abt. all service details. If anything happened to Hart, he wld. find his succession very difficult.

He then dwelt upon the services wch. he had rendered to H.M.G., particularly in connexion with the Commercial Treaty, wch. he said wld. never have come to anything had he not furnished Mackay with a set of proposals. He thought he was entitled to expect H.M.G. to do something for him.

I asked what sort of thing he meant, but he wld. not give me any indication. So I suppose he wants a decoration or a title of some sort.

He also laid great stress on his right to eventually succeed Hart, and alluded to intrigues that were going on to deprive him of the succession. You will see what he meant if you read the enclosed paper [see No. 31 below], wch. was given to me by a leading man in the Customs at S'hai. I had heard before I got there that the Customs service is very discontented, that they wish Hart to retire, and disapprove of Bredon as his successor.

I told him I had written to you about him in July, but had heard nothing. As far as I could see Hart had no intention of leaving Peking. He talked of resigning now and then, but never to me. I understood that he had come out to China on the understanding that he shld. succeed Hart. With respect to the commercial negotiations & his part in them I was not in a position to say anything. I thought however that he had done H.M.G. a bad turn by the

attitude he had taken up regarding the Hwangpoo conservancy. His pamphlet had as it appeared been inspired by J.W. Jamieson, who had been expressly told by me not to busy himself on the question of the conservancy. The notion that had been put into the head of Liu Kunyi that the Annexe 17 to the Protocol was an encroachment on the sovereignty of China was absurd, for nothing less than an international Board could stop riparian owners fr. encroaching on the river. In short, I gave him a hint that by interfering as he had done, he had damaged his own interests with H.M.G.

He suggested to me that England shld. call a conference of the Powers & invite them to accede to article 8 of the Mackay Treaty. To this I replied that after our experience during the negotiations at Peking of the inconveniences of conferring with the repres'ves of all the PP., both big & little, I doubted whether H.M.G. wld. care to try a second experiment of the kind, either in Europe or at Peking.

Another suggestion of his was that H.M.G. in ratifying the Mackay Treaty shld. explicitly state that they did so upon the understanding that the Maritime Customs shld. continue to be administered as at present, that is by an Inspector-General of British nationality and not by a Board.

He said that he had seen Yüan Shihkai that morning, who had declared that China wld. refuse to pay the indemnity in gold. I told him that he and the Chinese might rest assured that in that case Russia wld. not evacuate the remaining two-thirds of Manchuria. He replied that China might repudiate altogether.

But I gathered fr. him that he was not convinced that the Chinese had finally made up their minds not to give way as to the metal [gold, silver etc.] in wch. payment is due.

I expect to reach Singapore tomorrow, where I shall ask [Sir Frank] Swettenham [Governor of Singapore] to put this in his bag. My plans are to land at Marseilles & go to San Remo for a week to see some of my people, so you will get this before I arrive in London, and it may be useful to you to have it all on paper.

y..v.t.

31. Copy of an unsigned paper given me at S'hai by F.E. Taylor, of the I.M.C. ¹

"The present position of affairs is full of menace to the future of the Customs service. There is no use in ignoring the fact that our present chief [Sir Robert Hart] cannot last for

¹ Francis Edward Taylor, Statistical Secretary & Assistant Commissioner, Imperial Maritime Customs. This copy of the memo. is in Satow's handwriting.

ever, & we cannot be justly criticised for considering what results may follow his withdrawal. International jealousies are now so strong that the only hope of our having another I.G. [Inspector General] instead of that monstrosity an International Board, lies in the selection of a candidate who would be acceptable to the Ministers in Peking as well as to the Service. As to whether an I.G. or a Board wld. best advance the interests of the Service may be open to question. Were the Board composed of Commissioners in the Service, trained in Service traditions and understanding Service feelings & needs, there may be some who wld. prefer such a division of power. But it is almost certain that such a board would be composed of bureaucrats fr. abroad selected for political reasons by their respective Govts. It is needless to elaborate the arguments agst. such an arrangement from a Customs point of view. We shld. gradually become the pawns in a game of political intrigue and our fortunes wld. be at the mercy of the individual or cabal having most influence at any particular time, while the Board, instead of being the loyal servant of the Chinese Govt. wld. necessarily be under the influence of the PP [Powers] to wch. the members owed their appointments. Obviously the safest position for the service & the Govt. is that some man shld. be recognized as the accepted successor of Sir Robt. Hart, who will step into his place naturally and without question.

Such a man must possess a combination of qualities wch. confines the area of selection within very narrow limits. Fr. the Service point of view, he must have sufficient ability and experience, judgment and caution, to carry on the work of the Customs with safety and credit; he shld. be a man whose sense of justice will be above prejudice and favouritism, but who will demand and sustain a high standard of discipline, education & manners in the Staff: and, further, we ought to be assured that the interests of the Service will never be sacrificed nor its funds applied to the advancement of personal ambition. He must have an exceptional knowledge of the Chinese language and of Chinese affairs, and he must be known and respected by influential Chinese officials. Further, he must be a man who would be trusted by his colleagues, supported by the British F.O. and acceptable, or at least not objectionable to, the Foreign Ministers in Peking.

The present Deputy Inspector General of Customs [Sir Robert Bredon] cannot be said to fulfil these conditions. All available information seems to make it certain that, altho' he might step into the vacancy on account of his title, [he] ¹ would not be allowed to retain the position, and many of the senior men in the Service would protest against his apptmt. The

¹ This addition in square brackets was made by Satow, not the editor of this volume.

result would probably be a Board of imported officials.

There is naturally a feeling agst. taking any step wch. may have the appearance of anticipating the withdrawal of our present chief. We do not anticipate it, but we have good reason to dread it under present conditions; and, unless the I.G. will himself take the necessary action, the question may arise whether it will not become the duty of the Seniors, in the interests of the future of the Service to take whatever steps may be necessary to secure the recognition of a suitable successor and protect the Service against disaster.

32. Satow to Lansdowne

Singapore

11.12.02

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

On my way to S'hai I turned aside to see Chang Chih-tung [on November 27th – see diary], who had sent me a message thro' Mr. [Everard H.] Fraser that he hoped to meet me before I went home.

I had a long argument with him about the necessity of paying the indemnity in gold, in wch. I repeated to him all that I said to Prince Ch'ing on the subject. He perfectly understands now the proper construction of the Protocol, and his attempts to prove that it means payment in silver were comparatively feeble. His chief ground of objection was that China finds it difficult enough to pay in silver, that some of the provinces have to borrow in order to make up their quota, and that if she paid in gold fresh taxation would be necessary, and would lead to insurrections. We had 'promised' he said to take silver for 9 yrs., could England not persuade the other Powers to do the same. I replied that we had not promised, but merely offered to accept silver for a period if the others were willing, but they had all refused with the exception of America. He observed that if China were impoverished, the effect upon trade would be serious. I told him that the 3 PP that take the largest share of the indemnity have objects in China to wch. they attach more importance than trade, and I warned him that if payment is not fully made, these PP will keep an account, & fr. time to time present the bill for arrears, accompanying it with demands wch. may be far worse for China to grant than mere concessions for mines and railways. As I was likely to be absent for some months, it was my duty as a friend to give him this warning, wch. I trusted he wld. meditate carefully.

He asked me if I had any plan by wch. China cld. be enabled to meet the liability without

borrowing. I told him that there was a great deal of waste of the revenue, and I instanced the fact that the Peking octroi [duty levied on goods entering a town] is farmed out to Prince Ch'ing and Junglu for 400,000 taels less than was paid in last year by the previous collector, and that the Empress Dowager is going to have a railway built to the Western tombs wch. is to cost 700,000 or 800,000 taels, and will scarcely pay its running expenses. I expressed the opinion that Russia will not evacuate the remaining portions of Manchuria unless she gets her share of the indemnity in full.

On the subject of Russian intrigues and schemes in regard to Thibet I could not get any information fr. him. He admitted that was a country that interested England very greatly. (Our secret informant at Peking had stated to us that Chang had recently telegraphed to Peking for information about Russian doings in Thibet, but I could not find out whether he had done so.)¹

I also urged him abt. the apptmt. of the Chinese delegate to the Hwangpoo conservancy Bd. wch. his predecessor had refused to recommend to the Peking Govt. He brought out all the stale arguments abt. the constitution of the Bd. being an encroachment on the sovereignty of China, wch. I refuted. All I could get out of him was that he could not be expected to decide in 3 wks a matter wch. had been under his predecessor's consideration for a whole year.

While I was at Nanking Yüan Shihkai arrived there fr. Hankow, having gone there after burying his mother somewhere in Honan. I called on him, and he returned my visit at Shanghai. He said he had been much interested in making Chang Chih tung's acquaintance, & had been struck by his inexhaustible flow of conversation; but he did not say what the subjects of discussion had been. He asked me abt. the Chinese Engineering & Mining Co., wch. he understood to be an Anglo-Chinese undertaking. I explained that tho' there were Chinese as well as English shareholders, it was in law an Engl. co. registered in England, & that if the shareholders held that they had not been fairly treated by the directors, or if the original owners thought they had any ground of complaint agst. the promoters, an Engl. court of law could alone exercise jurisdiction. I told him I heard it was maintained by

¹ See diary: "I could not find out whether he had recently been telegraphing for information, and he wld. not admit knowing anything. (Townley had telegd. that acc. to our secret informant C. had telegd. on the 7th for information. As he arrived at Nanking 5 Nov. and took charge on the 8th, it seems unlikely to us that he shld. have sent the alleged telegram.) He said he quite understood that Thibet interested G.B. in a high degree." (Ruxton, Volume One, 2006, p.302)

Chang-Yi that the sale that took place in July 1900 was a fiduciary transaction for the purpose of protecting the property of himself & the other Chinese shareholders fr. seizure, & that Hoover & Moreing were not justified in treating it as an out-&-out sale. If so they could have their remedy by a suit in equity. He made no allusion to the incident of the Chinese flag being hoisted, & it was not discussed.¹

I see one of the China papers has it that I went to Tongshan & ordered the Chinese flag to be lowered. The fact is I passed thro' Tongshan station on my way to Chinwangtao to embark, & Major Kay who had orders to see that it was hauled down came to report to me what steps he was going to take. It was flying when I passed, & I have not heard anything further abt. the matter, except what I have read in the papers.

Mr. Mayers who went with me to S'hai returned to the north on board the Chinese man of war that conveyed Yüan Shihkai to Taku. I asked him to repeat to Yüan what I had said to Chang about the indemnity. Subsequently Bredon told me that Yüan also maintains that it is payable in silver. The position seems to me very serious & I do not see how the Chinese are to get out of the difficulty.

33. Satow to Sanderson

Westminster Palace Hotel

23. Jany./03

My dear Sanderson,

I enclose my account for the past year up to the date of my leaving Peking.

Some of the items require explanation. Jan. 6 \$415 shld. have been \$410. Feb. 5 \$75. This was for whitewashing the hospital for natives looked after by Dr. Gatrell & the medical officer of the Legation guard.

Feb. 5 \$385. Dr. Gatrell had a small balance over fr. money I had given him for procuring information abt. the proceedings of the Court on its way to Peking, and this balance and the \$5 overpaid in January were deducted from the usual monthly pay[men]t.

¹ Diary: "20 Nov. [1902] Jules Lecomte, a young Belgian, brought me papers from [T.R.] Wynne Agent & Genl. Manager of the Engineering & Mining Co. reporting that ex-Director Yang had brought 40 Chinese soldiers & hoisted Chinese flag at Tongshan. This man has also put forward a manifesto explanatory of his conduct. So after consulting with Townley, I asked Bower officially to order the O.C. [Officer Commanding:] at Tongshan to turn them out, to lower the flag & protect the mines agst. further aggression. Also telegd. to F.O. what I had done."

Mar. 18 Early in the year I took a Chinese house outside the Legation quarter for the members of the Chinese secretariat to see Chinese visitors in who cannot come to the Legation for fear of being marked down. The rent is \$27 a month, and I had to repair it and put in some furniture. The caretaker gets \$9 a month. There is an additional item for furniture under Aug. 5. At present some of the students are living there, as there is no room for them in the Legation, and they will pay the rent out of their rent allowance as long as they occupy it.

Under Aug. 14 there is mention of a secret informant. This is a very useful man, who gets news and documents.

The Legn. is certainly better informed now as to what passes at Court than it was previously, and young [S.F.] Mayers takes a great deal of interest in that part of his work. I am anxious to multiply sources of information, but this can be done only gradually, whenever a suitable agent presents himself.

y.v.t.

P.S. In June Gatrell asked me to give him \$40 a month additional to help him in entertaining Chinese officials, and as I thought it wld. be money well spent, I gave it to him.

E.S.

34. Satow to W.E. Davidson (law officer at F.O.)

25/8/03.

My dear Davidson,

When I was passing thro' S'hai [Sir F.S.A.] Bourne [Chief Justice] mentioned the following subjects to me.

In July 1902 he recommended the supply of certain lawbooks to the consulates in China, & I sent home his recommendation. Nothing seems to have come of it as yet. He suggests the Stationery Office might send out at once the books as to wch. there is no doubt.

We have a V-C [Vice-Consul] at Peking, apptd. for the purpose of trying police cases & other small matters in wch. the Tommies of the Legn. Guard are def[endan]ts. The F.O. made him, not V-C at Peking, but at Tientsin, the result of wch. is that he cannot legally exercise any judicial powers whatever. Either his commission shld. be made out for Peking, wch. seems simpler (in spite of Peking not being an open port), or a similar order shld. be made as is proposed in the case of the new legal V-C for Tientsin, taking the jurisdiction

away fr. the consul-general & giving it to the V-C. A desp. [despatch] marked “Consular” on this subject (i.e. of the legal V-C) is going by the same bag as this letter.

Bourne says that the S’hai Court costs & solicitors charges sh[ou]ld be revised, for various reasons, one of w[hi]ch is that the existing scale is not plain in certain cases. As Sir Hiram [Shaw Wilkinson] once practiced as a solicitor before the Court, B. thinks it might be disagreeable that he shld. undertake the work. He suggests that he (Bourne) & the Crown Advocate shld. draw [up] a new scale of charges & send it home for approval. What do you think?

I got back on the 21st, & am not sorry to be at work again.

y.s.

35. Satow to Mrs. Vaughan Smith

Mrs. Vaughan Smith ¹

Editor of Peking & Tientsin Times

26/8/03

Private & Confidential

Dear Madam,

I must apologize for not replying earlier to your letter of the 21st enclosing an extract from your paper. You will find the documents relating to the organization of the S’hai “Settlements North of the Yang-king-pang” in Mayers or in Hertslet’s Collection of Treaties. The history of the matter is that the British & American settlements were joined together under that title, and a municipal organization created by the Ministers of Gt. Britain, France, United States, Russia and Germany, the only Powers then represented at Peking. Whether the British settlement was founded before the American settlement I cannot at this moment say, but when I arrived in Shanghai in January 1862 they were both in existence, & the amalgamation took place some years later.

The use of the expression “International Settlement” is to be deprecated, because 1stly it is not the correct expression, & 2ndly it gives occasion for people to draw erroneous inferences.

¹ Alice Mildred Vaughan Smith, born 1861, was a leader writer and latter editor of the *Japan Gazette* from 1889-93. She then spent some time in India, before moving to China. She was married to W H Vaughan Smith, who was manager of the Imperial Chinese Telegraph Administration until 1906. See F H H King (ed.) and Prescott Clarke, *A research guide to China Coast newspapers 1822-1911*, (Cambridge, MA: East Asia Center, 1965), p. 158. (I am grateful to Jim Hoare for this footnote.)

y.f.

36. Satow to C.W. Campbell

25 Aug. 1903

My dear Campbell,

Townley has shown me yr. letter of 5 June asking about the rumours as to Hipplesley's [Hippisley's] health. Townley had written to me on the subject, & while at S'hai I made guarded inquiries of Mansfield. The result is merely that Hipplesley like other men who have been long in hot countries has a habit of dropping off to sleep when he is in company, but his head is quite sound.

I formed the same opinion from a conversation I had with H. himself. I could not see any signs of mental weakness. He showed me confidentially Townley's letter to him saying that he was to be our candidate for the succession to Sir R. Hart.

Bredon kept his lips closed on the subject, tho' I saw him several times. Nor did he mention either his C.M.G. or his indemnity claims. He has just bought a house at S'hai, & I conclude means to hold on there. It is pretty clear fr. what Townley tells me, of his hint that he might hereafter publish the corresp'ce, that we have made an enemy of him. It will prob. be seen that when Sir Robt. departs this life Bredon will be found to favour the substitution of an International Committee for the office of I.G. & Townley tells me that Hart is in favour of such a solution.

Several people in China have recently mentioned the subject to me, & I have replied that H.M.G. wld. insist on the maintenance of the present system, under an Englishman as head.

I have not seen Sir Robt. who is away at Peitaiho.

37. Satow to Lansdowne

27/8/03

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I could not find a convenient & safe opportunity to write to you before getting here. Briefly, the result of my conversations with Ld. Curzon abt. matters in wch. India & China are both interested was that Thibet is more important than all the other pending questions. It appears that Khambajong is a poor place, & not much better suited for a trade mart than Yatung, & that some other place must be found. We agreed that direct dealings betw. India & Thibet were more likely to lead to a satisfactory result than attempts at negotiation thro'

the Chinese Govt. This seems to be sufficiently shown by the fact that it takes a long time for the [Chinese] Resident [the Amban] at Lhasa to report to Peking, as he has to send over the mountains to Tachienlu before he can get to a telegraph wire. Younghusband & White can remain where they are until the Thibetans come to terms. I think that if it became necessary to push on further, it would not be difficult to get to Shigatse, or even to Lhasa with the 500 men of wch. the escort consists, but probably a hint that our negotiators wld. go to Gyantse if satisfactory arrangements are not made at Khambajong would be sufficient to make the Thibetans yield to our demands.

With regard to the lands in Raskam for wch. the Kanjutis desire to obtain leases, the Viceroy considers that the question is not a pressing one. If, as he expects, the Russians eventually acquire Kashgaria, it might be inconvenient to have a number of people who are dependent on India residing in that territory, & it might be better to compensate the Mir in some other way. It wld. be however rather a loss of prestige if we failed to get these leases, as it is only Petrovsky, the Russian consul at Kashgar, who is opposing us, & we are agreed that I shld. continue to press the Chinese to conclude.

I found the Viceroy desirous of having the agent at Kashgar, Major Miles, invested with the title of Consul, & I left with him a memo. with the understanding that he wld. write a desp. to the India Office on the subject. We need not, I think, ask the Chinese to give him an exequatur [official recognition], but simply inform them that he is to be consul; just as we have done with regard to Chengtu & Yünnanfu.

I suppose it might be difficult to obtain from China an engagement not to cede Kashgaria to any other Power, but if we cld. it wld. act as a considerable check on Russian designs in that region.

As to the Burma frontier, I found that Ld. Curzon had no particular desire to press at present for a solution, & it was agreed that all Burma questions shld. be left to be discussed by me at Rangoon with the Lt. Govr.

Of course I did not discuss Seistan [a border lowland region of Southwest Afghanistan and Eastern Iran] or Afghanistan with the Viceroy, but fr. what Mr. L.W. Dane, the Foreign Secy. said I conclude that the former is the most urgent & important of all the questions affecting the Indian frontier, & that, Afghanistan apart, Thibet comes second. The position as regards Kanjut and Kashgaria comes next in order, & the Burma-China frontier last of all.

At Rangoon [on July 23rd] I talked over the various Burma questions with Sir Hugh

Barnes. We agreed on a teleg. wch. he was to send to Simla abt. the Nmaikha-Shweli-Salwin frontier, that we shld. simply give the Chinese notice that they must not send armed bands across the boundary we have proposed to them. As nothing has yet been put definitely before the Ch. Govt. respecting the boundary through the Wa country, we agreed to recommend the adoption of a similar line of proceeding, but as there seemed to be no hurry, we thought it better that our suggestions be put before the govt. of India in a written desp. We discussed Mr. Litton's proposals abt. allowing Chinese opium to be sent thro' Burma in bond & for allowing certain imports to get a refund of duty on passing into China, but came to the conclusion not to recommend their adoption. We approved of Mr. Litton's proposal for improving the road to Têng-yüeh, but were of opinion that this cld. best be treated as a local question.

I met Mr. W.H. Wilkinson, the consul-general for Yünnan, who was in Burma on the way to his post. The state of the roads is such at this season of the year that he will hardly be able to reach his post before Novr.

It is not quite a week since I arrived, & I have had no opportunity of discussing business with the Chinese government. I shall take the earliest opportunity of trying to get Prince Ch'ing to put down on paper the result of the discussions on rlwy. matters wch. he had with Mr. Townley. As regards the Pukóu-Sinyang line wch. the B. & C. Corpn. insist on maintaining, I believe it passes thro' too poor a part of the country for it ever to yield a return, but it looks well on the map & it may be useful from a political point of view.

38. Satow to Lord Knollys¹

27/8/03

Dr. Ld. Knollys,

I delivered the King's message to my colleague Lessar, who was much flattered by being remembered. He perfectly well recollected the conversation he had with H.M. on taking leave. The K. said that Lessar had the reputation of being Anglo-phobe, to wch. he had replied that in Russia he was reproached with being Anglo-phile, the truth being that his endeavour always was to arrange matters amicably & fairly, so that whenever an arrangement was come to thro' him he was accused by each party of having favoured the other. He smiled & chuckled contentedly while he said this to me & seemed quite satisfied

¹ Satow spoke to the King for 45 minutes on June 13, 1903 then with his private secretary Lord Knollys. (Diary)

with his achievements. I then gave him the end of the message, wch. was that the King had watched his career with much interest but that drew nothing from him but praise of the agreeable society in London.

He has lately been very ill with phlebitis [inflammation of the veins, usually in the legs] & is still unable to put a foot to the ground. I found him sitting bolt upright at a table, with his legs extended underneath. In this position he gave a dinner party the other day.

I went to see my Fr. coll. [Dubail] a day or two after my arrival [August 23rd – see diary], & paid him a compliment on the success of [French President] M. Loubet's visit to the King. He smiled complacently, & said that no doubt the smoother relations wch. wld. result ought to facilitate the arrangement of various questions, but wld. not affect our respective interests. This I suppose was meant as a hint that we are not likely to get more out of France than before. Dubail is certainly not friendly to us, having formerly been consul-general at Shanghai, where international jealousies provoked by our predominant position are rife.

y.v.s.

39. Satow to Lansdowne

27/8/03

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

It is hardly necessary for me to say anything in commendation of Mr. Townley's conduct of affairs here during the past 9 months, but I shld. like at least to say that his treatment of railway concession affairs appears to me to have been eminently worthy of approval.

He particularly asks me to say that he sincerely appreciates the loyal & unflagging assistance rendered to him by Mr. Cockburn, whose special knowledge of local affairs was simply invaluable.

y.v.f.

40. Satow to Lansdowne

27/8/03

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

On my way to Peking I turned aside to to [sic] Weihaiwei to meet Sir Cyprian Bridge [on August 16 – see diary], as it was the only opportunity for seeing him for at least two months to come, & prob. also for the rest of his stay on this station.

I found him a good deal disturbed by the fact that the Russian squadron is superior to

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ours in number of battleships & large cruisers. Such a thing as our squadron on a foreign station being outnumbered by that of any other Power, he says, has never occurred within the memory of man.

The information he had about the probability of war betw. Japan & Russia was not very much. In his opinion the elder Japanese both in & out of office are adverse to war, but the younger men, & especially the army, are rather bellicose.

The news that the Japse. have officially addressed the Russian Govt. on the Manchurian question seems of great importance. If the Russians refuse to discuss it, will not the Japse. Govt. find themselves compelled to declare war? For if they sit down quietly under a rebuff, Russia will take the whole of Manchuria & ultimately Korea, to wch. she is already stretching out her hand at Yongampho.

I think Ad. Bridge wld. agree with me that the result of a war in wch. Japan fights Russia singlehanded wld. be her defeat & the loss of Korea. Then Russia becomes the dominant Power in this part of the world, & will swallow up at least all northern China.

You were good enough to tell me that you thought Japan had some reason for considering that we had not afforded her sufficient support since the conclusion of the alliance, & I find Sir Cyprian deeply impressed with the same view. He had just heard of the detention of the "Argonaut" on the China station, & I told him I thought it was for the purpose of putting heart into the Japanese.

May I venture to say that to let Japan be crushed by Russia wld. be a disaster for us also? With our assistance she wld. have nothing to fear, even if the Russians were determined to provoke her to declare war, as many Russian officers declare is what will be done. But if Russia is victorious over Japan, then tho' we shall have not lost a ship or a man, we shall be powerless in the Far East.

The French Min. & the Chinese Foreign Board both say that Russia will evacuate on 8 Oct. One must hope for the best, but I confess the prospect does not look a bright one.

y.v.f.

41. Satow to Cartwright

28/8/03

My dear Cartwright,

I am much obliged to you for having obtained an allowance for C.W. Campbell during his period as Acting Chinese Secy., & also for the concession made as to consular outfits. It

wld. save a good deal of correspce. if it were understood that a man promoted to be consul, but sent to officiate elsewhere than at the post to wch. he is named should receive , & then on transfer to his real post he wld. acc. to the circular get the other . If the old rule were adhered to, it wld. have the effect of hampering the Minister's action in many cases. E.g. I recommended Goffe for the vacancy at Têngyüeh, but if I had sent him there it wld. have been necessary to displace Litton, who has been much more useful at Têngyüeh than either Goffe wld. have been, or Litton wld. have been at any other post. Again C.W. Campbell is titular Consul at Wuchow, but being too good a man to be buried up the West River, he has never gone there, but has been employed provisionally in other posts where his abilities were more useful to the public service. Yet he gets no outfit, tho' obliged to establish himself at two such places as Tientsin & Peking. He has never complained, but suppose he said to me he wished to go to Wuchow and draw his outfit [allowance]. Could I fairly say to him, you must lose this outfit, because you are wanted elsewhere?

On p. 31, 2. of Tower's report there is a suggestion about letting senior men take leave once in three years. I wish you cld. persuade the Treasury to do this. It wld. be very effectual in inducing senior men to be willing to remain in the Service, whereas now the general temper is to try & get retired as early as possible, When a man is young five years on end in China is easy to bear, but becomes less & less so as time goes on. Pray do what you can for me.

E.S.

42. Satow to Lansdowne

10/9/03

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The presentation of a new note abt. Manchuria by Lessar, summarised in my teleg. of yesterday & reported on in my desp. of today, seems to point to further delay in the evacuation of Manchuria, & prob. of the signature of the American commercial treaty, providing for the opening of ports at Moukden & Tatungkou[?]. Prince Ch'ing's observn. that the negotiations on the new conditions wld. take some time, taken with the fact of Uchida's advising him to wait until the issue of negotiations at Petersburg betw. [Japanese minister] Kurino [Shinichirō] & Ct. Lamsdorff, seems significant. Uchida has not told the Prince anything more than the bare fact that pourparlers are going on at Petersburg, & has said nothing to Conger. But telegs. fr. Japan have mentioned them, & there has been a good

deal of speculation as to their nature. Morrison tells me that up to 14 Aug. [Russian minister Roman Romanovich] Rosen was sending long telegs. to Russia [from Japan], & that then they suddenly ceased, showing that up to the moment of Kurino's action, there had been discussion at Tokio. Uchida seems to me to expect war, though he does not admit it.

Chang Chihtung took advantage of my calling on him on Aug. 31 to talk abt. the Supao case, & tried to find out what we wld. agree to regarding the trial & punisht. of the accused. As he said it was not his affair, I declined to give him any information. Afterwards, reflecting that perh. he was being set on to try his hand at arranging the matter, & that failure wld. do him no good with the Empress-Dowager, I sent a confidential message to warn him agst. burning his fingers. [See diary for September 3rd.] No other official mentioned the case until Prince Ch'ing, when he called yesterday began again above [?], & asked for the men to be tried by the Chinese Auth. under a pledge that their life wld. be spared. He referred to Art. 21 of the Tientsin treaty, wch. obliges us to surrender criminals. I replied that I greatly doubted whether this undertaking included political offenders, because it was well known that England never surrendered persons accused of political crime. In any case, I had definite instructions on this point, from wch. I cld. not depart, & so had some of my colls: H.M.G. desired the Taot'ai's agreement to be carried out, for their trial at the mixed Court & for the punisht. to be carried out in the settlement. The only concession I cld. make was that of allowing a higher official to sit with the mixed Court magistrate, as the Taot'ai had proposed to me when I passed thro' S'hai. I urged him to agree to this, in order to get this case out of the way, & enable us to consider regulations to restrain seditious publication in future. Of course, until the trial was finished & the precise degree of guilt of each prisoner determined, it was impossible to say what wld. be an adequate punisht., but H.M.G. considered that it shld. be proportionate to the offence.

After some little more debate the Prince said he wld. teleg. to the Viceroy of Nanking to reconsider the proposal made to me by the Taot'ai, & I am in considerable hopes it may finally be so arranged. I have been waiting to hear fr. S'hai before going to confer with Dubail, who is in a rather delicate position, as he was at the outset the strongest advocate of surrender. When I hear that the Viceroy gives way, then I propose to ask Dubail to join me in inducing the colls: to accept the proposal of the Taot'ai.

Brenan who represents the B. & C. Corpn. has been very indiscreet in his utterances. He talked so much abt. the desirability of selling the extra-mural line, wch. at present is being worked at a loss, to the Russians that the Tientsin newspapers gave it out as a definite

agreement. He also has told many people that the Corpn. have no intention of ever making the Pukóu-Sinyang line, & only hold on to the concession in order to block others. This may represent the real mind of the Corpn., but it is not his business to say so. Further, he tells me that the Corporation have no wish to do anything to the Tientsin-Chinkiang rlwy., & that the obstructive attitude of Yüan Shihkai on the question of a govt. guarantee suits them very well. To the Germans a guarantee is of the highest importance, & without it they cannot get the necessary capital in Berlin. The result wld. be that the Kiaochou-Chinan line wld. be left in the air & prove a commercial loss.

The Corpn. have as you know a concession for a line fr. Canton to Hongkong. Brennan says they have no intention of proceeding with it. When I was in Hongkong recently Sir H. Blake had to lunch Sir Paul Chater, the Hgkg Armenian capitalist ¹, who is interested in the line being built. [See diary for August 8, 1903.] The latter suggested that if the Corporation did not intend to construct the line, the Americans who have the concession for the rlwy. fr. Canton to Hankow shld. be allowed to take it over. I replied that as the concession had been obtained by the Corpn. with the assistance of H.M.G. & not by their own efforts, no doubt it cld. be taken fr. them & given to any other group H.M.G. might choose, but I felt sure they wld. not sanction its being transferred to foreigners.

The Yangtze Valley Co. of wch. Edmund Davis is chairman are also sinners in respect of concessions obtained by our aid. Wilton was four months at Chengtu getting a concession on their behalf for mines in Ning Yuan & another for petroleum springs. The concessions have been sent up here but the Co. make no effort to procure their ratification, & they have recently elected Col. Thuys & 2 other Belgians to the Board of Directors. So all the hard work of Mr. Wilton on behalf of British capital is thrown away.

43. Satow to Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India

9.9.03

Dear Ld. Curzon,

In Oct. 1898 the Govt. of India addressed a desp. to the Sec. of State abt. the boundaries of Hunzer, Afghanistan & Kashmir with Chinese Turkestan, & in April/99 a desp. was written fr. here enclosing copy of a Note to the Chinese Govt. setting forth the proposals of the Indian Govt.

¹ Sir Catchick Paul Chater (1846-1926) was Armenian and born in Calcutta. When I first transcribed the Satow Peking diaries I misread "Armenian" as "American", for which I apologise here. (Editor's note)

It does not appear that any written answer was ever recd. fr. the Chinese Govt. & I do not recollect that we discussed the matter when I was at Simla [July 7-14, 1903, see diary]. Perh. it has been intentionally been ¹ allowed to sleep as long as the question of the leases of land in Raskam to the Kanjutis remained unsettled. I mentioned the boundary yesterday to Prince Ch'ing, who was of opinion that China had given a reply, but beyond a promise to call for a report fr. Yarkand I do not think she ever said anything.

I am trying to study the Raskam question, but have not yet managed to get all the papers together. When I have done this I will write again.

44. Satow to Curzon

9.9.03

Confl.

Dear Ld. Curzon,

Lessar on the 6th presented a fresh note to the Chinese Govt. proposing conditions on wch. Russia will evacuate Newchwang & Moukden on Oct 8, Kirin in four months time & Heilungchiang after the lapse of a year. The conditions have been telegraphed to the "Times" on the 7th, but in addition the Russians propose to establish landing stages on the Sungari River, to be connected by telegraphs & guarded by Russian soldiers, & also to establish posting stations on the road fr. Tsitsihar to Blagovestchensk. Prince Ch'ing wants to cut down the periods to 2 & 4 months respectively, & to refuse the protection of the landing stages by Russian soldiers, & the posting station to Blago[vestchens]k. The rest he wld. agree to. He tells me he does not expect an agreement to be arrived at speedily, & the Japse. Minister [Uchida] has advised him to await the result of the negotiations going on at Petersburg betw. Japan & Russia.

Uchida appears to me to expect war, wch. no doubt will break out over the Russian lumber station at Yongampho in Corea near the mouth of the Yalu. I think Ito [Hirobumi] will do all he can to avoid a war. In any case it seems to me that Japan is likely to be elbowed out of Corea. If she fights alone she will be beaten & if she does not fight the end must be the same.

¹ "been" is repeated in the original text.

45. Satow to Lansdowne

24/9/03

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

You have prob. heard that Japan is negotiating at the Hague a treaty with Persia, thro' their own Minister and the Persian Minister there. I have no knowledge of its contents, but am informed that it is almost ready for signature. It was the Japse. Minr. in Siam, Inagaki [Manjirō], who volunteered this information to me when I met him recently in the train between Tientsin & Peking.

Our old friend Hu, of the Northern Rlwys. told me that the Chinese Govt. telegd. to their minister at Petersburg to remonstrate against the conditions wch. M. Lessar was insisting on with respect to the invasion of Manchuria. Count Lamsdorff replied that he had nothing to do with the affair, wch. was in the hands of Admiral Alexeieff, & that the latter recd. his orders direct fr. the Emperor.

It was also Hu that told me that Lessar had written a private letter to Lien fang, the Fr[ench] speaking member of the Foreign Board, stating that Sir R. Hart had been injurious to Chinese interests as Inspector-Genl. & that Russia & China being such good friends, the latter ought to agree to all the custom houses in Manchuria being manned by Russians, under a Russian Inspector-Genl., who wld. be independent of Hart.

Sir Robt. seems to enjoy excellent health, & continues to surround himself with young girls of 17 or 18. He has been considerably upset by a teleg. fr. Lady Hart, who says she is coming out with her younger dau. to spend Christmas with him. He complained that this wld. upset his household arrangements & compel him to sacrifice his hours to her wishes. Perh. she thinks he requires looking after.

My endeavours to get Dubail to work with me in connexion with the Supao case have not been successful. Instead of agreeing to the proposal of the Italian Colleague, that Conger, Uchida & I, who have been addressed by Prince Ch'ing, shld. be left to negotiate a settlement wch. cld. be accepted by the other legations, as he had led me to believe he wld. do, he merely put "vu" [seen] on the circular of the Doyen, when it went round to him a second time.

During Mumm's absence Dubail gradually came to be the colleague who initiated joint action on the part of the diplomatic body, & he seems to dislike this affair being settled without him. As it originated in the Anglo-American concession, & the Fr. are not so directly interested as any of the others, it seems quite reasonable that the Americans,

Japanese & ourselves, whose consuls-general made the agreement with the Taotai abt. the trial in the Mixed Court, shld. take the lead in trying to settle it. I have not yet heard fr. Prince Ch'ing as to the result of his teleg. to the Viceroy of Nanking of wch. I spoke in my last letter, but I hope to have an opportunity of asking him in a day or two.

Conger's language to Prince Ch'ing abt. Manchuria, reported in a desp. of today's date, was very explicit. He has no doubt been called [sic. hauled?] over the coals for expressing the opinion that his govt. is indifferent to the fate of Manchuria, provided they secure the open ports & commercial facilities they asked for. I propose when I see Pr. Ch'ing to use similar language, & advise him at any rate to await the result of the negotiations between Japan & Russia.

Uchida went all the way to the Summer Palace on the 10th ¹ to see the Prince, & tell him by instructions of the Jap. Govt. that they must by no means agree to Lessar's proposals, for if they did Japan wld. consider herself entitled to similar concessions elsewhere.

46. Satow to Lansdowne

28 9 03

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

A few lines to explain my despatch abt. Lessar's proposal that there shld. be a separate Inspector-General of Customs for Manchuria.

My first informant was [Edward Guy] Hillier of the Hg'kg & S'hai Bank, the 2nd Hu, the friendly Joint-Adm'or of the Northern Rlwys., the third was [George Ernest] Morrison of the "Times."

Two days ago I went to Sir Robt. Hart, & repeated to him what I had heard fr. my 1st informant. He replied that he knew nothing whatever about it. Knowing that Morrison had his information direct fr. Hart, I was not a little surprised, but made no remark, & passed on to other matters.

Yesterday, however, I recd. a letter from him. in wch. he confirmed the information recd. fr. Morrison, with the sole difference that he spoke of 'a remark made by the Russian Legn. instead of a private note fr. Lessar. I can hardly find fault with this initial want of candour if he thought it was a secret of the Chinese Govt. that he was bound to keep, but in that case he shld. not have told the "Times" correspt.

¹ In my transcription of the diary for this day I wrote: "He did not go to the Summer Palace on the 10th..." In fact "not" is my error and was not in the original diary. (Satow's Peking diary, Ruxton, 2006, Volume One, p. 370)

In former times I suppose Sir Robt. served British interests well, or he would not have had honours conferred on him, besides being offered the apptmt. of British Minister. But I don't think he serves us particularly well now, & the reason, it seems to me, is not far to seek.

When the Chinese dismissed [Horatio Nelson] Lay ¹ in 1863, they offered the position of Inspector-General to Hart direct, without the intervention of [British minister] Sir Fredk. Bruce, or of the British Govt., as far as can be seen fr. the Parl[iamentar]y papers. He organised the service of the Maritime Customs & became its autocrat, independent of his own govt. or of any other than his Chinese employés.

He has told me that he considers it was a mistake for H.M.G. to demand that his successor shld. always be an Englishman. I have little doubt that he resented this step, as being an interference with his independence. He would make whatever arrangements he thought best when the time came, without asking the leave of the B. Govt. They were not his masters was the feeling.

The second cause of annoyance was the selection of [Sir Robert] Bredon as heir-apparent. Bredon has made as much of the promises given to him by the F.O. as he cld., & Hart will not have anything to do with him.

I cannot doubt that the step taken at the beginning of this year, of telling Bredon he was no longer candidate, and of choosing another, skilfully as it was communicated to Hart, vexed him greatly. I was not in favour of its being done, knowing how very sensitive the old gentleman is with regard to this rich inheritance, of which he intends to dispose. The simple notion that the Br. Govt. desire to dispossess him & dispose of the succession only increases his determination to stop here. He sometimes throws out a hint abt. a peerage. I am convinced that he wld. take it if offered unconditionally, but wld. not accept it as the price of his retirement. The very notion that they shld. desire to be rid of him seems to him incomprehensible & unreasonable, for where could any single man be found to cope with the work wch. is child's play to his gigantic intellect. Therefore he must, when the time comes, be succeeded by an international board.

I hear he now talks of going home either when he is 70 or has completed 50 years in China. But I regard these suggestions as only intended to amuse those who desire his retirement, and that when either of those periods arrives he will discover excellent reasons

¹ See *Horatio Nelson Lay and Sino-British Relations, 1854-1864* by Jack J. Gerson, Harvard University Press, 1972.

for staying on.

The conclusion I draw fr. all this is that he is not a safe man to meddle with, & that he is best left alone. We can at least comfort ourselves with the certainty that while he will never do us any intentional harm, his presence here is less injurious than that of an international board, & in my opinion we ought to possess our souls in patience until Providence in its own good time removes him, & gives us the opportunity of insisting on an Englishman succeeding. But do not let us then too openly back our particular candidate. That is what both Bredon & Hippley at different junctures have been very careful to impress on me, and I think they were right.

I have read Townley's teleg. of 21 February & his desp. of 23 Feby. recording his conversation with Prince Ch'ing on the subject, & notice that the latter said he looked to Hart to nominate his successor, and as far as verbal assurances go we are safe.

47. Satow to F.A. Campbell

5.10.03

My dear Campbell,

The Agent of the B. & C. Corpn. alluded to in my desp. no. 342 very conf., is Brennan. I have no wish to do him harm, & hope you will not on any account give a copy of the desp. to the Corpn. If you think it necessary to say anything about it to them, please give them only the gist. I daresay that they will themselves have heard about the matter fr. E.G. Hillier or E. Cousins.

I told Lord Lansdowne about these blazing indiscretions in a private letter of 10 Sept.

48. Satow to F.A. Campbell

7.10.03

My dear Campbell,

I ought to have written at the time I sent off my teleg. abt. Col. Browne as Genl. Manager of the Chinese Engg. & Mining Co., to explain my objection to him. The fact is that he drinks. Some time after I had heard of this, he dined with me, & I noticed he was particularly abstemious. But I recd. so many confirmations fr. sources wch. it was impossible to suspect, that I feel quite certain that it is the fact. I have no doubt Major Nathan will do quite as well as anyone else, tho' as I said in my teleg. I know nothing of him.

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As long as we have an attachment at Shanhaikwan, with intelligent officers, we shld. not have to rely on a man at Tongshan to keep us informed as to the doings of the Russians at the former place. As you will infer fr. a desp. abt. the occupation of Fort No. 1 at S.h.k. the Russians have cleared out of that place, & in fact they have now only a hundred Cossacks left.

I have spoken to Dr. Gray abt. the question of private practice. He has no desire to give up his pension rights in return for leave to practise. The fact is, some of the Engl. here (who are not numerous) wld. like to have him, & people sometimes send to him fr. the hotels, but he usually refers them to Dr. Gatrell. Gray tells me that when he was in Central Africa, he had a desp. authorizing him to take private practice, notwithstanding his pension rights.

49. Satow to Campbell

20 10 03

My dear Campbell,

Here is a letter I have recd. fr. Col. Browne about his apptmt. I shall of course not answer it. But you must not mind me saying that I cannot see why, if it was thought necessary to consult me, he was told that you were going to do so, and afterwards that I had objected. I naturally supposed your telegram was a confidential inquiry. If I had taken it to be a mere formality, my ans. [answer] naturally wld. have been "he is a capital fellow", or something of that sort.

y.s.

copy

Oak Cottage

Haslemere

14th Sept. 1903

My dear Sir Ernest,

Your telegram to the Foreign Office has been a great blow to me. I had hoped that my work on the railway in China might have disposed you to view my appointment with favor.

Of course personal matters cannot be allowed to influence general policy, but the salary offered, £4000 a year and a free house, would have enabled me to make a provision for my family, and I have nothing except my pay.

Yours very truly

(signed) C.A.R. Browne

50. Satow to Lansdowne

22.10.03

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

The Fr[ench] text of the Russian draft notes about Manchuria was given me by Uchida, who got it from Chang Chihtung. The Chinese text of the signed Notes & Prince Ch'ing's replies was obtained from the under-secretary of the Foreign Board, to whom I had suggested thro' Cockburn that it might be useful to China to let the justice of their cause be known to the world. I was much disappointed however to find that the brave words the Prince told me he had written to Lessar were not on paper at all. The Chinese are very vague in their statements at times, wch. is partly due to their language having no declensions or conjugations even of the simplest kind.

The Japse. bank here and at Tientsin has been sending away its spare cash to Japan & Shanghai, under the impression that if hostilities break out Russia may make an excuse for occupying these 2 places. I do not know whether there is any ground for this idea, but it seems quite possible that in the event of war about Manchuria the Russians might invent a pretext for treating China as allied with Japan.

I telegraphed a day or two ago about the desire of the Germans to negotiate separately for their portion of the Tientsin-Pukóu (formerly Tientsin-Chinkiang) line. They have probably found out that Yüan Shihkai is not particularly anxious to see the section Chinan-Tientsin constructed, and that the B. & C. Corporation have no present intention of bringing out a loan for their portion of the line. Brennan, while affecting to leave the negotiations in the hands of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank represented by Cordes, made no secret to me of his entire indifference, & of his belief that the Corpn. wld. not be able to make the necessary financial arrangements. Indeed, seeing the condition of things on the Stock Exchange & the low price of Consols, I do not see how they can hope to float the Shanghai-Nanking railway.

The Yangtze Corpn. are still doing nothing to obtain the ratification of the concessions in Szechuan obtained for them with so much trouble, & have dismissed Archibald Little who negotiated them with Wilton's aid. It seems vexatious that so much hard work shld. be entirely thrown away. The real reason for the delay is that the Chinese insisted on a clause protecting them from any claim of Pritchard Morgan's, & the Yangtze Corporation are unwilling to pay black mail to that gentleman. For my own part I do not think M. has any

claims to indemnification.

Lessar is in a very bad humour about having to give way on the Supao case, & I anticipate his endeavouring to upset the arrangement come to here by the Diplomatic Body, by instructing his consul at Shanghai to protest against the recognition of the Taotai's agreement with the Consuls. I have warned Mansfield agst. this. But even if the Senior Consul replies to the Viceroy as we have instructed him, I greatly doubt the Viceroy's accepting our proposal, & then the Dipl. Body will have to make up their minds to release the prisoners. Dubail has supported me in accordance with his instructions, & I have made the process of eating his words as easy to him as possible.

Of the real authors of the incriminated [sic. incriminating?] articles one escaped to Kiaochou. Mumm tells me the German Auth: tried to find him, but were unsuccessful. I imagine that they did not try very diligently to effect his arrest, for after all they have a serious fear of the "Times".

51. Satow to Sanderson

Secret

22/10/03

My dear Sanderson,

Acting on the permission given to me, I have arranged with Edmund Backhouse¹ to supply me daily with notes on the contents of the Chinese newspapers, and translations of any Russian documents that may come into my hands. He is also to study Mongolian, and if after a year he is able to speak it, he is to go to Urga to see what the Russians are doing

¹ On January 22, 1903, Satow had lunch with Geoffrey Drage in London. "Lunched with G. Drage... Promised to ask Sanderson to give me young [Edmund Trelawney] Backhouse as a private secretary for Chinese and Russian work." On March 26th Satow was told by Sanderson: "Backhouse, cannot well ask Treasury to give an app[oin]tm[en]t but c[ou]ld get Ld. Lansdowne's consent to expenditure of £300 a year on him as newswriter. Spoke of my idea of sending him to Urga, which seemed to him not bad." On April 29th Lansdowne also approved of Satow's idea. On October 17th Backhouse lunched with Satow in Peking: "I proposed to him that he shld. furnish me with précis of the newspapers and now and then a Peking Gazette memorial, also translations from Russian, and should study Mongolian for a year with a view to going to Urga & Mongolia generally to furnish news, to give him £300 a year. He has a five year engagement with the Peking University, which can be terminated at 3 months' notice, and it was [agreed?] that he should go on with this until the time arrives for him to go to Urga." (All diary entries)

there, particularly with the Thibetan Llama who resides there, and generally to supply information as to what goes on in Mongolia. He has a great gift for languages, and I have no doubt of his being able to pick up Mongolian in the time mentioned. He has an engagement for five years to teach English at the Peking University, subject to 3 months notice on either side, and I have agreed that he shall continue this for a year. If he resigned now, immediately after accepting the apptmt, it would injure him in the eyes of the Chinese, wch. would not be desirable.

He began on the 19th & is sending very useful digests of newspaper articles in different parts of the country. I have offered & he has accepted £300 a year.

52. Satow to Sanderson

28.10.03

My dear Sanderson,

It might perhaps be as well to warn Ld. Glenesk agst. a man whom the "Morning Post" seems to have hereabouts as a correspt., a drunken fellow named Mortimer O'Sullivan, who when he has taken too much liquor forgets to tell the truth; with him it is in vino mendacitas.¹ It was he who recently sent broad-cast a teleg. fr. Chefoo that the Russian fleet had left Port Arthur under sealed orders, & that war wld. be declared the following day at noon.

y.v.s.

53. Satow to F.A. Campbell

5.11.03

My dear Campbell,

Regarding the W.H.W. [Wei Hai Wei] gold mining co. & Tiger Hill, I have written several despp. of wch. 2 go by this mail. I hope my view may have some weight, i.e. that if I carry out my instructions literally & make a protest to the Chinese Govt. about the wording of the Germ. mining concession wch. overlaps not only our neutral zone, but also the leased territory, I shall achieve nothing. The Germ. concession is four years old, & we know nothing of its wording all this time. I think I have exhausted all the possibilities of persuasion with Mumm, & that nothing effectual can be accomplished except at Berlin.

Mumm wld. not give me the whole German text of the para. in their concession, but perh. you can obtain it at Berlin. In any case the expression I quote is authentic.

¹ As opposed to 'in vino veritas'!

If Lord Lansdowne decides that it is not expedient to say anything at Berlin, you will of course telegraph to me that I must carry out my instructions, but I am afraid you will not obtain the desired result.

Something ought certainly to be done to put the Legn. Guard into proper buildings. The Treasury can afford the money, for there is a margin over & above our military expenditure, fr. the Indemnity.

The Haikwan tael at the moment is worth 3s/1d, so that the Chinese would not be gaining by having the indemnity fixed in gold.

y.s.

54. Satow to Curzon

5.11.03

Dear Lord Curzon,

By this mail I am sending the result of my studies in the Raskam affair in the shape of a digest of the papers we have here, and a memo. containing some observations. These reduce themselves to two points, however, namely that up to 14 Mar. 1899, when we presented a Note calling upon the Chinese to give up Hunza, they did not heed the objections of Petrovsky, and that owing to the India Office converting the word “ousted” used by Macartney into “expelled”, the instructions I recd. & acted on, necessitated my accusing the Chinese Auth: of doing what in fact they had not done.

These two false steps are very difficult to retrace, & if I were now instructed to re-open the case, I shld. be at a loss how to proceed.

Our Consul-general at Chengtu is sending some interesting reports of the Chinese in Thibet to the Viceroy of Szechuen, wch. have every appearance of being genuine.

Japan seems to have made up her mind not to fight abt. Manchuria, & it is likely that her prestige will suffer. The consolidation of the Russian position in Manchuria will give an impulse to the general movement in the direction of partition. I hope H.M.G. will stick to their present policy, & refuse to be dragged at the tail of the amateur statesmen of Shanghai who press for our claiming the Yangtze basin as our “sphere of influence”.

Lessar says Russia must either continue to occupy Manchuria with China friendly, or annex it outright. As soon as it becomes known that Japan means to do nothing, Chinese opposition to Russian demands is pretty certain to collapse.

y.v.s.

55. Satow to Lansdowne

5.11.03

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

Fr. your teleg. of the 2nd telling me the Japse. say they will not fight about Manchuria I infer that Ito's prudent & pacific views have triumphed, & that there will be no war. It always seemed to me difficult for Japan to create a casus belli [reason for war] out of Russia's omission to evacuate Manchuria.

Lessar I am told says that Russia must either continue her occupation with China friendly, or annex Manchuria in spite of her. China friendly means the willing acceptance of all the new demands that were recently rejected. It must be a severe tax on Russian finances to bring so many soldiers to Eastern Asia and feed them there, & to keep nearly the whole Baltic fleet in China waters.

The re-occupation of Mukden a few days ago has much upset the Chinese, & Yüan Shihkai was summoned in haste fr. Tientsin to a council.

On the 29th Oct. he sent me his confl. man Tang Shaoyi [唐紹儀] to say that he was much concerned about the negotiations between Japan & Russia. If war was the result, what attitude ought China to adopt. She could hardly remain neutral if there was fighting in her territory.

I said I cld. not advise China to take a course that wld. bring upon her greater disasters than ever. Had she troops & officers capable of leading them that would be of any use to an ally?

He replied in the negative, but said she cld. furnish supplies & transports. I gathered that his idea was that China ought to ally herself with Japan, but that he feared the Japse. wld. become domineering if they were victorious. I therefore said that I thought the Japse. were moved by a sincere desire to help China, & that she feared for her own safety if China were overwhelmed by Western aggression.

He acknowledged that the wisest Japanese ¹ were animated by these views. But what the Viceroy feared was that in the event of war, one or the other combatant wld. occupy Peking, in order to force China to take sides. Five or Six thousand men wld. suffice.

I told him that as long as the Russian fleet was in command of the sea he need be under

¹ The equivalent passage in Satow's diary at first read: "He acknowledged that this was the view of all sensible Japanese." But later Satow crossed out "Japanese" and substituted "Chinese"!

no such apprehension as regarded Japan.

He observed that in the case of war Russia wld. prob. seize the northern railway & advance into this province.

I tried to console him with the idea that possibly the Japse. strategists might avoid Chinese territory & direct their efforts agst. Vladivostok. But China shld. preserve a watchful attitude and await the result of the negotiations.

On the 1st inst. Chang Chihtung sent to say that he was summoned to the Summer Palace, doubtless to be consulted on the Manchurian business, & would like to know my opinion.

I said I thought China shld. adhere to her refusal of the Russian demands, & the newspaper reports of an agreement betw. Russia & Japan that the former shld. be allowed to do as she liked in Manchuria, in return for the latter getting a free hand in Corea, were untrue. Russia evidently intended to stay in Manchuria unless she were turned out by force. I cld. not say whether there wld. be war, but peace was by no means assured. The messenger [Liang] asked whether China might not appeal to the PP. I answered that this would be regarded by Russia as an unfriendly act, & it was prob[able] that the PP. wld. either take no notice of the appeal or refuse to intervene. The best thing for China to do was to remain quiet, & not to heed newspapers who argue that she shld. ally herself with Japan. That wld. provoke Russia to do something worse than merely remain in Manchuria.

All the Russian talk that is repeated here & the tone of Ad[miral] Alexeieff's paper the Novi Krai[?] of Port Arthur indicate that the Russians, or at least a great many of them, would welcome war, in order to crush Japan once for all; & doubtless, I conceive, to pick a quarrel with China on the ground of her having listened to Japanese counsels, & then occupy N. Chihli. Russia is under no engagement towards the other PP to limit the number of her soldiers in Chihli, or not to station troops on the line of communications betw. Peking & Shanhaikwan.

I find my French colleague increasingly amiable.

[Alexander] Hosie has some difficulty with the new Viceroy of Szechuen, who omitted to notify his having assumed office, & tried to insist on communications passing thro' a channel known as the "foreign board", wch. is manned by French sympathisers. I have given him my support, & he telegraphs that matters have been arranged to his satisfaction. It is very useful to have a man likely [sic. like?] Hosie at Chengtu, where all the Thibetan business is focussed, & he knows how to take advantage of the position.

Every one says that this province has been quieter than it has been for years, & the

attitude of the people is quite satisfactory.

Morrison's telegram reporting that an attempt had been made to blow up the magazine is his first serious mistake. It has caused a great stir out here, & people have imagined that I suppressed the truth for political reasons. I do not know who was the purveyor of the news, but the officer who presided over the Board of inquiry, and gave it as his opinion that "the circumstances were suspicious" has been talking a good deal of nonsense outside. He is a new arrival in Peking & is quite incompetent to weigh probabilities.

56. Satow to Lord Knowles¹

16.11.03

Dear Lord Knowles,

Peking has lately recd. a visit fr. the ex-grand vizier of Persia, the Atabeg Azam, accompanied by a son & a clever secretary who speaks German well, French less well, & English badly. The Atabeg Azam himself speaks Fr[ench] to a respectable amount. We have dined him to his great content & he came to the ball I gave on the King's birthday. He says he is going on to Japan, thence to America & Engl[and], on his way to Mecca, wch. he must reach some time in Feby. We have not mentioned to him disagreeable subjects like the death of the Hakim el Mulk & the apptmt. of Ani el Kowleh[?] as Grand Vizier, nor have I talked politics with him. He had a private interview with Natung the intelligent Manchu who has just been reappointed to the Foreign Board, but I do not know what they said to each other. The relative advantages of friendship with Russia & England wld. be a topic on wch. both wld. feel deeply.

Abt. 3 wks. ago [October 21st – see diary] I had the Raja of Kapurthalla & his Rani here, & they came to dine. The lady is very good looking, & tall, more like a Greek in appearance than an Indian. She speaks a little Fr. & Engl. They intended going on to Japan & then wld. return to India.

The Empress-Dowager had been busying herself with the expectation that the Russians wld. evacuate Manchuria on 8th Oct. & issued invitations for garden receptions at the Summer Palace, on the 9th for the foreign ladies, on the 10th for the Dipl. Body. The

¹ This appears to be a letter to Viscount Knollys, the private secretary to King Edward VII. In fact on the fourth page of this letter copy at the top "Lord Knollys" is written. (According to the *Oxford Authors' and Printers' Dictionary*, "Knollys" is pronounced "Knowles".) Did Satow make an error out of fatigue? He also seems to have frequently misspelt A.E. Hippisley, Assistant Commissioner of the Imperial Maritime Customs as "Hippesley" in both his diaries and letters.

Townleys were away, & I was not well, so no one went fr. this Legation. It turned out that the E-D was in a bad humour, & was not as gracious to the ladies as usual, & the colls: who went on the second day were told they must not ascend the dais, as had been the custom hitherto. One can understand that the Russian refusal to evacuate had upset her, & in fact we now hear that she had fixed on those days in order to receive everybody's felicitations on the happy event. When things turned out diff[eren]t to what she had expected, she wanted to countermand these fêtes, but was told by her people that it was not possible. So she had to hold her receptions, & the innocent ladies & diplomats had to bear the brunt of the ill-temper that ought to have been wreaked on Lessar alone. But he too was not there, being absolutely unable to stir.

Of course the absence of the Br. Legn. was much gossiped abt., & Mumm tried to draw me into an admission that it was by way of a demonstration agst. the Palace. The simple fact is that I find a fourteen mile journey out there at 7 o'clock in the morning in a springless cart & the same back again scarcely repaid by the opportunity of making a bow to an Emperor who does not speak to me.

The Townleys are leaving at the end of the month, & I suppose will not come back. He ought to get a secretaryship of Embassy. They will each of them be a great loss to me.

y.v.s.

57. Satow to Lansdowne

18.11.03

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

I hope you will approve of my having instructed the Commercial Attaché to make the report on the trade of Tientsin, which successive Consuls-general at that port have omitted to send home for some years past. The commercial attaché has very little work, & I am disposed to think that instead of stationing him at Shanghai it would be better to have him at Peking, and to entrust to him the care of the commercial corresp'ce with the Chinese govt. This is at present looked after by the Chinese Secy. very efficiently, but it takes up a good deal of his time wch. might be more usefully employed in matters that properly belong to his apptmt. As there are no quarters for the Commercial Attaché in the Legation he wld. have to take a house outside, but I do not think that wld. be a serious difficulty. The number of despp. sent home by him fr. S[hang]hai will furnish the measure of his utility there, & work done at the port could as well have been performed at Peking.

y.v.f.

58 Satow to Davidson

18.11.03

My dear Davidson,

[H.S.] Wilkinson ¹ has sent to me copies of a letter he has addressed to the F.O. abt. [F.S.A.] Bourne's ² interpretation of Art. 25 of the O. in C. [Order in Council] of 1865. I am sending to F.O. a copy of his official letter to me & of my reply. I presume he is wrong in supposing that the expressions "inadvertence & ignorance of the legal aspect of the question" were applied to him, & have said so in my ans. to him. He is a touchy little man. But what I particularly want to interest you in is the desirability of relieving the Tientsin consul-general from judicial duties as far as possible, & of making the Peking V-C and the man at Chungking judicially independent. Here there are a large number of Indians, not of good character, and they are likely to become more numerous as time goes on.

When is the new O. in C. to come out? China seems in a bad way, & a première partition of this Far Eastern Poland seems to be imminent. If Japan goes to war, it will give the Germans the opportunity they have long desired of extending their sway over Shantung. I trust Engl. will be faithful to her compact [the Anglo-Japanese Alliance] with Japan.

y.s.

59. Satow to Lansdowne

19.11.03

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The Chinese press is indignant at the occupation of Mukden by the Russians, and talks of the necessity of declaring war, but it is quite certain that the Empress-Dowager will do nothing of the sort. Prince Ch'ing seems still disposed to await the termination of the negotiations between Japan & Russia.

Reuter has informed us among other things that Gt. Britain & France were uniting to press Japan to be reasonable in her demands & again, that the result of the interview betw. the Emperors William & Nicolas was a promise by Germany to support Russia in case war

¹ Hiram Shaw Wilkinson, father of Hiram Parkes Wilkinson, was appointed Chief Justice of H.M. Court for China and Korea in May 1900. He retired in 1905.

² Frederick Samuel Augustus Bourne was Acting Chief Justice at Shanghai from April 6, 1902 to October 1, 1903. (F.O. List, 1941)

broke out & Japan was helped by England.

On my jokingly saying [on November 9, 1903 – see diary] to Dubail that I heard France & Germany were going to make war with Engld. & Japan, on the side of Russia, he said very confidentially that he had news fr. Paris that M. Delcassé had been asked by England & Japan to arrange matters with Russia for them.

I can quite imagine that there are Germans who wld. be in favour of a renewal of the Far Eastern alliance of 1895 [Russia, Germany & France] that turned Japan out of the Liaotung Peninsula, because if Japan goes to war, China will be dragged in somehow, & that wld. give Germany an opportunity of taking possession of the whole of Shantung [peninsula]. She has 3000 men at Kiaochou, quite enough for the purpose.

My Japanese coll: [Uchida] who dined with me a week ago [see diary for November 12th] said that his Govt. wld. have to conclude a satisfactory agreement with Russia before 5 Dec., for wch. date the Diet is summoned. If they do not, the Cabinet will be impeached, & they must fall before popular indignation. They might try to stifle discussion by proroguing the Diet, but if they did either Katsura the Prime Minister or Komura wld. run great personal risk.

My Amer. Coll: [Conger] says that the U.S. is quite indifferent to the fate of Manchuria [see diary for November 15th], and that Germany is only waiting for an opportunity to follow the example of Russia. He regards the Chinese Govt. as completely effete & incapable & says that according to English-speaking Chinese friends of his, there is a great deal of unrest in central China & the Yangtze region. The people attribute the heavy burdens imposed on them in consequence of 1900 to the Manchu dynasty, & say that the only hope for China lies in getting rid of them.

But this sort of talk on the part of Chinese educated abroad I regard as mere froth, not likely to lead to anything.

I hear Bredon is making a grievance of his being no longer supported as the Br. candidate for Hart's succession. It was pretty certain that he wld. make himself disagreeable. I was very glad to see that his name did not appear in the list of birthday honours. He wld. have regarded the bestowal of the V.C.M.G.[K.C.M.G.?] as a due recognition of his merits & services, & have still hung on in China.

I do not suppose that the Chinese resident [Amban] will effect much, even if he does leave Lhasa and go to meet Younghusband ¹. Prince Ch'ing seems at last to have perceived

¹ Colonel Francis Younghusband, British commissioner to Tibet, 1903-04.

that we mean business this time. In speaking to Lien fang whom Prince Ch'ing uses as his messenger in such matters, I have dwelt upon the impracticability of the Thibetans & the necessity of obtaining reparation for their hostile proceedings, & have also pointed out that the new Resident might have reached Lhasa long ago if his movements had been duly expedited. I suspect the truth to be that neither he nor the man he is going to replace relishes the idea of having to be responsible for Thibetan stupidity. The Chinese have about 2000 so-called soldiers in Thibet, but they are probably little better than Falstaff's band of recruits, & China exercises very little more influence there than she did in Corea.

I hope to send the Fr. rlwy. agreeet. home by the next bag. Fr. what I hear of its provisions, it seems to be the logical result of the exchange of notes of 1898, & the Chinese have got as good terms as possible under the circs. But the fact remains that it is a foreign govt. rlwy. entirely under foreign control, & the stipulation that it shall revert to China after 80 years is not worth the paper it is written on. If the Fr. Govt. guarantees the interest, there ought to be no difficulty in raising the necessary capital.

60. Satow to Charles Hardinge ¹

2 Dec. 1903

My dear Hardinge,

It is with diffidence that I venture to submit the enclosed observations & an amendment on your memorandum of proposals for a change in the grading & salaries of the Junior members of the Diplomatic Service.

There is another measure wch. I am persuaded would be of great advantage to the public service, if it could be carried out in practice, I mean the assimilation of the F.O. staff & the Diplomatic Service up to the ranks of Asst. Under Secretary & Secretary of Embassy, and the frequent interchanging of men between London and foreign capitals.

y.v.s.

Proposals &c.

The scheme is virtually one intended to remedy the existing state of things by wch. on promotion to the rank of Secretary of Legation, at 9 out of 13 posts, Diplomatic Secretaries cease to perform any active work.

The remedy proposed amounts to a change of title at those 9 places, the salary remaining

¹ Charles Hardinge, from 1910 1st Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858-1944).

the same (except at Rio, where it wld. be reduced fr. £700 to £500).

At any Legation the senior 2nd Sec[retar]y after 5 years service wld. receive the honorary title of Secretary of Legation.

The same is proposed for senior 2nd Secretaries at Embassies and at Peking, Tokio, Tehran & Cairo, the present First Secretaries, if thought desirable, receiving the title of Secy. of Embassy on apptmt. or after a certain term of service.

The late Earl Russell in 1860 laid it down in a Circular to the heads of Missions that the whole public business of the Embassy or Mission shld. pass thro' the hands of the Secy. of Embassy or Secretary of Legation as the case may be, & that public & official despatches & papers shld., if not opened by the Ambassador or Minister himself, reach him thro' the Secretary of Embassy or Legation, & the directions of the Chief in regard to all matters of public business were to pass thro' the Secy., & be executed under his superintendence & control.

Nevertheless the force of tradition is such that the Secretaries of Embassy & Legation, with certain exceptions, still take very little part in the business of the Embassies & Legations. Is it not likely that conferring these titles by way of local rank, on apptmt. or after 5 years' service, will tend to perpetuate the tradition?

The proposal to increase the salary of 2nd Secretaries is one in wch. every head of a mission will cordially concur.

To return to the remark in para. 1 of the foregoing. There is a period in the official life of each member of the Diplomatic Service who has entered by the usual gateway resembling the calm wch. overtakes a sailing ship when passing thro' the doldrums in crossing the line, and the problem is how to get rid of this, and ensure a continuance of active duties when a Secretary reaches that part of his career.

This calm dead water may be compared to what we find in a river divided into smooth reaches by rapids caused by rocky accumulations. There is a block in the onward course of the stream to wch. it is due, but if this were removed it wld. flow on with a steady even current.

In the case of the Diplomatic Service this block appears to be produced by the rule wch. requires a senior Member to retire only when he has attained the age of 70 years. I would suggest that it might be in a great measure removed by extending & developing the rule, so that the age of retirement decreased with the rank attained, as is the case in the Army and Navy. Thus, retaining the age of 70 for Ambassadors, Envoys might retire at 65, Ministers

resident at 60 and Secretaries of Embassy at 55. An examination of the existing list seems to show that this wld. afford a considerable measure of relief, and allow junior members of the service to attain to positions of responsibility while their energies were still fresh and unabated.

61. Satow to Lansdowne

3 Dec. 1903

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The Townleys left for home the day before yesterday, & will get to England weeks before this letter as they travel by Siberia. I shld. be very glad if some official notice were taken of the exceedingly able manner in wch. he acted as Ch. d’Aff., for up to the present moment no word of appreciation is on record.

I learn fr. Genl. Ventriss that Gen. Creagh has suggested taking away Col. Bower fr. the command of the Guard to reorganize the Chinese Regiment at Wei hai wei, & I am sending home copy of a letter vehemently protesting. Besides the general grounds on wch. I feel obliged to object, there are others wch. arise out of the special qualifications of the officers who wld. be personally affected by the arrangement.

Col. Bower is a senior officer, who has rendered distinguished services and is quite capable of holding his own with the commanders of other Legation guards of whom the Russian alone is senior to him.

Colonel [Charles M.] Ducat’s strong point is the collection of military intelligence, and the ferreting out of hidden secrets. He is a sort of military Sherlock Holmes and makes a first rate military attaché. But I doubt whether he wld. make a good commandant; if he were apptd. he wld. have to completely neglect the duties of an Intelligence Officer.

Captain Bagshawe, who commands the detach[men]t of Sherwood Foresters, has been five years adjutant of volunteers, and has spent the rest of his time at the Dépôt in Derby, so that he has no regimental experience.

I have been stirring up Mr. Fulford the consul at Newchwang to send me more information. It is no doubt difficult to obtain, for missionaries up country are careful of what they write, and the only Br. subject at Port Arthur is one Maccollough, a journalist employed by the Russians. Fulford & his wife are in bad health, wch. may account for our not hearing more fr. him. If things do not improve in this respect, I hope he will ask to exchange with some one else. Unluckily capable men do not abound among our consuls,

and the pay at Newchwang is no more than at unimportant places like Ningpo, Wuhu & Ichang, where any sort of man can rub along.

I am doing all I can to strengthen the hands [sic. hand?] of Mr. Geo. Jamieson, the Agent of the Peking Syndicate, in his negotiations with Shêng. The latter is away burying his father. At the same time I do not think Jamieson plays his cards well. The failure of the B. & C. Corpn. to find capital for the Shanghai-Nanking line is greatly to our disadvantage, and gives Shêng excuse for doubting whether any of our concessionaires mean business.

62. Satow to Barrington

[3 December 1903]

My dear Barrington,

Townley has left me, to my very great loss, and I fear there is no probability of his returning, as you no doubt have something better in prospect for him. There is I believe no instance on record of a secretary ever coming back to Peking after leave of absence. So when you have found for him the post wch. he so well deserves, I hope you will think of supplying his place [replacement]. You know Peking is full of work, and there is more than the minister can cope with by himself. He needs the help of a Secretary of Legation who will read the papers that come in, discuss all subjects with him and relieve him of some of the drafting.

I am told that the desirable man for me is [Launcelot Douglas] Carnegie, and that he has a charming wife. So tho' I do not know him personally, I hope that will be your choice for me. Of the others near the head of the list I know only Stephen Leech, but do not know what sort of worker he is. Ralph Paget [of the Japan Consular Service] I am very fond of, but I don't think he could stand the severe climate of Peking.

63. Satow to H.E. Fulford, Consul at Newchwang

3.12.03

Dear Mr. Fulford,

I hope my desp. asking for an explanation why the Port Arthur Port dues regulation had not been reported did not seem to you framed in a tone of reproach. The fact is the F.O. attaches very great importance to getting detailed and frequent information abt. affairs in Manchuria & Russian doings in general, and we have not of late heard much from you. You will see how anxious they are about such matters fr. my teleg. of today in consequence of

one from them.

A rumour has reached me that both you & Mrs. Fulford are not enjoying very good health, & if you are in any anxiety about her I can well imagine what your presumptions must be. If you thought that a warm climate wld. benefit either of you, I could perhaps manage it, say an exchange with Butler who is at Chefoo. I daresay he would not mind such an arrangement. But I shld. like the proposal to come from you, on considerations of health.

I quite appreciate the difficulties in the way of getting missionaries to furnish information. The writer of the Article in the Pall Mall was, I am told, probably a Mr. Bush; one of the brothers came to see me here not very long ago, and professed to be very anti-Russian, but I distrusted him.

The Townleys thought the risk of not being able to cross the Liao too great, & went away on the 1st intending to cross from Chinwangtao to Chefoo, and thence to Port Arthur. I am afraid they will have a cold journey home.

64. Satow to Sanderson

17.12.03

Secret

My dear Sanderson,

As soon as I heard that the Intelligence Dept. had paid £195.5.3 into my banker's, I gave a cheque for that amount to Mr. Ottewill, the acc[ountant] of the Legation, who paid it into the H'gK'g & S'hai Bank[in]g Corp[oratio]n. I believe the money was originally advanced to Lt. Campbell out of an irregular fund existing here, wch. originated in seizure of sycee during or after the siege of 1900, and it has been restored for that fund. So it does not appear in the Legation accounts with the Chief Clerk.

E.S.

65. Satow to Davidson

17.12.03

My dear Davidson,

I have written to Bourne what you say about lawbooks for the consular courts, the muddle in connexion with the apptmt. of Vice consuls to discharge judicial functions, & the revision of the scale of costs of solicitors' charges. You will have seen from [H.S.] Wilkinson's official letter to me that he is touched in his personal dignity by the words

“ignorance & inadvertence”, & has no doubt sat on Bourne for treating the famous judgment he delivered when V-C at Kōbe ¹ as pronounced by one who was not in fact endowed with judicial power. So I have it well to encourage B. with the idea is held by those who sit in the seat of authority. [?] And I also thought it better that he should speak to Sir Hiram abt. the costs & solicitors’ charges, rather than I, for my thinly disguised sarcasm about “ignorance & inadvertence” may have got me into the C. J’s [Chief Justice’s] black b[oo]ks.

How we are to get over the difficulty abt. the C.J. & Crown Advocate being father & son [H.S. Wilkinson and H.P. Wilkinson] I do not know. They doubtless feel that they have a hold over the F.O. of wch. they will make the best use.

I met Sir Mortimer Durand ² long ago, in 1887, when he was still an Indian official. He struck me as rather wooden in manner. It was not possible to keep him at Madrid until he reached the age of 70, so he had to go somewhere else. I am delighted that Egerton has been promoted; he is a good fellow.

I quite agree with your estimate of Chas. Hardinge, & hope the [Foreign] Office will be able to keep him.

y.s.

66. Satow to F.A. Campbell

17.12.03

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for yours of Oct. 23. Sir Robt. [Hart] perhaps has some idea of bringing Hipplesley [Hippisley] here, for he complained to me the other day that the Treaty negotiations at Shanghai still deprived him of Hipplesley and Taylor. But as I wrote at length to Ld. Lansdowne some time ago, Sir Robt. is a ticklish person to deal with, & a hint abt. the possibility of his retiring fr. me wld. only make him more determined to stay on.

Bredon’s writing to Cameron abt. his grievances & the suggestion of the latter that he shld.be appeased by a K. [knightood] delighted me. I have seen a good deal of Bredon one way & another and I do not trust him. He was proposed (perhaps by the China

¹ H.S. Wilkinson was Acting Vice-Consul at Hiogo (Kobe) and Osaka in 1872. Presumably this is what is referred to here.

² Sir Henry Mortimer Durand (1850-1924) was a diplomat and civil servant in colonial British India. From 1884 to 1894 he was foreign secretary of India. The Durand Line is the name for the border which he negotiated in 1893 between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was British ambassador to Spain, 1900-03 and to the United States, 1903-06.

Ass[ociatio]n) as the Nanking Viceroy's nominee for the vacancy on the Hwangpu Conservancy Board. But the Germ. Fr. & American consuls got wind of this, and let the Viceroy know that this would not do. When I was at S'hai in Aug. I was told that unless the Viceroy's delegate were an Englishman we shld. be in a minority on the Board. However, I am myself disposed to think that B. wld. not serve our turn. He was really at the bottom of old Liu Kun yi's opposition to the scheme we negotiated here. I have written privately to Warren that I am indifferent whether Bredon or a Chinaman is app[ointe]d, or rather I do not care to have Bredon on it. If he had any hopes of staying on in Shanghai in that capacity he wld. accept it, hoping to secure Hart's succession in spite of everybody. The less inducement he has to remain in China, the better.

I am very glad you have spoken straight to Keswick. Out here the HgKg & S'hai Bank people are much set agst. him, & think they would have done better not to ally themselves with Jardine, Matheson & Co. I am much entertained with his sending you a copy of my remarks on the subject of railways to the China Association. It had been agreed that no notes shld. be taken, & of course these minutes were never submitted to me for correction. I am now going to write to Sir Ch. Dudgeon [Asst. Commissioner, Shanghai] & correct some of the blunders into wch. they have fallen. Somebody who was present on that occasion must have repeated a great deal to a pressman, for a fortnight or so later I saw a pretty accurate acct. of what had taken place appear in a Japanese newspaper, of all places in the world, with the difference that things I said were put into Dudgeon's mouth & vice versâ. Some of my colleagues were much scandalized.

67. Satow to Barrington

17.12.03

My dear Barrington,

At Claud Russell's request I am sending home his application for leave of absence. I don't at all wish to lose him, but this is a hardworked post, and two years of it is quite enough for the head of chancery. I believe he came here almost straight fr. Constantinople.

I hope that, unless Townley comes back, you will be able to make the arrival of his successor fall in about the time of Russell's taking his leave.

He has done very well here, and is a capital hand at drafting despatches.

y.s.

68. Satow to Lansdowne

17/12/03

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The results of the “Supao” sedition case are so far satisfactory that four out of the 6 prisoners have been acquitted. There remain only the 2 pamphleteers, on whom the Chinese magistrate stupidly pronounced a sentence of decapitation commuted to imprisonment for life, wch. Mr. Giles the Assessor promptly rejected. I have telegraphed to Sir Pelham Warren to try to arrange with the Taotai that the sentence shall not exceed the two or three years proposed by the Assessor, & I hope he will manage this.

It is very satisfactory to be able to say that my French & American colls: entirely support my views now.¹ The former [Dubail] has observed to me that fr. the moment the Powers insisted on the trial taking place in the Mixed Court, in wch. a foreign assessor sits, it was incumbent upon us to see that the trial was carried out in accordance with western procedure, & that the sentence shld. be in conformity with our practice.

I have in the case of the pamphleteers been guided by the case of Mort, with wch. theirs is on all fours.

The German [Mumm] & Amer. [Conger] Minrs. & myself have addressed a letter to the Doyen of the Dipl. Body [Czikann von Wahlborn] proposing to inform the Chinese Govt. that if they do not at once appt their Delegate to the Huangpu Conservancy Board, we shall go to work without them. A good deal of opposition has no doubt arisen from the Fr. Germ. & American colls: having discovered that we had suggested Bredon as the Chinese delegate. I thought it as well therefore to tell Conger that I did not care whether an Englishman or Chinaman were app[oin]t[e]d & he is sure to pass it on.

With regard to the new rules of procedure for the [Shanghai] Mixed Court, I am sending a desp. reporting that the Fr[ench] Min[ister] seems disposed to withdraw his opposition. But this does not mean that he is at all disposed to give way in regard to the question of jurisdiction of the respective Mixed Courts. I do not trouble you with this question at present but if the China league, or the China Association or the [Shanghai] Municipal Council shld. revert to the matter (as one must expect they will) I shall be prepared to go into it from the beginning, and demonstrate that they have no legal ground for what they claim.

It is a curious thing that the Chinese press speaks almost uniformly of our Thibetan

¹ See Satow's diary for December 10 and 11, 1903.

mission in a friendly tone, ascribing our action to the inability of the Chinese Govt. to exercise proper control over that dependency. On the other hand it frequently reports that England is abt. to appt. a Viceroy of the Yangtze, to land troops there, or to send gunboats in numbers up to S'hai. I have had an article inserted proving that England has no such object in view, because her alliance with Japan has been entered into for the purpose of upholding the integrity of China – not out of love for her, but because it is their own interest.

I am not certain where these Yangtze stories originate, but my Germ. coll: takes much interest in them, & perh. it is the man at Nanking concerning whom I wrote officially, who is mainly concerned in their fabrication.

69. Satow to Lansdowne

29.12.03

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

With regard to my conversation with Dubail wch. I have reported in full, my idea was that it would be useful to let him understand that the Japanese mean business, and that the Russians are making a mistake if they think they can intimidate them. He has been in Japan, & understands them to a certain extent, but like most of the colls: he is inclined to make light of what they can do on land & at sea.

What however seems to me far more serious is the possible result of the Chinese taking up arms on the side of Japan. Fr. the way in wch. Uchida & his military attaché speak, I think they undoubtedly hope to make some use of the Chinese, but in what way I cannot say as long as the plan of campaign is not disclosed.

I find that those of my colls: who trouble their heads abt. these things believe that Russia wld. welcome an opportunity of a new quarrel with China, wch. wld. give her a pretext for moving troops into this province, & occupying Tientsin & Peking. I do not see how the Chinese can offer any effective resistance unless they put forth all the energies of the whole country, & that wld. lead to a general conflagration in wch. perh. the native troops wld. make no distinction betw. one foreign nation & another.

Besides, seeing that there is a sort of international occupation of Peking (Legation guards), Tientsin & the line of communications betw. Peking & the sea at Shanhaikwan, in wch. the Russians take part, it wld. be exceedingly inconvenient for fighting to take place on that line betw. the Russians & Chinese. Moreover, the Chinese, if they go to war, wld.

naturally want to move troops up to Shanhaikwan, & perh. to occupy that place & Chinwangtao, both of wch. places are now occupied internationally by foreign troops. I conclude therefore that the neutrality of China is necessary to us to ensure the safety of our position.

I suppose one may conclude that the Franco-Russian alliance is on the same lines as the triple alliance, namely that if either is attacked by more than one enemy the other must come to the rescue, if called upon for assistance. In talking this over with Conger, he suggested that possibly Russia might choose not to regard China's taking part as a *casus foederis*¹, because that wld. bring England into the field, & it wld. be more advantageous to her to have Japan alone to fight at sea in the Far East, than, with the help of the insignificant French squadron, to fight England & Japan combined. And this might also suit France better.

Fr. what is repeated abt. the opinion of Fr. officers in China, one wld. conclude that they do not at all like the idea of having to fight us out here for the sake of Russia. There are no doubt a good many Frenchmen who think that the alliance with Russia has brought them very little; as Dubail says, merely the certainty of not being attacked by Germany. They have lent Russia vast sums of money but got no help in the Fashoda business², & cannot rely on Russian assistance in recovering Alsace-Lorraine. I suppose one need not conclude that even "faithful allies" are blind to their own interests, or that they will go all lengths in observing the pact to their own disadvantage. A permanent alliance between a civilized country like France & such a barbarous nation as Russia seems unthinkable.

I have no means of finding out what line Germany will take in the event of war. Conger tells me that Mumm, who used to talk freely on political questions, has since his last return fr. Germany been quite inscrutable. It had seemed to me possible that she might try to renew the triple agreement [between Russia, France and Germany] of 1895 wch. turned Japan out of Manchuria [the Liaotung peninsula], but from Tokio I hear that there are no signs of it there. Not that this goes for much. In 1895 up to the very last moment Germany said soft things [through her minister in Tokyo, Freiherr von Gutschmid] to Japan & patted her on the back. I suppose one may pretty safely say that Germany will keep a watchful eye

¹ *Casus foederis*: From the Latin "case of the alliance". In diplomatic terms, a situation in which the terms of an alliance come into play, such as one nation being attacked by another.

² The Fashoda Incident (1898) was a territorial clash in the Sudan south of Khartoum between Britain and France in the so-called 'Scramble for Africa'. It was peacefully resolved by French foreign minister Theophile Delcassé in the following year.

for any opportunity that wld. enable her to overrun Shantung, but she has only some 2500 troops betw. Kiaochou and the province of Chihli all told, & she could hardly take away her Legation guard or her garrison at Tientsin.

70. Satow to Walter Langley¹

27.12.03

My dear Langley,

In my No. 158 of June 10, 02 I sent home a desp. fr. S'hai (No 22 of May 28) containing a mass of corresp'ce betw. the Municipal Council & the Consular Body. The chancery tell me they cannot find this S'hai desp. & it has occurred to me that we possibly sent you the original in order to save the trouble of copying such a mass of printed matter, in the expectation that we shld. get it back in the [confidential] print. But unluckily it is not reproduced in the print of Aug. 4, 1902 section 3.

These letters exchanged betw. the Municipal Council and the Consular Body are of great importance & I shall be unable when the question is next raised to do without referring to them.

What I wld. ask you therefore to do for me is either to return S'hai desp. No 22 of 28 May 1902, or if you cannot part with it have the corresp'ce printed, & so let the whole thing be complete.

I daresay the F.O. does not often have to work up past questions, and it has a librarian to do that for it. But to us who rely a great deal on the conf. print, to come across the footnote 'not printed' is enough to give one a cold shudder.

71. Satow to Sanderson

31 Dec. 1903

My dear Sanderson,

I enclose my S.S. [Secret Service] account for the time since my return here. [on August 21, 1903]. Cockburn has repaid me \$965.52 on account of furniture bought by him for the house I had established in the Chinese quarter for [C.W.] Campbell & Mayers to receive native visitors in. You will find this item in the account enclosed in my letter of 23 January last.

¹ Walter Langley (later Sir Walter), was a Junior Clerk (assistant head of department) in 1903 in the Foreign Office. He later became a Senior Clerk (Head of Department) and in 1907 he succeeded Eric Barrington as Assistant Secretary of State, a post he held until 1918. (Footnote courtesy of Jim Hoare.)

PRO 30/33 14/13 China (1-71)
(May 8, 1902 – December 31, 1903)

y.v.s.

(Bal'ce in my favour \$834.48 @ 1/9 = £73.0.4

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/14

Letter Book. Chinese mission. (31 December 1903 – 12 September 1904)

“Private Letters”

1. Satow to Lansdowne

31 December 1903

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I am sending full instructions to Mr. Hopkins to see the Viceroy Yüan Shih Kai [袁世凱], & to warn him in a friendly way that the Chinese Govt. cannot be permitted forcibly to possess themselves of the Kaiping coalmines & the Chin wang tao harbour works. They ought not to put any obstacle in the way of Chang Yi's carrying on his action before the High Court of Justice, & that in my personal opinion Chang Yi & Detring ought both to go to England if called on.

I said this abt. Chang Yi because a few days ago [T.R.] Wynne [of the Chinese Engineering & Mining Co.] came to see me ¹, and speaking abt. the action said that if Chang Yi were put out of the way the company's position wld. be immensely strengthened. He supposed Chang Yi would be either banished or executed, and in that case the action wld. fall to the ground for want of a p[lain]t[if]f.

Major [W.S.] Nathan, the new agent [replacing Wynne], came to see me today [see diary]. He told me there was no likelihood of Yüan Shih Kai trying to take possession of the harbour works or the mines. He spoke with the greatest confidence of the failure of Chang Yi's action. Of the two he thought the Co. could get on better with Chang Yi than with Yüan. His idea was to get the former reinstated, wch. he said wld. be easy, and then to work with him & Detring. Betw. Yüan & Chang Yi it was merely a personal quarrel, Yüan trying to ruin Chang Yi.

In spite of the Co's confidence in the success of their side in the pending action, I think there is one very weak point, namely the anti-dating [sic.] of the agreement signed on the 19 Feb. 1901, and substituted for the original document of 30 July 1900. There is no doubt that the agreement signed by Hoover and de Wouters on 19 Feb. 1901 was given in order to get this falsely dated document, to wch. Detring is a party. He is afraid to go in the witness box and tell the truth, and that is precisely the reason why I wish him to go to England along with Chang Yi to be summoned as a witness. I am convinced that Chang Yi has been

¹See Satow's diary for December 22, 1903.

imposed upon, and so is Wynne.

There is no time by this mail to send a copy of my instructions to Hopkins, & I am holding back my note to the Chinese Govt. until I hear the result of Hopkins' interview with Yüan Shih kai.

I have told Major Nathan that H.M.G. only wish to protect the nationality of the Co. & will have nothing to do with the action that is pending.

[Algernon C.] Moreing, [Herbert] Hoover & Chang Yi are perh. equally dishonest in financial matters. [Gustav] Detring does not fill his pockets, but his ways are crooked.

2. Satow to Lansdowne

11 Jany. 1904

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

I am sending an official reply to the observations of the B. & C. Corpn.'s remarks on my conversation of August last regarding their proceedings with regard to railways in China.

There are one or two points worth mentioning wch. I cannot well put in an official desp. in addition to what I said about their attitude in respect of the Canton-Hongkong line in my private letter of Sept. 9.

One is that shareholders in the Hongkong-Canton-Macao Steamboat Co. are not anxious to see the rlwy. built, & the probability is that among these shareholders will be found Jardine Matheson & Co.

Another is that men in high positions out here in the Hgkg & Shai Bankg. Corpn. openly express their regret that Sir Ewen Cameron and others entered into a combination with J.M. & Co. to form the Corpn., because they believe that it is Mr. Wm. Keswick who is the obstructionist who prevents anything being done with these railway concessions.

y.v.f.

3. Satow to Lansdowne

14 Jany. 1904

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The exchange of ratifications of the Amer[ican] & Jap[ane]se commercial treaties providing for the opening of Moukden & Antung, without any hitch, seems to be a sign of the times. Prob[abl]y the Russian Legn. made no attempt to prevent it, recognizing that it wld. be futile. Up to a couple of years ago a word fr. them wld. have been sufficient. But

the refusal to evacuate Manchuria & the reoccupation of Moukden has entirely turned the Chinese Court agst. them. If Lessar eld. have had his way, he wld. have carried out the evacuation in accordance with the convention without putting forward the additional demands presented originally by Plançon, & Russian influence at Peking wld. have remained almost undiminished. But Alexeieff & his patrons were too strong for him. It seems a great blunder on their part.

There is nominally a sum of 5,000,000 taels of Chinese capital, wch. was kept back out of the Russian 4½% loan of 1896, wch. is regarded as their share in founding the Russo-Chinese bank. They are not given a share of profits, but only interest at the fixed rate of 4%. But even this had to be retained in the bank, as a fund for the Imperial Chinese university. The authorities of the latter however managed recently to get 300,000 taels of this out of the manager at Peking, & promptly deposited it with the H'gk'g & S'hai Bank. Encouraged by their success they tried to get another 200,000 taels, but [A.M.] Posdnéef [the representative of the Russo-Chinese Bank at Peking], having doubtless heard what had become of the first pay[men]t, refused to give them any more.

Hu, whose visit to Port Arthur I reported in my desp. no. 453, came [on January 8th – see diary] to tell me of an audience he had of the Empress-Dowager in order that he might relate his experiences to her. He said that in course of the conversation she had asked him abt. our doings in Thibet, on wch. he told her that we were merely going there to prevent the Russians fr. taking possn., with which explanation she appeared quite satisfied. He advised her not to fall in with Alexeieff's suggestion that a high official should be sent to Port Arthur to negotiate about Manchuria, and said that there were only two of Plançon's demands that could be entertained, namely that the establish[men]ts of the Russo-Chinese bank shld. be guarded by Chinese troops, & that its branch at Newchwang shld. continue to receive the customs duties for the acct. of the Chinese govt. On this I enquired what had become of the duties recd. since 1900, and he replied that after the amount due for the repairs of the extramural r[ai]lw[a]y had been deducted the bal'ce was held to the order of the Chinese Treasury, wch. drew on it from time to time. He asked what China shld. do if war broke out. I said the best thing for her was to remain quiet.

What seems however likely to happen is that in spite of the Chinese Govt. declaring itself neutral, it will be unable to control the turbulent portion of the inhabitants of Manchuria, & that the latter will give the Russians a good deal of trouble.

On the 11th Wu Ting fang came to tell me that he had been instructed to prepare a

proclamation of neutrality. This would be also communicated to the repres'ves of the Powers at Peking, who wld. be asked to confer together for the purpose of ensuring that China's neutrality was respected. Among other things he said that the Court fears the Russian Legation guard might some night seize the gates of the Palace & make the Emperor & Empress-Dowager prisoners. I reminded him of the 5000 troops under Genl. Chiang Kueiti wch. form the garrison, but he said they were useless. The best thing wld. be for their Majesties to take refuge in the British or American Legation. I think he talks a good deal at random, & certainly does not deserve the great reputation he had at Washington for the clever speeches he used to make. But those I am told were written for him by some American hanger-on[?] of literature.

On the 12th Uchida came to tell me his instructions to advise the Chinese Govt. to remain neutral, on 3 grounds, 1° that in the event of war it was the duty of belligerents to limit the area of hostilities as much as possible, so as to avoid interfering more than is absolutely necessary with the commerce of neutrals, 2°. that belligerents ought to avoid dragging other Powers into their quarrel; 3° that if China were to take part in the war, the excitement thro'out the country wld. be so great that the Govt. wld. have much difficulty in preserving order in the provinces and at the open ports, & if any disturbances occurred that wld. afford an opportunity to Foreign Powers of intervening in different parts of China. Prince Ch'ing's answer was as I reported in my telegram.¹ Uchida had the air of carefully repeating instructions recd. in English, & drawn up with great care. I believe it to be a fact that the Japse. Foreign Dept. consults [Henry Willard] Denison, their legal advisor, on such matters, and that all important instructions are telegraphed in English. If it ever becomes necessary to publish a (Japse.) bluebook of these negotiations, the Japse. portion of it will be found to have been very well done.

I suppose however that if Japan shld. begin to have some successes, the Chinese will think it necessary to strike in, so as to save their own credit.

Dubail is not quite straightforward abt. the Huangpoo conservancy. He promised to give me the corresp'ce that had passed betw. the Chinese Legation in Paris and the Fr. Govt., but sent nothing. So after waiting a fortnight I went to remind him, & succeeded in extracting the Chinese telegram. He certainly never told any of his colls: what had happened. Warren writes to me that at a recent meeting of the consuls at Shanghai it was proposed to urge the

¹ See Satow's diary for January 12, 1904: "Prince Ch'ing said he was ashamed that in a matter like this where China ought to take the lead, she was obliged by her impotence to remain quiet. She wld. take the advice & remain neutral."

Viceroy to nominate the Chinese delegate, whereupon the Fr. Consul-general said that it would be irregular, as negotiations were going on for enabling the Chinese govt. to take the conservancy works entirely on its own shoulders. None of the other consuls had heard anything of these negotiations, wch. have evidently been smothered in the cradle. I think Dubail is at the bottom of the illegitimate birth and of its concealment. The Viceroy wrote to the consuls asking for the two convicted authors of seditious pamphlets to be handed over, in order that they might undergo imprisonment in a Chinese gaol, but recd. a refusal. I have not yet got the full report of the trial, for Warren says the printers have been very slow.

There is a better prospect of the colls: combining to check the unfair way in wch. the indemnity instalments are converted by the commission of bankers. Most of them now agree that something ought to be done, but up to the present my only supporters in proposing to fix the rate by public tender are the Belgian and Dutch Ministers.

4. Satow to Curzon

18 Jany. 1904

Dear Lord Curzon,

The crisis of the Russo-Japanese negotiations is at hand and everything points to war. Before this can reach you, the F.O. telegs. will no doubt have put you in possession of full information. The Japanese have at last declared that they will recognize that Manchuria is outside their sphere of influence, and its littoral [i.e. coastline, river banks etc.] as well, provided Russia engages to respect the integrity of Chinese territory in regard to Manchuria, and undertakes in return to regard Corea and its littoral as outside her sphere of interest. Thus Japan appears to be upholding the integrity of China and the independence of Corea for wch. it was recognized by the Anglo-Japanese agreement that she might have to go to war. The Japanese Note seems further to have said that if the reply of Russia is unsatisfactory or is unduly delayed, Japan will have to decide what steps she will take to maintain her rights and interests.

It reads like an ultimatum, tho' officially this character is denied of it.

Japan, with the approval of H.M.G., has advised China to remain neutral, and to devote special attention to the maintenance of order in the provinces and at the open ports; so as to avoid giving justification for foreign powers to interfere. It is rumoured that this has special reference to French and German designs on Yünnan and Shantung.

There are signs that Russia, which is confident in her ability to crush Japan, will

endeavour to provoke China to take up arms, and that her first step will be to cross the Liao river and occupy Hsin-ming-ting, the terminus of the extra-mural rlwy – not far from Mukden, but situated in the portion of Manchuria wch. she evacuated in October 1902. The Chinese Govt. I hope will remain neutral, and avoid any conflict, even if provocation is offered to them. The reasons given by Japan for desiring China to remain neutral are quite sufficient by themselves, but in addition there are the absolute unreadiness of the Chinese and their inability to conduct warfare on civilised principles.

As to the results of a war, I do not hazard a forecast. Russians out here and their friends are confident of victory. The Japanese seem not less so. Admiral Bridge and British naval officers, as well as American naval men with the exception of “Fighting Bob Evans”¹ have a very high opinion of their efficiency at sea. On land every one acknowledges that their weakness is in cavalry. On the other hand most English military men think the Russian railway organization will break down.

If Russia wins, she gains Manchuria, perhaps Chihli, and Corea whenever she chooses to take it; and with the latter she will be in a position to command the mouth of the Yangtze, as a glance at the map will show.

If Japan wins, she secures the hegemony of Eastern Asia.

All this of course you will have seen for yourself. I only mention it as a preface to what I am going to say about the situation here.

Russia has completely lost her predominant position at Peking. Japan occupies the first place, while our relations and those of the Americans have much improved. The attitude of the Chinese govt. in regard to Thibet seems to have been affected by this. They have on the whole treated the proceedings of the Mission in a moderate manner. Of course there have been protests and pleas for delay, but the latter are part of ineradicable habits and the former for the sake of “face”. On the whole they seem to feel that our presence where we are is more directed against Russia than against China, and as I said in a desp. or a telegram to F.O. they are probably not sorry to see a lesson given to their recalcitrant vassal. I hope the telegrams they receive from their agent by our line report faithfully. At any rate they manifest no anxiety to me, and if they could decypher the telegs. you have recently sent to me they would be under no apprehensions of dark designs on our part.

I have not yet received any further instructions from the F.O. about the Nmaikha frontier question, nor any about Macartney at Kashgar. I wrote to Lord Lansdowne privately in

¹ Rear Admiral Robert Dunglison Evans (1846-1912).

September that in your judgment of the questions betw. India & China Thibet ranked first, and Kashgar second, while the two Burma frontier questions came afterwards. As to Kashgar, now that I have read all the papers going back to 1883, it is difficult to resist the conviction that it could easily have been settled by Wade ¹, if he had not been summoned home never to return, or by O'Connor ² in 1885 if he had not been superseded by the appointment of [Sir John] Walsham. When O'Connor came here as Minister [in 1892] the position was much less favourable, and after 1895 Russian influence could not be resisted. Perhaps under present circumstances it may prove easier.

In justification of what may perhaps seem to you a weakening on my part since I got back here, I wish to say that in July last Russian [sic. Russia?] seemed to possess such an influence over the Chinese that nothing but knocking them hard wld. enable us to secure our objects. Since the Chinese have lost their fear of the Russian bugbear, & our position has improved, I think we may perhaps attain our ends by less rough methods. If it were the case that I was affected or infected by the mental atmosphere of Peking or by pro-Chinese proclivities, I ought to be removed and replaced by some one hard enough to resist the environment. But without boasting, I do not think it is so with me.

y.v.s.

5. Satow to Lansdowne

27 1 1904

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Whether Lessar has had any hand in persuading the Chinese to ask whether mediation could not be had betw. Japan & Russia, I have not been able to ascertain. The suggestion seems to have been made to the Chinese by Dubail, in accord with Lessar's wishes. Fr. the way in wch. I have been bombarded by different high Chinese officials it is clear that Dubail has frightened them thoroughly as to the dangers for them involved in a war between Japan & Russia. In addition to all their other reasons for wishing to stave off the

¹ Sir Thomas Wade (1818-95) was British minister in China, then the first Professor of Chinese at Cambridge University.

² The papers of Sir Nicholas Roderick O'Connor (1843-1908) are held at the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. O'Connor joined the Diplomatic Service in 1866. He had a variety of postings, including Secretary of Legation at Peking (1883-6), acting as Chargé d'affaires at the Legation, (1885-6); Secretary of Legation, Washington (1886); Consul General, Bulgaria (1887-92); Envoy extraordinary and Minister plenipotentiary to the Emperor of China and King of Korea, Peking (1892-5); Envoy extraordinary and Minister plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Russia (1895-8); and Ambassador to Turkey (1898-1908).

evil day, they are a set of the most terrible cowards. The only man among them is Yüan Shih-kai.

Chang Chih-tung's man asked Conger wch. wld. be worse for China, a victorious Russia or a victorious Japan. He told me he replied: 'The former undoubtedly. The victory of Russia will be followed by the partition of China. Manchuria will be gone for ever. Perh. Japan if she is obliged to see Corea pass under Russian domination will seek compensation in Fuhkien. Germany will take the whole of Shantung [peninsula] and France a good slice of the South.' I daresay he added that England wld. take the Yangtze valley, but if he said so he did not tell me. "Whereas victorious Japan means the liberation of China and Corea, and the recovery of Manchuria."

Brig.-Genl. Allen, the [American] commandant of the Philippine gendarmerie, who dined with me the other night [January 23rd – see diary], told me he thought Japan ought to, and wld., keep Port Arthur at least. He is however eager that the onward progress of Russia shld. be checked by whatever means, before it is too late, and wishes his countrymen c[ou]ld look ahead two generations. I gather that the Americans are very pro-Japanese at present. Mumm tells me that Mr. Hay recently gave Count Cassini a piece of his mind abt. Manchuria, and afterwards repeated what he had said to the other ambassadors.

Mumm as far as I can see is lying low, and giving no advice to anyone. His principal pre-occupation is the final contract for the Tientsin-Chinkiang rlwy. When he tells me he has no instructions to propose to me a separation of German and English interests I do not quite believe him. But I answer with a perfectly clear conscience that I have no instructions on the subject, & that the matter is entirely in the hands of Brenan and his principals. I surmise that Mumm hopes there will be war, in order that Germany may fish in troubled waters. Dubail for various reasons tries what he can to prevent it. He would like to achieve a diplomatic success, he thinks Fr. investments in Russian loans wld. suffer & he wants to go on leave in the spring. He also does not see what good a Russian victory over Japan (wch. he looks on as certain) wld. do to French aims in China. In the talk of the Chinese who have been to me about mediation I hear the echo of his ideas.

The other colleagues take no part in the game. Mumm says Belgium is in the bad books of France and England, and is trying to curry favour with Germany, by for instance announcing that she will no longer charter British ships, but take up German vessels instead. When I was in S. America 10 or 12 years ago, there was a line of str. [steamers] belonging to Holts that ran to Brazil & the River Plate under the Belgian flag, and perh. it still goes

on.

I was told yesterday by a very intelligent Japanese newspaper correspondent [Kamei of the *Jiji Shinpo* – see diary] that according to letters he had received fr. Tokio, no reply to their note of January 13 is expected by the Japse. Cabinet, and that they are simply waiting till their preparations [for war] are complete, including the arrival of the two Italian cruisers.

¹ The Russians are stationing troops at Fěng huang chêng and other points in S.E. Manchuria towards the Korean border, as if they expected an attack fr. that side. He says that in Japan even the women and children in remote country places are subscribing to the war fund.

Reuter treats us to telegs. declaring that the Emperor of Russia is ready to make any sacrifice to preserve the peace, but I suppose there is not much in this.

It is rather useful to us the [that?] Wu Ting fang has been apptd. to the Foreign Board, for he loves to talk, and reveals secrets that his colls: who have to use an interpreter are chary of imparting. I am in constant touch with my Japanese & American colls: and tell them all they ought to know. Mumm I see a good deal of. He is not on very intimate terms with Conger, and each complains that the other does not speak openly to him. Mumm we call le faux bonhomme. Dubail is wily, and does not scruple to say the thing that is not. Lessar is always confined to his bed, and lives in rooms kept at a temperature of 75°. I seldom can make up my mind to visit him, for it is difficult to avoid thorny subjects, and he easily loses his temper. I think I have said that the Russian legation says that his successor will be either Pokotiloff, Wozack or Pavlov, but the chances of the latter are not good because he has had a domestic scandal. He fought a duel with some one in Söul about his wife, and the lady has retired to Paris.

y.v.f.

6. Satow to F.A. Campbell

28 1 04

My dear Campbell,

Most of our smaller questions are hanging fire at present.

¹ Two armoured cruisers were completed in Genoa in 1903 on behalf of Argentina. Japan negotiated secretly and completed the purchase on December 30th through British brokers. The Russians made a similar offer but it was a day late. The ships sailed on January 9, 1904 with British officers and an Italian crew. When they reached Yokosuka on February 16th they were renamed *Kasuga* and *Nisshin* and went almost immediately into service. (With thanks to Professor Ian Nish for this information.)

Hwangpoo conservancy . Here we are delayed by Dubail not getting instructions to join the rest of us in a Note to the Chinese govt. threatening to go on without them if they do not speedily appt. their delegate. I told Warren to talk to the Viceroy abt. it. All he could extract was that he had not nominated a man because some of the consuls were unwilling to undertake that their people shld. contribute towards the foreign share of the expense. Warren ought to have known that this was an old pretext, refuted more than a year ago by the Dipl. Body.

Indemnity Russia still refuses to agree to Joostens' scheme to accept pay[men]t in silver provisionally and to make up accounts afterwards. All the others are agreed.

Rates of exchange . fixed by the Commission of bankers for the instalments of the indemnity. Most of the colls: acknowledge that "something must be done," but with the exception of the Belgian and Dutch colls: none have expressed their willingness to accept public tender, wch. is the only way out of the difficulty.

Newchwang Customs revenue . Conger is quite willing to advise the Chinese govt. to claim fr. Russia the bal[an]ce due, but Uchida thinks there are plenty of more important things on wch. the Chinese might protest. Natung the President of the Foreign Board [Wai Wu Pu] does not seem inclined to make a protest, but Hart tells me that as soon as the 1903 returns of receipts reach Peking the Russians will be asked to shell out.

Pekin Syndicate's railway. Jamieson (Geo.) telegraphs from Shanghai that Shêng refuses to come to terms. I am waiting for full particulars by post. On the one hand I do not think Jamieson is a particularly energetic or generous negotiator; his pots de vin [bribes] are not big enough; and on the other it seems a pity that the only really British railway should be transferred to the Chinese and become part of the Franco-Belgian Luhan system. I suppose Carl Meyer has made the discovery that what he has put his money and that of his friends into is not really a good thing, and wants to get out of it by inducing the public to subscribe for a guaranteed loan. I do not quite see how China is to find the money to pay all these guarantees that Shêng is giving to the French, Belgians & Russians.

Belgian line from Kaifêng to Honan. Mumm tells me the concessionaire Souffart wants now to dispose of this to Germany. He is not connected with the Société d'Etudes who are partners in the Peking-Hankow line.

Burma frontier . I have telegd. to W.H. Wilkinson at Yünnan the heads of a Note wch. he is to present to the Viceroy, & as soon as he has done this, I shall launch mine at the Foreign Board. They have been already prepared for it.

Chinese Engineering & Mining Co. My note warning the Chinese Govt. not to take possession has had the desired effect. As to the merits of the controversy betw. Chang Yi & the London Board, or betw. him & Yüan as to whether he was duly authorized to dispose of the property, I presume Lord Lansdowne has no desire that I shld. pronounce an opinion. I am convinced that Hoover is no better than he should be, that Moreing is dishonest and that Chang Yi is tarred with the same brush as most Chinese officials, who regard all methods of acquiring money as equally sanctioned by the moral law.

y.v.s.

P.S. Since I began this letter the Newchwang Customs returns have been given to me by Hart, and I have telegraphed them to you. They will be useful for the bluebk.

7. Satow to F.A. Campbell

29.1.04.

My dear Campbell,

I hasten to offer you my very sincere apology for my ill-tempered letter about Col. Browne.¹ It had never entered my head that he had suggested a reference being made to me. Of course, knowing his [drinking] habits, I could not say that I approved of his being appointed by the Engineering & Mining Co. But that is neither here nor there. What I want to say is that I am heartily sorry for having written to you in such a tone.

y.s.

8. Satow to Sir Hugh Barnes²

5/2/04

Dear Sir Hugh,

I am sending you u.f.s. a despatch for Mr. Wilkinson containing a copy of my Note to the Chinese Govt. abt. the Nmaikha valley boundary, & shall be much obliged if you will send it on to him sealed up, after you have read it, & taken a copy if you wish to have one.

You will prob. have recd. copy of a previous desp. to the Viceroy, with an acct. of a conversation I had with Natung some weeks ago, wch. I thought it desirable to try the effect

¹ See PRO 30/33 13, letter no. 49, Satow to Campbell, dated October 20, 1903.

² Sir Hugh Barnes (1853-1940) was Lieutenant Governor of Burma, 4 April 1903 – 9 May 1905. Satow had been received by him at Rangoon on July 22, 1903 and they discussed the Nmai Kha [river] boundary and the Burma frontier question. (Diary)

of before presenting a formal Note. But owing to the system on wch. China is governed, Peking will never consent to anything wch. the man on the spot has not recommended. I imagine that the real brunt of this affair will fall on Wilkinson.

There are two points to wch. I wld. invite your attention 1° that the Chinese lay claim to the allegiance of Hpare[?] and another chief, & that we have never examined this 2° that sooner or later it will become necessary for us to back up our present intimation to the Chinese by deeds, as a mere paper frontier not consented to by them cannot long avail us agst. the enterprise of their frontier officials.

I hardly venture to anticipate that the Notes delivered here and at Yünnanfu will settle the affair. Probably the Chinese will invite us to examine the question of Hpare and the other place, and can we justify a refusal to have a joint commission?

I am studying the other frontier question with a view to the preparation of a Note, and in connexion with that also it seems to me doubtful, as suggested by J.W. Jamieson in 1899, whether it is quite fair to insist on the wild Was[?] being included in our frontier if we do not intend to keep them in order. The papers are voluminous, and I cannot get through them except by instalments, & I have not a staff to prepare a proper history or précis of their case. I shall however make all the speed I can.

Mr. Wilkinson writes to me that Litton ought to go on leave in Europe to consult the doctors about his condition. He is troubled with giddiness, attributed to malaise & overwork. Unluckily I cannot spare a man to relieve him, and it has occurred to me that if you could lend a man fr. Myitkina[?] who knows all about frontier matters, to take Litton's work while he is absent, that would be the best way to get the work done. Even if I had a man available, he wld. be completely new to all the local questions, and my experience of Mr. Mackinnon as Acting Consul at Fêng yüeh has not made me over anxious to try such an experiment again. If you think favourably of this suggestion, please send me a telegram, & I will then telegraph to the F.O.

Things look rather black just now. The Russians are very averse to giving Japan any assurance about Manchuria, and I suspect them of trying now to buy the Japanese off with an offer to support them in obtaining compensation elsewhere, wch. the Chinese wld. prob. be ready to give, so anxious are they to avoid a war, fr. wch. they expect no good to themselves whichever side wins. The Russians have no wish to fight a tough adversary like Japan, and are skilful in devising means of avoiding a struggle of the sort. To fight their way is not at all consonant with their habits of mind & past practice, tho' a massacre is not

at all contrary to their tastes.

y.v.s.

9. Satow to Sir Pelham Warren

9 2 04

My dear Warren,

I was much interested in the acct. [account] of your visit to Nanking given in your letter of 30 Jany. Your view that Liu Kunyi in 1900 suggested joint occupation of Kiangyin does not seem to be supported by your telegs. to F.O. of that period. Fr. that of June 17, it appears that Sundius asked your opinion as to suggesting a joint occupation. On the 22 you repeat another fr. him asking whether H.M.G. were willing to notify Foreign Powers that no military operations must take place on the Yangtze, and that G.B. and the Viceroy will alone maintain order. Under these conditions the Viceroy consents to joint occupation.

Fr[om] these telegs. the only inference is that Sundius suggested it to the Viceroy who consented on certain conditions, (wch. H.M.G. refused). But this is not the same thing as the Viceroy offering.

I am sending you for your information extracts of a conversation with Prince Ch'ing abt. "Supao" case & the Hwangpoo conservancy. I am sorry that we did not send the whole of the corresp'ce betw. the Dipl. Body and the Wai wu pu on the latter affair to S'hai, as it wld. have enabled you at once to contradict the Viceroy about unwillingness of certain people to pay the necessary taxes. We are still waiting for the Fr[ench] Govt. to instruct Dubail to join in the proposed Note to the Wai wu pu, declaring that we will go to work without them if they don't appt. their man. Mixed Court affairs are of course hung up until the question of the sentences on these 2 prisoners are disposed of. I shall continue to go at them about this & the Hwangpu.

y.v.t.

10. Satow to Lansdowne

11 Feb. 1904

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

My Germ. coll: [Mumm] a couple of days ago, talking abt. the war, remarked that whichever way it turned out, the result would be bad for Germany & England. ¹ If Japan won, she would secure a prominent position in China, & be a very inconvenient competitor

¹ See Satow's diary entry for February 10, 1904. (Ruxton, Volume Two, p. 24)

in commerce, alliance or no alliance. If Russia were victorious, our commerce wld. be practically shut out fr. whatever territory she secures. I contented myself with the observation that a war often resulted in consequences that were distasteful to the onlookers.

What he had in his mind in speaking abt. the results of a Japse. success was prob. the German position in Shantung. China, advised and supported by Japan, will certainly offer persistent opposition to any further extension of German influence in that province, but that wld. prob. be the least of the evils to be expected. The situation of Germany at Kiaochou might even be rendered uncomfortable. ¹ It wld. not be surprising if this war, for wch. Japan has been steadily preparing since 1895, entirely changes the face of the far east. Today the Engl. head of the Timothy Richard College ² [later Shansi University] at Taiyuanfu in Shansi came to see me. He says there are 2 Japse. professors in the Military School, 2 engaged in training police, & 2 more teaching some branch of western science. That is a specimen of what is going on in many parts of the country. The same is the case in Szechuen, as the reports fr. Chêngtu inform us. There is so much that the Japse. have in common with the Chinese, & they work for so much lower pay than Europeans that they beat us out of every teaching field but that of missions, wch. are entirely supported from home. I hope the alliance will last, and the good will of the United States. In that case the other Powers will have to draw in their horns.

My Fr. coll: Dubail made a curious observation the day before yesterday. He was saying how badly the Russians had blundered in the Manchurian affair, by refusing to evacuate. Had they carried out the convention they wld. have been able to exercise a virtual protectorate “as” he said, “we are enabled to do in Yünnan, in virtue of our being immediate neighbours, without having to move a man across the frontier. And then he repeated to me the tale he has told before, of the military people in Tonquin desiring to send troops into Kwangsi and Yünnan to put down the disturbances, a policy wch. he successfully opposed, pointing out that it wld. be money thrown away merely to gain the show of what they already enjoy in substance. I did not remind him that by the Siam convention of 1896 we had equal rights to Yünnan, as the opportunity was not convenient.

The proposal that we shld. join Italy, France & Germany in recommending to our govts. that they shld. ask the 2 belligerents to undertake not to send troops into Chihli came from Dubail. I had no difficulty in agreeing to it, as I had suggested the same thing in my teleg.

¹ Germany was dislodged from Shantung province at the start of World War One by Britain's ally, Japan.

² Timothy Richard was a missionary who worked on behalf of the Baptist Missionary Society in Shansi in the 1870s.

of 19 Jany. Mumm had some doubts about it, prob. as it had come fr. a Frenchman. The Italian coll: made no difficulty, tho' he was not enthusiastic. The presence of Japse. troops to the number of at least 1000 besides their Legation guard, while all the Russians have been withdrawn except two or three score at Tientsin, seems to create some difficulty. I have told my Jap. Coll: [Uchida], who seemed to approve, and I added that Japan having of her own motion urged China to declare her neutrality, cld. not consistently object to anything wch. tended to assure that neutrality. On the other side the fear is that Japan might wish to land troops at Ch'in wang tao, wch. is on the inside of the Gt. Wall, and I think they may be willing to consent. Dubail certainly anticipated no difficulty with Lessar, & prob. had consulted him beforehand.

Until the 2nd Jany. Dubail & Mumm, and most of the colls: believed that there wld. be no war, that Japan wld. be content with Corea, & that she wld. not venture to challenge Russia. Conger was better informed.

Mumm behaved to me rather curiously abt. the idle tale I telegd. on the 5th that Russia had induced China to offer Japan valuable concessions elsewhere in exchange for her rights in Manchuria. He told me that it had come to him fr. Shanghai. It looked to me like a desperate effort to make the public believe that Japan was capable of being "squared", & that was why I telegd. it. But on the following day he confessed that it had been sent to him by his govt., who wished to know whether there was anything in it.

The exploits of the Japanese navy, especially at Port Arthur, have been a rude shock to some Europeans, who thought Russia would have a walkover. It was the same in 1894 when the war with China broke out.

11. Satow to Sanderson

12.2.04

My dear Sanderson,

Many thanks for yours of Jany. 1. & for kind new years wishes. I am very glad to have the additional Print, all of wch. is interesting; your sending it has anticipated a request I had thought of making, for Persian & Asiatic Turkey Print, to complete my knowledge of what goes on along the frontier of India fr. West to East. The daily telegraph sections are most useful.

We get all sorts of contradictory & exaggerated reports here, Shanghai as usual distinguishing itself by the abundance of detail of wch. it cannot possibly know anything.

My great anxiety is to keep the Russians out of Peking and to prevent the Court from taking to flight.

The Japanese plebs [common people] here is very cock-a-hoop. They print extras & distribute their broadcast among the Chinese, so I have suggested to Uchida that if the result is a demonstration agst. the Russian legation, very unpleasant things will be said.

12. Satow to Hardinge

12.2.04

My dear Hardinge,

I suppose the intended apptmts. to Mukden & Antung are meant as a demonstration of our good will towards the Americans, & my U.S. coll: [Conger] expressed great joy when I told him of them. As far as commerce is concerned I don't think they are likely to be of much use, & until the war is over it will be scarcely possible for a man to be sent to either place. My suggestion of Fulford for Moukden was made because I think, after having had him over to Peking for a few days, I have formed a very good opinion of him. Of the five men senior to him Mansfield & Playfair have already better paid ports than Mukden is likely to be. Brady refused to go to Yünnan on the ground of his health, & is merely a good humdrum consul, Hausser has a monomania that people are trying to take his life, and Tratman is incorrigibly lazy.

I am sending a desp. abt. Burnett, the Consul at Ichang, whom I have had some difficulty in getting to hand over to Goffe. Burnett did not wish to go on leave till April. But I cld. not have Goffe kicking his heels in S'hai doing nothing, & so told Burnett to go Jany. 1. This he objected to, & sent a telegraphic statement fr. his doctor that he was not fit to travel. If it can be done I shld. like G. to have the acting pay fr. the date he took charge, & B. the pay of the post till he goes on leave.

B. is not a good Consul. He is given to the use of morphia & his health is completely ruined. I hope he will be allowed to retire.

Three other men are also under a cloud. Higgs (1st Asst.) for not sending home his accounts fr. Kiukiang. He left debts to the amount of nearly £140 due to Chinese, wch. is disgraceful. I do not propose to give him an acting billet again in a hurry.

Savage was transferred fr. acting consul at Wuhu to be local Vice Consul at Hankow. He had displayed extraordinary ignorance of a Consul's duties.

Mackinnon (2nd Asst.) is also one of the gentry who send no accounts. In fact he seems

to have done nothing at all while he was in charge of the Têng yüeh Consulate, & left not a vestige of archives or accounts behind him. His explanations were contradictory, & I fear he is of the company of Ananias.¹ He must also be kept in a subordinate position until he proves himself worthy of confidence.

You see that the consular service is not brilliant. There are some first rate men, like [C.W.] Campbell, James Scott, Hosie, Fraser, young Mayers & Barton, Good men like Warren, Mansfield & Fulford. The rest are either mediocre or below mediocrity, & when I have to put a man in charge of a difficult post, I am often at a loss. I have not mentioned [L.C.] Hopkins [Consul at Tientsin] in the above list. He is a good fellow, but not, I think, of marked ability.

y.s.

PS. Wilton & Litton, tho' juniors, are first-rate. W.H. Wilkinson, the Consul-general at Yünnanfu, is a clever ass.

13. Satow to Lansdowne

12.2.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I saw Prince Ch'ing this afternoon and found him rather fatigued with affairs of state, but greatly pleased with the turn things have taken. Our news up to the present is of the destruction of two cruisers at Chemulpho and of seven at Port Arthur. He expressed the hope that after the Russians had received one or two more such blows they would be disposed to make peace. The Chinese declaration of neutrality is on the point of being issued. With regard to Manchuria it will say that they cannot enforce neutrality in such districts as are affected by the adverse occupation of foreign troops, a phrase suggested by the Chinese govt.

I told him that H.M.G. wld. send consular officers to Mukden & Antung as soon as it becomes practicable. He expressed his satisfaction & said that these appmts. [appointments] were welcome not only from a commercial but also a political point of view. He added that China wld. also open Talienwan (christened Dalny by the Russians) to foreign trade, wch. seems to indicate great confidence in the ultimate success of the Japanese.

¹ Ananias: A member of the first Christian community, who dropped dead suddenly after attempting to deceive the Holy Spirit by withholding part of the profit from the sale of a piece of land.

14. Satow to F.A. Campbell

12.2.04

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for your kind wishes for the New Year.

I shall of course do what I can to fall in with the War Office wishes about the defences of the Legation, but I am inclined to think they are in excess of what is likely to prove necessary. The military people want to get back the howitzers, & I shall not oppose it, being anxious to content them as far as I can without appearing to the Chinese to feel alarmed. The fact is all danger of an attack is less now than it was 3½ years ago, & most of my colls: share this view.

The Japse. have made a good beginning, and I hope they will go on in the same style. They feel that they have undertaken a big job, wch. requires caution & circumspection. I think they will do nothing rash, and throw away no chances.

15. Satow to F.A. Campbell

23.2.04

My dear Campbell,

I had been keeping my eye upon Szechuen rlwy. affairs, and as the Viceroy of the province has recently sent up a memorial to the Emperor proposing to raise money for the construction of a line without foreign assistance, I drafted a despatch to [Alexander] Hosie, giving him my ideas on the general subject, and such instructions as seem calculated to meet the special case. But before it was copied for signature came your teleg. no. 48 of Feb. 20 telling me to apply for a concession on behalf of the "Chinese Central Railways." This seems to indicate a diff[erent] line of policy, and I am therefore not sending it to him. Still, I want to put my views before you, because I think there is something in them & believe them to be capable of being carried into effect. I wld. ask you therefore to be so good as to read the enclosed draft. By a mistake of the Chancery it has been copied for signature, instead of in draft form, as I had intended. The last para. refers to various reports wch. have been put in circulation lately, and of course believed by the ever-credulous Chinese, that we were sending a flotilla of gunboats up the river, and designed to occupy the adjacent country with 150,000 men. The Viceroy of Nanking actually asked Warren if the latter story were true.

16. Satow to Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge

25.2.04

Dear Sir Cyprian,

I quite understand your objections to leaving the “Espiègle” where she is, but the moment has not yet arrived when I can tell the F.O. that the Consulate & B.Ss. ought to be withdrawn. I repeated to Sir Claude [MacDonald] the teleg. wch. I repeated to you. The F.O. can if it sees fit find out thro’ him what the Japse. are likely to do at Newchwang ¹, & arrange with them to give plenty of notice. It is very prob. that the Russians may seize the rlwy. fr. Newchwang to Shanhai kwan, or that it may be destroyed by one of the combatants, and in that case only a man of war could bring the fugitives away. I do not wish to precipitate matters, nor to expose one of H.M. ships to any risk, but it seemed to me that if discretion were left to you and me to take the necessary measures, without referring home, when an emergency arises we shld. be able to do the right thing. You know that I have the interests of the navy very much at heart, and would not willingly do or recommend anything to hamper you.

I cannot learn anything about the movements of Japanese troops, but infer that the only landing that has hitherto taken place is in Corea, perh. at Wönsan as well as Chemulpho. Uchida tells me the navy has established a provisional base somewhere south of the latter point, on the W. coast of Corea, and that the ships seen to pass Weihaiwei yesterday and on the 13th were probably going there.

My colls: think the Russians will certainly crush the Japse. land force when they come to close quarters, and I cannot myself say that I have confidence in any other result. It may take a long time for Russia “to strike a blow worthy of her might”, but she has enormous resources in the way of men. Her pride has been deeply wounded by the misfortunes of her navy, and I don’t think she will leave off until she has completely beaten her antagonist. The outcry agst. Japan for treachery seems unjustified. On the 6th [February] the Japse. minister at Petersburg delivered notes breaking off relations, announcing that Japan wld. take measures to protect her interests and that he was to withdraw. They thus had forty eight hours notice, and ought at once to have warned [Admiral E.I.] Alexeieff to be on the lookout. I am not so clear as to the Chemulpho [Inchon] affair [in which the Russian cruiser

¹ Newchwang is nowadays called Yingkou. It is a port city on the Bohai Bay, the innermost gulf of the Yellow Sea. The Liao river flows into the sea there.

Koreets was blown up], of wch. I have seen no official account, but it seems to have occurred on the 9th, a day later.

This is I fear the last opportunity of communicating with you before you take your way homewards, so I will take advantage of it to thank you for the hospitality I have enjoyed from you during your stay on the [China] station any [and?] my great satisfaction with the friendly relations that have existed betw. us in public affairs.

17. Satow to Lansdowne

25 2 04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

My Germ. Coll. seems to be anxious abt. the possible results of the war, for he returned to the subject with me on the 14th. If Russia gains the day she will establish a protectorate over Manchuria & Corea, but wld. prob. come no further South. If she tried to do so the other Powers wld. unite to restrain her. Not that Germany had any particular interests in the province of Chihli that wld. make her object to Russia taking Peking. Japan however if successful wld. obtain a virtual protectorate over China, wch. wld. be contrary to all foreign interests.

I replied that wchever way it went the Gt. Powers, say France, Germany, England & the United States wld. insist on having a voice in the final settlement.

This he said was a capital idea.

I continued by saying that Italy & Austria have very small interests in China compared to the first four. Whether they were admitted to have a voice wld. depend on whether the treaty of peace were settled here or in Europe. In any case we ought not to let in the minor PP, Belgium, Holland, Spain & Portugal. As for the results of a success for Japan I did not think they wld. be so far-reaching as he feared. The Japse. had not a light hand, and their endeavours in 1894-5 to exercise a predominating influence in Corea had been a complete failure. Like other peoples with a strong character they had no tact. The Chinese were proud, and wld. resent the feeling of being under an obligation to a nation they had formerly despised, and of this we had indications during the past few weeks, when they had made the most strenuous efforts to ward off war, almost at any price. I did not anticipate that Japan wld. be a bit better able to govern the action of China than that of Corea.

All the Germans here are exceedingly anti-Jap[ane]se, and are regarded with a good deal of suspicion by both Japanese and Americans.

Surely it would be more to the advantage of Germany in Europe that Russia shld. be weakened, than that she shld. be victorious in China. I suppose that the real German tradition is to wait until she sees to which side victory inclines, and then joins in falling on the underdog.

Mumm certainly sees a great deal of Lessar, as much as Dubail does, at least, with the object of ingratiating himself there. He was of course delighted to find that Dubail's proposal to join in recommending that steps shld. be taken to get Russia and Japan to recognize the neutrality of Chihli had not been submitted beforehand to Lessar & that the latter did not quite like it.

I confess I have some misgivings as to the Japanese being able to beat the Russians on land. But only a professional soldier can estimate the probabilities. They are probably thorough & careful in small things, but they seem to me mentally a good deal slower than the best Europeans.

Both Russia and Japan seem to have carefully refrained fr. saying anything to justify a supposition that they regarded the evacuated portion of Manchuria as Chinese neutral territory. The Japse. have given an assurance to China that they have no intention of occupying Manchuria in the event of their success, but when I asked Uchida if this extended to the Liaotung Peninsula & Port Arthur, he said these were not mentioned in his instructions, and it wld. be premature to say anything about them.

Wu Ting Fang [伍廷芳] (late Minister at Washington) came to me ¹ with a scheme for relieving Pr. Ch'ing, who he says is as weak as water, & always surrenders to the last person who makes a demand on him, fr. the responsibility of deciding difficult questions in neutrality. In the case of the [Russian gunboat] "Mandjour" Uchida induced him to send instructions to order her out of Shanghai at 24 hours notice. Lessar protested, and the instructions were revoked. As my teleg. of today will have shown the poor Prince is still between two fires. Wu's plan is to ask Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States to allow China to appt. their Consuls-general at Shanghai to form a commission with the Taotai, to wch. knotty questions of international law shld. be submitted for decision. "In this way", he said "we shall get rid of all this trouble".

I said that personally I thought it was undignified for a great nation like China to abdicate the performance of her duties as a neutral in favour of a body of foreign officials, who, not being experts in international law, wld. consult their govts. in every case before giving an

¹ See Satow's diary for February 24, 1904. (Ruxton, 2006, Volume 2, p. 34)

opinion. So it amounted to putting China, for the period of the war, under the tutelage of four Great Powers.

He said that the plan had not yet been fully elaborated, but had recd. the approval of Prince Ch'ing and the rest of his colls: in the Foreign Board, and that Dubail, to whom the scheme had been mentioned, expressed his approval. He tells me himself that he replied that he wld. think it over & consult his govt. before approving. His opinion as given to me was that such important questions ought not to be given to a committee of consuls to decide, & that the proper forum was Peking; but then the difficulty wld. arise of excluding other members of the diplomatic body. Conger, to whom I have just mentioned it, doubts whether the belligerents would consent to obey the decisions of such a body. Mumm I think has not been consulted, tho' I told Wu he must ask his opinion. The Chinese Govt. is decidedly flabby.

18. Satow to Lansdowne

Mar. 9. 1904

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I am reporting by desp. on the efforts I have made to strengthen Mr. G. Jamieson's hands in his negotiations with Shêng abt. the Peking Syndicate rlwy. It is very difficult to do more than fr. time to time bring his complaints to the notice of Prince Ch'ing, & I do not think he quite makes the best use of his opportunities.

What seems to be the real position is this. The mines on examination do not prove to be so valuable as they were supposed to be, & the Pekin Syndicate having sunk a considerable amount of money in their rlwy. now wish to get rid of it to the Chinese in exchange for bonds at 5% with a Chinese Govt. guarantee, wch. they will then put on the market. But I cannot write this in an official despatch.

E.S.

19. Satow to Lansdowne

9 Mar/04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

My Fr. coll: has been very busy the last few days in going round to persuade colls: that the bringing of troops fr. the Yangtze valley to the north will leave that part of the country without a sufficient force to preserve order. He spoke to the Foreign Board in that sense, &

got Conger & Mumm to do the same. I objected to him that only 2500 had been moved fr. the neighbourhood of Hankow, & I saw no reason for anxiety. He came back to the subject twice during our talk on other matters, and to get rid of him I said I wld. mention the subject at the Foreign Board. He did not tell me he had enlisted the two others.

Uchida came yesterday to tell me that he heard Conger had spoken officially on the subject & had given the Chinese to understand that all the Powers wld. make similar representations. So I told him what had passed betw. myself & Dubail, & that under the circs. I shld. excuse myself from joining the crowd. There are abt. 25,000 drilled men lining the frontier of Chihli towards Manchuria, wch. constitute a certain amount of menace to the Russian communications. One can understand why Dubail shld. be anxious to prevent their numbers being increased, while Uchida is only too pleased to see them there.

It does not seem to be my business to play the game of the Russians. The Japse. are not likely to ask the Chinese to join them unless the[y] feel the need of a horde of undisciplined auxiliaries. I have telegd. to Shanghai & Hankow to inquire whether they think the provinces are being denuded of troops to an unsafe extent.

The press unanimously says that the Chinese mean to throw in their lot with Japan, & that is the opinion of both [Colonel] Bower [of the Tientsin Provisional Government] & [Colonel Charles M.] Ducat. I am inclined to think that Uchida rather calculates on this too, but he is too cautious to precipitate matters. Should the Japse. gain any successes on land, I am disposed to think it might be a good thing for China to display a little manly vigour.

The colls: seem still to be haunted by a fear that Japan may carry off the honours of the war, tho' they still maintain that she must be beaten in the end. They also talk about a congress to settle the terms of peace. I hope that in that case the discussion will take place in Europe, and not here, where we should have much difficulty in excluding the minor Powers, whose participation proved so very inconvenient in 1900-1.

Mumm goes out of his way to assure me that Germany wants nothing in Shantung, but he seems to have secured a good deal by the consent of the B. & C. Corpn. to the signature of separate agreements for the Tientsin-Chinkiang rlwy. & he is confident later on of getting the branches to Kaifêng and to Chênghing.

Dubail says that what we both want is that the balance shld. be preserved between Japan & Russia, neither becoming too powerful in China. I do not see how that is to be, so long as Russia controls Manchuria. But as long as Japan can command the sea Port Arthur is useless, and the possn. of Manchuria loses its *raison d'être* for Russia.

I suppose the ultimate decision must depend on whether Russia can transport another squadron to the Far East. With the aid of a fleet of colliers escorting her battleships I suppose she might do this, though with considerable difficulty.

Shanghai and all the other folk who cry out abt. the decay of our position in China seem to forget that the rise of Japan as an eager naval & military power and the Siberian railway are factors that have completely changed the situation in the Far East. They live under the influence of the traditions of the early 'sixties [1860s] when England & France ruled the roost; and they ignore altogether South Africa and our financial position in South America.

Lessar has been reinforced by two of the Secs. fr. the Tokio Legation. He is very ill, poor fellow, & cannot possibly recover. He conveyed to me the idea that he was counting how many months he could still go on working, & calculated that he might last till August or September.

Pavlov from Corea is said to be waiting at Shanghai pour recueillir la succession.

It is impossible to learn anything about Japse. plans of campaign. Bower thinks they mean merely to stand on the defensive on the banks of the Yalu, and deliver their main attack elsewhere, say at Newchwang, so as to isolate Port Arthur. This coincides with the general opinion of the hoi polloi here: Uchida and his military attaché are very careful not to express an opinion.

y.v.t.

20. Satow to F.A. Campbell

10.3.04

My dear Campbell,

In continuation of my letter of 23 Feb. I beg to invite your attention to my Desp. No. 72 giving acct. of a conversation I had with Wu Ting fang abt. the Chêngtu-Chungking line & the Chinese Central rlwys. I tried to defend the Corpn. & the Syndicate as best I c[ou]ld, but without any success. The Corpn. is regarded by everyone, Chinese and English, out here as merely blocking the way. Shêng is hostile to them for he gets no advantage out of the abortive concessions, while the Belgians & Russo-Chinese Bank do what is handsome by him. The Syndicate having already a Rlwy. wish to put the burden off onto Chinese sh[ou]lders. How is it possible to persuade the Chinese Govt. that they will act fairly and squarely in any other matter.

The fact is both Syndicate & Corporation stink in Chinese nostrils, & the combination by

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any other name smells no sweeter.

If the Chinese Central rlwys desire to rehabilitate themselves in Chinese opinion, & to then furnish a justification for granting them further opportunities, they shld. proceed without delay & in spite of the state of the Far Eastern money market, to build the Shanghai-Nanking rlwy. wch. wld. yield a dividend considerably over 5% & their capital wld. be well invested.

Do you think this could be put before them? I regard the Chinese state[men]t that the Chungking-Chengtú line is included in the Hankow-Szechuen railway as of the greatest value, as it effectually bars the Fr[ench]. They may, if they can, hereafter prolong their Laokai-Yunnanfu line to Suifu on the Yangtze, but beyond that point they will be blocked. If the teleg. I am sending meets with approval, I shall write a note to the Chinese enumerating all possible branches in Szechuen & assuring that they form part of the main undertaking.

Even if the two combined did not care to build the Shanghai-Nanking line at present they might show their *bonne volonté* [Fr: goodwill], & win the goodwill of English people out here by constructing the Canton-Hongkong line, wch. is less than half the length of the other.

Both Brenan & I greatly regret the consent to sign separate agreements for the German & British portions of the Tientsin-Yangtze line. From a political point of view it is bad. If the Chinese under additional pressure fr. us consent to the proposal, the result will be that the German line to Chinan, wch. at present is of no financial value, will become a paying concern. Tsingtao will become the passenger and mail port during the winter months, Mumm will get his two branches to Kaifêng & Chingtingfu – and we shall be left out in the cold. Even if the B. & C. Corpn. built the line fr. the Yangtze to the Southern border of Shantung, no power on earth will compel the Germans to construct the section fr. the latter point to Chinanfu, unless they consider it advantageous to them.

I hope we have got some *quid pro quo* in return for the valuable concession we are making to the Germans in this matter.

21. Satow to Admiral Sir Gerard Noel

Mar 10, 1904

My dear Noel,

I send just a few lines to welcome you to the China Station, where I suppose you have

not been since 1867. The whole place & the circumstances will doubtless present an air of almost complete novelty to you.

Whenever it suits you to come up north & to visit Peking, I shall be glad to offer you & your staff the hospitality of this Legation. It will be expected of you that you will ask for an audience of the Emperor & present your staff.¹ The more post captains you can bring in your train on such an occasion the better.

Peking is perfectly quiet and the populace is quite civil to Europeans. At present China is very bent on maintaining her neutrality (as a favour, I was told by a prominent Chinese, to her neighbours Russia and Japan). But I think there is reason to suppose that if the Japse. land any considerable body of troops at Newchwang, the pressure of circs. may force her to act on the Russian lines of communication. We must keep her back as long as we can, for the Russians wld. like nothing better than an excuse for occupying Tientsin and Peking. I am speaking of Alexeieff & his staff, not of the pacifically-minded Emperor & Lamsdorff.

It is absolutely impossible to learn anything abt. Japanese military movements, except that they occupy Phyöng –yang in force, but who is in command I do not know. Up to the 7th the Japse. mily. attaché here had learnt that there were 3000 Russians at Antung, the same number at Fêng huang chêng & 8000 more disposed along the right bank of the Yalu. He does not expect anything to happen for another month, & no big engagement for perhaps 2½ months.

Of naval operations the only thing we have heard is the Russian teleg. about a bombard[men]t of Vladivostok a few days ago. Admiral Togo with the main body of his squadron I believe to be somewhere in the Gulf of Pechili. The Japse. have a temporary naval base on the W. coast of Corea, south of Chemulpho.

The telegs. tell us that Ad. Wirenius is to stay in the Mediterranean with his fleet till June, when he will be joined by ships from the Baltic, and make a start for the Far East. Do you think it possible for him to get out here by coaling from colliers en route, without having to put into neutral ports. It wld. be awkward for the Japse. if he got near enough to oblige them to raise the blockade of Port Arthur & Vladivostok.

Any information I can give you about public affairs will always be at your disposal. I can write only once a fortnight by our messenger to Shanghai, & if you have any occasion to write to me, please send your letters by English post to c/o H.M. Consul-general Shanghai,

¹ An audience took place with the Emperor and Empress-Dowager at the Palace on October 8, 1904. (Satow's diary, Volume 2, p. 117)

marking the envelope “to go with the F.O. bag”. Sometimes I get the Hgkg & S’hai Bank to enclose a letter in one of their covers, but there is danger of the latter being opened in the Chinese, French or German post. The Jap. post office people are also inquisitive.

y.v.s.

22. Satow to Lord Lansdowne

24.3.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

In my letter of the 9th [of March, no. 19 above] I mentioned that Dubail had asked me to join in dissuading the Chinese Govt. fr. bringing any more troops to the north. The inquiries I made of Sir P. Warren & Mr. Playfair elicited replies stating that there were quite sufficient forces left on the Yangtze to preserve order. I have not said anything to Prince Ch’ing on the subject, especially as I found that Dubail had induced both Mumm & Conger to speak about it, yet without telling either of them that he was moving the other, nor did he inform me that he had been to them.

Here in Peking everything remains perfectly quiet, and the demeanour of the common people is as civil as could be.

I hear that Pavlov is to go to Moukden, but unless he smuggles himself in thro’ Tientsin I do not see how he can manage it.

Nothing is known here about the Japanese military plans. The Russians evidently expect an attack on Newchwang, since the departure of the foreign ladies. I hope you will not disapprove my having allowed Fulford to protest agst. blocking the river there, for it seemed important to leave a free passage for the “Espiegle”. The U.S. gunboat “Helena” will also leave as soon as she can. Conger says he believes Admiral [“Fighting Bob”] Evans has instructions to send no ships north of the Yangtze, lest any overzealous officer, worked upon by local influences, should get mixed up with the belligerents.

I have told Mumm that the B. & C. Corpn. are willing that separate contracts shld. be signed for the German & British portions respectively of the Tientsin-Yangtze railway, and that the Corporation’s agent must fight the question with the Chinese negotiators at Tientsin. As I am entirely ignorant of what has passed betw. the German Agent & the Chinese, I am not in a position to say anything to Prince Ch’ing, and that I must have time to inform myself.

A rumour reaches me that the Germans will prob. undertake the whole line as far as the

Yangtze, but I hope this is not true. Brennan it is said talks of taking two years' holiday in Europe, until the Chinese market improves enough to allow of the Shanghai-Nanking loan being floated.

I hope we shall be able to keep the French out of Szechuen. [Emile] De Marteau, the Agent mentioned by the Peking Syndicate, has been in Peking, but I have not been able to learn anything about his proceedings. He has some questions relating to missing concessions in Szechuen to settle. No one of course believes that any Chinese company formed under the auspices of mandarins can ever raise money to build a Szechuen railway, perh. not even to make a beginning; but neither are British capitalists ready to go to work.

I had a conversation today ¹ with a Swedish agent of the British & Foreign Bible Society, named Larsen, who tells me that in 1901 he accompanied a party of Russian engineers who made a preliminary survey fr. Kiachta [Kiakhtha] viâ Urga ², Kalgan & the Nankin pass to Peking. It is quite easy fr. Urga to Kalgan, and water can be obtained everywhere 2 or 3 yards below the surface. The difficulties are the descent fr. the plateau at Kalgan & the Nankin Pass, but they are by no means insuperable. The Gobi Desert he says is no desert at all, but a grass-grown plain. The first traveller who gave it that name must have passed thro' in winter when the grass was withered. I sounded him about sending us information of interesting events fr. Kalgan, where he is stationed, but he said the Bible Society instructed their agents not to give information on political matters, in order not to give offence to the Russians, who allow them complete freedom for the sale of their publications throughout Russia. Wingate the D.A.Q.M.S. for Intelligence at Tientsin has also interviewed Larsen, and thinks his services can be secured for £300 a year, if it were thought worth while. He wld. of course sever his connexion with the Bible Society. I think he could be useful to us.

The general at Hongkong sends me intelligence reports fr. S'hai, compiled by a certain Lieut. Bland R.E. brother to the Times correspondent and secretary of the municipal council [J.O.P. Bland], who is the soul of anti-french propaganda at that place. It seems to me that an intelligence officer wld. be better employed in recording facts, than in expressing crude opinions on municipal govt.

E.S.

23. Satow to F.A. Campbell

¹ This conversation is not recorded in Satow's diary, nor is there any mention of a man named Larsen.

² Urga is the old Russian name for Ulan Bator in Mongolia.

7.4.04

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for your letter of Feb. 26 explaining how it came to be proposed that we shld. ask on behalf of the Central Chinese Railways for a line from Chungking to Ch'êngtu. I am sending by this mail Pr. Ch'ing's last reply. Cockburn thinks that we have for the present blocked any French application. So far so good. The secret of their success in the case of the Luhan line is baksheesh to Shêng, & to every one else who can help them. They have bought one of his secretaries, and it is openly printed that they pay the Chinese Minr. in Washington, Chentung K.C.M.G. ¹ \$1000 gold a month for his help in getting control of the N. end of the Canton-Hankow line. We cannot compete with them in this, for Englishmen have not the art of administering bribes. For instance, how can a man like Geo. Jamieson who all his life has acted up to our official code of honour learn the trick of corruption. To deal with Shêng requires a man of business acquainted with Chinese methods, some low fellow like Louis Spitzel the notorious.

I have sent to [Alexander] Hosie in a cyphered letter what you have told me about the genesis of the Chungking-Chengtu proposal, for he must be trusted fully in the matter.

I have added that our policy must be to keep the Szechuen railway scheme en l'air [up in the air] without pressing the Chinese too much. For if they really organized a company, & wanted money, we might find ourselves in a difficulty. Since the B. & C. Corporation cannot get the money for such a splendid line as that fr. Shanghai to Nanking, both ends of wch. are commanded by our ships, it seems highly doubtful whether the public could be induced to subscribe, even to a light railway, so far away in the remote interior. I have told Hosie that he had better encourage the Viceroy in his project of a Chinese company, holding out hopes of pecuniary assistance; but to let him simmer very gently: he must not boil over and spoil our cookery. ² If the French got an inkling of what we are up to, they

¹ Sir Chentung Liang Cheng (Liang Pixu) studied in the United States. He was 12 years old when he arrived there as a member of a Chinese educational mission in 1875, and he became a keen baseball player. In 1897, while serving in London as secretary to the Special Chinese Embassy to Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations, Liang Cheng was named an Honorary Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George. He was appointed China's minister to the United States on July 12, 1902 and held the post till July 3, 1907.

(Abstracted from *Taking in a Game: A History of Baseball in Asia*, by Joseph A. Reaves, University of Nebraska Press, 2002, pp. 24-27, quoted on the web at <http://faroutliers.blogspot.com/2004/08/early-baseball-addict-sir-chentung.html>, accessed August 7, 2006.)

² The metaphor is an amusing one, which has sadly fallen into disuse in modern English!

might push him on, and persuade him to apply to the Central China Railways Ltd and to the American Syndicate mentioned in one of my telegrams, & then if there was no British or American capital forthcoming, claim that we had not availed ourselves of the refusal given to us, and put themselves in our place. If the Viceroy shld. ever formally ask for our assistance in raising capital, I shld. feel certain the French were egging him on. Of himself he will never do it, his idea being to keep such things in Chinese official hands. It is an idea which is very prevalent just now.

It seems to me a very delicate business. I quite understand however the necessity of being able to answer troublesome people in Parliament and press, and shall do my best.

I have just recd. a despairing telegram fr. Geo. Jamieson, to the effect that the prospects for a settlement of the Peking Syndicate business are more remote than ever. Shêng of course is quite aware that the money invested in the Taokao-Tsechou[?] rlwy. has been thrown away, and that the Peking Syndicate merely want to get out without loss. I saw today Alexander Reid, who has just been appointed manager of the mines and railways. He says they have gone down 280 feet, and will not reach the coal bearing strata till the autumn. That if their contention that their agreement gives them mining rights over the whole of Honan north of the Yellow river fails they may as well pack up and go. You know fr. [Reginald] Townley [Secretary of Peking Legation] that the Chinese & English versions, both of wch. are originals, do not agree on this point. He also says the railway is of no use, unless made part of the Luhan main line, & that he wld. never have recommended its construction.

Sir John Lister Kaye ¹ is still here, and I am doing all I can to help him in getting his concession for mining in Anhui ratified by the Foreign Board [Wai Wu Pu]. But he is not wily or business like enough to deal with the Chinese. I cannot understand why he shld. go in for the trade of a concession-hunter.

With regard to Szechuen-Hankow rlwy. & its branches, if things ever arrive at a stage where the Chinese are willing to employ Anglo-American capital, it will be necessary for an agent to go to Chênghu to negotiate with the Viceroy, subject to ratification by Peking. The Central govt. it will be remembered does not negotiate such matters for the provinces.

I have not said anything to Conger about the corresp'ce on railway matters with Prince Ch'ing, but if you think I might safely do so, please telegraph. A.W. Bash the American

¹ Believed to be Sir John Pepys Lister-Kaye, 3rd Baronet, OBE. Lt, RHG and Yorkshire Hussars. Born 18 February 1853; died 27 May 1924.

agent mentioned in one of my despp. on the subject is still here.

y.s.

24. Satow to Lansdowne

7.4.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

My Portuguese Coll: [José Azevedo Castello Branco] has gone to Shanghai ¹ to negotiate his commercial treaty, & to arrange abt. his rlwy. concession from Macao to Canton & Samshin[?].

Before he went he told me that he had had a conversation with Dubail upon the arrangements wch. will follow upon the termination of the present war. Russia Dubail says, will have Manchuria, & other Powers must obtain compensation. This shld. not be in the form of partition of Chinese territory, but in the establishment of protectorates, the limits of wch. wld. be settled among the Powers. France he said wld. have Kwangsi & Yünnan in this fashion, & prob. Szechuen. As for the Canton Delta she had no aspirations in that direction, because even if Portugal were not already established there, England wld. be entitled.

Azevedo thought that this scheme was not Dubail's, but probably emanated fr. Paris. I fancy I have seen somewhere a statement that M. Delcassé had expressed himself in this sense.

I told my coll: that by the Siam Convention of 1896 G.B. & France had agreed to share equally the privileges obtainable in Yünnan & Szechuen, and that Dubail's scheme was therefore blocked.

y.v.f.

25. Satow to F.A. Campbell

21.4.04

My dear Campbell,

Please do not give a copy of my desp. no. 132 of April 11 abt. the Canton-Kowloon railway to the B. & C. Corp'n. or to any of them, as it might be inconvenient to Mr Gershom Stewart, who was my informant, if Mr. Keswick knew how frankly he had expressed

¹ See Satow's diary for April 3, 1904.

himself.¹ St[ewart] has recently married a sister of Gresson, one of the China partners of J M [Jardine Matheson]& Co. He is the leading exchange broker in Hongkong, & was much appreciated by Sir H. Blake.² You will see from the encl: [enclosure] in no. 131 that he brought credentials fr. the China Association at Hongkong.

I am afraid that there may be a hitch abt. the Transvaal Chinese Labour Convention. Yüan Shihkai's objections I have already informed you of. And now the Viceroy of Canton complains to me thru' the Foreign Board that labourers are already being engaged in Hongkong, before the regulations under negotiation with the Chinese Minister in London [Chang Têyi] have been finally agreed to. I noticed that in the 'Times' of some 10 weeks ago Reuter stated that Chang Têyi was annoyed because agents had already begun operations in China while the regulations were being debated. You telegd. to me the day before yesterday that Chang had now wired out the text, but it had apparently not been recd. at the Foreign Board when they wrote their note forwarding the Canton remonstrance.

I have never understood how Chang came to propose that the emigration regns. should be negotiated in London, instead of in China, but perh. it was put into his head by agents of the people in the Transvaal who want Chinese labour. He wld. naturally get a present for his share in the work.

Do you know whether he has been in communication with the Viceroys of Chihli & Canton during his negotiations with you? If steps have not been taken to content these two magnates and to remove their objections, I am afraid that the Central Govt. will find it rather difficult to persuade them to agree. And without their being satisfied, the Peking Govt. can do nothing. They are quite powerless to override a viceroy's opinion in a local question, unless they have some very urgent motive.

I have suggested to you that the text shld. be telegraphed to me because I cannot very well do without it, & it is humiliating to be obliged to ask the Chinese to give me a copy.

I am writing at some disadvantage, for I had a fall from my pony a few days ago, & am still on the sofa.³ No bones broken, only muscles and tendons wrenched.

y.s.

¹ Gershom Stewart, a bill-broker and temporary member of the Hong Kong legislative council, visited Satow on April 11th. (Diary, Ruxton, Volume 2, 2006, p. 51)

² Sir Henry Arthur Blake (1840-1918), Governor of Hongkong 1898-1903.

³ The fall occurred on April 18, 2004 (see diary).

26. Satow to Lord Knollys

21 4 04

Dear Ld. Knollys,

For the past 8 months Miss Carl ¹ an American artist who exhibits sometimes in Paris has been engaged on a portrait of the Empress Dowager for the St. Louis Exhibition [of 1904]. She went daily to the Palace and spent several hours there, painting whenever the subject was in the mood for it. The portrait being at last completed, was conveyed with Great pomp to the Foreign Board, and the Dipl. Body were invited to a 'private view'. I got there [on April 12th – see diary] after the colleagues had left, and on entering the courtyard was confronted by what I took to be a Chinese painting, placed before the real portrait by way of introduction. Great was my astonishment when I was told that this was the work of the American lady. It seems that the Empress-Dowager insisted on having her own way about the style. ² She is represented looking straight at the spectator, with a large pink and white face belonging to a woman of 30 artificially coloured, and absolutely flat, without any shading at all. The dress which is of imperial yellow embroidered with medallions in blue, is treated in the same manner, and looks more like a curious kind of curtain than the covering of a human body. The feet are invisible, but by way of compensation the hands are represented with long nails and gold nailguards, like the claws of some uncanny bird. The stomacher ³ of big pearls and pale rubies must be worth a great deal. All the accessories are very handsome, and there the artist seems to have been allowed a free hand. The general result however is not likely to enhance her reputation as a painter. As it is the most authentic portrait of the famous lady that the world is likely to see, it will probably be photographed or reproduced when it gets to America.

y.s.

¹ See *With the Empress Dowager of China* by Katharine A. Carl. New York : Century, 1907. xxv, 306p. It was dedicated to Sir Robert Hart. "Kate's mother was a Bredon, related to Lady Hart, and [her brother] Francis worked for the Chinese Customs." (Sterling Seagrave, *Dragon Lady*, p. 410)

² "As the portrait progressed Kate found herself obliged by officials to adjust it to Chinese artistic conventions, with minimum detail, no perspective, and no shadow. 'The Empress Dowager, however, knew nothing of my discouragement, and seemed perfectly contented with the progress of the portrait then on hand.'" (Sterling Seagrave, *Dragon Lady*, p. 410)

³ The stomacher is the triangular section in the front of a bodice that goes from the neckline to the stomach.

27. Satow to Lansdowne

21.4.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Dubail sent to me today one of his secretaries to say that he had heard fr. a private source that the Japse. had arranged with the Chinese to occupy Amoy for the period of the war, and ask whether I had any confirmation. I replied that I had heard nothing of it & thought it unlikely. I afterwds. inquired of Uchida, who treated it as a malicious invention, wch. I have no doubt it is.

Abt. 10 days ago [on April 11th – see diary] I met D. at dinner, & after we had exchanged mutual congratulations on the conclusion of an arrangement betw. Fr[ance] & Engl[and] he expressed the hope that an agreement wld. be arrived at betw. Engl. & Russia regarding our frontier in Asia. I replied that such a project appeared to me very difficult of realization. Till I came to Peking, I had never had any business with Russian colls: but in 1900 & 1901 I had been much struck with the want of loyalty in their proceedings. He rejoined that [Baron Mikhail] de Giers was a very poor creature, & things wld. have gone very much better if Lessar had been in charge of the negotiations for Russia. I agreed, but said I had been much disappointed in Lessar, of whom at one time I had entertained great hopes, but I had found that he raised difficulties about quite minor affairs, & I mentioned his refusing to join us in our last instructions to the Shanghai Consuls abt. the “Supao” prisoners. Dubail excused this on the ground of “nervosité” resulting fr. a painful illness, and instanced the Manchurian question as one in wch. he had shown himself reasonable. If it had not been taken out of his hands by the military people, there wld. have been no trouble at all. Certainly the Russians had made “une gaffe”; they would beat the Japanese in the end, but it would be a very costly affair. He looked on the Japanese as a very dangerous people, whose object was to drive all Europeans out of China, & that our alliance with them was a great imprudence. I remarked that it had been productive of one good result, in that it had limited the range of hostilities.

D. says he saw a good deal of you when he was Consul-general in Canada, and that you used to lunch quietly with him by way of a change fr. the formalities of Govr.-generalship, & that he was the only person so honoured.¹

I gather that D. does not feel so certain of Russian success as he affects to be. That a

¹ Henry Charles Keith Petty-FitzMaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne (1845-1927) was Governor-General of Canada from 1883 to 1888.

Japanese success wld. change things in the Far East very considerably may I imagine be regarded as a truism, but it wld. injure the Fr. & Germans before anyone else, & I greatly doubt whether the Jap[ane]se who have shown great political intelligence, will want to quarrel with all Europe & America.

Another thing Dubail said was that America, with her enormous economic resources, was the real danger to the world, and that all Europe ought to combine agst. her.

As for Lessar, he is certainly far cleverer than de Giers, but quite as false & tricky as any Russian of them all.

Fr. what v. d. Goltz, the Germ. Secy. of Legn., who has just returned from leave, told me, I gather that had not war broken out, the Budget Commission of the Reichstag wld. have cut down the China estimates, so that the Germ. Govt. wld. have been forced to propose the withdrawal of the foreign troops in Chihli. I replied that had the Russians carried out the Manchurian evacuation, we might this spring have sent home the troops stationed on the lines of communication, and greatly reduced the number of the Legation guards. My original expectation had been that they wld. not stop here more than four years, and for that reason had recommended the provision of only temporary quarters.

28. Satow to Sir W. Chauncey Cartwright¹

2 May/04

My dear Cartwright,

Your letter of Mar. 14 abt. Vice-consuls, Assistants & Students.

We waited to recommend King for Vice consul at Tientsin until he actually took up the apptmt. & Phillips ceased to draw the local £100. I have now done that by telegram to you. At the same time I recommend Wilton for Chungking (Consul or Viceconsul as the case may be). This leaves one 1st. Asst. vacancy wch. falls to [S.F.] Mayers, & one 2nd Asst's falling to Kirke.

This reduces the number of student interpreters to 21 (Porter having been already promoted in consequence of the creation of a 2nd Asst. for Pakhoi).

Your normal number of students, 19, is thus nearly attained, and I think will be actually before long.

Bennett who is in bad health, indulges in morphia & is otherwise undesirable, shld. retire. I hope he will not be allowed to come out again.

¹ Chief Clerk of the Financial Department of the Foreign Office, 1900-13

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Graham I understand has been told that he will cease to draw pay at the end of the last Qr. I fear his tuberculosis is incurable.

If these two go, then we get down to the normal no. of students.

Mackinnon is also given to morphia. He neglected his duty disgracefully when acting at Têng-yüeh, sent home no accounts, and when asked for an explanation made misrepresentations.

I think he should be got rid of.

Coales who has just gone home on sick leave is a nice boy, but very delicate, & it must depend on Sir Patrick Manson's ¹ verdict whether he returns to China or not.

If these two vacancies shld. occur, I shld. be glad to have them filled up without delay. What I shld. recommend as the best thing for the service wld. be the apptmt of two (2) Students every year, so as to keep up a regular supply, & maintain a graduated service, instead of as has sometimes happened, the apptmt of a batch of six or more at a time. Please think this a possible thing. The average 'waste' is between deaths & retirement quite as much as 2 per annum for the last 25 years.

As to filling up the posts at Moukden & Antung, I have made my recommendations, but the war broke out almost simultaneously & I hope the apptmts have not been gazetted. Recently I sent you a desp. abt. the inadequacy of the proposed salary for the former post, & intimating that I would return to the charge when the time came. But the war must come to an end first.

I am beginning to think that some of the £800 Consulates might be reduced to £700 on the next vacancy, the money being applied to increasing salaries elsewhere. Thus I would make Kiukiang, Wuhu and Ichang £700, give £100 to the legal vice-consul at Tientsin, £100 to the Cons. Genl. at Yünnanfu and £100 to the Cons. Genl. at Chêngtu. When Amoy is reduced to £800, as it is to be on the next vacancy, I would give £100 to Newchwang & £100 to Tientsin.

These are dreams you will say, but before midnight, therefore they shld. come true.

29. Satow to Admiral Noel

5 May 1904

My dear Noel,

¹ Sir Patrick Manson (1844-1922). British parasitologist who founded the field of tropical medicine. Physician to the Colonial Office, 1897-1912.

Many thanks for your letter of March 26 wch. reached me on the 11 April. I shld. have written sooner, but a terrible [fall? – word missing] fr. my pony wch. laid me up in bed for a fortnight made it difficult & irksome to write.

My Fr. coll: a couple of weeks ago started a story that the Japse. had made a secret arrangement with China to be allowed to occupy the port of Amoy, and that troops were to be landed there, in order to have a convenient base from wch. to intercept the [Russian] Baltic fleet. Whether fr. a strategic point of view this wld. be any great advantage to Japan you are the best judge, but politically I think it could only be a harmful thing, as it wld. be entirely at variance with the policy of maintaining the neutrality of China, wch. Japan was the first to assert & recommend, several weeks indeed before the war broke out. But Dubail managed to get what he said was confirmation fr. his Consul at Foochow. [Herbert F.] Brady tells me that the latter is not in touch with the Viceroy of Fuhkien, & that if the story had originated with him, he shld. look on it as a fabrication. Hausser at Amoy has also given to him a similar story with a few more details.

I told Dubail that I thought there was no more foundation for it than the ‘canard’ [French: lit. duck, also a deliberately false story] set on wing in 1902 abt. Sir Jas. Mackay having proposed to the Viceroy of Nanking that we shld. occupy the forts below Nanking. I knew how that had originated & how it had passed fr. one person to another till it reached the German & Fr. Govts. & was accepted by them as true, tho’ there was absolutely no foundation, & I entirely refused to credit the present fable. I believe he has since come to think that he has been imposed upon. You may perh. hear something of it, & if you do, I shld. be greatly obliged by your telling me how far it gains credence.

The Home papers seem to get hold of a good deal of false intelligence, wch. they are unable to distinguish from the false [sic. true?], & the deductions made by the “Military Correspondents” of the Times are often amusing. I see in the Times of 24 March a plan for landing at Newchwang, wch. I strongly suspect comes from the pen of our last military attaché, Col. S.F. Browne, who was a great hand at drawing maps and possessed more geographical & topographical information abt. China than any other man of my acquaintance. But I confess that I have never felt any confidence in the anticipations so freely indulged in on this head, & if I recommended that the Espiègle shld. be allowed to ‘remain as long as possible’, instead of ‘being withdrawn at the earliest possible date’, it was because this wld. have tranquillized the agitators, & my suggestion to the F.O. was that carte blanche shld. be given to the Admiral & myself to concert the necessary measures

whenever any danger arose at Newchwang. But Bridge wld. not hear of this, & got his own way. I loyally accepted this, & informed the Newchwang people to that effect (or rather that the ship wld. be withdrawn) thro' the Consul. When therefore your first teleg. on the subject seemed to reverse this decision, I felt that other people had got a hearing behind my back.

As far as one can see the Japanese have no intention of landing at Newchwang, but it may have been useful to them to have this belief entertained by the Russians.

The other day the Russian Legation celebrated the sinking of the Japanese transport Kiushiu maru ¹ by a banquet and a band. This is in marked contrast to the very quiet demeanour of the Japanese when they score a success, such as the sinking of the Petropavlosk ² and the battle on the Yalu on May 1.

y.s.

30. Satow to Barrington

5.5.04

My dear Barrington,

Rumour has come from several quarters that Eric Phipps is to come here to supply the place of Claud Russell, and I hope that before long [George Jardine] Kidston will get his promotion to 2nd Secretary.

It seems to have been the custom with regard to Peking to leave the departing 2nd Sec. still nominally on the list of Peking Secs. for several months, quite as much as six, before appointing him to a new post, during wch. time he receives the extra pay wch. is given to Peking. When Dering went away this was the case, and then again when Vaughan went home. The result was the man who was doing the work of the head of chancery got very little pay. Could not something be done to alter this, so that the man who does the work gets the pay.

Kidston is now head of the chancery, & gets £150. The assistants who work under him each get £300 a year, besides an interpreter's allowance if they have been able to earn it.

I parted with much regret from Claud Russell. ³ He has excellent abilities & a fund of

¹ 'maru' written 丸 is a common suffix for Japanese ships.

² The Russian ironclad 'Petropavlosk' was sunk by a Japanese torpedo with the loss of 600 lives, including that of Admiral Makharoff, on 13 April 1904.

³ A farewell bachelors' dinner was held at the Legation for Russell on April 21, 1904. He left Peking by train on April 26th. (Diary)

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general information, besides being a very amiable fellow into the bargain. His drafts are very good. What he wants is to shake off a curious sort of shyness with which he is afflicted. He wld. like I know to go to Paris, & I hope you may be able to give him his wish.

I expect Carnegie in five or six days.

y.s.

31. Satow to Lansdowne

5.5.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

A couple of days after the date of my last letter to you [see above] Dubail came again to me [on April 23 – see diary] about the Japanese at Amoy. He said he had asked his Consul at Foochow to ascertain what truth there was in it, and that the Consul confirmed it. Troops were to be landed in three weeks time. Lessar he said had also heard it.

I replied that I was very sceptical abt. rumours of this sort wch. emanated from Chinese sources, & reminded him of the ‘canard’ about Sir Jas. Mackay and the Kiangyiu forts in 1902, wch. I had traced to its source. I also told him of another that had attributed to the French themselves the design of seizing on Amoy, some time earlier in that year. I did not believe any of them.

A week later [on April 30 – see diary] he came back with an air of great satisfaction, & said that China has recently given definite assurances that she will observe strict neutrality. As regarded Amoy, the knowledge that he & I were opposed to its being lent to Japan had put a stop to what was on foot. He thinks Uchida certainly asked for a piece of land for a coal depot, but I gathered fr. him that he doubted whether the matter was as serious as he first imagined.

As I have not uttered a word to the Chinese on the subject, I suppose he took upon himself to say that I agreed with him abt. Amoy.

He said he had not heard anything of the Russian Govt. having complained at Paris about the Chinese attitude.

The Russian Legation had great rejoicings over the sinking of the Japanese transport Kiushiu maru by the “Rossia”, & borrowed the German military band to celebrate the occasion. This is in marked contrast to the sober demeanour of the Japanese, who have not excited themselves at all over the destruction of the “Petropavlosk” nor over what seems to have been a victory for them on the banks of the Yalu.

They have a story that when Dubail went to Prince Ch'ing to impress on him the necessity of remaining neutral he said that if China attacked Russia, France wld. be under a treaty obligation to fight on the side of the latter. He is quite capable of this.

Mumm a couple of days ago hinted to me that just as Germany had no desire to see Russia triumph over Japan, he supposed we were not anxious to see Japan achieve too great a success in the war. I told him his military people must be pleased professionally to see how well their pupils had profited by their lessons.

He talked to me a few days ago about the Chinese proposal that emigrants to South Africa shld. be sent by British or Chinese vessels only, wch. he said constituted a monopoly contrary to the Treaties. I said that it was very inconvenient that foreign vessels going fr. Chinese ports with coolies to Br. Colonies cld. not be inspected by our consular officers to ensure that the Colonial Passengers act [Act] was complied with, & hinted that Natal might quite well pass a law forbidding the importation of labourers except in British ships, on the analogy of the old navigation laws.

It seems that some one connected with the engagement of Chinese labour for South Africa believed that the exclusion of foreign bottoms formed part of an arrangement with China, for a telegram was recd. at Hongkong ordering the charter party of the Shimosa.

y.v.f.

E.S.

32. Satow to Admiral Noel

15.5.04

My dear Noel,

In confirmation of my teleg. I write about railways. This is rather a thorny subject. You have prob. heard a good deal at Hongkong of the proposed Canton-Kowloon rlwy., for wch. the British & Chinese Corporation have held the preliminary concession for the past five years, without taking any steps to utilize it. The Hongkong people are anxious that H.M.G. shld. take the concession out of the hands of the Corporation, and give it some other body of capitalists who will set to work to build it. [Hongkong Colonial Secretary Sir Francis Henry] May & C.W. Campbell at Canton are each in his way & to the extent of his ability endeavouring to persuade H.M.G. to adopt this course, & to sanction the grant of a guarantee by the Colony, similar to what Indo-China has given to the Coy. wch. is to build the rlwy. fr. Laokai to Yünnanfu.

Next comes the Shanghai-Nanking railway. The final contract for this was signed last July, but the B. & C. Corp'n. say that the condition of the money market is such that the money cannot be procured. I am told that the price at wch. they calculate the cost of this railway is exorbitant, & works out at £12,000 a mile, abt. double what it would really cost.

Thirdly there is a negotiation proceeding betw. Geo. Jamieson, on behalf of the Peking Syndicate & Shêng the Director-general of railways for the issue of a loan to cover the cost of the line in Honan constructed already by the Syndicate. I think Jamieson ought to be able to conclude [an agreement] with the diplomatic aid we constantly give him, but he is very slow, & is always trying to secure something more. It does not seem possible to do anything else for him.

The B. & C. Corporation are concerned with a German Syndicate in a line from Tientsin by Chinanfu to a place just opposite Nanking, on joint account. The Germans are to construct the northern part, the B. & C. Corporation the Southern section. The former have completed their Surveys & are ready to go ahead, if they can get the preliminary converted into a final contract. Our people are not ready. They have not completed the survey of their section & have no prospect of being able to raise the capital. For political reasons I am not anxious to see the Germans succeed in obtaining their final contract; that wld. give them the control of a line from Kiaochou to Tientsin, and whoever has that can exercise a sort of protectorate over the territory it serves.

The B. & C. Corporation has a preliminary agreement for a line from Pukou opposite Nanking to Sinyang on the Peking-Hankow line. Obviously they are not in a position to do anything with it, & I do not believe them when they say they are surveying it.

Lastly, the Chinese Govt. have given us an undertaking that in case they wish to build a line from Szechuen to Hankow, and are not able to find the money, they will apply to English & American capitalists. Whether such a line can be constructed except at a ruinous cost has yet to be ascertained. A party of surveyors headed by Col. Manifold I.M.S. (a doctor) is examining possible routes, and will report this summer. Such a line will cost at least £15,000,000 wch. we have not got to invest.

It is not that we cannot procure railway concessions in China, but that English capital is not forthcoming. Russia, Germany & France are using state funds for rlwy. building, and the Belgians have the vast hoards of their King to fall back on. But the B. Govt. dare not ask Parliament to guarantee interest on loans for constructing rlwys. in China, yet without that I do not see how British capitalists are to do anything.

The B. & C. Corpn. & the Peking Syndicate have lately pooled certain of their railway interests under the name of “the Chinese Central Railways Ltd”, in wch. the moving spirit will be Carl Meyer, but seeing that the latter is the man who is negotiating for the transfer to China of the only existing bit of British railway, I do not anticipate much good from the combination.

This statement of the position of British rlwy. enterprise in China will I think make it clear that it is not pressure on the Chinese Govt. that is required to put our affairs on a prosperous footing. My own view has always been that investors at home believe there is a better field for investing their savings in the River Plate & in S. Africa. They must be converted before anything can be done out in China.

y.s.

P.S. I say nothing abt. Yünnan, because Lord Curzon opposes any application of Indian revenues to the prolongation from Lashio [in Myanmar] to the Mekong [river] and thence into Chinese territory.

E.S.

33. Satow to Lord Knowles¹

15.5.04

Dear Ld. Knowles,

On the 9th & 10th inst. [see diary] the Empress Dowager gave garden parties to the members of the dipl. body & other gentlemen & to the diplomatic ladies and some foreign officers' wives fr. Tientsin. We men went to the first, the ladies to the 2nd, it being considered incorrect to mingle the sexes on these occasions. The rule however is not adhered to with perfect strictness, as on the ladies' day they are accompanied by the Doyen of the Dipl. Body & the interpreters of the different legations. Perh. there is some court fiction that these gentlemen like ambassadors 'n'ont pas de sexe' [are sexless]. The parties were at the Summer Palace about fourteen miles distant. We had to start at seven o'clock in the morning & drive half way to a temple on the banks of a canal, where we embarked on barges towed by small paddle steamers, in wch. we accomplished the rest of the journey. In this way we reached the summer palace about half past ten, and were immediately ushered into the presence of Their Majesties. The Empress Dowager as usual occupied the seat on

¹ See letter no. 56 in the previous file, PRO 30/33 14/13. Again this seems to be Lord Knollys, pronounced Knowles.

the throne behind a table, the Emperor being in an armchair about four feet from her left and a little lower. The heads of missions formed a row in front of the dais, with their Secretaries military officers and other visitors, 116 in all, standing behind. The Doyen [Austro-Hungarian minister Czikkann] stood in the middle, and read a short complimentary speech, wch. was addressed to the Emperor but seemed as if intended for the Empress-Dowager & then the Emperor took a piece of paper fr. the corner of his chair, wch. he handed without uttering a word to a member of the Grand Council. This contained his reply. The Councillor recd. it on his knees, and shuffling to the edge of the dais, got down somehow & standing by us, read it out. You know the fiction is that the Emperor speaks his reply in Manchu & hands a Chinese translation to some one to read for him, the fact being that his ordinary speech is Chinese like that of any of his subjects. Then we all ascended the dais & stood in front of the Empress-Dowager, who exchanged a few sentences abt. the weather our health and her wish to show us her gardens, in Chinese. It was the first time I had a good opportunity of seeing her well. She has a sallow complexion, and her mouth wch. is very large is twisted on one side. Her voice is soft and agreeable. In making my bow before descending the dais I managed to get quite in front of Her Majesty, and she bestowed on me a most gracious smile. She is not in the least like the portrait that has been sent to the St. Louis Exhibition. It appears that she wld. not allow the artist to put on any shading, wch. she says looked like dirt, and her face is clean! The Emperor looked pale & ill, and had dark circles under his eyes. He has the appearance of an unhealthy boy of fifteen, tho' he is over thirty. After the audience we were entertained at luncheon, not very sumptuously. The wines, for which the Court doubtless pays very highly, were quite undrinkable. After lunch we got again on board the barges and were towed along the lake to another part of the grounds, where we landed & walked thro' the grounds, wch. are laid out in very formal style. After saying goodbye to the officials who had entertained us, we started homewards, & I got back to the Legation abt. six o'clock.

Lessar is behaving in a foolish manner towards the Japanese colleague [Uchida], whom he refuses to recognize when he meets him. His attitude is much blamed by the other colls:. He is still very ill, but made a great effort to go to the garden party. Pavlof had just come here from Moukden, it is supposed with the object of being able to report that Lessar's state of health rendered him unable to represent Russia. He had to go away in a hurry, lest he shld. be cut off by the Japanese army advancing northwards from where it has landed in the Liaotung Peninsula.

y.v.s.

34. Satow to Lansdowne

19.5.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

It is difficult to feel certain what the French & Russians are aiming at in accusing the Chinese of maintaining a suspicious attitude, but the opinion of my Italian & American colls: is that Russia wants to pick a quarrel with China, so as to cover her want of success agst. Japan, out of whom she cld. get nothing in the event of a completely successful termination of the war, while there is no limit to what cld. be extorted fr. China in the way of a cession of territory. If this is so, it wld. seem that the object of inviting the Powers to address a warning to the Chinese is threefold. 1°. To force them to remain perfectly neutral until the time comes when it will be convenient for Russia to deal with them. 2° to provide beforehand material for accusing China of having maintained a hostile attitude from the beginning 3° to be able to cite us all as witnesses to the fact.

As regards motives more personal to my coll[eague]s: Lessar seems to be playing the Russian game with thoroughness, for Wu Ting-fang says that he is perpetually worrying the Foreign Board about alleged infractions of neutrality & unfriendly attitude.

Dubail is doubtless anxious for the safety of the R.C. missionaries scattered all over the country, & apprehends that a general rising agst., foreigners wld. take place if war were declared agst. Russia. As to Mumm I think his principal object is to create prejudice agst. Yüan Shihkai, who has done all he can to frustrate the German negotiations for railway extension to Tientsin and elsewhere in the province of Chihli. So he shakes his head wisely & says he has reason to know that Yüan's entourage uses warlike language.

I do not believe that the Chinese have any desire to fight, or that the Japanese hanker after their alliance.

But I am told that the common people of Manchuria are getting excited by the reports of Japanese victories, and are disposed to give them what help they can. At the same time the troops of Gen. Ma & Yüan Shihkai, wch. are posted on the frontier of the province manifest no such inclinations, and they are kept well in hand by their chiefs.

Reports on the subject published in the English press at Tientsin are taken from Chinese newspapers & are totally untrustworthy. Reuter's telegs. & those of the correspondents in North China, except the "Times" own, come fr. the same source, and are equally valueless.

Very little trust can be reposed on the reports of J.O.P. Bland, the “Times” correspondent at Shanghai, who is not in touch with the Chinese.

Dubail expressed to me his hope that Russia might secure a victory on land, wch. would afford an opportunity for France & England to intervene & put a stop to the war. In the present temper of the Japanese, I shld. imagine that one defeat wld. not suffice, and I reminded him of the recent Russian announcement that no one wld. be allowed to interfere between them and their antagonist.

Tibet is sometimes mentioned in the Chinese papers, & the Amban as well as the Viceroy of Szechuen are represented as telegraphing urgently to Prince Ch’ing to ask me to stop the further advance of the British troops! Not a word has been said to me by the Chinese abt. Tibet for months past, and I have carefully abstained from alluding to the subject. It is prob. that they look forward to our re-establishing their authority at Lhasa, & I cannot help thinking that it might be worth our while to set the Humpty Dumpty of an Amban ¹ up again, with a British officer at his side to keep him upright.

35. Satow to Lansdowne

26 04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I think there is no doubt that the Russian Legn. is trying to make difficulties with the Chinese, by bringing accusations of unfriendly attitude and a desire to depart from their duties as neutrals, so as to have later on an accumulation of grievances for wch. to demand redress.

On the 26th I had a talk with Nat’ung [see diary], who told me that Lessar had officially complained that passports had been given to ten Japanese, who had forthwith proceeded with sinister intentions to a part of Mongolia that is under the jurisdiction of the Tartar-general of Moukden. The Foreign Board made inquiry, and found that the passports were issued long before the war broke out: sometime last autumn. The Russians frequently make demands on the Tartar-general for supplies & transport, to furnish wch. wld. be regarded by the Japse. as a breach of neutrality, & when they are refused then the Russians complain. Lessar sent for him to question him abt. the alleged agreement to let Japan have the use of Amoy as a naval base, & wld. not believe his disclaimer. Last of all, Lessar had

¹ An Amban was the highest imperial official representing the Chinese central government in Tibet and certain other ethnically non-Chinese territories such as Kashgar and Urga.

written an official note to the Foreign Board [Wai Wu Pu], stating that he was informed that an arrangement had been come to by wch. we were to restore Wei hai wei to China, upon condition that it was transferred to Japan. To this the Board replied that the English had a lease of WHW for as long as the Russian lease of P.A. [Port Arthur], & that the duration of one wld. last as long as the other.

There seems to be an idea abroad that if the Japanese succeed in taking Port Arthur, we shall have to give up WHW. I have tried to explain that the capture of P.A. wld. not be a legal termination to the Russian lease.

Another accusation fathered by the Russian Legation is that Uchida is trying to persuade Yüan Shihkai to occupy the country west of the Liao river, fr. wch. the R[ussian] detachments have mostly withdrawn. The Chinese wld. be perfectly in their right in sending troops there to maintain order, but Prince Ch'ing is a great deal too prudent to run any risks. He is quite alive to the meaning of Lessar's saying that the Russians wld. pull the pigtailed of the Chinese & force them to bite.

Nat'ung said Lessar had sounded the Chinese abt. taking over Newchwang when the Russian groups retire. I advised him to accept, & to let the Tartar-genl. of Moukden send down one of his subordinates to assume charge when the time came. And speaking generally, I advised him to acquaint the friends of China with the Charges made agst. her by the Russians fr. time to time, & with the nature of their defence, instead of keeping these things bottled up until it was too late for their innocence to be demonstrated.

Certainly the time has not yet arrived for China to take up the cudgels on her own behalf. But if the Japse. shld. succeed in getting to Harbin, wch. wld. practically amount to the expulsion of the Russians fr. Manchuria China will have to make up her mind either to garrison the country or to pay Japan for doing it. If the Russians shld. then invade Ilia Kashgar, I suppose the Chinese with a stiffening of Japse. officers wld. be able to worry them out again.

Dubail insists on it that Mumm has asked permission to station troops along the rlwy. fr. Kiaochou to Chinan. Mumm has had the report denied in the North China Daily News. I have not yet been able to ascertain whether D. or he is telling the truth.

The negotiations for the continuation of the German line to Tientsin make no progress. I am now waiting to be moved by the agent of the B. & C. Corpn. who does not appear to be in a hurry.

36. Satow to Lansdowne

2 June 1904

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

I have written officially abt. the Empress-D's birthday wch. takes place on the 16th Novr. & the opinions of my colls: The Fr[ench] Min[ister] alone seems to hanker after giving her presents, tho' he has just been to tell me that all he cares for is to do what the rest do. In 1886 or 1887 when I was at Bangkok my Fr. coll. came to me & said that we ought not to make a fuss over the Crown Prince's recognition, & that he deprecated any official notice of it being taken by us. But a couple of days before the occasion he let me know that the Govr. of Indo-China was sending an official deputation to offer congratulations, when it was too late for us to do anything. I confess that I do not trust Fr. colls. in general, and Dubail in particular.

Should it be decided that the King sends a letter of congratulations to the E-D, I hope the Treaty Dept. will have it put in some sort of casket, such as an Oriental Potentate loves to look on, and not merely enclose it in a plain paper envelope. ¹

y.v.f.

37. Satow to F.A. Campbell

2.6.04

My dear Campbell,

Apropos of my desp. of today or yesterday abt. the various plans for fixing the rate at wch. the Bankers' Commission shall remit the indemnity, Dubail came to me this afternoon, & said he did not think much of the proposal to create a supervising committee of Consuls. The latter know nothing abt. such matters & wld. be in the hands of bankers of their own nationality. He agree with me that before any other step is taken Russia must agree to the Belgian proposal, wch. he says Delcassé has recommended warmly at Petersburg.

He wld. not admit that my plan of public tender was any good, for he maintained that the bankers instead of competing wld. have a 'knock-out' among themselves. This is the very opposite pretext for refusal to what has been put ford. hitherto.

¹ Satow attended an audience on November 23, 1904 at which the Diplomatic Body presented its congratulations. "We were the first to be introduced. The King's letter to the Emperor was in an ordinary white envelope, with a seal covered with paper; that for the E-D was a roll of paper tied with blue ribbon, enclosed in a silver casket of rather mechanical embossed design, and that again enclosed in an oaken outer box fastened with a lock." (Diary, Ruxton, Volume Two, 2006, p. 134)

I am afraid we have all got rather into a muddle abt. this coolie emigration business. On the one side there has been F.O. (African Dept.) Colonial Office & Lord Milner ¹ sending instructions, independently of each other, to the Am[inistrat]or at Hgkg, myself, the Comr. at Wei hai Wei, the Cons. Genl. at Tientsin & Walter the Delegate emigration agent (I have not been able to discover whose agent he is) then there is Mr. Perry the Chairman of the Rand Native Labour Association flying about the place & asking help on all sides. There is no copy of the convention in China. [Sir Francis Henry] May [Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong, 1902-10] has a telegraphic summary in English, & the Waiwupu say they have recd. only the heads in Chinese. Ld. Milner was to teleg. the final amendments to the form of Contract to Walter, who was to give me the amended text. He has not got them. Without them I cannot carry out the instructions I recd. long ago. May seems to have got them, but while sending them to me à titre d'information, he has not sent the Chinese text, wch. is absolutely necessary. And I am not told to get them fr. him. I have telegd. to F.O. & written to Walter without success. I suppose F.O. has to write to C.O., the latter telegs. to Pretoria, & Ld. M's managing clerk thinks that informing May at Hgkg is the same thing as informing Walter at Tientsin. I suppose it will all come right in the end, but after being told by the African Dept. that these delays are intolerable, I feel inclined to retort in the same tone.

y.s.

38. Satow to Campbell

15. 6. 04

My dear Campbell,

I daresay the F.O. takes no very great interest in the question of Macartney's being made Consul at Kashgar, wch. is an affair that principally concerns India, and Peking only in a secondary degree. But I think I ought to mention a fact wch. possibly contributed to a certain extent to my difficulties in the matter. The "Times" of 27 Feby. containing the official Gazette of his apptmt. reached Peking some time before the desp. of 29 Feby. conveying the information to me, and I saw it lying on Lessar's table. The desp. of 29 Feby. must have left London on March 11, so Lessar had at least a fortnight to act. Of course one cannot blame the Consular Dept. for not being aware that it was important for me to know

¹ Alfred, 1st Viscount Milner (1854-1925). Colonial administrator. In December 1903 there was a crisis in the gold-mining industry in Johannesburg. He reluctantly agreed to the mineowners' proposal to import Chinese coolies on a three-year contract. The first of them reached the Rand in June 1904.

of the apptmt. at as early a date as possible, and before the Russians.

y.s.

39 Satow to Noel

16 June 1904

My dear Noel,

Very many thanks for your letter of June [May?] 17. It certainly was a great pity that you missed seeing Chang Chih-tung, who tho' 'rather uncertain' at times is disposed to take our advice, and is a very interesting man to talk to. Tuanfang is a charming fellow.

I have sent you Clennell's report abt. the Poyang Lake affair, & am awaiting your reply. There is this peculiarity abt. China, that if the provincial authorities consent to a thing, the Central govt. almost always approves, whereas if the former make objections, it is extremely difficult to get Peking to overrule them. And a second peculiarity of China is that you may do many things without asking permission, wch. will be forbidden if you do ask. I shall probably want to have information abt. the way in wch. the river gunboats have managed their quarterly target practice in the past. If there is a precedent something can be made of that, nay, a good deal. I am very pleased that you found [commercial attaché] J.W. Jamieson useful. [Pelham] Warren is a first rate man, but I do not think much of [A.J.] Sundius' judgment, and he is very deaf to boot.

Will you come to Weihaiwei and run the risk of floating mines, of which we hear so much? By the way my German colleague pretends to know from an authentic source that the Japanese really have lost the Yashima, but saved every one on board. He says they want to keep it dark until Port Arthur is taken. I have not put any questions to Uchida, for if it is true I have no use for the information. I am kept here hard at work day after day, Tibet, Chinese coolies for South Africa and a host of things. The F.O. have a disagreeable way of telegraphing for the materials of an answer to a Parliamentary question at very short notice, & I can hardly venture so far as Weihai until the House is up. By the way, Reuter surely has misunderstood Ld. Percy's reply about our tenure of the place. We have it for as long as the Russian lease of Port Arthur endures, & obviously the capture of the place by the Japse. wld. not put an end to the Russian lease. That can only be done by Russia surrendering the lease to the lessor, namely China.

Is there any prospect of your coming up here? I will try to find out beforehand the dates at which the Court is likely to be in the city during the summer, so that you cld. have an

audience conveniently. I have five spare bedrooms and a sitting room at your disposal, & can put up an European man-servant besides.

The Russians are bent upon accumulating griefs agst. the Chinese, as a ground for attacking them after they have vanquished Japan, & obtaining fr. them the compensation that they will not be able to extract fr. the Japanese. At least that is what I hear fr. Petersburg is their policy, & their conduct here is in harmony with such a plan. It looks a long way ahead, it is true, but the Chinese have taken the hint. They are quite amiable to us about Tibet, & seem to hope that we will coerce the Dalai Lama, who disregards their advice completely. But what H.M.G. seem to care most abt. at this moment is the exportation of coolies.

y.v.s.

40. Satow to F. Villiers

16.6.04

My dear Villiers,

I hope that by next mail I shall receive plenty of copies of the Convention as it was signed. Thus far I have only the copy of the draft enclosed in your desp. no. 119A of 22 April, and it is the only one in China, so I have had to lend it about, to [H.E.] Fulford, [F.] Perry and Walter. The Chinese have a copy in their own language telegraphed by Chang Têyi [the Chinese minister in London]. But I am told the context shows that it ought to be inserted.

Hong Kong, the emigration agents supposed, wld. be dealt with in the convention, and the information that came to [Sir Francis H.] May threw no light on this point. May, I am told, had nothing up to quite recently beyond a sketch of the content of the convention that reached him by telegraph on 24 Mar. he evidently supposed I had this too, for he did not send it to me till May 18.

It seems to me that Perry & Hamilton ought to have sat tight & done nothing until the convention was signed, but on the contrary they have been recruiting in the neighbourhood of Canton & at Tientsin for a long time past. No wonder the local auth: have thrown obstacles in their way, for their proceedings were diplomatically quite “incorrect”. Perry does not understand that as Rudyard Kipling says “you must not try to hustle the East.”

Undoubtedly the speeches of the Opposition have raised up a host of difficulties for us in this matter, and I am told that the councils of the C.O. [Colonial Office] were divided; if so,

that will account for the lack of diligence in keeping May informed.

Now Perry wants to recruit labourers in Shantung & to ship them from Weihai wei & Chefoo, or perh. only from the former. [Commissioner of Weihaiwei J.H. Stewart] Lockhart wld. like that, as it would give importance to his Colony, but as his population is small, the consent of the Shantung authorities will certainly be necessary to procure men fr the interior. I telegd. to you about this yesterday.

If things don't run quite smoothly, I hope you will not attribute all the blame of it to me. I have done my best, but have been greatly hampered by delay in providing me with the conditions of the contract. Luckily Perry turned up the other day with a number of copies in English & Chinese. I am afraid T'ang Taot'ai & the Viceroy of Tientsin will make all the delays they can, in the apptmt. of an Inspector & so forth.

y.s.

41. Satow to Lansdowne

16.6.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I learn fr. Mumm that Dubail professes to have learnt from a trustworthy source that the Empress-Dowager is very ill, that she has either had a stroke or is subject to swellings of the head. He says Uchida went to Tientsin recently (wch. is quite true) & prob. had a talk with Yüan Shihkai on the question of her successor. Yüan, he says, betrayed the Emperor at the time of the coup d'etat in 1898, and would not like to see him mount the throne. His conclusion from all this is that we ought to consult together abt. the course wch. the Powers ought to adopt when she dies.

Mumm I must say thought there was not much in all this, & agreed with me that it was not desirable to discuss these questions. I replied that I thought the best plan was to make no arrangements until the event happened, & if possible to let the Chinese settle their affairs in their own way.

In 1900 when some of the colls: proposed to insist upon Tuan's son being removed from the line of succession I said that it was not desirable to interfere in these questions, & I have never been told that H.M.G. disapproved my language.

I have made inquiries about the E-D's health, & have no reason to believe that it is other than normal. She will be 71 this Novr., but the Chinese are a long-lived people, & she looks young for her age.

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Junglu being dead, & nothing having been heard of his dau. [daughter] bearing a son to the Emperor's brother who married her, the scheme of wch. there was talk in the autumn of 1902 of setting up the expected grandchild of Junglu seems unlikely to come to fruition. My own preference wld. be in favour of refusing to discuss eventualities. My experience is that on such occasions as these M. Dubail is thinking of things pass[ing?] off much more quietly than speculative politicians expect.

I suppose it is true that the Russians have hopes of being able to beat Japan to her knees, & of settling terms of peace without the intervention of other Powers. But it can hardly be that they will be allowed to dispose of the future of China, wch. is what is at stake in this war, entirely acc. to their wishes & convenience.

A Chinese newspaper the other day rather aptly compared the position of China between Russia & Japan to that of a bride living with two mothers-in-law. In this country she is generally little better than a slave, even with only one to order her abt.

y.v.f.

42. Satow to Campbell

16/6/04

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for your letter of May 6 & copy of Carl Meyer's of 29 April. He seems almost to suggest that it is the want of support fr. H.M.G. that at that time drove N. Rlwy Bonds down to 85. But what is it then that has driven them up again to 95. I observe that he says "there is very limited investing public in this country for Chinese Rlwys". That is what I have always maintained is the real reason, & not the want of support fr. the Br. Govt.

I am afraid there is not much hope of the Huangpu Conservancy. The China Association at S'hai having come to the conclusion that there wld. not be a Br. majority on the Board, wish to throw it over. I shld. like to ask them what guarantee they think there is for the Chinese carrying out the new scheme, but they wld. retort on me that they look to H.M.G. to compel them. I am told it is not the first time that Shanghai has gone in hotly for some scheme wch. they have afterwards abandoned with equal zeal.

In 1900 we listened to their clamour for a protecting force being landed, when there was no danger, & we have seen the result.

I have studied the history of the Shanghai Land Regns. & find that they have not in all these years changed either their skin or its spots.

I greatly fear that you will not induce Paris to give instructions to Dubail to join us in insisting on the execution of the Protocol scheme, & that we shall have to try our hands at amending these new proposals. Both Mumm & I are sick of weaving capes[?] of sand, & we shall not embark on the enterprise with either enthusiasm or hopes of success.

I trust the way in wch. I gave notice of the intended advance to Lhasa will be thought sufficient. It seemed better in my judgment to do it by word of mouth. I had rather shrunk fr. having to initiate a conversation abt. Tibet, but I was agreeably surprised at the calm & matter-of-course way in wch. Nat'ung took it.¹

The Transvaal Emigration is going to give a lot of trouble I fear, & I have written a few lines to Villiers to prepare. There is no use in crying over spilt milk, but I cld. say a great deal on that aspect of the matter.

P.S. With regard to the indemnity, every one but Lessar has accepted again the Belgian proposal. I am convinced that Lessar has instructions to accept, but he refuses to carry them out. It is the old Russian game, of preferring a tête-à-tête to a conversation [in] wch. others have the same right to be heard.

43. Satow to Lansdowne

30.6.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I have done my best to help my Portuguese colleague, but it is not an easy thing to do. There seems to be a sort of feeling on the part of the Chinese Govt. that Portugal is a Power that need not br taken into acct., & I found 2 years ago that my efforts on his behalf were not recd. very amicably. [José Azevedo] Castello Branco is a very good fellow, well-read and plays a remarkably good hand at bridge, but he fell out with our Fr. & Germ. colls. who did all they could to frustrate his negotiations in 1902 & to prejudice the Chinese agst. him. I think he had no particular desire for my assistance, & has told me nothing abt. the course of his negotiations.

Shêng on the other hand is a troublesome person to deal with, and a keen hand at a diplomatic bargain. The frequent occasions on wch. I have had to intervene on behalf of Sir Jas. Mackay in 1902, & of the Peking Syndicate and B & C Corpn. have no doubt annoyed him. The people he really likes are the Belgians who fill his pockets for him.

¹ See diary for June 15, 1904. (Ruxton, Volume 2, p. 74)

44. Satow to Lansdowne

30.6.04

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne.

The Indian Govt. have repeated to me a teleg. sent to Col. Younghusband on the 26th in wch. they convey to him their ideas as to the terms to be demanded fr. the Tibetans.

I confess this teleg. has surprised me considerably, especially the proposals to demand fr. both Tibet & China the recognition of exclusive Indian political influence, & fr. China that she will not enter into agreements abt. Tibet with any Foreign Power without the previous consent of I.R.[?] This practically amounts to demanding a British protectorate over Tibet, especially when it is coupled with the condition that no arms may be manufactured or imported in Tibet without British permission. I think it will be practically impossible to obtain the consent of China, & that there will be a great outcry if such terms are imposed.

What however seems to me, if I may venture to say so, the most unjust of all these proposals is that of exacting an indemnity fr. the Chinese Govt., or a portion of an indemnity, to be calculated at so much a month fr. the date of the attack on the mission at Gyantse on May 4th. I suppose the ground for this is the alleged neglect of the Chinese official to inform Col. Younghusband that the attack was coming off. I see that it is reported in a teleg. of May 6 fr. the Indian Govt. that Younghusband hopes the Chinese Govt. may be held to account for the failure not only to prevent attack, but even to give warning. I do not observe that this suggestion was ever adopted by H.M.G. & I have never been instructed to make a complaint on this head. The only communication I have been told to make to the Chinese Govt. was of the intention to proceed to Lhasa if negotiators did not appear at Gyantse by a given date. Surely the Chinese wld. be entitled to protest agst. such a demand being sprung upon them now.

The Indian Govt. fr. the beginning have maintained that Chinese authority over Tibet was a polite fiction. It is quite clear that the Chinese Resident at Lhasa [the Amban] was unable to exercise any authority. Much less wld. an inferior officer at Gyantse have been able to prevent the attack.

India is at war, not with China, but with Tibet. Since the former was told months ago that an advance to Gyantse was ordered, & her request that troops might not be sent into the interior was refused, she has accepted the situation, & certainly has done nothing of wch. we have any ground for complaining. The only thing we can say agst. them is that they are unable to control their unruly vassal, but we knew that before a single soldier crossed the

border.

Surely there is something to be said for the Tibetans even. We were practically at war with them fr. the day of the fight at Guru, and at the very moment when they attacked our camp at Gyantse we were attacking them on the Karola [Pass]. Let us demand the payment of our military expenses, but the date chosen for reckoning them from seems to me rather an unfortunate one.

I hope you will pardon the tone of this letter if it seems to go beyond what is fitting in the way of criticism on the proposals of the Indian Govt.

45. Satow to F.A. Campbell

25.6.04

My dear Campbell,

In your letter of 6 April you asked me abt. the dealings of Mr. [Henry] Bush with respect to coal at Newchwang. This is what Fulford writes (extract fr. letter of June).

Bush was also engaged in the sale of cattle to the Russians, but I have heard that this did not turn out quite so profitably.

You asked me also if I had seen anything of Major [W.S.] Nathan [Manager, Chinese Engineering & Mining Co.], & what I think of him. I have seen him several times, both about the coalminers and abt. labourers for the Transvaal. He is undoubtedly clever, but for all that has not been able to come to a satisfactory arrangement with Yüan Shihkai. He has tried to induce me to speak to the Foreign Board on behalf of Chang-yi, but I have declined to interfere. I fancy that I have written abt. this in a desp. I still remain of the opinion that [Herbert] Hoover behaved like a swindler, & that Chang-yi had no authority to sell the property. I have maintained to Nathan as to Yüan Shihkai that the only way to settle the dispute is to go on with the action already commenced in London. It is only Jews like Edmund Davis [1861-1939] and a lot of Belgians like [Colonel] Th[u]ys who are interested; no respectable English capitalists are concerned in the affair.

Nathan wants to make money out of the Chinese labourers for the Transvaal, & I think he & Perry are hand and glove. It was a great mistake to allow Perry to come out here & begin recruiting while the negotiations in London were still pending. Perry is as pushful [pushing, aggressive] as if he were himself a Jew. The whole business has got into a mess, and I am besieged on all sides, by Perry, Schwabe and the administrator of Hongkong. We have recd. 2 copies of the Convention, but are quite in the dark as to the provisions of the Indian

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Emigration Act mentioned in the schedule. The Chinese having asked me for the schedule, I hastily assumed, hastily I admit, that it was the schedule attached to the draft convention of April 15 wch. had been sent to me, & furnished it to them officially. Now I must give them the real one, attached to the Convention, wch. they will be unable to understand. The African Dept. has not given us all the information they might have done, & it seems to me regrettable that the matter was left so much in their hands.

For all that goes wrong I blame the inventors of the telegraph, wch. is a most pestilent contrivance.

y.s.

46. Satow to Sanderson

1.7.04

Secret

My dear Sanderson,

I enclose my account for SS. during the past half year. If you find my calculations are correct, please be so kind as to have the amount paid to my acct. with Parr's Bank Ltd 77 Lombard Street.

y.s.

	\$
January 6	450
Feb. 8	450
Mar. 3	450
Apr. 6	450
May 10	450

exchange for December quarter was at the rate of 1/9; for March Quarter was 1/11

This works out to £118.2.6 for the first three months and to £86.5.0 for the other two.

The reason for taking these rates is that I drew from the accountant at the end of the December Qr. £500 minus income tax, and at the end of the March Qr. the same sum, at the respective official rates. G. was paid out of the dollars so provided.

Jany. 18	£75
April 30	<u>75</u>
	150

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add 204.7.6
total £ 354.7.6

Note. [Larsen? See letter no. 48 below]. is away travelling in Mongolia & has therefore not recd. his allowance for June.

47. Satow to F.A. Campbell

7 July 1904

My dear Campbell,

Wld. there be any objection to my being supplied fr. time to time with the confidential memos. that are drawn up for the use of the F.O. on the various questions in wch. this Leg[atio]n is interested. For instance, Tibet. I do not know whether there are any others.

During the last 2 or 3 years there has been an immense accumulation of papers on opium, & I shld. like to suggest their being made into a separate section of print. I believe they come in China Trade at present, but it is really a question by itself.

Chinese railways is almost a big enough question to have a section to itself.

Pray consider whether anything can be done in this way, for the classification of documents greatly concerns one's official happiness.

E.S.

48. Satow to F.A. Campbell

12.7.04

My dear Campbell,

Regarding my mention of the Swedish missionary Larsen in my private letter to Ld. Lansdowne of 24 March, & the observations contained in your letter of May 20 – you observe that he cld. hardly be made a Consul or attached to the Legation (in which I quite agree), and you ask whether the Bible Society wld. take him back when we had done with him.

I have consulted Wingate, whose idea it originally was that we shld. employ Larsen. He says he thinks the B. Socy. wld. probably not take him back afterwards, & that he fancies L. wld. not take service with us unless he were sure of the future.

As I cannot guarantee that he wld. turn out a useful man, I am not inclined to advise his being taken on as a permanency. The utmost I wld. propose wld. be to employ him on S.S.

for a couple of years, wch. wld. enable us to test his capacity for obtaining correct information. I think he shld. be paid in just the same way as other men who furnish me with information. He is travelling in Mongolia at the present moment, & I do not know when he will be back. But I will not make any proposals to him until I hear further from you.

49. Satow to Lansdowne

18.7.04

Dr. Ld. L.

I was not well eno' to write my usual letter by the last bag, having been upset by the heat.

There is not very much to say abt. the genl. situation. With the exception of the disturbances in Kwangsi, the country is perfectly quiet, & the govt. is maintaining a strict neutrality. Lessar addresses to them fr. time to time comminatory notes [i.e. denouncing and threatening punishment] abt. the Hunghutze brigands in Manchuria & the export of contraband of war, but they do not seem to take this as serious, for they rely on the Japse. prosecuting the war with success. As to the "Yellow Peril", I do not think the Chinese will be much inclined to put themselves entirely in the hands of a triumphant Japan, unless it be for the purpose of getting her aid agst. aggressive European Powers. How far Japan will lend herself to such a policy will depend upon the European Powers themselves. Already I see the German newspaper at Sh'ai, wch. is ably conducted, suggesting that Germany ought to recognize the justice of the cry "China for the Chinese", & its endeavour to so behave in Shantung as to disarm the suspicious as to her ulterior motives wch. are industriously disseminated by her enemies.

It is perh. not the policy of Berlin. Fr. Sh'ai I hear fr. Hipplesley that the Germ. Govt. declines to begin negotiations for a commercial treaty until the final contract for the Tientsin-Shantung railway is arranged to their satisfaction.

Dubail has it that Mumm not long ago told the Foreign Board [Wai Wu Pu] that Germany wld. demand in Shantung the equivalent of whatever Russia ultimately obtains in Manchuria. But that is only Dubail's acct. of the matter, & it sounds more like putting in Mumm's mouth a definition of what everyone believes to be German policy. I do not think it wld. be at all necessary for Mumm to make any such clumsy declaration.

I heard fr. my friend Rockhill at Washington, who is Mr. Hay's adviser on Chinese matters that "we think the mission to Tibet a most unfortunate step wch. will inevitably result in impairing Chinese prestige, control & sovereignty over what we all hold to be an integral

part of the Chinese Empire, and may be later on used by some other Power as a valid precedent for territorial acquisition in China. Then again we think the reasons given for this 'war with Tibet' quite insufficient, the interests of trade unimportant & the danger fr. Russia, in that quarter at least, too small to justify the means adopted by the Indian Govt."

In replying to him I have tried to make it clear that Chinese authority in Tibet was scarcely greater than what it was formerly in Corea, & that it was impossible to disregard the Russian intrigues carried on thro' Dorjjeff.¹

Rockhill has a personal interest in Tibet, being one of the few Europeans who have a scholar's knowledge of the language, and having travelled in the eastern part of the country. He is almost certain of the apptmt. to Peking if Mr. Roosevelt is re-elected.²

50. Satow to Lansdowne

19.7.04

Dr. Ld. L.,

I have had Professor [Jeremiah Whipple] Jenks, of the American Commission for the reform of the currency in China, staying with me in the country for a couple of days³, & we have talked a good deal abt. his plans. Since Feby. he has been travelling thro' the country & interviewing the principal governors, viceroys & business people, & has also discussed his plans with the leading foreign bankers & merchants.

His idea is to start at once with a gold standard, instead of beginning with a uniform silver currency, wch. was the procedure preferred by the London Commission. A loan of £4,000,000 or thereabouts wld. be required, but the profit to the Chinese Govt. wld. he calculates, be quite 20 per cent, independently of the enormous benefit to the country.

He is now engaged in trying to convert the Chinese Govt. & holding daily conferences with a commission of Chinese officials.

In his opinion, wch. I share with him, the management must be placed in competent

1 In the summers of 1900 and 1901 Agvan Dorjiev (1853-1938) led embassies from the Dalai Lama to Russia expressing official greetings. British perceptions of his activities eventually led to the British invasion of Tibet by Colonel Younghusband in 1904. (See Helen Hundley, 'Tibet's part in the "Great Game"', *History Today*, Volume 43, October 1993, pp. 45-50.)

² On William Woodville Rockhill (1854-1914) see Satow's diary (Ruxton, 2006, Volume 2, p. 185 footnote) and the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, April 1915, for a detailed obituary by Alfred E. Hippley.

³ See diary for July 16, 1904. (Ruxton, Volume 2, pp. 80-81)

foreign hands, much as the Maritime Customs are controlled by Sir Robt. Hart.

I said that the U.S. having taken the lead in this matter, at the instance of the Chinese Govt. it appeared reasonable that the Director-general of currency, or whatever he is called, must be an American, but that looking to the magnitude of British financial & commercial interests in China, we shld. prob. expect to have a share in carrying out the work.

To this he assented, & said that the establishment of an Imperial Bank of China wld. be an indispensable part of the scheme, & at the head of this he wld. like to see an Englishman. I told him [Charles Stewart] Addis of the Hgkg & Sh'ai Bank wld. prob. be our candidate. He replied that he had read something by Addis on banking questions wch. convinced him of his great ability. He wld. perh. propose a Russian for the management of the Hankow branch and a Japanese for Shanghai, if he cld. get the right men. Two other departments wld. be the mint and accountancy. The latter might be directed by a Frenchman & a place wld. be left for a German. Lastly there ought to be a Dept. of Mines to turn to account the deposits of gold and silver wch. are known to exist.

International jealousies being thus provided agst. there remained the question whether China shld. be pressed to start at once or wait for the end of the war.

It seemed to us both that the sooner a beginning was made, the better. For one thing the machinery for the new Tientsin mint is on its way out, and if the Chinese once start on a silver basis, it will cost them a great deal more to change it into gold than if they adopt gold from the first.

Secondly, if the war terminates decisively in favour of either of the belligerents, that Power will be able to exercise sufficient influence to upset any scheme of an international character. If the Russians win, they will try to prevent any rehabilitation of Chinese finance, except thro' the agency of the Russo-Chinese Bank. If it is Japan that triumphs, she will press for the adoption of a scheme of hers already submitted to China a year ago, and work in her own exclusive interest.

These reasons seem to incline the balance on favour of immediate action.

The real difficulty will be to persuade the Chinese that they will not be able to work the scheme by themselves, as they will be apt to fancy. He will have the official support of the American Minister in urging them to place its working in foreign hands.

I think it might be useful if I were instructed to urge the Chinese Govt. in this sense whenever opportunity offers.

51. Satow to Eric Barrington

27.7.04

My dear Barrington,

You were prob. as much surprised to receive my teleg. of yesterday abt. Phipps as I was on the 23rd to hear fr. him that on arriving at S'hai he found it necessary to ask for sick leave on acct. of his eyes.

I had been calculating on his arrival enabling me to give a month's leave to [George Jardine] Kidston, who has been continuously at work since November. Now, I do not know when it will be possible for him to get away. In December he will have been two years in Peking, wch. is quite long enough for any junior secretary to stay in this dull place, where the work is as hard & continuous as at the very busiest port, & relaxation practically nil.

I hope that you will have already started a man on his way hither, & that a junior secretary will be sent out early in the year. This is a place where one can make no use of a man unless he is inclined to be industrious. It is not only corresp'ce with the F.O., but we have all the Consulates, India & Hongkong constantly telegraphing to us, wch. is work that does not show. I have been very fortunate in my diplomatic staff and am grateful to you for sending me of your best. Pray don't destroy that sentiment.

y.s.

52. Satow to Lansdowne

28.7.04

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

Fr. all the information that reaches me it appears that Gen. [Aleksei Nikolaevich] Kuropatkin is in immediate danger of being surrounded, & that a large portion of his army will be captured. The Russians are said to have believed that the Fourth Army had not left Japan, where they supposed it to be held in reserve for an attack on Vladivostok. It had however been landed quietly at Takushan a few weeks ago under Marshal Nozu.¹

If Kuropatkin's army is disposed of & Port Arthur captured, I imagine the Japse. will move on Harbin, & if they succeed in that Vladivostok ought also to fall into their hands. This wld. give them a pawn in the shape of Russian territory wch. is necessary for them in order to obtain satisfactory terms. They wld. prob. demand the rescission of all Conventions

¹ Satow received this information from George Ernest Morrison on July 26, 1904. (Diary, Ruxton, Volume 2, p. 82). Marshal Michitsura Nozu (1841-1908) was born in Kagoshima. He commanded the First Army in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Fourth Army in the Russo-Japanese War.

& Treaties betw. Russia & China regarding Manchuria & the Chinese Eastern Rlwy., including the secret Treaty [Cassini Convention] said to have been concluded by Li [Hung-chang] at Moscow in 1896 providing for an alliance between Russia & China agst. Japan. It is said that Lessar has more than once quoted this document to Prince Ch'ing, but the Chinese say they have no copy of it. Japan no doubt wld. in addition demand a war indemnity as the price of Vladivostok.

If she gets that ought she not to be contented? Even then she wld. be far too powerful in the Far East, & it would be to the interest of all the Powers to mediate.

I suppose that by the terms of our lease we shall have to give up Wei hai wei on the Russians agreeing to the rescission of their lease of Port Arthur, stipulating that no other Power shall take it. And a general agreement among the Powers to respect the "independence & integrity" of China seems a sine quâ non to secure us agst. Germany stepping into our shoes. I shld. like to see a stipulation that China shld. not make any further rlwy. agreements by wch. she hands over the control of the main lines of communication to foreign governments or syndicates.

53. Satow to F.A. Campbell

28.7.04

My dear Campbell,

De Gaiffier, the new Belgian Minr. said to me yesterday that he believed pour-parlers were going on betw. the B. & C. Corporation & the Belgian Société d'Etudes for the construction of the Tientsin-Paotingfu line, & that he wanted to renew the conversation he had last year with Townley as to a compromise by wch. each party shld. build one-half. I said that I had heard nothing on the subject, but that I shld. always oppose to the best of my ability the grant of r[ai]lw[a]y concessions by wch. the control was handed over to foreign companies. He said that such a condition was necessary, as without it the money cld. not be raised. Personally I do not see the advantage of China having her railways constructed on such terms, especially as we [i.e. Britain] have no money to spend on rlwys. in this country, while our rivals have plenty. The Fr[ench] have actually been offering large sums for the construction of the Szechuen-Hankow rlwy. while we cld. not get a penny, even if we had a concession in our pockets. There is a Frenchman named Chazalon up here ¹ just now, bent

¹ Satow learned this from Edward Guy Hillier of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (Diary, July 27 and 28, 1904).

on obtaining some kind of concession, who is financed by the Société Générale, & seems to have the command of unlimited cash. I have not yet been able to find out what he is after.

You will have seen that a Belgian & 2 other R.C. missionaries have been murdered in Hupeh, not far fr. a place called Shih-nan. At the Foreign Board I was shown a teleg. fr. Chang Chih-tung in wch. the outrage was ascribed to Protestant converts. But Playfair was told by the Customs Taotai at Hankow that the murderers were said to be connected with a secret society. A day or two after I got a letter from Goffe at Ichang, enclosing one fr. Montague Beauchamp of the C.I.M. [China Inland Mission] dated June 27. He has been recently at Shihnan, & writes that the R.C. Bishop (the man subsequently murdered) had denounced to the local magistrates as dangerous characters four men who had placed themselves under Beauchamp for instruction. Also one of the C.I.M. colporteurs had been beaten within an inch of his life in the presence of 7 priests by some R.C. converts. He reports other outrages on Protestant Chinese by R.C. converts in that neighbourhood. It seems highly probable that the murder of the missionaries is the outcome of the events narrated by Beauchamp. I know the latter very well; he is a gentleman & entirely trustworthy.

I said to Natung that I hoped China wld. not give either territory, or rlwy. or mining concessions as compensation, but confine herself to punishing the responsible individuals, whether officials or common people. He said the situation was diff. fr. [different from] what it was a few years ago (with an allusion no doubt to Kiaochow), & that the Fr[ench] Minister's note asking for redress was couched in very moderate terms.

Gaiffier said that Belgian Missionaries are under Fr. protection, & that he had very little to say in the matter.

I am sending a desp. enclosing copy of the joint note inviting the Chinese Govt. to sign the bonds presented to them by the Commission of Bankers, & offering to be contented with receiving silver taels up to 1940 instead of the gold taels of the protocol, sub. [subject] to interest on the monthly differences & payment of the accumulated arrears after 1940. I am not very sanguine ab[ou]t the result. Natung wants the Powers to forgive them the interest on these differences, & I think will answer the Note by a proposal to that effect.

As you know, Dubail & I are authorized to consent, provided our govts. are not placed in a less advantageous position than the others.

The fact is, the Powers who refused to have the indemnity stated in sterling are to blame. Pounds sterling would have been perfectly clear. Instead of that they insisted each on

having bonds in their own currency. You will remember that H.M.G. refused to agree to francs, even if the rest were willing. The protocol suffered in explicitness in consequence. We quite understood what we meant. The Chinese prob. did not. As far as I know the only occasion on wch. it was verbally explained to them that the in[dem]nity wld. form a gold debt was at a meeting betw. the indemnity committee, & a Chinese committee consisting of Li Hung-chang, Hsü Shou-fêng & Natung. Of these the first two are dead. There was no further meeting at wch. the subject was mentioned. We sent the text of the Protocol to Li & Prince Ch'ing, & they accepted it without more ado. Some consideration the Chinese are entitled to certainly, for I am told that the French of the protocol is lacking in clearness. These are the sort of arguments I shld. use if the question comes up before a meeting of colls:

54. Satow to Lansdowne

Aug. 11. 04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I am much obliged for your letter of 25 June. That you shld. be able to find time to write to me at all excites my wonder, & I do not look for it, tho' I value your hints as to the line I shld. take very highly.

Yesterday I had an opportunity of speaking to Prince Ch'ing himself abt. Tibet, & impressed on him the necessity of the Amban trying to induce the Dalai Lama to come to an understanding with Col. Younghusband. The Prince said it was certainly the desire of the Chinese Govt. that the Amban shld. exert himself in that sense, & expressed surprise that no reply had come to the teleg. I forwarded to him fr. the Foreign Board thro' the Indian Govt. on July 27.

Yesterday morning at their request I sent off another teleg. to the Amban, & as perh. India is not particularly anxious to have him mix himself up in the negotiations, I telegd. to Simla [India] today that the Prince was surprised to get no ans. [answer], & added at the end that I was repeating my teleg. to you. It is possible that Col. Younghusband thinks it better politics to work thro' his Bhutanese friend the Tongsa Penlop [honorary governor of Bhutan]. My own view is that as we are not going to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet our best plan is to strengthen the position of the Amban. As far as the Chinese Govt. are concerned, they seem to me to have acted a friendly part to us in the whole business, & it wld. be a pity I think to demand an indemnity fr. them, whatever we may impose on the

Tibetans.

I had some conversation with the Prince abt. the way in wch. the war is going. He does not seem to hear much fr. the Jap[ane]se, & in fact I think he has no other source of information than Reuter's telegs., wch. are full of stories coming from the Russian side of huge slaughter of Japse. I conclude fr. this that there are no confidential relations betw. China & Japan. Again the Chinese Govt. have just abolished the camphor monopoly established in Fuhkien 2 yrs. ago at the instance of the Japse. & the latter are greatly vexed. These things are perh. only slight indications, but they seem to confirm the idea that even if the Japse. get the best of the war, China will not easily fall under their control.

The Prince was anxious to know what I thought of the prob. development of events. I said that up to the present there were no signs of the tide turning in favour of the Russians. It was reported that when the Japse. had taken Port Arthur & driven the Russians N[orth] of Mukden they wld. sit down to rest & not renew the campaign till next spring. I did not see how they cld. afford to do that. Supposing them to be successful all along the line, they wld. merely have recovered what was Chinese territory, & that wld. not induce Russia to make peace. It seemed to me therefore that the Japse. meant to go on till they got to Harbin, & then try to take Vladivostok. Then they wld. have some Russian territory in their hands, & Russia might be willing to come to terms in order to recover it.

[Edwin H.] Conger in talking abt. the future today said that whatever the result of the war, the neutral powers will be obliged to act together in order to prevent the victor fr. disposing of China at will. The U.S. wld. certainly take a strong line, & England wld. have her hands much freer than during the Boer war. France too he thought wld. have an interest in deciding on the future of China, & if Russia were beaten wld. have to act for herself. He came to the conclusion therefore that after the war, no power wld. be able to dominate in China as Russia had done for some years past.

I encouraged Prince Ch'ing to expect that when peace comes to be made China will be allowed to assert the right of having a voice in the settlement of Far Eastern Affairs, in wch. her own destiny is involved.

Her position however will be a peculiar one, as she has been unable to take part in a war that is practically for the defence of her own territory.

The Japse. here are very sanguine [confident] abt. being able to take Port Arthur, & pooh-pooh the Russian stories of the immense slaughter of the attacking force.

55. Satow to F.A. Campbell

11.8.04

My dear Campbell,

I hope the line I have taken abt. the proposal to sign separate contracts for the German & English portions of the Chinkiang rlwy. will be approved. Goltz, the German Secy. of Legation, to whom I told what ans. [answer] I had recd. fr. the Chinese, replied that in his opinion nothing more could be done until the survey of our portion was concluded, & that then a joint agreement shld. be negotiated. Mumm is away at the seaside, & I do not know what he thinks. I am sending you an interesting report on the progress of the rlwy. survey fr. the man in charge. It is not easy to get information fr. the B. & C. Corpn. They are very fond of appealing for help, after leaving one in the dark for months abt. their negotiations, & when help has been given, never tell us the result.

I have written you a long story abt. the Mixed Court [in Shanghai], wch. I hope will convince you that there is nothing to be done but let the *modus vivendi* continue. The China Association is run by a small knot of men, whose sole idea is to wave the British flag in the faces of other nations & to make good their claim to have the Yangtze valley recognized as the exclusively British sphere.

I have had a hard tussle agst. Japse. influence over the trade mark regulations, but believe I have succeeded in securing all the amendments that were of importance. The owners of trademarks are now regretting that they ever agitated for registration, as they have now discovered that it has to be paid for. So like Shanghai people. They cry for the moon, believing it to be made of green cheese, & when you have taken an infinity of trouble to secure the object of their desires, they are disappointed to find it is a mass of volcanic scoriae¹ & pebbles. The Hwangpoo Conservancy is another instance.

In writing my desp. abt. the rlwy. indemnity I have been greatly assisted by [E.G.] Hillier. I hope it will be approved. If not I shall abandon my rôle of amateur financier, for wch. I was not educated, in despair.

56. Satow to Admiral Noel

16.8.04

My dear Noel,

I am sure you must be glad to be back at W.H.W., & hope that the injury wch.

¹ Scoriae: in geology, porous fragments of dark lava resembling cinders.

newspapers report to have happened to the Leviathan was not serious. Up to the present I have not heard any explanation of the reasons that led to H.M.G. instructing you to go away.

This affair of the [Russian destroyer] Reshitelni at Chefoo seems likely to give much food for discussion. Here every one condemns the action of the Japanese destroyers, & the statement put in circulation by the Japse. Govt. does not to my mind improve their case. There is too much suggestio falsi [suggestion of something which is false] abt it. The case of the Wachusett & Florida at Bahia [port in Brazil] in 1864 is exactly a parallel, in all its details.¹ In Calvo there is a very full account of the occurrence.

The German Legation here is going abt. asking colls: whether it is true that we are negotiating with China for the exchange of Chusan agst. W.H.W. I have said in reply to questions that I know nothing of it. Fr. what previous Admirals have said to me abt. Chusan, I imagine it to be by no means a desirable station for ships, subject to fogs & pervaded by currents & fierce tides. Nothing cld. be an equivalent for W.H.W. I wonder what your view is as to arming it; whether you hold with Ad. Bridge or Ad. Seymour.

I sincerely hope you may be able to come here sometime in September, for I shld. greatly like to have a talk with you. At the present moment it does not seem possible for either of us to move far. Perh. we might meet at Tientsin. That wld. be a saving of three days to you, & I shld. be able to keep in touch with F.O. & India by the telegraph.

I informed my Russ. coll: of the wreck of the destroyer off Shantung & the internment of the crew; & offered to procure any particulars for him. He seemed only to desire details abt. the naval battle, but I had none to give him.

Is there any truth in the report of the “Kasuga” having been sent to the bottom by the “Cesarewitch”, & have you heard what became of the rest of the Port Arthur squadron. I suppose MacDonald keeps you informed. Here we are dependent on Reuter, the Ostasiatische Lloyd & bulletins issued by the Japse. Legn. Scarcely anything has leaked out fr. that side abt. the operations agst. P.A., & the Russians keep everything to themselves but the slaughter of the assaulting forces, wch. seems usually to be 10,000 at a time. If that were true, there would not be much of Nogi’s army left.

¹ The Confederate cruiser *Florida* steamed into Bahia port, Brazil on October 4, 1864 to obtain coal and supplies. The US Consul protested but was told that Brazil recognized the Confederate States as legal belligerents entitled to humanitarian assistance under international law. The USS *Wachusett* was also anchored in the port. On October 7, 1864 the *Wachusett* struck the *Florida* which eventually surrendered and was towed out under fire from the forts of Bahia.

(Summarised from <http://home.ozconnect.net/tfoen/florida.html> , accessed August 30, 2006).

y.s.

P.S. I am afraid I cannot get the Chinese to agree to our having gunnery practice on the lakes, but I see no difficulty in maintaining our right to send ships in, for the protection of commerce.

E.S.

57. Satow to Lansdowne

25.8.04

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

I think the reports furnished by M. O'Brien Butler regarding the seizure of the Reshitelni at Chefoo, wch. I am transmitting, will show that the explanation furnished by the Japse. Govt. is not altogether veracious. This does not cause surprise when it is remembered that they were not quite truthful in their statements abt. the sinking of the "Kowshing" in 1894.

The French, German, Austrian, & Belgian Legations of course take the Russian side. But my American coll: [Conger] & I both feel that the incident is unfortunate for Japan, & this sentiment is shared by most English people in Peking. Even a Japanese newspaper corresp[onden]t who often comes to see me [Koizumi of the Kokumin Shinbun] said to me that he thought the explanation put ford. by his govt. was wanting in candour.¹

The proceedings of the Japse. in connexion with the camphor monopoly established in Fuhkien at their suggestion, on wch. I am reporting by this mail, do not create a favourable impression, and I am afraid there will be trouble yet about this matter.

Today we hear that the Russn. Govt. has consented to have the "Askold" and "Grosvoiv" dismantled at Shanghai. It is alleged that the Japse. at the beginning demanded this as an alternative to their being ordered to leave within 24 hrs. The Chinese neutrality rules do not provide for disarmament of refugee war-vessels, & the arrangement seems one-sided, as these vessels must have surrendered for want of ammunition if they had met a Japanese man of war in the open sea. The difficulty is that Japan consented to the disarmament of the "Mandjour", as the Chinese rules do not, as ours do, provide for the case of a belligerent

¹ Satow was visited by Koizumi on August 17, 1904. "Borrowing his phrase, I said it was a pity to hurt the general sentiment for the sake of a miserable destroyer, and being pressed I said the best thing was for Japan to do was to restore the destroyer [Reshitelni] and censure the officer, but of course as representing the ally of Japan I had to be very careful abt. giving an opinion." (Diary, Ruxton, 2006, Volume 2, p. 94).

ship of war that happens to be in harbour when war breaks out.

The weakness of the Chinese is deplorable. Whenever a difficulty arises owing to a conflict betw. the claims of the two Powers, they think it is sufficient to disclaim all responsibility and say “settle it among yourselves”.

As to Chefoo, there is no doubt that the Russians erected a wireless telegraphy station on the roof of their consulate for communication with Port Arthur, & the allegation made on their behalf that they never could get the instrument to work does not seem to improve their case.

58. Satow to Lansdowne

8 Sept. 04

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

In my letter of July 19 [see no. 50 above] I wrote abt. Prof. Jenks & his scheme for placing the Chinese currency system on a gold basis. He stayed here rather longer than he intended, & obtained a considerable measure of success in persuading high officials of the soundness of his proposals.

He came to see me on the 26th. Aug., the day before he left, & said nothing had been decided, as the Chinese committee said they must consult the Viceroy. I gathered fr. him that if at any time they decided to adopt his plans & invited him to superintend their execution, he wld. accept the apptmt. But the thought they were hankering after a Japanese, because they can get him at a lower salary.

It seems to me that if anything is to come of Jenks' exertions it is only fair that he shld. be apptd., & I have no doubt that we shld. be able to secure our fair share of the subordinate apptmts. As we have the Customs, & the French the Post Office (under Hart), neither of us could pretend to control the currency system. I propose therefore, if I have an opportunity of speaking on the subject to Chinese officials, to back up Jenks & his scheme.

59. Satow to Lansdowne

8 Sept. 1904

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The principal topic during the past fortnight has been the “Askold” & “Grosvoï” at S’hai. The Japse. were urging the Chinese to give them short notice to repair & leave, Lessar was insisting on as long a term as possible, more than was necessary in fact. On Aug.

23 Natung came to ask my advice on this point, & showed me a Note fr. Lessar of the day before slating that 10 days were necessary. I told him that I had heard there wld. not be enough water to for the 'Askold' to get out of dock before the 27th & that the first report fr. S'hai was that the repairs wld. be finished earlier. In my opinion China had the right both to lay down the conditions on wch. she wld. admit ships of war of the belligerents into her ports and also to interpret those conditions. It was for her also to fix the date by wch. necessary repairs must be finished & the ships depart, & I told him the instructions I had sent to Warren, to transmit to the Dock Co any orders in that respect wch. the Taotai wished to give. He finally said he wld. split the difference betw. the contending parties & order the repairs to be completed by the 27th, the ships to leave on the following day. The same afternoon he wrote to Lessar & Uchida to tell them this. However, two days later orders fr. Petersburg arrived for the disarmament of the two Russian ships.

The Taotai consequently asked Pitzipios[?] (who was in charge, Warren having gone to Japan to fetch his family) to give notice to the Dock Co to cease repairs when the time limit expired, wch. he did. On the 31st Lessar came to me with a teleg. fr. the Russian Consul stating that Pitzipios had written him a private note to say that at the request of the Taotai & by my instructions he had intimated to the Dock Co. that the repairs of the "Askold" must be stopped. He said she had been disarmed, but certain repairs were necessary before she cld. safely go out of dock.

I explained that I had simply instructed the Consulate-genl. to transmit the Taotai's request, but as to the character of the repairs and whether she had been disarmed or not I knew nothing & was not concerned to inquire. China had laid down her own neutrality regulations & alone was responsible for their interpretation. We cld. not allow a British concern to stand in their way. Extraterritorial rights must give way to the paramount right of China to have her regulations respected. He tried to draw me into an argument abt. similar orders being given by the Chinese for stopping work on a Fr. or German ship in time of peace, but I refused to enter upon that subject, and finally said my instructions to Warren had been approved fr. home. With that he had to content himself.

I conjecture that the repairs were not stopped on the 27th August, for on the 4th inst. the Taotai again asked that instructions might be given to finish them in thirty six hours. What the result was I have not heard. It is pretty clear however that the Dock Co. without regard to rules, proceeded first to repair the funnels and other parts above the water line, so as to be able to assert that the necessary repairs could not be finished by the time fixed.

They were in a measure compelled to act as the Russians requested, otherwise the latter wld. have told them to look elsewhere for pay[men]t. Besides, the probability is that the sympathies of business people are rather with the Russians than with the Japse., who are disliked as commercial rivals.

A good deal of amusement has been caused by Lessar sending his interpreter to Lien Fang in the dead of night to say that two Japse. cruisers & several destroyers had arrived at Chefoo and landed 700 men in disguise, & he feared they wld. attack the Russian Consulate. Telegs. were sent off in haste, but it soon appeared that there was nothing in the story, & the Chinese had a good laugh over the nightmare wch. they supposed Lessar to have had. But one result was that the Russian wire less [sic] telegraphy station at Chefoo was dismantled.

Conger tells me that Lessar has talked to him in a very excited way abt. the Chinese having clearly thrown in their lot with the Japanese. Russia could no longer regard any portion of Chinese territory as being outside of the zone of operations. She had many old scores to settle with China, one of which related to Ili.

The Chinese are now perplexed by the question what they are to do with the 700 Russian sailors they have on their hands at Shanghai. Natung said that he was afraid to put them under the charge of Chinese military officers, who wld. treat them with either excessive rigidity or excessive laxity, and he asked my advice.

I said that failing satisfactory arrangements for interning the men in China, the only thing I cld. think of was that with the consent of Japan the Fr. Govt. might be asked to take charge of them till the termination of the war.

My reason for thinking the arrangement was feasible is that not long ago Dubail asked me whether I thought Japan wld. object to the Reshitelni's men at Chefoo being sent away in a French str. [steamer]

I hope the representations I have made to Dubail abt. the difficulties Protestant converts have in obtaining justice when the other parties to a lawsuit are Roman Catholics may do some good. If I cannot get him to cooperate with me in putting a stop to the present scandalous state of things, I am afraid I shall have to complain on each occasion to the Chinese Govt. as I have already done in a case reported by the Consul at Swatow. I am inclined to believe that in many parts of the country the R.C. bishops & clergy act in a very highhanded manner. The recent murder in Hupei prob. arose fr. the bullying behaviour of a native catechist who was accompanying Bishop Verhagen.

60. Satow to F.A. Campbell

8.9.04

My dear Campbell,

Apropos of the desp. I am sending you on the subject of the proposed tax on boiled opium at Canton, it may be useful to you to know that the idea of an opium monopoly is again being revived, the suggestion being that it shld. be undertaken by a Br. Syndicate in association with Chinese capitalists.

I think that in some such scheme might be found a solution of all our difficulties regarding this question of opium.

Just before Ld. Curzon went home Sir Robt. Hart wrote to him abt. a scheme for an opium monopoly, a principal feature of wch. was that China shld. continue to purchase fr. the Indian Govt. the quantity of opium she now takes, & that importation by private persons shld. be prohibited. Opium growing would then be restricted to Szechuen, Yünnan & Kueichow, & the produce bought up by the Govt. Sir Robt's letter must have reached Simla after the Viceroy's departure, & I have not heard the result. But within the last few days Chinese officials have again come to Guy Hillier abt. it & said that the matter is again being brought ford., & that the Empress Dowager favours it, provided, as she says, "you don't cause a rebellion". I think myself that tho' there are difficulties in the way of prohibiting the importation of opium by private persons (the Sassoons would squeal like a stuck pig), yet a workable scheme might be devised if India agrees.

I hope you will take the views I have expressed in my desp. abt. the claims of J.M. [Jardine Matheson] & Co. for a commission of 5% on the Rlwy. indemnity. If everyone connected with the getting up of that claim were to get as much on equally good grounds, there wld. be nothing left for the Administration. J.M. & Co's man hardly moved a finger.

The labour emigration convention does not work quite smoothly, for three principal reasons. (1) because on the F.O. side there was no one who knew China. (2) because Hong Kong & Weihaiwei were left out (3) because Perry was allowed to come here months before the convention was signed, & under his direction recruiting began almost at once. Perry is a pushful gentleman who is difficult to keep in order. Of course we can say that we can send people away from our own colony & the leased territories without asking China's permission, but it is surely contrary to the Spirit of the Convention to send recruiting agents into the neighbouring provinces & gather people together for embarkation at Hong Kong (wch. is what Butterfield & Swire have been doing) or at

Weihaiwei, wch. is what the Colonial Office have instructed Lockhart to negotiate with the Govr. of Shantung. Also, allow me to remind you that I have not yet recd. copies of the legislation referred to in the schedule to the Convention, tho' I telegd. that I did not possess them. There is a great deal of popular feeling agst. the emigration to S.A. [South Africa] The native press is unanimous agst. it, & the leading English paper in S'hai condemns it. The echo of opposition speeches in Parliament & of the press has been loudly heard in China. It is therefore not surprising if difficulties arise.

61. Satow to Admiral Noel

12.9.04

My dear Noel,

Many thanks for sending me the telegs. you exchanged with the Admiralty abt. what was to be done with belligerent ships seeking asylum. It is quite unfair that the victor shld. lose a ship that other wise wld. fall into her hands or blow herself up.

At the time of the Mandjour we had not by us the rules adopted by the Br. Govt. in the case of a warship happening to be in one of our ports at the outbreak of war, & every one fancied it was a new case. Of course it was not my duty to advise the Chinese what rules they shld. make, but if I had known I might perh. have dropped them a useful hint. As it was they made great fools of themselves by going out of their way to prohibit the export of contraband of war, wch. was no part of their duty.

Abt. W.H.W. I do not hear of anything being done. Interpreting our agreement in the sense wch. it clearly bears, we cannot be asked to give up as long as the Russian occupation does not come to an end with their consent. To say anything abt. it to China at the present moment wld. be to depart fr. our neutral attitude. H.M.G. cannot officially assume either that Japan will turn them out or that the end of the war will be such a defeat for Russia that she will have to abandon her ambitions in this part of the world. So the only thing H.M.G. can do is to inform inquirers that they do not expect that they will have to leave WHW as a result of present operations, vide C.O, [Colonial Office:] to Lockhart & Lord Percy in reply to a busybody in the H. of C. I always think the less said the better in reply to fishing questions.

The last I hear abt. Port Arthur is that the Japanese are making regular approaches. I daresay this is part of their game. They naturally wish to try their hand at that, just to show what they can do as sappers & miners. I wonder whether soldiers have any machines for

mining similar to what civil engineers use for driving tunnels thro' the Simplon and constructing two-penny tubes.

The Japse. give their losses in the fighting wch. ended with the capture of Liaoyang as 17939 killed & wounded. They say the Russians lost over 35,000, among them General Mischenko.

You will prob. see Lionel James.¹ He is said to have acquired an anti-Japse. bias because he was not what he would call well-treated. I am not sure that his riding off without waiting for the pass he had asked for was quite a proper thing to do, but a newspaper correspondent of course has his own professional standard of propriety, just as diplomatists have, or are said to have.

Fr. my Japanese newspaper acquaintance [Koizumi] I gather that if they succeed in taking Port Arthur they will have a try at Vladivostok. Certainly they will need something in the way of a Russian pawn in their possession in order to be able to extract terms fr. their enemy.

Reuter says the Lhasa Treaty (it is only an agreement) was signed on the 7th, but I have no official news.

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

¹ Lionel James, the *Times* special correspondent, called on Satow on September 10, 1904. (Diary, Ruxton, Volume 2, p. 106) On his activities see Peter Slattery, *Reporting the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05: Lionel James's first wireless transmissions to The Times*, Global Oriental, 2004.

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/15

Letter Book. Chinese mission. (13 September 1904 – 10 June 1905)

“Private Letters”

1. Satow to Lansdowne

Peking. 14/9/04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Sir Robt. Hart came to see me this morning, and after discussing on other matters, spoke pretty much as follows:

“Some years ago I thought of going home, & of recommending as my successor James Hart, after him [Robert] Bredon, but as both of them had retired, my choice fell on Hippley [Hippisley], & I communicated this to Sir Cl. MacDonald. Sir Cl[aude] said Hippley wld. never do. So I wrote to Bredon inviting him to come out, & he went to the Foreign Office, where he had a conversation, the result of wch. was that he came to Peking and was apptd. Deputy Inspector-General. After a while Bredon became dissatisfied at my remaining here instead of giving up to him, but I replied that I had merely promised to put his name forward when I retired. I had never made any promise as to the date of my retirement. Last Jan (1903) Townley came to me & said that the F.O. no longer supported Bredon, & that Hippley was their man. Now, I consider myself bound to the former, & that when I go I must put his name forward to the Chinese Govt. I had desired to go this year, but owing to the war feel that I cannot. I have said to the Chinese that as I shall be 70 in 1905, I should like to go then. They merely laughed, & told me I shld. live to be 90. But I am feeling that there is too much work; it is constantly growing. I have recently made arrangements for the headquarters staff to be brought back to Peking. Bredon writes to me in a rather unpleasant tone that I ought not to do this. Shanghai is a much better place, because the staff is in immediate touch with the merchants, and that it is not right to bring them back to a place where they will run the risk of being murdered over again, as they did in 1900. However, I have sent orders for every one to come here, & Bredon, as Deputy I-G [Inspector-General], must come here too.”

I thanked him for his communication, & said that I had always refrained from speaking to him on what seemed to me a very delicate subject. I had not advised the instructions of last Jan[uar]y being sent to Townley. As he said the work was becoming so enormous, could he not lighten his burden by having Hippley up here, who I understood was a very

able man.

That he said was quite true, but he could not put him over Bredon's head.

I said we must content ourselves with hoping that Bredon wld. refuse to come to Peking & go home instead. Then the way wld. be clear.

He added that he had always thought that it was a mistake to have demanded of the Chinese Govt. that the I-G. shld. always be an Englishman, as that had made it a political question. His successor wld. certainly have been an Englishman in any case. A second mistake was throwing over Bredon & putting for[war]d. Hipposy. [sic] as in the event of his retirement there wld. be two candidates, one recommended by himself, the other supported by the Br. Govt.

There the conversation ended. I do not draw fr. it the conclusion that he has any real intention of retiring. But I think it probable that Bredon has written to say that he will not come to Peking unless he is promised the succession, & that Sir Robt. wanted to make his own intentions clear in that respect. He is so much of a Chinaman that in this matter at least I shld. never build much on what he might say as to his own retirement.

As Bredon has got what he wanted in the shape of the K.C.M.G. we have no leverage left to make him go, and the only hope I may have is that he may take himself off home in preference to returning here to play second fiddle, without having any influence on the choice of the tune.

2. Satow to Lansdowne

14.9.04

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

Another subject on wch. Sir Robt. Hart spoke to me today was Weihaiwei. Had H.M.G. made up their minds what they wld. do if Port Arthur were taken by the Japse.

I referred him to Lord Percy's reply in the H. of C. [House of Commons] on the subject, & said that obviously H.M.G. must refrain fr. any further utterance on the subject wch. might appear to be based on the assumption either that the Japse. wld. be able to take Port Arthur, or that they cld. extort its retrocession to China as one of the conditions of peace.

He replied that he felt certain the Chinese wld. prefer that we shld. keep WHW, or give it back to the Japse. fr. whom we had recd. it. He was the first to mention the Chinese wishes in 1898. They were anxious we shld. ask for it, lest the Germans shld. insist on succeeding the Japse., & then claim the rest of the territory right up to the Promontory.

I told him he was mistaken in thinking we had got it fr. the Japse. They had merely handed over to us some buildings they had put up, & we had acquired it fr. the Chinese with the consent of Japan.

He rejoined that we did not go abt. the acquisition in the right way. We had ‘demanded’ instead of ‘asking for’ it.

I observed that this was perh. because Sir Claude [MacDonald] had not happened to run up agst. the same Chinese officials who had made the suggestion that we shld. ask.

What Sir Robt. meant by this conversation to convey to me no doubt was that the Chinese wld. rather we shld. keep it in the event of Russia abandoning Port Arthur, lest the Germans shld. claim it; & that if we did not feel ourselves entitled to keep it in that event, they wld. prefer our passing it over to the Japse. I told him however that we were anxious to retain it ourselves.

If therefore the Russian lease comes to an end when peace is made, the conclusion would apparently be that the Chinese, if they were approached in the right way, wld. agree to our remaining at W.H.W. I mean that the Chinese with whom Sir Robt. is in touch wld. agree. There may be, and probably are, others who wld. like to see Japan there, and there may even be some who wld. be interested in seeing Germany succeed us. The latter, if such people exist, could not be actuated by purely patriotic motives.

3. Satow to F.A. Campbell

16.9.04

My dear Campbell,

The diplomatic colony is much perplexed by the information conveyed to us by Reuter that the opinion in England has completely changed in regard to the superiority of the Japanese strategy over that of the Russians, & that Kuropatkin’s retreat fr. Liaoyang is looked upon as a greater success than his expulsion thence by Ōyama. Not only the Americans seem dismayed by this change of tone, but also the Germans rejoice with Schadenfreude.¹

The explanation I give to them all is that a certain correspt. [Lionel James] in sending a long teleg. to England allowed his opinions to be coloured by the anti-Japse. bias produced by the way in wch. all correspts. have been restricted in their movements and in the use of the telegraph. The men who in S. Africa sent home accounts not only of what happened but

¹ Schadenfreude (German) means delight in the misfortunes of others.

also of intended operations have been spoilt. & further they have not recognized that when you accompany an army into the field, you must not expect to be better fed, say than the general in command.

The fact is that Lionel James, who at the outset looked at everything thro' Japse. spectacles, was greatly vexed at the limitations imposed by the General Staff on the use of the "Times" chartered str. "Haimun", and at being kept always at a distance of 4 miles fr. the fighting line. He managed however to get into Liaoyang, and then rode away down to Newchwang without waiting for the pass he had asked for. As soon as he reached Shanhaikwan he sent off abt. 4000 words, and on reaching Peking 6000 more. Morrison tells me he contrived to get the tone of this second message moderated. [Colonel] Bower & [Colonel Charles M.] Ducat do not share L. James' opinion of the admirable success achieved by Kuropatkin.¹ They point out that the latter had a formidable position at Liaoyang, strengthened by every possible means. It was the spot where he had elected to await the Japse. & administer to them a stunning blow. In taking up his position there he had the advantage of using the railway and of retiring on his magazines. The Japse. had the disadvantage of advancing by three routes thro' a mountainous country without good roads or lateral communications, & had to carry provisions & ammunition with them. Lastly they appear to have been numerically inferior. Yet they turned Kuropatkin out, & forced him to retreat further north.

v. Claer the German military attaché who came to see me yesterday expressed much the same views. Altho' politically some Germans may wish for a Russian triumph, the military man is flattered by the way in wch. the Japse. turned to acct. the lessons they recd. fr. Genl. Meckel & other officers.

After all, what have the Japanese set out to do? To clear the Russians out of Manchuria. Did any one of their critics expect them to achieve half of what they have achieved? No. Most of us thought the Russians wld. scatter them like chaff.

Of the operations at Port Arthur we hear little or nothing. No one believes the stories of the immense slaughter among the assailing force.² On the other hand the Japse. seem to make slow progress, and to have taken recently to making regular approaches. It is Sebastopol [besieged in 1854-55 during the Crimean War] over again.

¹ Aleksei N. Kuropatkin (1848-1925) was the Russian Imperial Minister of War, 1898-1904. On February 7, 1904 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in Manchuria.

² In fact Port Arthur was heavily fortified and Japanese casualties in the long siege (July 10, 1904 – January 2, 1905) were very high.

4. Satow to F.A. Campbell

17.9.04

My dear Campbell,

With refce. to the refusal of the Portuguese Govt. to recognize Mr. Oiesen[Oriesen?], the Chinese Customs Comr. at Macao (Lappa), as Actg. Br. V-C., C.W. Campbell has sent me some confidential correspce. fr. wch. it appears that the real reason is that the HgKg. Govt. has prohibited the export of arms to Macao. No doubt Oiesen has had something to do with this prohibition. At any rate it has been part of his duty to see that arms & ammunition were not smuggled out of Macao into China. It seems that the river “pirates” on the Canton waterways & the Kwangsi rebels procured their supplies of warlike material thro’ this channel. Lello the Macao Col. Secy. is in league with the gang of smugglers. When Seaton[?] went to say goodbye to the Govr. it was suggested to him that either Barts[?] or Pacheco (who are Fr. & Ital. V-C. respectively) might act for him. These two gentlemen also belong to the gang.

The Govr., who is a new arrival, is entirely in the hands of his Col. Secy., who appears to have persuaded him to adopt the view that if the Comr. of Customs, whose official residence is Lappa but who actually lives in Macao, were recognized as Br. Acting V.C., the negotiations concerning the establisht. of the Chinese Customs in Macao wld. be prejudiced. This cannot be true, if as [the Portuguese Minister in Peking] Castello Branco informed me, the clause providing such an arrangement has been struck out of the Port[uguese] draft commercial treaty. But no doubt that is what has been represented to the Port. Govt.

It is interesting to learn that the West River piracy & the rebellion in Kwangsi have been fed in this way fr. HgKg & I hope Sir M. Nathan [Governor of Hong Kong] will remain firm in prohibiting the export to Macao.

I remember that when I was at Tangier the smuggling of arms into Morocco, wch. was a fruitful cause of tribal disturbances, was carried on fr. Gibraltar, & the Authorities there found legal difficulties in the way of putting a stop to it, because the arms were stored in hulks in the harbour, over wch. they had no control!

Oiesen, as you know, on a previous occasion had been recognized as Br. consular agent under precisely similar circs., only there was no prohibition of the export of arms. He is being brought to Peking by Sir Robt. Hart, so that the apptmt. cld. not have taken effect, but he is pleased at its having been offered to him. I hope next month to give Canton an additional Asst. who can act at Macao.

5. Satow to F.A. Campbell

22/9/04

My dear Campbell,

I wonder whether you will agree with me that the Chinese shld. not press for any alteration in the status quo at Newchwang & in Manchuria generally until peace is made. In conversing with Wu Ting-fang the other day I impressed this view on him, & I hope I have not done wrong, tho' perh. the H. of C. may think differently as to the Customs revenue.

It was Wu who gave me the idea reported in my teleg. of the 9th to India that the Chinese wld. object to the Tibet agree[men]t. At that time they had only the first dft. & were not aware of the indemnity payments & consequently the occupation of the Chumbi valley [in the Himalayas] being spread over 75 years. As I cld. not assume that Wu, who is a bit of a gossip, was speaking on behalf of his colls: at the Waiwupu, I did not give his name. He was clearly alluding to Art. 9 when he talked of it converting Tibet into a vassal state of G.B. I asked him whether the similar undertaking China had given in regard to Manchuria converted China into a vassal of Russia. The Indian view that the agreeet. "fully recognizes" the suzerainty of China seems to me extravagant, considering the wording of Art. IX. Moreover there is not a word in the agreement that in any way implies that China is now suzerain, and the word occurs nowhere in the adhesion agreement.

If the Chinese refuse altogether to sign the adhesion agreement, we shall have all we want, in spite of them, in the agreement signed by the Tibetans. Wu abused Yütai [the Chinese Resident or Amban in Lhasa] as entirely ignorant of foreign affairs and said he was as incompetent as all the other Manchus. He had noticed in Reuter that Younghusband was to leave Lhasa on 15 Septr., & I was very glad to learn fr. the telegs. that he was authorized to stay on till the middle of Octr. One of his (Wu's) suggestions was that the negotiations shld. be transferred to Peking. I replied that I did not think H.M.G. wld. consent to this, & that for my own part I had no desire to be entrusted with them.

Natung on the 14th was very reserved, but he let out that they were annoyed with Younghusband having signed without waiting. I said that as the latter had repudiated all obligation under the Convention of 1890, it was necessary that they shld. be parties. They had urged him to sign at once, so as to get the mission away, and he had therefore signed without waiting for the Amban. But there was an adhesion agreement & a provision for ratifications being exchanged in London. It was quite clear fr. his language that he had not

then recd. the text of the agreement as actually signed by Younghusband.

I think there can be no doubt that my amiable Russian & German colls: & perh. also Conger, will have suggested to the Chinese that they ought not to recognize Art. IX. Conger asked me "by the way" after the publication here, whether it was correct, & I told him that what he had seen was a draft, wch. differed in some particulars fr. the final text. My conversation with Mumm was quite friendly, & we laughed heartily over the hint[?] I gave him abt. the publication of the agreement in a newspaper so closely connected with Germany. When it was started it was commonly said to be subsidized by the German Legn. & I think this highly probable. It is too expensive a paper to have a large circulation. The Russo-Chinese organ here has been much quieter than the German, wch. has torn the agreement to pieces & used the strongest language in condemnation of our proceedings. It might without much injustice have said that we had taken a leaf out of the Russian book.

You will prob. have recd. a teleg. fr. the China Association demanding the postponement of the Trade Mark Regns. for six months. I think that is the form used in the H. of C. for proposing the rejection of a bill. Anyhow, what the merchants in Shanghai now want is that there shld. be no regulations at all. It is quite true that they are not of much use, as they only protect agst. piracy by Chinese, & of that there is little danger. But after all it was the merchants who cried out for registration, not H.M.G. who forced it on them.

6. Satow to Lansdowne

5/10/04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Younghusband's departure fr. Lhasa on Sept. 23 with the whole of the mission, wch. was evidently unexpected by the India Office & Indian Govt., has quite upset my endeavours to make the Chinese Govt. see reason. It was evidently no use to go on trying to persuade them to sign the adhesion agree[men]t, as there was no one left for the Amban [Chinese Resident in Lhasa] to sign it with. As soon as I learnt this rather disconcerting fact, I telegd. asking for fresh instructions, but they have not reached me, & as I had previously asked Prince Ch'ing for an interview in the afternoon, I had to go. After discussing several other questions, I broached Tibet, whereupon he said he had confided his views to Wu Ting fang, as appears in my official desp. on the subject, & we had a long conversation in wch. the Prince persistently evaded my efforts to bring him to the point. The explanation of his attitude seems to be this.

Up to quite recently I had confined my conversations on this subject to private talks with Natung, the very intelligent Manchu who is junior Vice-president of the Board, & they proved very satisfactory. It was he who worked the deposition of the Dalai Lama, & he constantly backed up the Amban, who is also a Manchu. When however the draft agreement (of Sept. 2) reached Peking, Wu Ting fang who is a Cantonese & really much sharper than any Manchu, got hold of it, and came to give me his view of article 9. As he is rather a windbag, I did not suspect that he had been put on to enlighten me as to the views of the Foreign Board, & I merely telegd., I think the same day, that the agreement had been signed on the 7th, but I scarcely believed it, until I heard it direct fr. India on the 12th. I had up till then supposed that the main agreement & the adhesion clause wld. be signed simultaneously. The Chinese Govt. had certainly not expected the event to occur so soon, for on the 9th & 10th they despatched those 2 interesting telegs. forbidding signature by the Amban. They curiously agree with what Wu said to me on the 9th, & confirm my idea that he was taking a hand. Then on the 14th I went to my friend Natung to find out what the Chinese Govt. thought of the Agreeet., & found they did not like it at all. I think it was on the 16th that a Chinese version of the draft appeared in a native paper said to be subsidised by the Germ. Legn. It had evidently got out from the Foreign Board, & I think this was done intentionally. Then began a series of violent articles in that & other native papers, and Yütai [the Amban] was vigorously denounced for allowing himself to be hoodwinked, and as an ignorant Manchu unfit for his post. Precisely the style of language used abt. him to me by Wu. When your teleg. of 21 Sept. reached me, with instructions to urge the Chin. Govt. to sign the adhesion agreement, I felt that I must go to the fountain-head of authority, & so asked Prince Ch'ing for an interview, wch. took place on the 23rd. Natung had dropped out and Wu was present in his stead. I telegd. what seemed on the whole satisfactory language fr. Prince Ch'ing, & three days later the instructions sent by the Board to the Amban, wch. so greatly differed from the Prince's view. It was evident that he had been got at, & that talking to him alone was insufficient. So after the receipt of your teleg. no. 142 of Sept. 29 I arranged to ask for another interview with the Prince for today [see diary], & in the meantime sent Cockburn to see Natung & Wu. He saw them on the 2nd. Fr. the former he extracted very little, but on his pointing out to Wu the discrepancy betw. the Prince's language to me and the instructions to the Amban, Wu said that as originally drafted the instructions were in accordance, but they were sent into the Grand Council, where Chü Hing-chi got hold of them and completely changed their spirit. Wu said he had

remonstrated, but without effect, but whether this is true or not I cannot tell. The Prince however was partly prepared by Wus's talk with Cockburn for what I had to say to him today, & as soon as I opened my lips on the subject interrupted me by saying that he had confided his ideas to Wu who wld. explain them, wch. he did as reported in my desp. recounting the conversation. I tried to pin the Prince down to his language of the 23rd, but he wriggled out of it quite successfully. As Younghusband had left Lhasa ten days ago, I felt it was beating the air, and I did not insist. The Prince is so weak, so good-natured, and at times so frank that I did not like to use strong language.

It appears that the choice of Tang for the mission to Tibet is Wu's suggestion. The papers say Natung was at first proposed, but declined. Then the name of another Manchu was put forward, who also refused. Then Wu himself, who made excuses, and advised that Tang, who is a clever Cantonese, speaks English perfectly & has the reputation among his countrymen of not readily surrendering to pressure, especially fr. English people, shld. be sent. I do not think he will easily get the better of Lord Curzon.

The Prince volunteered the information that first Conger, then Mumm, and after them Dubail & [Count Giovanni] Gallina were the foreign MM [Ministers] who had out pointed questions to the Foreign Board abt. the Agreement. Mumm of course prompted Conger & Gallina. Dubail required none, I imagine. Lessar seems to have observed a discreet silence, in spite of press rumours to the contrary. For it is so obvious that we have taken a leaf out of the Russian book, inserting in our agreement stipulations [similar?] to those wch. the Russians insisted on in the case of Manchuria, that to protest would have been to lay himself open to an obvious retort.

I am very sorry that I have been unable to effect anything, but the slowness of communication with Lhasa has caused me always to speak to the Chinese when it was too late. And the very day that I had my first conversation with Prince Ch'ing abt. the advisability of the Amban being instructed to sign, Younghusband was starting homewards fr. Lhasa.

7. Satow to F.A. Campbell

6.10.04

My dear Campbell,

I asked Prince Ch'ing yesterday what his reply wld. be to my Note abt. the Hwangpu Conservancy of wch. a copy was enclosed in my desp. No. 334. He said that the proviso for

reviving Annex 17 of the Protocol (International Board) in case the works were not efficiently carried out was very hard on China. However, he had referred the matter to the Viceroy of Nanking to see what he wld. say to this condition, & if he accepted the scheme, it wld. then be communicated to the other Legations.

I explained that we were entitled to a guarantee that the works wld. be properly executed, seeing that the International Board of the Protocol wld. have ensured this, & I added that my Note had been written after consultation with one of my colleagues. He at once rejoined that Conger had addressed him to the same purpose.

Mumm spoke to me a few days ago abt. a local scheme, started by the German firm of Carlowitz & Co., wch. may or may not be a good one, but the principal object of the promoters it seems to me is to obtain a considerable increase of valuable frontage for themselves, without thinking much of the interests of the port. I told him that I had been authorized fr. home to accept the Chinese proposal to undertake the Conservancy, and said that with certain safeguards I should do so. Under the circs. I was not disposed to adopt the local scheme.

Abt. a fortnight ago, after consultation with G. Jamieson I sent in a Note enclosing copy of the Peking Syndicate Railway agreement wch. has been accepted by Shêng with the exception of the clause abt. arbitrating the actual cost of the construction, wch. Shêng declines to agree to, while at the same time he is putting forward a claim of the Govr. of Shansi for a half share of the Syndicate's projected coal mines in that Province. In view of the unjustifiable demands of Shêng & his dragging out negotiations that ought to have been concluded long ago, I asked that an Imperial Edict might be forthwith issued instructing Shêng to sign. I telegd. to you my intention of doing this on 17 Sept. & as no answer came, have concluded that it was approved. Yesterday I spoke to the Prince abt. it, who said they had sent a teleg. to Shêng instructing him to come to terms with J [Jamieson]. I replied that I cld. not accept this, & must absolutely decline to let Jamieson go back to Shanghai. He was at Tientsin within easy reach of Peking. etc. etc. So after a little consultation with Wu, he said that another teleg. shld. be sent to Shêng & if he still delayed, then Wu shld. be apptd. to settle with Jamieson.

This is the only way, I am convinced, & I shld. have adopted it long ago, but for the love Jamieson himself has for bargaining with Shêng. I only hope it may be possible to hold the Prince & Jamieson to it.

You will have recd. [C.W.] Campbell's desp. reporting the proceedings of Butterfield & Swire in regard to recruiting for coolies and taking them down to Hong Kong even before the convention was signed. Both this firm & Perry have given us a good deal of trouble with their over-eagerness to start operations, & I have had to tell the latter that he must not try to hustle the East. My desp. criticising the proposed arrangements with regard to Weihaiwei went by last bag. I sent a copy to Lockhart, so that he may make any observations he likes. The Admiral [Sir Gerard Noel] is due here tomorrow, & I shall be able to learn all abt. the conditions of the merchant anchorage during bad weather.

8. Satow to Lansdowne

6.10.04

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

Sir R. Hart again spoke today abt. his impending retirement.¹ He said that when it came to pass it wld. be a question of Bredon or Hippley. The former talks of coming to Peking without his wife & daughter, & says he wants his position to be assured, by wch. said Sir Robt. significantly is meant "that he wants to have me under his orders." I said I hoped he wld. not go before the end of the war, to wch. he replied that the work no longer gave him so much satisfaction as before. He had suffered this summer from stomach trouble, and was warned by it to go while it was yet time. In Feby. he wld. be 70, and he had told the Chinese that he wld. like to go then. The colls: wanted an International Board, with their own nominees on it, wch. wld. be a disaster. I said I had heard rumours that some of them cherished this wish. (In fact, I learn that the American Legation talks of it as a foregone conclusion). He continued that his own idea was to lay the foundations of a Committee of Customs men of different nationalities, wch. wld. obviate the apptmt. of outsiders on the nomination of the Foreign MM. They would share the work among them and have a voice in making the appointments in the service. Above them wld. be the Inspector-Genl. who of course must be an Englishman.

I made no comment on this proposal, merely noting it in my own mind for your information. It may be that he was only sounding me. As I wrote last year, his feeling is that no single man cld. possibly be of sufficient calibre to carry on the work wch. he has performed unaided. I do not feel certain that he will go next Feby. He has talked in past

¹ Satow's diary entry for October 6, 1904 merely mentions that this conversation took place and refers researchers to this letter.

times to Sir C. MacD. [Claude MacDonald] with the same apparent frankness, and when he was taken at his word, retracted it entirely. He said today that years ago he gathered fr. Sir Claude that Ld. Salisbury looked with favourable eyes on the idea of an international board, but I do not know whether there is any foundation for this.

I am very cautious in what I say to him, & contented myself with expressing the hope that he wld. put off his departure as long as possible, and give me timely notice when he finally resolves to go.

I feel that his retirement will be the signal for a very troublesome contest, wch. H.M.G. can have no desire to precipitate, & for my own part I have no desire to have a hand in deciding the issue. We shall have everybody in the Dipl. Body intriguing together against us when that fatal day arrives.

9. Satow to Lord Knollys

14.10.04

Dear Lord Knollys,

I have had Admiral Noel stopping with me for a few days, and on the 8th I had an audience of the Emperor and Empress-Dowager to present him, of which an account goes home by official despatch. It was the first time I had had an opportunity of exchanging conversation with her direct, as on official occasions when the whole Diplomatic Body is present she only speaks to the Doyen. I noticed that she looked fixedly at each of us in turn, & I had the advantage of being able to see her much closer than on other occasions. She does not look her age, and has not a grey hair. Her mouth is a little drawn down on the right side, & almost looks as if she had had a slight stroke of facial paralysis. She has a soft voice, & altogether does not look like the cruel wicked woman her enemies depict her as being.¹ No doubt she is kept a good deal in the dark and many things are probably done in her name of which she is ignorant. But of course she is more likely to crush her enemies than to try conciliation with them.

You know Admiral [Sir Cyprian] Bridge is a master of the pen, while Admiral Noel is more of a fighter. In the [China] squadron they say: 'This is a man, the other is a manuscript.'

Noel & I were shipwrecked together in 1868 in the "Rattler" in Soya Bay, La Peyrouse

¹ The central thesis of Sterling Seagrave's biography *Dragon Lady, The Life and Legend of the Last Empress of China* (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1992) is that Tzu Hsi was not the monster that she was portrayed to be by Victorian biographers.

Straits and Admiral Stephenson commanded her. ¹

10. Satow to F.A. Campbell

18.10.04

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for your two letters of 1 & 9 Sept. I imagine you must have been having a very busy time of it lately with the questions arising out of Russian interference with commerce.

I have looked at my notes of a conversation with the Jew Edmund Davis (who was first introduced to me by the Duke of Abercorn ², whom I did not know either). It was on 13 May. [See diary.] He told me he wanted to get hold of the Canton-Kowloon line, in wch. Thys was ready to take $\frac{1}{3}$ interest. I told him how matters stood, & that I advocated the concession being taken away from the B. & C. Corporation & given to any other group that would construct it, but I said I was not in favour of letting in the Belgians, wch. meant of course the King.

The question of this line I may leave safely to the HgKg Govt., but I hope [Sir Matthew] Nathan the Govr. is not leagued with any of these Jew money dealers. ³ I think the rich Chinese of HgKg & perh. of Canton might put money into it, if the HgKg Govt. had the concession. In the hands of the B. & C. [British & Chinese] Corporation it will never come to much.

As to a Peking-Tongshan line, acc. to one agreement when we handed back the Northern Rlwys., all branches within 80 miles of the existing line must be constructed by the Chinese rlwy. administration, & if they cannot find the money themselves, they must come to the B. & C. Corpn. for it. There are two objections to Edmund Davis getting ; 1°. it is not really wanted, & wld. merely carry off some of the traffic that now goes round by Tientsin; 2°. he proposes an Anglo-Belgian management. No-line is better, for these two reasons.

¹ Satow's diary of the wreck of H.M.S. Rattler in Hokkaidō has been reproduced by Ian Ruxton in *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits*, Volume 5, Global Oriental 2005, pp. 503-510. On October 12, 1904 Satow gave Noel an extract from his diary. (Diary, Ruxton, Volume 2, p.120).

² James Hamilton, 2nd Duke of Abercorn (1838-1913). British nobleman and diplomat. He announced King Edward VII's accession to the throne to several countries as special envoy.

³ Nathan was in fact himself Jewish. Nathan Road in Kowloon, Hong Kong is named after him.

11. Satow to Lansdowne

20.10.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Ad. Noel paid me a visit fr. the 17th ¹ to the 12th [October], & I had an audience to present him to the Emperor & E-D. The former looked very depressed, & did not utter a word, but the E-D was very friendly & spoke a good deal. She does not look her age, & may as far as one can judge live many years yet. It is a remarkable fact that she has not chosen a new heir apparent to replace the son of Prince Tuan, who was removed fr. that position a year or two back.

We discussed the future of Wei hai wei, & I told the Ad. that there is no question of our lease terminating until the Russians voluntarily give up Port Arthur, e.g. as one of the terms of peace. He believes that the Japse. will be victors in the war, & we agreed in that case we shld. endeavour to secure a lease of Wei hai wei on the same terms, and for the same period as the Germans hold Kiaochou, i.e. 99 years. As I have before written, Sir Robt. Hart says the Chinese do not want to have it back, as then the Germans wld. claim it fr. them, & they prefer its remaining in our hands. I gather that Ad. Noel wld. like to have some guns mounted in the forts on the island, so as to protect the place fr. a cruiser raid, but no more. He says that dredging is making progress, & that 3 months work adds a berth for a battle ship or a big cruiser.

A couple of nights ago [October 18th – see diary] I met Capt. Truppel, the Govr. of Kiaochou [1901-11], who is just going on leave. He said that the Cesarewitch cld. not have reached Vladivostok in the state in wch. she was, but must have been run ashore somewhere. After she had been disarmed the Capt. wanted to effect repairs, but he refused permission, replying that it wld. be his duty to restore her at the end of the war in the same condition as she was in when he took charge of her. Some one fr. the Dock at Shanghai where the Askold was repaired came to look over the Cesarewitch, to offer to execute the repairs, but he refused to allow it. He had no opinion of the Russian navy, and the officers were too much given to drink. The sea was not their element. Port Arthur, wch. he had seen, was in his opinion impregnable, but he regarded the Russian squadron now there as practically put out of action.

A Japse. financier ² who was on his way to Liaoyang abt. establishing a branch of the

¹ In fact this should be the 7th of October as in Satow's diary.

² Misaki Kamenosuke – see diary for October 17, 1904.

specie bank said to me that the Admiralty is quite prepared to meet the Baltic squadron if it ever arrives on the scene.

Up to the present I have seen no sign of discouragement on the part of the Japse. They were a little anxious before Liaoyang, as they believed their forces were numerically inferior to the Russians. A couple of days ago they were much elated, with the success of their tactics at Mukden, but since the 16th they do not seem to have made much headway. The gauge of the railway has been altered to fit Japse. rolling stock as far as Liaoyang, to wch. place they now have trains running fr. Dalny & Newchwang, their two sources of supply. Their steamers traverse the Gulf of Pechili without fear, & the mails fr. Tokio arrive as quickly and as regularly as in time of peace.

Now & then hints seem to be given that Japan is ready to come to terms, while Russian utterances in the press are to the effect that she will not desist until Japan sues for peace. I do not see anything as yet to show that Japan is tired of the war, tho' perh. indications to that effect may have reached you fr. my coll: in Tokio [Claude MacDonald].

Supposing on the contrary that Japan proves a winner & that means are found of opening negotiations thro' a friendly Power, without sacrificing Russian amour propre, Japan will not be content unless Manchuria is completely evacuated, & the rlwy. prevented fr. becoming again an instrument of Russian domination. An international guarantee of the independence & integrity of the whole Chinese empire might be effective for a certain number of years, provided the rlwy. itself were also placed under international control. A Board consisting of represves of the Great Powers might be created to manage it, with power to borrow money with the guarantee of the Powers, on the security of the rlwy. & of the proceeds part go to Russia to pay for her expenditure & part to Japan as a war indemnity. The whole of the rlwy. within Chinese territory, & not merely the branch fr. Harbin to Port Arthur, might be subject to the proposed control. Japan may be trusted, I think, to content herself with Corea, & not to aim at the possn. of Port Arthur.

On the 12th I recd. the visit of T'ang Shaoyi the man apptd. to Tibet. He told me that he had seen Prince Ch'ing only for a few minutes, who said he was to go to Lhasa to settle the affairs of the country, & on his way thro' Calcutta to discuss with the Indian Govt. one or two articles of the Agreement wch. are objected to by China. To this he had replied that at this season of the year the passes wld. be closed, & that before they decided to send him to Calcutta they shld. ascertain whether the Indian Govt. wld. talk to him. I said in reply that this was most reasonable on his part. The question of the conditions under wch. China shld.

adhere to the agreement could obviously only be treated here, or in London or at Calcutta. I had no instructions as yet as to this point. I had telegd. home what the Prince had said to me on this subject, but I thought myself Calcutta was preferable, as he wld. come in contact there with the govt. principally interested. T'ang however said that he & the Viceroy Yüan thought Peking was the proper place, and that the Chinese Govt. ought to negotiate with myself. I informed him that the matter wld. prob. not be decided until Younghusband arrived at Simla & presented his report.

I see that the Indian Govt. is of the same opinion as myself that Peking wld. not be a good choice, because of the leakage that goes on here, and the facilities that gives my colleagues for interfering. In fact the position is like that in regard to Manchuria two years ago, only the parts are reversed. Lessar's proposals were brought to Uchida & myself for our advice. In the present instance any draft I might put forward wld. be shown to my colls: for their opinion and wld. also be given to the press, as Younghusband's draft agreement was. I am persuaded fr. what I hear that Wu Tingfang was the author of this indiscretion, & that he is the prime mover in the opposition to the terms obtained fr. the Tibetans.

Reuter today for the first time informs this part of the world that we [Britain] are to occupy the Chumbi valley for 75 years till the indemnity is paid. It is an unlucky disclosure. But I think there is a good deal of leakage in the Indian Foreign Dept., thro' native clerks & printers. It was I believe notorious that King Thebaw [the Burmese sovereign] used to procure in that way printed copies of Sladen's despp. to India.

12. Satow to Lansdowne

20.10.04

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

Mumm has just been with me to say that fr. something Morrison let drop, he gathers that he is believed to have told the Chinese that if they sanctioned the Tibetan Agreement, Germany wld. claim equal rights under the most favoured nation clause. All he did was to ask them whether the text published in a Chinese newspaper was correct, and to add that he did not know of any interest that Germany cld. possibly have in that remote corner of the world. He had not mentioned the most favoured nation clause. Moreover he could not see what interest any one could have in the matter, unless perh. the Americans, for the sake of the open door. He did not see Prince Ch'ing, but only some of the lesser officials.

I replied that he knew how such things got distorted when repeated fr. hand to hand, & I

did not see what Tibet mattered to anyone but Lessar, and the answer to him wld. be to quote [G.A.] Plançon's demands respecting Manchuria.

This disavowal may be taken for what it is worth. If Mumm did not put the Italian coll: up to making inquiries at the Foreign Board, it is inconceivable that he shld. have gone out of his way to do it. The account of what he said to the officials may be literally exact, but the Chinese seized the bearing at once.

13. Satow to F.A. Campbell

20.10.04

My dear Campbell,

The trademark regulations are giving us all a great deal more trouble than they are worth. I have sent in a Note in accordance with your teleg. of yesterday asking for postponement, but I do not think the Chinese will agree after having refused Germany and France. They certainly know that America declined to ask for postponement. I did all I possibly cld. to inform B.Ss. [British Subjects] in time, and I have now suggested a means by wch. they can protect their marks fr. being appropriated by anyone else. Prob. they will not follow it, and I doubt whether any one will register.

I hope you will agree with me that under the circs. it is best not to press Sir Robt. Hart abt. his retirement. My desp. is perh. too outspoken, but I think I ought to say what I feel to be true in an official desp., as well as in private letters.

There is a project on foot for getting authority given to certain Chinese (behind whom I believe stand the Franco-Belgian group) to contract with Pearsons (who have built the Peking Syndicate's rlwy.) for the construction of a line to Kalgan [now Zhangjiakou]. Mr. Ch. Denby [son of Col. Denby, former U.S. minister] of the German firm of Carlowitz & Co. came to me abt. it. [See diary for October 14th.] He either could not or wld. not disclose the names of his principals. I told him that the undertakings given by the Chinese to ourselves & the Russians precluded any arrangement of the sort.

The opium monopoly is still being debated. [Guy] Hillier tells me everyone approves except Chang Chih tung, who says the proper way to increase the revenue fr. this drug is to raise the land tax on fields in wch. it is cultivated, & that he has procured 400,000 taels in this way. If they put on a higher tax, the importation of Indian opium will develope. The Board of Revenue wanted to know whether H.M.G. wld. agree to this. I replied to Hillier that he might tell them, certainly not.

If the Chinese Govt. shld. carry out the idea I mentioned in my letter of Sept. 8, [PRO 30/33 14/14, no. 60] of contracting with the Indian Govt. for a certain number of cases of opium annually, abt. which Hart wrote to Ld. Curzon, then they cld. afterwards create a monopoly of boiled opium or adopt any other plan for raising revenue that they liked.

14. Satow to Lansdowne

3.11.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I learn that Morrison's teleg. to the "Times" reported that the Italian Minister also had questioned the Chinese Govt. abt. the Tibetan agreeet., & I hear indirectly that he recd. a teleg. fr. his govt. inquiring what action he had taken. The Italian Secy. Baron Vitale who was dining with me recently gave me to understand that Ct. Gallina was much annoyed at the acct. that had been telegd. to the "Times". I asked what had happened. He replied that he had made a rough translation fr. the text published in a Chinese newspaper & had taken it to his chief, who had directed him to go to the Foreign Board & inquire whether it was authentic. He did so, but not finding any but subordinates there, left a cutting containing the text, & said he wld. call again. Next time he saw Lienfang, one of the Directors, who told him it was approximately correct. That he said was all.

I rejoined that the Chinese officials do not understand inquiries of the sort being made for the mere innocent purpose of obtaining information and that they urged such questions about the transactions of another Power as a veiled hint of a wish to obstruct. If my coll: had put the question direct to me he would have obtained the information he was in need of. I begged him however, in case Count Gallina mentioned the matter again, to assure him that the incident had not caused any feeling on my part towards him.

I do not know whether Morrison learnt fr. the Chinese that pointed inquiries had been made by the Italian Legn., but at any rate I told him of it, and said that I could not understand Count Gallina taking the trouble unless it had been suggested to him by Mumm.

Morrison tells me that the records of the Foreign Board show that Mumm asked 1° Is this agreement genuine, 2°. Have you signed it 3° Are you aware that other PP have m.f.n. clauses in their Treaties, 4° Do you know that Germany is one of these.

He had some conversation with Mumm on the subject, who asserted that he had not mentioned the Tibetan agreement to Gallina, but admitted that he had discussed it with Conger on the initiative of the latter.

But independently of the observations & suggestions of my colls: the Chinese are quite sharp enough to see the bearing of the words “without the consent of Gt. Britain” in Art. 9.

I hope you will not think that in urging that Calcutta is a better place than Peking to negotiate at I am merely trying to avoid a difficult piece of business. It seems to me so very clear that negotiations here wld. be greatly handicapped by the watchfulness of my colls:

15. Satow to Lansdowne

3.11.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The controversy that has taken place over the postponement of the trade mark regulations has ceased to be on the merits, & has assumed the character of a trial of strength betw. Japan & the Powers that Germany can bring into line. The desp. of today's date that goes by this bag gives some indication of this. I find Uchida firmly resolved not to give way, and to a great extent because, as he said to me a couple of days ago, something more than mere trade marks is involved.

Mumm has displayed almost superhuman activity in the matter, even going all the way to the Summer Palace to see Prince Ch'ing on the 21st, & he has both written notes & gone in person to the Foreign Board.

As regards the Regns. themselves 1°. German merchants do not want to have any, 2° they suspect the Japse. of having forced these on the Chinese in order that they may steal a march on the foreigner & register his marks before he can ge in an application, 3° they know that a Japanese expert framed them.

British merchants are activated by the same reasons. They likewise suspect the Jap[ane]se of sinister designs, they do not wish to pay for the protection of their trade marks, & have an innate dislike to innovations that cause them trouble.

Other nationalities have no immediate interest in the question, but they are ready to take part in an international tug-of-war agst. the Japanese.

The latter have to a certain extent taken the place of the Russians as the Power that China is afraid of. Like the Russians they oppress China, witness the question of the pontoon at Hankow wch. they maintain in a position to wch. they have no right. This disposition shows itself in many little ways. If Japan is victorious in the war, she will succeed to the Russian position of predominance and utilize it in much the same style. The Chinese I think will oppose a good deal of stubborn resistance, and will not let Japan reform them to please her

own taste. I do not think Europe need fear the organization of a huge army under Japanese leadership for the liberation of Asia from European masters. Japan will regard China as a mulch-cow, as we all do.

It is instructive to note that Gatrell, whose diary I am sending home, found a newly arrived Japanese at Urga, who said he was going to set up as a merchant. It is more probable that his presence there is a beginning of that organization of “intelligence” fr. Mongolia of wch. the Japanese Col. Aoki spoke to Wingate.

16. Satow to F.A. Campbell

14.11.04

My dear Campbell,

Your letter of September 1 about employing Larsen.

I am inclined to withdraw my proposals regarding this person. [See PRO 30/33 14/14, letters no. 22 and 48]. When he came to see me in Peking I was not much struck with the signs of intelligence and capacity displayed by him, and think we can do better by making use of Gatrell.

I enclose a letter wch. he wrote to me the other day, and am of opinion that if he could get an invitation to go to Uliasutai [in Outer Mongolia] fr. the Russian residents there, it would be a good thing to try him for a year, giving him the same allowance as I do now. I have had some talk with him on the subject, and suggested that he should write to them that he had returned here, and how much he had enjoyed being with them. That might draw fr. them an expression of their desire to see him there again. He wld. establish himself at Uliasutai and make periodical visits to Kobdo and Urga.

He ought to have a cipher for use in communicating with me, as his letters must come by the Russian post or by Mongol messengers. A couple of copies of some disused cipher would do, I daresay, for this purpose.

extract fr. [Gatrell's] letter enclosed in the above

Peking 2 Nov. 1904

Dear Sir,

Travelling in Mongolia, especially in the north, I found both pleasant and instructive. At both Urga and Uliasutai I made many friends among both the Russians and the Chinese. I was asked several times to remain & practise my profession. Russians at Uliasutai

suggested to me that I should make that my headquarters and pay periodical visits to Urga in the East & Kobdo in the West. It was even suggested that an offer of a retaining fee would be made to me if I would consent to go back.

During my journey I learnt sufficient Mongol to make me practically independent of an interpreter for all ordinary intercourse with the people. And I am confident that I could quickly learn Russian, exchanging lessons in English, which many told me they were anxious to learn.

The country & the climate suit me, and should the opportunity be given me I would gladly go back to Mongolia.

17. Satow to Lansdowne

17.11.04

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

Before long I hope to send you some notes on the way in wch. funds have been supplied in whole or in part by foreign govts. for rlwy. construction in this country, wch. I hope will meet the wish expressed in your letter of Sept. 14.

I have been careful to explain to every one who spoke to me on the subject that even if the Japse. succeed in taking Port Arthur, that event by itself will not affect our tenure of Weihaiwei. Meanwhile, to judge fr. the reports published in Japan of the siege operations, the conclusion is yet a long way off. The assailants meet with great difficulty in mining towards the forts owing to the rocky nature of the ground, & each fort requires almost a separate siege. The accounts remind me more of the siege of Saragossa than of either Sebastopol or Kimberley to wch. I see Port Arthur is compared by the press.

In my last letter I spoke of the contest abt. the trade mark regulations, in wch. so far the Japse. have got the best of it. My teleg. of the 7th gave a pretty full acct. of the views of Mumm & Dubail. They would like to beat a retreat rather than push onwards with no certainty of gaining the day, but they wish to throw the responsibility for the decision on their govts., after having rather exceeded their instructions. Mumm in particular feels the difficulty of the position, as he has been much the most active in trying to get the regulations postponed, & has committed himself with the public by giving to the press the statement that he had recd. a promise fr. Prince Ch'ing. Conger has recd. instructions again fr. Washington not to take any steps, & this after the endeavour of the German Ambassador to induce Mr. Hay to oppose Japan in the matter.

There is no doubt that the Japse. are actively insinuating themselves into every part of China, & gathering information. They have a school at Shanghai where the students study the language, & then issue forth to travel and take notes. I am told that there are 70 in North China at present, four studying the judicial system, four the financial. They are inquisitive about the working of the Inspectorate-genl. of Customs and the administration of the northern rlwys. There are at least half a dozen if not more in the Customs service, and they know how it is run at the ports. The task of these intelligence-gatherers is of course immensely facilitated by the familiarity with the Chinese written character that they already possess. In the Board of Commerce they have a technical adviser, who has prepared the trade mark regulations and will no doubt frame other schemes for them. Fortunately for the Foreign Represves they have not yet obtained a footing in the Foreign Board.

I am very glad that it has been decided to receive T'ang Shaoyi at Calcutta. That will throw on China the onus of making proposals. Before he gets there perh. the amount of the indemnity will have been reduced in connexion with the ratification of the Agreement by the Viceroy, and the length of our occupation brought down to a convenient term of years. Much time too will be saved by the negotiations being directed at Calcutta by the F.O. & the I.O. working in concert. If the negotiations had taken place here, there wld. have been, doubtless, frequent referring to India on every point before final instructions were sent to me, and the delay on each occasion wld. have been considerable.

18. Satow to Eric Barrington

17.11.04

As Kidston has recd. his leave, he will take his departure in abt. ten days time. He has been a most efficient head of the Chancery and has the great merit of being a willing as well as a good worker. I have never been so well served.

I suppose he will not return here, & if so, pray let me have his successor as soon as you can. As there are no students here now, we have plenty of room, and you need not fear to send us a married man.

Collier arrived a fortnight ago, & fr. what I have seen of his work I am grateful to you for the selection you have made for me. You know what a quantity of work there is here, and that the most elegant of triflers, if such exist, are not appreciated in the chancery.

19. Satow to F.A. Campbell

17.11.04

My dear Campbell,

I partly hope that the conversation with Prince Ch'ing abt. the Peking Syndicate rlwy. reported in a desp. will bear fruit. Yesterday was the Empress Dowager's birthday, so in a few days, if I hear nothing, I shall stir H.H. [His Highness] up again. Jamieson is still away at the mines. He takes things in a leisurely fashion, as befits a man who draws a big salary as long as his job lasts. I understand he has at the back of his head a project for disposing of the mines as well as the railways to Shêng, lock, stock & barrel.

On the whole it is not easy to effectively help the Syndicate. Their agent appeals to us every now and then for help, as the Syndicate does to you, but I don't fancy they want to put themselves in our hands, or to tell us the whole of their case.

The Chinese have lately imposed a fee on transit passes & permits for the transport of rice & bullion for purchasing wool, hides &c. up country. The mercantile community are up in arms, & Dubail, Mumm, Gaiffier, Conger & I have protested. If we allowed them to do this, they wld. shortly propose other 'fees for office expenses', intended to relieve the Treasury. It appears that of the amount proposed to be collected $\frac{1}{3}$ is to be applied to office expenses, $\frac{2}{3}$ to go to the Foreign Board & $\frac{1}{3}$ to the Board of Revenue.

We are still discussing the Chinese indemnity proposals. Lessar is the colleague who makes most difficulties.

20. Satow to Lansdowne

30.11.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I hope the memo. drawn up by Mr. Carnegie wch. I am sending by this bag will prove of use. The principal lacuna is the origin of the money for constructing the German railway in Shantung, abt. wch. I suggest that information might be procured in Berlin. Mumm tells me that he will shortly receive the draft agreeet. for the Tientsin-Chinkiang railway, and that he will come to consult with me abt. supporting the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank & the B. & C. [British & Chinese] Corporation in their negotiations.

As I hold that it is politically not to our advantage that the Germans shld. strengthen their rlwy. position in N. China, I propose not to very zealous in assisting in the conclusion of the final contract.

The lawsuit abt. the C.E. & M. [Chinese Engineering and Mining] Co. seems about to come before the courts, as Chang Yi & Detring have left for London. Major Nathan affects to believe that the Co. will win, but I know that he has offered a loan of nearly a million sterling, on terms, first to the Viceroy Yüan, and afterwards to the Minister of Finance to pay off the Indemnity, if they wld. consent to the suit being abandoned. Whichever way it goes, it will be a satisfaction to see the Moreing and Hoover crew shown up in the Courts.

T'ang Shaoyi, who is going to Calcutta abt. the Tibet agreement, is one of the Cantonese who were educated in America, speaks English perfectly and is an intelligent man, a patriotic Chinese, reserved in manner. He is credited with being anti-English, and it is possible that he may have resented the late Capt. Bayly's threat to hang him during the Tientsin troubles of 1900. He may perh. get the better of Mr. L.W. Dane [Foreign Secretary, India], but I think he will scarcely be a match for Ld. Curzon, who I trust will get back in time. T'ang is certain to make assertions about the former extent of Chinese control over Tibet, but on that point he will scarcely be listened to. His story about the written promises of the Dalai Lama from Russia, wch. is related to my desp. of the 28th, is rather lacking in chronological probability. The resident Shêngtai died in 1892, when the Dalai Lama was only 17, and unless he had then fallen under the influence of Doyieff, it seems scarcely likely that he wld. have put himself in the hands of the Russians, being a quite ignorant boy. Perh. what T'ang was thinking of were letters fr. Russia of later date.

We are not making much progress with arranging abt. the indemnity. Most of the colls: want to know how much they will have to sacrifice before agreeing to the Chinese proposals, and we have not been able to get the calculation made. The Americans, who still maintain that it is payable in silver, now say that if the other Powers are paid in gold, they must have the same treatment. It is the American attitude wch. is to blame for the refusal of the Chinese to acknowledge our interpretation of the Protocol, and it seems difficult to find language to characterize their present action. Mumm, Gaiffier and I have let Conger know that he must fight his own battle without our assistance.

What handicaps us all is that we know nothing of questions of exchange, and are not very strong in arithmetic. If we go to a banker for advice, he gives us counsels wch. are influenced by his own sympathy for the banking fraternity at Shanghai, who have made very considerable profits out of this business. If experts fr. the different ministries of finance cannot be got together to settle the whole question, it wld. be a great help if some competent gentlemen from the Treasury cld. pay a flying visit to Shanghai & Peking.

It is the same thing with the Trade mark legislation. Neither the commercial attaché nor I nor any one on my staff understands the subject. I think it wld. facilitate a settlement if a Board of Trade official were sent out to Hongkong, Shanghai & Peking to assist in the negotiation. If he knew something of foreign trademark law & of the International Union for the protection of Industrial property, so much the better. This wld. enable the question to be settled more quickly than if the draft Chinese law is to be sent to Europe to be examined & perh. amended. In Europe each govt. will want to have a finger in the pie, and it takes longer for them to come to an agreement than it does even for the diplomatists at Peking.

21. Satow to F.A. Campbell

Nov. 30, 04

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for yours of Oct. 7 regarding the Mixed Court at Shanghai. I have now taken up the question of the Amendments to the procedure, and a letter will be addressed by Conger, Mumm & myself to the other colls: inviting their co-operation. I do not anticipate any difficulty as far as they are concerned, but we may have trouble with the Foreign Board, as Mr. Wu Ting fang is a Lincoln's Inn barrister (like your humble servant) and rather plumes himself on his genius for legislation.

In speaking of the China Association in my letter of Aug. 11, it was the Shanghai branch I had in my mind, of wch. that proxy ass F. Anderson (he is known to his friends as Silly Anderson) and J.O.P. Bland the Times correspondent & Secy. of the Municipal Council, are leading spirits. Another brouillon [stirrer, agitator], the gentleman who is really responsible for having urged H.M.G. to send troops to Shanghai in 1900, is Mr. Edbert Hewatt, P. & O. agent at Hongkong, who in that unlucky year was a prominent busybody at Shanghai. Dudgeon has been quite tamed by his knighthood. Of the London Committee I have no evil to say. Some of them, like Cecil Smith, Jackson, Rennie, old Tom Hansbury[?] & Cornes are my very good friends. I was sorry to see that a C.B. had been given to Gundy[?], whose patronizing way of addressing the F.O. on many occasions put my back up.

By the bag I am sending you a report of Geo. Jamieson's first interview with the Foreign Board. He is now at the mines going over railway accounts with Shêng's engineers.

22. Satow to Lansdowne

Tientsin 1.12.04

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Yesterday morning a report was brought to me by a man who is usually well-informed that Sir R. Hart had suddenly sent in his resignation. As my informant seemed quite certain, I wrote a hasty note to Sir Robt. to say I hoped it was no true, but if it were, that he would not press it, as it would be a very serious matter for the Chinese Govt. & most inconvenient for every one else.

He wrote back: No – it is not so. I merely told the Mins. that, after the river opens next year, I shld. like to visit home once more on leave.

I shall neither burn my boats nor cause a difficulty to the Board and the Legations while well enough to work.

Bredon remains still at Shanghai, waiting for Sir Robt.'s succession. Hippley who has been promised the support of H.M.G. has gone to America. At such a juncture Hart's resignation, if he really contemplated it, wld. have been seriously inconvenient. As long as there are two candidates in the field I hope there will be no vacancy in the Inspectorate-general.

23. Satow to Lansdowne

8.12.04

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

In continuation of my letter of Dec. 1 abt. Sir Robt. Hart's proposal to go leave in the spring.

On the 5th I went to him, and learnt that he had been to the Foreign Board and told them of his desire to revisit Europe, and the question of who was to be acting Inspector-General ought to be settled beforehand. The only man he cld. recommend was Bredon, but he knew that H.M.G. objected to him.

Wu Ting fang promptly replied that this could not be the case, as Bredon had lately been made K.C.M.G. I drew fr. him that he wld. make a strong effort to get away in April, & that he did not anticipate returning here if he once found himself in England.

He then said that he recognized the difficulty of the position, as other Powers besides G.B. have no wish to see Bredon made I-G.

He talked abt. his idea of establishing a Committee, to wch. he wld. delegate some of his

powers, & so anticipate the demand of the other Legations for a Board. Of this committee the I-G must of course be president, & he wld. be an Englishman.

I said it was impossible for me to say what view wld. be taken of this suggestion by H.M.G., to wch. he rejoined that in 1897 my predecessor had seemed to favour it, as he thought under instructions from home.

There is no trace of this among the papers here.

I replied to him that Prince Ch'ing had informed Townley that Hippenley wld. be their choice.

Yesterday Sir Robt. came to return my call. Nat'ung of the Foreign Board, he said, had been to see him & had declared that the Empress-Dowager cld. not possibly dispense with his services until the war came to an end. He had thereupon replied that he was very anxious to go home & see his people, but wld. say nothing more until the spring; but they must bear in mind that he might break down, & they must make up their minds as to what they wld. do in that case.

He went on to say that he & Bredon had not been very open abt. the succession in speaking & writing to each other, & he partly suspected Bredon wished to make a separate position for himself as head of the Shanghai Conservancy Board. Bredon had started fr. Shanghai, but till he came to Peking it wld. not be possible to ascertain his intentions. He had that morning told Aglen, his chief Secy., that Bredon was not to have any share of the work until he made it plain that he wld. remain in Peking. Then he went on to talk abt. Hippenley's state of health. It was reported to him fr. several quarters that H. had a habit of falling asleep in the middle of a conversation, & he thought his liver must be affected.

I threw doubts on this, & told him I had never observed anything of the kind.¹

The foregoing account shows how he wavers fr. day to day. It is said that his secret wish is to get rid of both B. & H., and to get [Francis Arthur] Aglen apptd. his successor. Aglen has had a promise of leave of absence, but Hart refuses to speak the decisive word, and keeps him dangling on here. There is I think good ground for believing that if there were no other candidate in the field, Aglen wld. be his choice.

Altogether, tho' I do not think he has definitively made up his mind to retire, he is nearer to doing this than he was 7 years ago. My own impression is, & has always been, that he

¹ George Ernest Morrison told Satow that Hippenley was "suffering from uraemia, wch. causes him to fall asleep at every moment, & must affect his brain. I said I had made inquiries, and could find no trace of it." (Diary, November 6, 1903).

likes to talk of retiring, but that he is more likely to leave his bones in China.

He showed me a private letter from Shanghai fr. which I gathered that a part of Bredon's scheme for the Shanghai Conservancy Board is to get a German apptd. engineer of the works "on political grounds". Mumm will do all he can to further this, & the Germ. Govt. have had a man ready in Shanghai for three years past. This is the person whom the Germ. Min. tried in May last to get admitted to the conservancy board (of the protocol) in the guise of a proxy for the Germ. Consul-general, as reported in my desp. No. 188. In the new Chinese proposals it is provided that the engineer must be approved by a majority of the FRR. I am doing all I can to secure the election of the Dutch engineer de Rijke, & can count on the support of the Dutch Minister (of course) , of Conger, Dubail, prob. of Uchida and perhaps of Lessar thro' Dubail. If the new arranget. is limited to the signatories of the Protocol we shld. thus secure a majority of one for our man. A Germ. engineer's apptmt. wld. be very obnoxious to the Shanghai English people, & I shall oppose it by every means in my power.

24. Satow to Lansdowne

13.12.04

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

In my new 3rd Secy. Collier I have found a treasure, who knows all abt. rlwys., having spent 6 mos. in rlwy. workshops in England and studied rlwys. in America. If I had a 2nd Secy. besides, who cld. be head of the chancery, I cld. next spring send Collier on a tour to examine the rlwys. that have already been constructed, as well as some of those that are in course of construction or projected, & he wld. be able to furnish a very useful report. But this is not practicable unless I can have a 2nd man, as the chancery cannot be left in charge of a junior consular assistant.

A word from you to Sir Eric Barrington wld. I feel sure result in the necessary arrangements being made.

25. Satow to Sir W. Chauncey Cartwright¹

15.12.04

My dear Cartwright,

¹ Sir William Chauncey Cartwright was Chief Clerk of the Financial Department at the Foreign Office, 1900-13.

In my desp. Cons. No. 149 of 12 Dec. I have proposed that [A.J.] Sundius shld. move to Wuhu & [W.P.] Ker go to Nanking fr. there. I have excellent reasons besides the one I have given officially. Sundius is very deaf, & the reverse of diligent. Ker knows Chinese well, is intelligent, sane & hardworking & is therefore a much better man for an important post like Nanking. I can rely on his doing what I tell him, & on his comprehending the instructions I give him, as he worked here for nearly 2 yrs. under me as Asst. Chinese Secy. I trust therefore you will support the recommendation contained in my desp. ¹
y.s.

26. Satow to F.A. Campbell

21.12.04

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for sending me Bredon's letter of 28 Sept. to Lister Kaye. I observe that he speaks of himself as the "Deputy Inspector General whom the British F.O. had sent" to Hart.

What is the "adequate compensation" he wld. take in return for going?

The expression "available for other work" seems to point to the desire he is thought to cherish of creating for himself a separate position at Shanghai as head of the Conservancy works in connexion with the Chinese proposal to undertake the whole cost & management. This wld. be "outside the Customs", & doubtless wld. please his vanity better than playing 2nd fiddle to Hart at Peking. But I do not think he will find any backers for such a proposal, either here or at Shanghai.

I did not know that the K.C.M.G. was given to Bredon to keep quiet, & merely supposed that he had induced Sir J. Mackay to use his influence with Lord Lansdowne. I am not going to make any retort on you for not taking my advice on the point, but fancy it must have been forgotten that Lord Lansdowne's teleg. to Townley of Jan. 25 1903 said that Bredon might be told that if he retired his claims to an honour wld. receive as favourable

¹ Previously Satow had been less complimentary about Ker. (See above, PRO 30/33 14/12, No. 7, Satow to Cockerell, April 26, 1901. See also P.D. Coates, *The China Consuls* pp. 445-6: "His [Satow's] discretion could verge on deviousness. Having removed Ker from the post of assistant Chinese secretary he drew attention in an official despatch to Ker's zeal and efficiency and to MacDonald's high appreciation of Ker's services [FO 17/1490. Leg. cons. 67, 1901], whereas a semi-official letter had previously given notice that he intended to replace little Ker, whose only virtue was some knowledge of the language, who was intellectually a child, and who was quite inadequate for a post [Assistant Chinese Secretary] which needed some character and ability.") This does not seem to be deviousness, but rather a case of Satow juggling his staff to put them in the posts to which he felt they were best suited.

consideration as possible, & that Townley reported having made that communication.

27. Satow to Admiral Noel

21.12.04

My dear Noel,

Many thanks for your letter fr. Hgkg of 2 Dec., & for Xmas wishes, wch. I heartily reciprocate.

I entirely agree with the observations you make on the withdrawal of the sloops, wch. were very useful vessels for river work. The measure was ordered no doubt without giving due consideration to the needs of the China station. I suppose you have nothing now that can get into the Bangkok river, for instance.

I quite agree with what you have written to Ld. Selbourne in your letter of 10 Nov.

It seems that of late a good deal of apprehension has been created in the Chinese official mind by the tone of the students who return fr. Japan. It wld. seem that they have acquired a good many of the ideas of a turbulent class called sōshi, who represent what in early days were called rōnin, ready for political agitation, assassination of politicians of whom they disapprove, cudgelling opposition members of the Diet & so on. These young Chinese came home with all necessary tools, such as Mauser pistols, swordsticks & anti-dynastic literature. Quite recently the Viceroy at Wuchang cut off the heads of one or two of these gentry. Mandarindom is beginning to think that it wld. be better to send students to England & Germany, where they wld. learn respect for constituted auth[ority].

28. Satow to Lansdowne

29.12.04

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

The strong combination of Fr[ance], Germ.[an]y, Austria, Italy & ourselves in regard of the Trade mark regulations has been [a] success in obtaining what is practically their suspension until the amendments we have to suggest are agreed to. The Chinese Govt. in the last exchange of Notes seem not to have consulted the Japanese Legn., & to have taken advantage of Uchida's absence to assert their freedom of action. I strongly suspect the Germans of desiring to shelve the question indefinitely, as Mumm tells me he does not hear of any amendments being sent to him by his Govt.

Fr. one of my despp. you will see that Mumm is pressing for our aid in bringing the

Chinese to book with respect to the Tientsin-Chinkiang railway. I do not see how the money for our section is to be provided, unless by the somewhat revolutionary proceeding wch. I have ventured to suggest of a British Govt. guarantee. The German & British sections are to be built & managed by 2 separate boards, so that the final contract, tho' nominally for one, is in reality for 2 rlwys. It is not a partnership with equal powers and share of profits, but 2 separate undertakings. The Germans will make every effort to carry their line fr. Tsinanfu to Tientsin, but we have no means of compelling them to construct the small piece fr. Tsinanfu to Likuo on the frontier of Shantung to join our line down to Nanking (Pic-kóu).

We are making fair progress with the new agreement abt. the conservancy of the water approaches to Shanghai, & have launched our proposals for the reform of the Mixed Court. I am not sanguine [confident] abt. the latter, but after all so much more depends on the tact & energy of our Assessor than on the regulations of the Court that I think it does not much matter.

The indemnity is causing more trouble, partly owing to the insistence of the Russian, Fr. & Germ. delegates on the bankers' commission on retaining their system of making large profits out of handling the indemnity, & partly by the difficulty of getting Govts. like that of Russia to recognize that China ought to receive just treatment at the hands of the Powers.

My friend Rockhill, who is almost certain to be apptd. American Minister here, writes to me fr. Washington, Nov. 2 (extract).

I have been unable to ascertain whether the Dalai Lama is still at Urga, or whether the Chinese have had him removed to Sining, as T'ang Shaoyi told me was the intention of the Govt. Perh. he is less mischievous at Urga than at Sining, wch. is several marches nearer to Lhasa, & I am inclined to think that even if he went to Russia as a "roi en exil" [king in exile] there wld. not be much to be regretted. The longer he stays away fr. Lhasa the better.

I wish we had some one at Urga to keep us informed of what goes on. [Edmund Trelawney] Backhouse who had been studying Mongol with a view to going there for me had to return home to consult an oculist, & now Gatrell abt. whom I wrote to Mr. Campbell on Nov. 14 [see no. 16 above] has accepted the post of doctor at the Peking Syndicate's mines. I have no one else in view at the present moment.

29. Satow to Sanderson

[Summary only] To Sanderson asking for the Morocco print.

PRO 30/33 14/15 China (1-67)
(September 13, 1904 – June 10, 1905)

30. Satow to Sanderson

1905 Jan. 2

My dear Sanderson,

I enclose my account for the past half year, and if on examination you find it correct, I wld. request you to kindly have the amount paid to my account with Parr's Bank Ltd 77 Lombard St.

G's [Dr. Thomas J.N. Gatrell's] travelling expenses did not seem extravagant, & as the hospital was being carried on for him during his absence, I thought there was no reason for cutting down his regular pay. y.s.

Lt. Campbell R.E.	\$336.35	£30.16.7
(See Enclosure) F.O.		

B. [Backhouse?] No 192 of 29 June	£
25 July	75
10 Octr.	75

G. [Gatrell?]	\$	
28 Oct (for June to Nov.)	2700	247.10
4 Nov (travelling expenses in Mongolia)	589.48	54.—
5 Decr.	450	41.5
21 Decr. (to Mayers for pay[men]t of Chinese informants)	100	<u>9.3.4.</u>
		£ 532.14.11
rate of exhcnage 1/10 per \$.		
2 Jany. 1905		(532.14.11)

31. Satow to Sir Cecil Smith

8.1.05

My dear Smith,

Your letter of 24 Nov. interests me greatly. It was a sensible thing to ask you to represent the C.O. in the discussions abt. the Canton-Kowloon Rlwy. Not like the F.O. who in

negotiating the S.A. labour convention had not joined to the principal spokesman a member of the Far Eastern Dept., nor a Consul from China familiar with the emigration question, tho' there was an excellent man at home on leave fr. Canton, James Scott.

But this is a digression.

As regards gauge, all the Chinese lines have been built with Standard English gauge, as was natural, seeing that the Kaiping-Tientsin line, the parent of them all, was started by an Englishman. But the Chêng-ting Taiyuan line, for wch. the Russo-Chinese bank have the concession, is to be laid down on metre gauge, & I believe the Fr. line into Yünnan is also to be of that gauge. So there are precedents.

As you say, the fact that the Canton-Hankow line has not been commenced is a factor in the question. As far as one can make out here, the capital for that line is not forthcoming. A.W. Bash, whose name is mentioned in some of my desp. on rlwy. questions, is trying to get a concession for a line fr. Hankow down S. by way of Kuikiang, Nanchang, crossing by Lienfing into the East river basin, & effecting a junction with our Canton-Kowloon line near Waichou (Kwei-chan of the C.I.M. map), & he is very anxious to join with us to get rid of the Belgians, behind whom the Chinese see the French. Bash represents a very strong combination of American capitalists, by name "The China Con-[] & Construction Co." If he is successful, we cld. no doubt arrange with his Co. to adopt the narrow gauge throughout. Fr. Washington I hear that the concessionaries of the Yüeh-Han (original Canton-Hankow line) are in difficulties and will prob. have to throw up the sponge.

It seems to me that if H.M.G. wish to see rlwys. constructed in China with British Capital, they will have to step forward & offer a guarantee, not of 5%, but of 3 or 3½. Fr[ance] has forced Indo-China to do that for the line into Yünnan. Russia made the line thro' Manchuria chiefly if not exclusively with the funds of the State, & there must be some kind of govt. support behind the Kiaochou Chinanfu line. Perh. as that was a concession granted direct to Germany, the certainty is that the Imperial govt. will treat it as their own child, & so funds are easily obtained.

Our position as regards these matters is different; private firms like the B. & C. Corp. have had concessions obtained for them, but the terms have been practically dictated by Shêng.

It will be interesting to see European comment on the fall of Port Arthur. For me it is an event of wch. it is difficult yet to foresee all the significance. Unless Russia can put forth all her strength at the far end of the Siberian rlwy. she cannot recover possession, & her Far

Eastern progress is knocked on the head. Fr[om] several Japanese I have heard that in the spring siege will be laid to Vladivostok, but perhaps that will not happen until the Japanese army gets to Harbin, when Vladivostok must fall of itself. We have nothing to do but sit tight, keep a stiff upper lip, but resist all attempts of Russia to pick a quarrel with us. Not that I fear the result of such a conflict. She cld. not invade India & fight Japan in Manchuria at the same time, but if she did it wld. be a war of giants.

32. Satow to George Nathaniel Curzon

10.1.05

Dr. Ld. Curzon,

Pray accept my warmest congratulations on Lady Curzon's recovery and your return to India. I hope it may not be long before her health is completely re-established, so that she may be able to rejoin you there.

A curious circumstance occurred in connexion with T'ang Shaoyi's departure for Calcutta. He went by train to Hankow, & with him were Laptew the Russian Consul at Tientsin, & Kow[?] the manager of the Russo-Chinese bank. How far they accompanied him I do not know. Major Nathan the brother of your new private secretary was also of the party, & you will prob. hear thro' him of anything of interest. I am told that T'ang is a great poker player, & these 3 gentlemen have played a good deal with him when he was Tientsin Customs Taotai, so perh. it was only good fellowship that induced the Russians to bear him company on his journey.

In decyphering the teleg. containing the ratification of the Lhasa convention, a mistake was made, wch. converted "three annual instalments" into "the annual instalments". I discovered it after T'ang left, & have written to him to Canton correcting it, & have also told him that Mr. Fraser will be the negotiator on the Indian side.

The Chinese seem to have taken the fall of Port Arthur very tranquilly. Their feeling I surmise is that no matter what happens, it can at best be only the exchange of one master for another. The Japanese Ch. d'Aff. tells me that the German Legn. fr. the head downwards loses no opportunity of belittling them in the eyes of the Chinese.

The Germs. are fortifying Kiaochou, & the Shanghai local German paper complains that the sum of 2,500,000 marks to be provided in the next Budget for further fortifications is a mere drop in the bucket. They are now giving open expression to their apprehensions that their turn will come next.

We are told that 80,000 men will be set free [by the fall of Port Arthur] to join Oyama's men on the Shaho, with a large no., fr. 500 to 600, of guns. The Japanese military attaché talks of active operations being resumed not later than February. This has been a very mild winter, & the enforced idleness of the troops will not last so long as in an ordinary season. The casualties of the Japanese ¹ before Port Arthur are said to have been 50,000 or 60,000 men. 203 metre hill cost something like 10,000, but Erhungshan only 1000 and Sungshushan 150. That was just before Stoessel offered to surrender. The price was well worth paying.

I cannot gauge the extent of Russian determination to go on with the war till they achieve a final triumph, for I do not know Russia, but as far as I can judge the Japanese I think there will be no flagging on their part. Some say there will be an attempt made to lay siege to Vladivostok, but I doubt it until after a victory at Mukden.

33. Satow to Lansdowne

10.1.05

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

Hillier tells me that the Chinese have several projects floating in their minds in regard to rlwys. ²

1. A railway to Kalgan to be built by the Board of the Northern Rlwys with a surplus of £100,000 wch. they have realized on the last year's working & a portion of the interest they receive on the rlwy. indemnity, wch. is taken at about £440,000. As this is entirely Chinese money the Russians could not, they say, offer any objection.

2. The purchase of the Peking-Hankow line fr. the Belgians, who are supposed to fear that the course of events will deprive them of Russian support, & wld. be glad to dispose of their share for 15,000000 taels besides 2000000 squeezed out of them by Shêng [Director of the Chinese national railways]. The Chinese wld. then run it as their own rlwy., on the same system as the Northern rlwys, borrowing the purchase money on the security of the line.

Hillier thinks the money cld. be procured for them by the Hgkg & Shai Bankg Corpn. ³

¹ The Japanese Third Army was commanded by General Nogi Maresuke.

² Guy Hillier came to Satow on January 5, 1905. (Diary)

³ The loan with a total volume of five million pounds was placed in 1908 by the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank (London) and the Banque de l'Indo-Chine (Paris). The bigger part of the loan (4 million pounds) was used to repurchase the 1899 loan (Kuhlmann No. 91). The remainder went into

To this I remarked that a) the Fr. own 3/5 of the bonds & wld. not willingly resign what they consider an important political interest b) that a possible cause of the Belgian desire to get rid of the undertaking is the extreme difficulty of crossing the Yellow River. Engineers say that the bridge is built on an insecure foundation, & will be swept away by the 1st big flood.

Hillier tells me that Koch, the present head of Panmure Gordon & Co., himself a Belgian, is just the man to arrange such a deal.

3. When the Russians evacuate Manchuria the line to be handed over to China for a consideration. The Hsin min tun branch of the Northern rlwys wld. be pushed on to the north of Mukden, while the Liao river wld. be bridged abt. 20 miles N. of Newchwang. The line to Port Arthur & Dalny wld become a mere branch. The Chinese lines wld. then be linked up with the Japanese lines in Corea. (The latter are said to be laying a line fr. Antung at the m[ou]th of the Yalu to join the Manchurian rlwy. near Haichêng; my authority is Maxwell the correspt. of the Standard with Kuroki's army, who was here recently.)

These are magnificent schemes, dependent on Japan being able to make peace on her own terms, one of wch. wld. doubtless be the cession of the Manchurian rlwy. wch. Japan wld. then sell to China.

It is 943 m fr. the Russian frontier on the E. to her frontier on the W. & 610 fr. Harbin to Port Arthur, so 1573 miles according to official statements it cost abt. £17,500 a mile, but it certainly cannot be worth that. But putting it at one half, that wld. be over £12,000,000.

Supposing all this to be done, wld. it not be better to treat this rlwy. as a great international means of communication, place it under the Administration of a Board like that of the Suez Canal, & get the Powers to declare it neutral.¹ It certainly will continue to exist, & after the war is over the traffic will be sure to develope, as nearly all travellers fr. Europe to China & Japan will use it.

4. Mr. Bash abt. whose projects I reported in my desp. No. 5 of 9/1/04 is now at Hankow trying to obtain a concession for a line to Canton to the East of the Belgian-American Hankow-Canton line (for wch. funds are not at present forthcoming) to come out near

the buildup of the industry. The Peking-Hankow railway was inaugurated in December 1905. It consisted of 755 miles of main line and 62 miles of light railway. Connections to several other railways existed. 5,000 pieces of the present paper, which was distributed by the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. in London, had been issued, but only 250 remained in circulation. (<http://www.hwph.de/historische-wertpapiere/losnr-auktnr-pa5-1.html> accessed September 8, 2006)

¹ This idea appears also in Satow's diary for January 5, 1905 when he talks to Yokoyama Magoichirō.

Waichow just N. of the new territory at Hongkong, & joining our Canton-Kowloon line. I have asked Mr. Fraser to give him what support he can with Chang Chih tung, & have suggested to him to make it a narrow gauge line, as I have heard fr. Cecil Smith that this is proposed for our bit of rlwy. If such a scheme could be carried out, it wld. add immensely to the importance of Hongkong, wch. seemed likely to suffer fr. the construction of the Hankow-Canton district rlwy.

I venture to say however that we shall achieve little or nothing in China in the way of railway construction, unless we make it a matter of State concern, as the Russians, Fr. & Germans have done.

The Chinese have recently seized a large quantity of small arms ammunition & 20 machine guns wch. the Russians were smuggling overland viâ Kalgan to be shipped to Port Arthur, also a quantity of ammunition for large guns sent fr. Mukden viâ Hsin min tun; these being intraband[?] by Treaty betw. China & Russia the latter are unable to protest.

The Japse. Ch. d’Aff. [Matsui Keishirō] tells me that the Chinese have displayed very little emotion on hearing of the surrender of Port Arthur. Some high officials are anxious that China shld. make a proposal for mediation betw. the belligerents, but Prince Ch’ing recognises that such an idea is at least premature. He also says that Mumm & the rest of the Germ. Legn. take every opportunity of belittling the Japse. in Chinese official eyes. It is certain that all my colls: & especially the Germans believed Port Arthur to be impregnable. I have not been able to extract anything fr. them on the subject of the war since Stoessel’s surrender.

Acc[ording] to the Shanghai Germ. paper provision is to be made in the budget for 2½ million mks. to be devoted to fortifying Kiaochou, wch. the editor declares to be as nothing in comparison of what is needed for its defence.

34. Satow to Admiral Noel

26.1.05

My dear Noel,

The principal topic of interest here is the circular wch. Russia has addressed to her repres’ves abroad enumerating instances in wch. China has connived at breaches of her neutrality by or in favour of Japan, and accuses her of making preparations to take an active part in the warlike operations.

None of the accusations can in my opinion be substantiated, & the last charge is in

particular absolutely without foundation. The object of the circular is I take it in the first place to lay charges agst. China betimes [early] to serve as the ground of claims for compensation in territory or money agst. China later on when Japan is compelled to sue for peace and she has leisure to pursue her policy of aggrandisement at Chinese expense.

I do not think that opportunity is likely to arise for a long time to come, if ever.

A 2nd object may be to enable the Russians themselves to violate Chinese neutrality by taking her ships out of Shanghai to join the Baltic fleet, & to justify seizing on Amoy, or more prob. Samsha, as a naval base when the Baltic fleet arrives (if it ever gets so far).

You will prob. see in the local papers the Chinese govt. instructions to their Ministers abroad, wch. they have given out for publication.

It is a curious fact, the meaning of wch. is not quite clear, that the Russian circular was not communicated to the German Govt. Perh. the Russians feel so sure of German sympathy that they regard it as unnecessary to say anything to them about Chinese or Japanese misdeeds.

Mr. Hay [U.S. Secretary of State John Hay] I think was in too great a hurry to address a warning to the Chinese Govt. & the result has been that he has been thanked with effusion by Cassini. H.M.G. I am glad to say have not given me any such instructions, and contented themselves with asking me whether it was a fact that the Chinese Govt. had sold pig iron to Japan, wch. they think could probably be regarded as a breach of neutrality.

It turns out however that it is 'iron ore', sold not by the Govt. but by a company of mine-owners. I do not think this can be made out to be contrary to international law. H.M.G. evidently regarded the other Russian allegations as nonsense.

I enclose the return of prisoners surrendered at Port Arthur, wch. Morrison has given me. He has just come back from there, having been shown over the whole place & seen everything with his own eyes. There was plenty of food, ammunition & fuel. The King Arthur, captured by the Japanese in leaving Port Arthur, had just landed a full cargo of flour. There were 30,000 tons of Cardiff coal, and 40,000 other sorts, stocks of firewood. The new Town had hardly been damaged at all, & there was plenty of house accommodation. The distilling apparatus was unhurt. [Major-General Baron Anatoly Mikhailovich] Stoessel was no hero. The capture of [the Russian fort at Port Arthur] Erhlungshan & the death of [General] Kondratchenko were the two main factors in Stoessel's decision to surrender, but it is said he wld. have given up several weeks ago had not his officers opposed him.¹

¹ Stoessel is remembered in Japan for his gift of a white horse to General Nogi after the surrender.

The Japanese expect to be able to make use of three battleships and the Bayan [a cruiser], after raising and repairing them.

The telegrams about the internal state of Russia seem to point almost to a revolution, but there may be exaggeration.

What do you think of [Russian Baltic fleet commander] Admiral Rozhdestvensky's chances? I suppose he cannot help making an attempt to reach Vladivostok, as to return home wld. mean that Russia had thrown up the sponge.¹

Of the position in Manchuria one hears nothing at all. The Japse. seem to be waiting for the breakup of the frost. The raid on Newchwang was a complete fiasco.

I was sorry to see that the Andromeda's mission was not successfully carried out. Perh. it would have been better if she had waited to get a reply fr. MacDonald.

We have been having a mild winter, but it has turned cold again with the last few days, & we all rejoice especially as there has been a fall of snow to moisten our dessicated nervous systems.

Encl. Prisoners are

	Army.
Generals	8
Field Officers	57
Company officers	531
Civil officers	99
Surgeons	109
Chaplains	13
N.C.O. & men	22,434
Non-combatants	<u>3,645</u>
	26,645

¹ Clearly Port Arthur was no longer an option for Rozhdestvensky, so Satow's supposition was correct.

PRO 30/33 14/15 China (1-67)
(September 13, 1904 – June 10, 1905)

	Navy
Admirals	4
Captains & Commandrs.	100
Lieutenants (including civil officers)	200
Chaplains	7
N.C.O. & men	4,500
Non-combatants	<u>500</u>
	5,311

The total number of Military & Naval officers & men surrendered is 32,207, the Volunteers being chiefly included among the non-combatants. Besides these there are abt. 15,000 or 16,000 wounded or sick in hospital. Abt. 1870 draught horses & abt. 100 charges are also in our hands.

--The above is General Nogi's official report. It seems as if the numbers in the navy return were not exactly known to him.

35. Satow to F.A. Campbell

26.1.05

My dear Campbell,

You may have seen newspaper reports to the effect that Pierpoint Morgan and his friends have brought back the Belgian shares in the Canton-Hankow railway Co. This is what A.W. Bash, whom I have mentioned in despp. & private letters writes to me.

“As all stock certificates have a blank transfer on the back, and are, when signed in blank, negotiable, we all know that it is very easy to have the registration & the books show a certain owner, while in reality the actual owner is another person altogether. And the real owner cannot be discovered without the whole matter being taken, by process of law, before a Court of Justice, which course is China's own hope of ridding herself of that obnoxious crowd.

“So long as the firm of Cary & Whitridge in New York is chief counsel & manipulator, Genl. Whittier (agent of King Leopold) is President; M. Pierre Mali (Belgian Cons. Genl. at New York) is Vicepresident & Treasurer & his own private Secy. is Secy. of the

Corporation; Mr. Cits[?] (the Belgian King's engineer-in-chief) is Manager of the Co. in China, anyone can see who are really masters of the situation."

Bash has given up all hope of being able to supplant the American China Development Co. & is back at Shanghai trying to put through his scheme for a line from Hangchow to Canton thro' Kiangsi abt. wch. I reported last year.

36. Satow to F.A. Campbell

26.1.05

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for your letter of Dec. 2. I can well understand how hard worked you must have been during the North Sea crisis, and wonder how you managed to get through it all.

I have been keeping you carefully informed abt. [Director of British & Chinese Corporation George] Jamieson's negotiations, wch. have made a good deal of progress. From the last report you will see that after having settled for £700,000 with the Chinese negotiator he has made the discovery that this does not suffice for payment of interest for the first six months & running expenses. This doubtless will lead to a counterdemand on Shêng's part. If the negotiations had been going on at Shanghai & with Shêng, instead of under our eyes here, the blame of this wld. have been thrown on Shêng, whereas it is Jamieson's mistake.

In my desp. No. 435 of Dec. 19 I gave you an account of negotiations for the settlement of the indemnity, a main point of wch. was my proposal to fix the rate by taking the London price of silver as a basis. Dubail at that time professed to approve of the idea. Abt. a fortnight ago I accordingly drafted a memorandum, giving up the old proposal of Hillier to fix the rate by public tender, & pronouncing for the London price of silver, coupled with a proposal to halve with the Chinese the difference betw. their estimate of the amount of arrears. This I showed first to Mumm, who agreed. But when Dubail came to read it, he declared his govt. wld. not hear of any London rate, but was willing to let the Chinese buy telegraphic transfers.

Gaiffier the Belgian cried out agst. the latter proposal, wch. I told him I cld. not accept unless the Chinese were free to buy of any bank they chose, because, said he, Belgium had established a bank expressly to handle the indemnity, to wch. she paid 1% commission, & if China were allowed to buy telegraphic transfers in the open market, the bank's occupation wld. be gone.

Yesterday Mumm came to me with a fresh draft of proposals from the Chinese, bearing evident marks of Dubail's handiwork, offering £1,200,000 in discharge of all arrears (wch. is about what my figures wld. be) coupled with a proposal that the average rate of Shanghai shld. be taken. This he explained to me meant of course that rate as based on the London price of silver, & I expressed myself contented.

Today I hear from him that Dubail will not hear of the London price, but he has found a formula wch. he thinks will satisfy me! I have written back to say that I do not think any scheme wch. leaves the fixing of the rate to the Shanghai bankers will prevent the recurrence of the past abuses. We are to have a meeting of our four selves tomorrow, when I shall hear what this formula is.

The Russo-Chinese, French, German & Dutch banks act together in trying to squeeze the Chinese, & owing to the system of voting they can always command a majority.

Morrison I see telegraphed to the "Times" that France, Germany & Russia were opposed to an equitable settlement, because their banks wld. lose the unjust profit they make out of handling their shares of the indemnity. This is quite true, but Mumm complained of it to me, having had an inquiry as to the meaning of the teleg. You have been good enough to leave me so much latitude, that I feel in a strong position agst. the colls: whose principal object is to enrich their banks at the expense of China.

I telegd. to you on the 9th that the Board of Trade shld. draft the amendments they desire to the Trademark regulations, & not content themselves with mere criticism. Since then I have recd. the desp. (No. 318) enclosing criticisms of the China Association, the Trademark Owners' Ass[ociatio]n & the British American Tobacco Co., & I am on the point of telegraphing my observations on these, & a request for definite instructions. For if, after acting in concert with Mumm & Dubail in presenting proposals wch. have not been approved by you in advance, & getting them accepted by China, they are thrown out on my sending them home, all the work will have to be recommenced, but under greater difficulties than ever.

I observe that abt. 3 wks. elapse between the arrival in London of a desp. or teleg. on this subject & your receipt of the comment of the registrar-general of trade-marks. I am going to suggest therefore that to avoid loss of time I should be authorized to communicate directly with that functionary.

I have sent for the commercial attaché [J.W. Jamieson] to come here, with all the information he can gather together at Shanghai as to the needs & desires of the China

Association. A good many of the criticisms of the Board of Trade are founded on mistranslations of the Chinese text wch. were made by him.

I greatly doubt the wisdom of his headquarters being fixed at Shanghai. In my experience of this post he wld. have been more useful if he had been stationed at Peking, and sent to Shanghai when the need of his presence there arose.

You telegd. fr. the African Dept. a week or two ago to inquire whether he or Mayers could be seconded for service in South Africa, & I answered with such alacrity that I could spare J.W. Jamieson for as long as you liked provided Hosie were apptd. in his stead, that I am afraid you have guessed that I should be glad to get rid of the individual. At any rate you have not accepted my offer!

37. Satow to Lansdowne

26.1.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The correspce. betw. Lessar & the Foreign Bd. of wch. a précis, completing what I have sent before, goes forward by this mail, seems to show that the Russian circular is founded entirely upon it. Several of my colls.; as I think I have said before, are of opinion that it has been Lessar's policy to accumulate charges of undue benevolence towards Japan, in order to have a foundation later on for claiming fr. China that compensation, whether in money or territory, for the cost of the war wch. she could not possibly extract fr. Japan. The Chinese seem to fear that the circular is a prelude to the occupation of a port on the coast of China, whether Amoy or Samsha, as a flying base for the Baltic squadron, but before the latter can reach either place it will probably have met the Japanese fleet, & whatever the result of the encounter, a flying base would scarcely be of much use after that. Either the Russian ships will get thro' to Vladivostok or will betake themselves to Saigon. Another use to wch. the circular might be put wld. be to justify the departure of the "Askold" "Mandjour" and destroyers fr. Shanghai & Chefoo, but no doubt these will be carefully watched by the Japanese.

I think there is little doubt that the Japanese Legation had a hand in the preparation of the Chinese reply to the American Ch. d'Aff. & of the circular instructions to the Chinese Ministers abroad, wch. are superior to the usual run of such documents when framed by the Foreign Board unaided.

The Chinese have asked my Italian coll: [Carlo Baroli], who was unable to tell them

whether the Russian circular was communicated at Rome, to telegraph to his govt. requesting them to give entire credence to whatever the Chinese Min. said to M. Tittoni ¹ regarding this matter. He said he would be very happy to do so.

The sentence inflicted on the Russian sailor who unintentionally killed a respectable unoffending Chinese at Shanghai seems to have been adequate, and I have told the Chinese govt. & everyone else that under the circs. I doubt whether a heavier penalty wld. have been imposed in England.

But it seems to me rather a doubtful proposition to invoke the extraterritoriality conceded by Treaty to Russian subjects coming to China in the ordinary way, in favour of sailors who have been interred to save them fr. falling into the hands of the enemy. I shld. suppose that from a legal point of view they are in the custody of the Chinese Govt. instead of in that of the Japanese.

Fortunately I have not had to express an opinion on this point, wch. is probably quite new.

Mumm tells me that the Russian circular was not communicated at Berlin, as far as he knows, wch. he considers strange, as it was the German Govt. that led the movement in favour of restricting the area of hostilities in Chinese territory. Dubail also seems uncertain whether any communication was made at Paris.

It was the Chinese Foreign Board wch. by Prince Ch'ing's permission communicated the correspce. betw. them & the Russian Min. & also the notes exchanged with the American Ch. d'Aff.

The rumour is current that Conger will be offered the Embassy at Mexico ², and in that case Rockhill is almost certain to succeed him here. I think we ought to pull well together, for we have kept up a friendly correspce. since he left Peking in the autumn of 1901.

38. Satow to F.A. Campbell

8.2.05

My dear Campbell,

Since the date of my last letter, Mumm, Dubail, Gaiffier & I have held several meetings, & the result of these & of communications with the Chinese is that the latter offer to pay 8 millions of Protocol taels to wipe off the arrears of the indemnity, & to pay hereafter in gold,

¹ Tomasso Tittoni (1855-1931) was Foreign Minister of Italy, 1903-05.

² E.H. Conger told Satow on March 18, 1905 that he was pleased to be appointed to Mexico. (Diary)

subject to a deduction of interest at 4% per annum on the monthly instalments. They propose to pay either by bills or telegraphic transfers, wch. they are to be at liberty to procure fr. any bank they please, & at Shanghai or any other financial centre, but offer to pay any Power that prefers it at Shanghai in silver according to the parity of exchange based on the London price of bar silver. It is understood that they will at the same time deliver to the delegates of each Power a gold bond for the whole amount of the indemnity due to it, expressed in its own money, & that pay[men]t shall be made by monthly instalments.

We 4 had constituted ourselves into a private 'conciliabule', & the Chinese proposal is now being circulated among the colls: by Mumm, as the result of conferences betw. Gaiffier & the Chinese. What they will say to it I do not know. Lessar is supposed to be likely to make difficulties.

On the 27th after a long discussion in wch. I made it clear that I wld. not agree to payment in bills of exchange or telegraphic transfers, unless the Chinese were allowed to procure these on the open market, i.e. fr. any bank they chose, & not for each Power exclusively fr. its own bank, the following formula was drafted.

En ce qui concerne l'avenir, les Puissances autorisent la Chine à opérer des versements mensuels et à déduire 4% sur les versements anticipés.

Ces versements seront effectués sur la base du prix de l'argent à Londres, augmenté du coefficient des charges.

Quant aux Puissances qui n'accepteraient pas ce mode de libération, la Chine devra les payer en or ou en transferts télégraphiques en monnaie de leurs pays, qu'elle pourra se procurer à sa volonté et au mieux de ses intérêts.

As it was evident that all the Powers must prefer telegraphic transfers, I tried to get 'at any bank she may choose', but the others wld. not hear of these words being inserted.

Then it was proposed that when the circular came round we shld. all undertake to recommend this arrangement to our govts., but I said that as they had all pronounced themselves agst. telegraphic transfers on Dec. 14, I had not consulted H.M.G. on that point. I was authorized to accept the London price of silver multiplied by the bankers' coefficient, but could now only submit the alternative proposal for your appreciation, but without recommending it.

Next day Chao came to me with Gaiffier's Chinese version of the formula, wch. was not properly translated, so that it was incomprehensible to him. He brought a counterdraft

stipulating for liberty to call for tenders for bills on telegraphic transfers from any bank he liked, wch. I approved. On the 31st Chao came again with an amended draft, wch. I corrected for him; it gave him perfect liberty to buy exchange in the cheapest market.

On 1 Feb. we four had another meeting at wch. Chao's draft was produced, to wch. the Foreign Board had added a foolish para. stipulating that the arrears shld. be paid off in blank instalments spread over blank months. The colls: proceeded to emasculate Chao's draft by omitting the words 'at any bank', & added a new clause that the arrears must be paid in 15 days from the date of signature of the agreement bear interest at 4% fr. the 1st Jany.

Chao came to see me on the 2nd, and protested that he could not pay interest on the arrears, & that he had the money ready at any moment. I showed him the para. of the Foreign Board's counter draft abt. payment in instalments, wch. he said was their invention & not his. I told him to put in the words 'at any bank', wch. he promised to do.

The following day he wrote to Gaiffier to say that he cld. not agree to pay interest, to wch. G. responded by returning his letter & saying that he wld. not submit it to his colls: Mumm wrote a private letter to Lienfang, who reads French, declaring that we could not give way on this point, & that if China did not agree he wld. wash his hands of the whole affair. Mumm also asked me to take the same line, but I wrote back that I did not care abt. the interest, & I told Gaiffier that I thought the demand smacked of Shylock's pound of flesh. However the Chinese gave way, an undertook to pay 25 days after signature, with interest from Jan. 1.

Then Mumm & Gaiffier pieced together all the various projects & counter-drafts, retaining I am glad to say the words 'any bank' & put it in circulation the day before yesterday. I wrote on the circular that I would submit the proposal to H.M.G., but I thought it desirable that all the Powers shld. choose the same mode of payment.

I thought it of vital importance to insist on the words 'at any bank', because when the Powers each get a separate bond, they wld. be able to say "we will only accept telegraphic transfers negotiated thro' our own bank". This would have had the double effect of enabling them to use their indemnities as a means of separate negotiation with China & of 'squeezing' the Chinese treasury as much as ever in the matter of exchange. In any case the effect of adopting the new proposal will be to do away with the special function of the Bankers' Commission, namely the receipt of the money and its division among the Powers, for telegraphic transfers cannot be passed thro' the hands of the commission.

If the new method of payment is approved by the Powers it ought to secure to China a fair rate of exchange, and do away with the robbery that has been going on for the past three years. I acquit the Hgkg & S'hai Bank of any responsibility for the past abuses, for Russia, Germany & France, whose banks were allied in the matter, had between them 65 per cent of the votes.

39. Satow to Lansdowne

9.2.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The Directors-General of the Northern Railways, Yüan & Hu, finding themselves in possession of some two million dollars surplus, have conceived the idea of building a railway from Peking to Kalgan, and Hu came to consult me about it. I replied that so long as they built it with their own money & employed their own engineers, Russia cld. not oppose it, and I assure him that we shld. not either. Today I have let him know of the offer of the Treasury to divide the indemnity receipts with the Rlwy Administration until the railway claim is paid off, subject to the deduction of the £90,000 advanced for repairs in 1900, so that the Administration will get all it is entitled to by the end of 1907. Hu is of course immensely delighted, as this will greatly facilitate the construction of the Kalgan extension. An immense quantity of wool and hides comes down to Tientsin that way, so the new line is sure of a good revenue. Formerly I opposed its being built, lest it shld. merely afford a convenience for a Russian advance on Peking fr. the side of Mongolia, but the events of the past 12 months have rendered that danger rather a remote one.

Mumm who has just been to see me says that Lessar is much less opposed to the proposed scheme for settling the indemnity question than he was, wch. change of view he attributes to pressure exercised at Petersburg fr. Paris & Berlin.

The Trademarks question hangs fire, partly because the China Association has put forward new proposals, partly because I have not yet recd. answers to my telegs. asking for more definite instructions. I am suggesting to the Association that they should send some one fr. Shanghai to help me in my negotiations, & I also expect the Commercial Attaché fr. there in about a week's time, unless he goes off to South Africa in consequence of the Colonial Office making it worth his while.

40. Satow to Lansdowne

15.2.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

My German coll: has been trying to commit the Chinese Govt. to a promise to consult him beforehand with regard to the apptmt. of Govr. of Shantung. He began by saying to them that it wld. be much pleasanter for him if his Govt. heard who was to be apptd. before they learnt it fr. the newspapers, & this seemed so reasonable & natural to Natung that he said they wld. be only too happy to oblige him. But when Chou-fu was transferred to Nanking in October & a certain Hu Ting-kan was made acting gov. of Shantung, the Foreign Board neglected to tell Mumm, & on being gently reminded of Natung's promise got out of it by saying that the new man was only acting. It then began to be whispered abt. that Mumm had objected to Hu's app[oin]tm[en]t. He told me himself, without my asking the question that this was not the case, but in fact Hu was a narrow minded pettifogging official of the old sort, & that he was glad he wld. not be confirmed. So Hu was got rid of and the Chinese govt. proceeded to appt. one Yang. This time some sort of communication was made to Mumm, who at once asked that Yang shld. call on him before proceeding to his post. Natung replied that there wld. be no difficulty about that; Yang was coming to Peking & would call at the German Legation. However, things turned out differently. Yang, who lived at Paotingfu as Provincial Treasurer, recd. instructions to proceed direct to Shantung on the ground of urgency. Mumm then got hold of our old friend, the Hu of the rlwy., & got him to telegraph an invitation to call at the German Legation. Yang replied that he could not come to Peking, & it was explained to Mumm that it wld. cost him 30 or 40 thousand taels, as high officials always have to give handsome presents each time they pass thro' the gates. Mumm persisted, & it was finally arranged that the German doctor shld. lend a temple in wch. he lives, outside the city, in the summer months, to Hu, to give a lunch, and that Yang & Mumm shld. meet there. This programme was carried out on the 5 Feby.

Yang is notoriously corrupt, and has the reputation of lacking in backbone. But he is Yüan Shih kai's man, who recommended his apptmt.

I had a visit fr. Yüan's son yesterday, an intelligent young man who has learnt English. He told me all abt. the way in wch. Mumm's meeting with Yang was arranged, & added that the Empress Dowager had placed the Shantung foreign affairs under the direction of his father. There is some idea of sending young Yüan to Shantung as a sort of adlatus

[assistant] to Yang, to see that he does not fall under German influence. If he goes, he wants to take with him Major G.F. Menzies of the South Lancashire Regt. who teaches him English & has been seconded for service with the Viceroy.

Menzies, whose nickname is “Wandering Willie”, is a thoroughly good fellow, honest & trustworthy. Perhaps not a brilliant soldier, but he gets on well with the Chinese, and likes to be with them. I hope he will be left alone, and not be interfered with by the Army Council.

Genl. Ventriss has on his staff as Qr. Master for Intelligence a certain Col. Wingate, who will very possibly suggest to the Genl. that Menzies ought not to be allowed to remain in an undefined position with the Viceroy. I trust that no hasty step will be taken without my having an opportunity of offering my opinion officially respecting the advantage of leaving Major Menzies where he is.

41. Satow to Cartwright

16.2.05

My dear Cartwright,

I hope there will be no difficulty abt. [A.J.] Flaherty drawing the Hangchow salary, tho' I am in reality sending him to Changsha. The state of things there & the obstructiveness of the Govr. made it necessary to send a Consul in anticipation of a salary being provided for in the estimates. And it was necessary to call him Consul in order to give him weight with the local officials. I cannot as yet say whether he will have to stay there permanently. That can only be decided after we see how the Govr. receives the remonstrances that Flaherty has been instructed to present.

42. Satow to F.A. Campbell

23.2.05

My dear Campbell,

In your letter of Dec. 30 you mention a teleg. fr. the Hgkg & S'hai Bank in S'hai fr. wch. it appeared that they had been insisting on 7% for a loan to the Wuchang viceroy, & you said that it seemed greedy. The explanation is that the amount the old man wanted to borrow was too small to put on the market, & the Bank cannot afford to lock up 600,000 taels for several years at less than 7%, wch. is the rate ordinarily charged to merchants for overdrafts. To lend to him at 5% or 6% even wld. be a direct loss to the bank. However

Hillier suggested to the London Office to place privately with parties interested in the projected opium monopoly a sterling loan for £150,000 for 5 years @ 6%, secured on the boiled opium excise of Hupei & Hunan, with a clause providing that the Hgkg & S'hai Bank must be consulted in case of a revision of the opium revenue affecting the security pledged. And I have heard fr. Hillier that the business seems to be going forward. y.s.

P.S. I am communicating confidentially to Hillier for the information of Chao, the Minr. of Finance, the contents of the India Office letter of Dec. 22 abt. the project for an opium monopoly, wch. was sent to me in the print list. E.S.

43. Satow to Lansdowne

9.3.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Natung in talking yesterday of T'ang's apptmt. to London, thanked me for having procured the King's approval, wch. was a polite way of saying that he knew he was wrong in at first refusing to ask for it. As a fact, he gave way as soon as he was reminded of the precedent in Sir Claude Macdonald's case. Having entered the Dept. of F.A. only in 1900 he is naturally ignorant of most things that occurred before.

He said T'ang had asked leave to come here before proceeding to England, but that it was not yet settled. Perh. it depends on the measure of success he meets with at Calcutta. The plan of sending him to Lhasa seems to have been abandoned.

From this subject it was an easy transition to the topic of the Dalai Lama. He is still at Urga, or at a monastery in the vicinity. On my enquiring whether he wld. go to Petersburg or come here, Natung replied that there was no question of the latter, & asked whether I thought it wld. not be best to remove him to Hsining, wch. he favoured. What shld. I think of his visiting Petersburg & then returning to Lhasa. I told him that in that event we shld. have to begin our work over again, for we could not admit Russian influence at Lhasa. Prob. it wld. be better to transfer him to Hsining, instead of leaving him at Urga, where he threatened to become a centre of agitation & to eclipse the Taranath Lama, a harmless person, of whom the worst that cld. be said was that he loved wine & women too well.

I fancy the Chinese Govt. wld. like to get him away fr. Urga, but dare not take forcible measures to remove him to Hsining.

Uchida told me a few days ago that the D-L has 2 agents in Peking, who are charged to obtain leave for him to come here & see the Emperor, or return to Lhasa. But Natung

denied this & asserted that it was only newspaper talk.

Backhouse who has just returned tells me that his Mongol teacher who recently came down fr. Urga reports that the natives there are flocking round the D-L, & paying him great reverence, completely ignoring the local Living Buddha. I am thinking of starting Backhouse on a trip to those parts, to find out what is going on. He will do much better than Gatrell, who is far from having had the same excellent education. Gatrell has recently taken a year's engagement with the Peking Syndicate, as Doctor at the mines. If necessary at any time I shld. be able to get him back without difficulty.

The Russian suggestions that China wishes to break the peace & that there is a danger of fresh outbreaks after the manner of 1900 are disbelieved by my colls: Dubail agrees with me that there is absolutely no sign of anything of the sort. In 1900 for long before the Siege of the Legations the hostility of the population of Peking was very marked. I go about on foot very often, & see no tokens of anti foreign feeling.

There seem to be a good many floating mines about the Gulf [of Pechili], & steamers have taken to navigating by day only. It is much to be wished that a small man of war could be detailed to search for & explode them. It wld. be useless to urge the Chinese Govt. to do this, & if we want safety we must secure it ourselves.

I think Ad. Noel finds the withdrawal of so many small ships of the Rinaldo and Britomart class very very inconvenient. They were very useful for river work, both on the Yangtze, Peiho & Canton river. I gather that he was not consulted abt. the matter. I regret equally with him the adoption of the measure, wch. leaves the policing of the rivers & the protection of the foreign settlements mainly to the Germans and French.

44. Satow to F.A. Campbell

9.3.05

My dear Campbell,

I am afraid you will think me a great worry for telegraphing so often to hurry up the B. of T. abt. their amendments to the Trademark Regulations, but our position is a very disagreeable one. The Frenchman & German both have their instructions, & rejoice in telling the Chinese that we block the way, & in seeing us at loggerheads with our Japanese allies. It is interesting, but not very useful to receive the criticisms of various chambers of commerce, & I confess I have no very great respect for the observations of Mr. Griffin of the Trademark registry.

The African Dept. put me rather in a hole by telegraphing offers of apptmts. in S. Africa without putting "Private" on them. The result is that they are decyphered in the chancery, where there are 3 consular assistants, who of course spread abroad the lucrative apptmts. that wld. be given to their service but for a cross-grained minister.

Jamieson having got his own terms cannot of course refuse to go, but I believe he wld. rather have declined even £3000 a year. He will go off in a few days, when we have thoroughly discussed S'hai views as to the amendments of the Trademark Regns. Yesterday we spent 2½ hours over them. Now he is studying what has come fr. home, the Fr. & Germ. proposals & my observations. It is no use my keeping him here till the B. of T. amendments come – usque ad Kalendas Graecas.¹

I am sending you a further report on the Peking Syndicate's negotiations. It really looks as if we were in sight of port. But as you will see the master of the ship is always wanting to change the course. Mayers has recd. a private letter fr. him asking for fresh verbal changes. His weakness is agreeing to things & then after reflexion finding reasons for dissatisfaction.

I hope the judgment of Mr. Justice Joyce in the C.E. & M. Co. will be upheld on appeal. There is no doubt that Moreing, Hoover, de Wouters & Co. are men without a conscience. Detring too came out pretty badly in the witness box. The F.O. is to be congratulated on refusing to dip its fingers in such a dirty puddle.

I trust you will support me in refusing the claim of J.M. [Jardine Matheson] & Co. to 5% commission on the railway claim. They first represented themselves as agents for the bondholders, & when they found the money was going to the rlwy. administration they tryed [sic] to make out that they had acted for it. After all it was Kinder & the Br. Military people who had all the trouble of collecting the data on wch. the claims Commission decided. They have (i.e. J.M. & Co.) the reputation of being terrible skinflints.

45. Satow to Lansdowne

18.3./05

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

The E-D [Empress-Dowager] in spite of all the advice given to her, immediately on learning of the retreat of the Russians fr. Mukden, sent for Chao, the governor-designate, to tell him that he must proceed forthwith to take charge. As soon as I heard of it I let Prince

¹ "Until the Greek calends", i.e. never, since the Greeks had no calends. (Merriam Webster online)

Ch'ing know that this was an absurd idea, & that China must remain quite quiet until the war is over. I feel sure that Japan will not give up anything until peace is made, & the majority of the Chinese officials quite understand this. But the Russians have underground communication with the Palace, & no doubt put it into the E-D's head that Japan intends to keep Manchuria. In spite of her intelligence in domestic affairs, she is quite ignorant of foreign politics, & is easily deceived.

There was some trouble a few days ago abt. some supplies wch. the Japse. commissariat wanted to send fr. Newchwang by rail to Hsin-min-tun. Bush of Newchwang, who was employed as agent, said it was for the army. The railway officials refused on the ground that it was a violation of neutrality. Then the Japanese officer in charge at Newchwang threatened to seize the rlwy., & Yüan Shih kai hearing of this ordered the rolling-stock to be withdrawn inside the wall. Lessar at once took advantage of this to point out that Russia had never made such a threat & to emphasize the rude and brutal behaviour of Japan. The result of all was that Col. Aoki the military attaché here went to give explanations to Yüan Shih kai & assure him there was no intention at all of seizing the railway, so the traffic was resumed, & I suppose the supplies are being forwarded.

As long as the Russians were in Mukden they used the rlwy. for sending supplies there in enormous quantities. The railway revenue grew rapidly, & all the officials got their squeeze. So the Russians are popular with them, & the Japanese, who cannot afford to give big tips are the reverse.

This illustrates too the difficulty Japan wld. have in establishing the same kind of influence here that Russia had. She will be able to put pressure on the Chinese Govt. by threats and naval demonstrations, but will not be able to buy acquiescence. There will always be a strong pro-Russian party at Peking, as long as the Russo-Chinese bank has money to spend in buying sympathy.

46. Satow to Lansdowne

23.3.05

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

The news sent by Colonel Ducat of a secret Treaty betw. Russia, France & Germany with the object of the revival of the Far Eastern "triplice" of 1895, wch. I am also telegraphing, seems to me worthy of attention. It is very circumstantial. Père Favier is of course very intimate with Dubail, & the latter is vain enough to boast that he had had a hand in bringing

about such an understanding. Of Père Robert the other informant I know nothing, except that he is the procureur-général of the Missions Etrangères & resides at Hongkong. The existence of such a treaty is not in itself improbable, for nothing can be more galling to the three Powers than to see Japan rise up and destroy the effects of their policy of 1895, besides the fear both of them must entertain of being the next to be dealt with. Nothing but the certainty that England, & the distant probability that America might interfere to prevent them robbing Japan of the fruits of victory would prevent their acting in the way indicated.

Mumm never talks to me abt. the war, but he affects now to think that Russia must make peace. I told him I did not share that view. Dubail's only utterance bearing on the question is that we cannot desire to see either belligerent become predominant in China.

I presume that if any exchange of views has taken place betw. the three powers in view of such support being given [it?] must have been earlier than [than?] the fall of Port Arthur and the retreat fr. Mukden, neither of wch. events was thought likely.

47. Satow to Campbell

23. Mar. 05

My dear Campbell,

I am afraid that at present I see no way of getting rid of Bredon. Hart is perfectly well aware that we no longer support Bredon, as can be seen from a private letter of Townley's to Ld. Lansdowne of 30. Jan/'03 & also fr. a private letter of mine to Ld. L. of 14 Sept, 1904. [See no. 1 above.]

Hart no doubt has said Bredon was "forced" on him, but he has played a double game with that gentleman, & has been found out. There was a young man named Simpson in the Customs, who was Mrs. Hart's lover. He took copies of Hart's private telegs. to Duncan Campbell telling him to prevent B. fr. coming, while officially he sent telegs. to B. in the other sense. Simpson was in Hart's confidential employ at the time, & remained here till after the siege. Then he looted on a large scale, and went down to Shanghai where he realized a large sum of money. Hart ordered him to Hankow, whereupon he resigned. Having lost all his ill-gotten gains he went to Port Arthur as a newspaper correspondent, & recently has published under the nom de plume of Weale a rubbishy book called Manchu & Muscovite. He has given (?sold) the telegs. to Bredon.

I shall keep my eyes open & if a chance presents itself of putting a spoke in Bredon's wheel, you may rely on my doing it.

48. Satow to F.A. Campbell

23.3.05

My dear Campbell,

In your letter of 10 Jany. you spoke abt. the news I had sent about the indemnity. Everybody has accepted the Chinese proposals except Lessar & Uchida. The former says he does not like to worry his people with telegs., but tells Mumm that he wld. like to see the text of the proposed exchange of notes, that he might teleg. in full. He also suggests that he wld. like to be able to demand telegraphic transfers for his share of the indemnity in £, as Russia has to pay interest on loans in London. But as the Russian bond is to be made out in roubles, it is clear to me that he cannot be paid by the Chinese in any other money. I regard this suggestion as a red-herring across the trail. Uchida also "has no instructions". I doubt his getting any, for there is no doubt Japan has her eye on this Russian indemnity, wch. she hopes to get assigned to her when peace is made. Then she wld. have abt. 34% of the total. So why shld. she hurry. He tells colls: of mine that Komura who negotiated the final protocol is very averse from seeing any part of it changed. So I think we are as far off as ever. And as far as H.M.G. is concerned the difference betw. payment in silver & payt. in gold is a mere fleabite.

49. Satow to Admiral Noel

29 Mar 05

My dear Noel,

Many thanks for your letter of Feb. 13. I am much relieved to find you are of opinion that the Japse. will beat the Baltic fleet if it tries conclusions with them.

The defeat of Kuropatkin by the united Japse. armies was a great & unexpected blow to the Russians here. I believe myself that the Japse. will now march on Harbin without losing more time than they can help, & that the Russians will be unable to hold the place. If they are prudent they will retire along the rlwy. westwards. But it is quite possible that the Japanese while advancing straight on Harbin will send a force to cut the communications further West. That they intend shortly to lay siege to Vladivostok there can be no doubt. I do not attach much importance to rumours of peace; even though an attempt were made by Russia to learn on what terms she cld. have it, the Japse. are bound to make demands wch. she is at present not ready to concede. Then the war will go on.

The situation is like that in 1870 after [the Battle of] Sedan. Jules Ferry [French statesman, 1832-93] refused the German terms, & the war went on until Paris had to surrender; then peace was made, & France had to submit to the conditions she had previously refused.

What might check the Japanese wld. be a combination of France & Germany to put pressure on them to grant easy terms, coupled with a failure of England to do her duty as an ally. Of such a concatenation of circumstances I trust there is no possibility. To shrink from a contest with France & Germany wld. be the most disgraceful weakness & the ruin of our future. I refuse to believe that any Br. Govt. wld. be capable of it. y.s.

E.S.

50. Satow to Curzon

6.4.05

Dear Ld. Curzon,

In my desp. of the 9 March I sent you a copy of a note wch. I had addressed to the Chinese Govt. regarding the undelimited portion of the Southern part of the Burma-Yünnan frontier.¹ My instructions were to say that the Scott² line wld. be regarded as the 'provisional' boundary. I hesitated a good deal abt. this word 'provisional', but finally decided to insert it, as it is best to adhere to one's instructions, & moreover it had been suggested in some of the papers on the subject that if the Chinese refuse to accept the Scott boundary, we shld. then be free to withdraw concessions we had offered to make.

As you will see fr. the Chinese reply wch. I am now forwarding they refuse to recognize it even provisionally.

Under these circs. I see no other course than for Burma to carry out the warning she gave that no Chinese officials or soldiers will be permitted to transgress the Scott line, tho' I am afraid it must be a costly measure.

The Chinese as you know are a very difficult people when it comes to a question of boundaries, & the Central Govt. will never go agst. the wishes of local officials.

But for that unlucky visit of Litton & two other officers to a Wa village, for wch. Sir Geo. Scott has told me they had not his leave, the boundary might probably have been settled by that Commission.

¹ See "Tribal Boundaries of the Burma-Yunnan Frontier", Martin R. Norins, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1939), pp. 67-79

² Sir James George Scott (1851-1935).

yv.s.

51. Satow to Lansdowne

2 April 1905

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

The papers report that Prince & Princess Arisugawa are going to Germany for the wedding of the Crown Prince, & that they will go to England. The Prince was sent in 1897 as special ambassador for the Queen's Jubilee, & was greatly pleased with his reception. The Princess used not to speak any foreign language when I was at Tokio, but she may have learnt since. She is really a charming lady, with plenty of innocent fun in her.

May I suggest that if any member of the Japan service is wanted to be in attendance on them, Mr. H. Parlett would do very well. He speaks Japanese fluently & is presentable.

It is very interesting to see the billing and cooing that is going on between Japan & Germany. Japan declaring that she is perfectly satisfied with the way in wch. Germany has discharged her duties as a neutral, & offering to guarantee her the possession of Kiaochou. Germany giving out that Japan has given her most satisfactory assurances, and that she is ready to make a loan if asked.

It reminds me rather of the lavish hospitality extended to a Russian Prince in Tokiō some years ago, & to Genl. Kuropatkin the year before last. The Russians seemed to accept all this as quite genuine.

I hear fr. Chefoo that there are quite as many Japse. at the provincial capital of Shantung as there are Germans, & I read in a Japse. newspaper that Germany's rights will be respected, but that she must not try to extend them.

Perh. the Germans put no more confidence in the Japse. than the latter do in them. Uchida certainly looks on Mumm with great suspicion.

52. Satow to F.A. Campbell

April 5. 05

My dear Campbell,

On receiving your teleg. No. 43 of 15 March abt. Lister Kaye's offer of a loan to Chang Chih-tung I repeated it to [E.H.] Fraser, with the exception of the last paragraph wch. I sent to him privately, making it a little milder. Owing to a breakdown in the Yangtze lines he did not receive it till Mar. 23, when he telegd. back that he thought it might not be fair to

transmit Kaye's message, as there was every prospect that the Bank & the Viceroy wld. come to a decision as soon as an expected teleg. abt. the rate of interest arrived.

I inferred fr. the general tone of your teleg. that you were not particularly anxious abt. Kaye's negotiation, & I replied to Fraser that under the circs. he might keep back the message, so as to leave the field free to the bank.

On the 3rd however [Guy] Hillier [of Hongkong & Shanghai bank] came to tell me that Chang having insisted on getting his loan at par, the bank had said that the interest must be 6½%. They had previously offered to lend at the rate of 6% for every £95. But now the bank had discovered that they cld. not place the whole £150,000 among their friends, & wanted to get out of the affair by giving Chang Chihtung 48 hrs. to make up his mind. They also consulted Hillier whether it wld. not be better to offer a half-share to the Germans, as Chang was inviting a tender fr. the latter. Hillier ask[ed] me whether I wld. approve of half being offered to the Germans. If they made a better offer to the Viceroy than the Bank had done, he wld. accept it, & we shld. have let the Germs. in. Was it not better to give them a half, & so buy off their competition than throw up the sponge & let them have the whole. H. was naturally very annoyed with his principals for their shilly-shally, but I suppose myself that Ewen Cameron's illness & retirement have had something to do with their change of mind.

I said that personally speaking I thought ½ a loaf was better than no bread, & therefore there seemed to be no other course than let the Germans share.

Under the circs. I thought it wld. be well to inform Fraser of the situation, & to ask him to transmit Kaye's message.

This morning I heard fr. him that on the 3rd the Bank gave Chang, thro' him, 24 hrs. notice to make up his mind, & that he wld. send on Kaye's message. I have not yet heard the result.

In explanation of his having written to Lister Kaye, Fraser wrote to me on the 23 Mar. that he "did not offer Kaye the loan, but merely suggested that as the Viceroy was eager to borrow on good security, his Syndicate wld., I thought, have a chance of the desired artesian wells concession or some other if they cared to lend. At the time – 20 Jan'y – the banks were averse fr. lending on terms wch. H.E. Chang wld. look at, & he did not want to go to other nations, he said."

For my own part I have no information as to who are Kaye's financial friends, & I have always doubted his business capacity since his application to me to put before the Chinese

Govt. in 1900, or 1901, proposals of his for the canalization of the Yangtze gorges, a wild-cat scheme if ever there was one.

53. Satow to Lansdowne

6 April 1905

Dr. Lord Lansdowne,

The Japse. Military Attaché, [Colonel Nobuzumi Aoki] who has just returned from Mukden, told me yesterday that the no. of Russian prisoners taken in the battles round that place was not more than 25,000. It was over estimated at first, owing to a return having been counted 2ce over. On the other hand the Russians left 36000 dead on the field. Of the guns wch. Kuropatkin admitted the loss, over 100 guns of position & 300 field pieces, they had not recovered more than a fourth, & it was supposed that a great many must have been tumbled into the rivers. Marshall Oyama's headquarters will continue for some time to be at Mukden.

I asked him abt. peace rumours that have been flying ab[ou]t & his reply was that as far as he could see there was nothing in the disposition of either Russia or Japan to lead to the belief that negotiations were likely to take place at present. He added grimly, we must first take Vladivostok, wch. will be an easier job than Port Arthur, as the natural defences are much less formidable.

Uchida told me not long ago that before going to war his govt. had foreseen the necessity of driving the Russians back to Harbin & taking Vladivostok.

The only one of my colls: who pretends to believe that peace is imminent is Dubail, whose foible is always to know more than anyone else abt. what is happening.

I have suggested privately to Nat'ung that when peace comes to be made China must be freed fr. all agreements with Russia limiting her freedom of action in Manchuria, in regard especially to such matters as railway construction. I have no doubt this will be done, & that the convention respecting the evacuation of Manchuria will be annulled, also the agreement for the so-called Chinese Eastern railway.

The existence of the Scott agreement will then be somewhat of an inconvenience to us, unless in connection with the future of the Manchurian railways Japan stipulates that China shall be at liberty to borrow where she likes. These lines will certainly not be allowed to remain Russian property, & Japan wld. much rather have their price than keep them for herself. So a loan must be raised for their purchase by China, & we ought to have our share

of it. It will no doubt be a difficult matter to arrange.

P.S. Col. Bower tells me he gathers fr. a talk with Col. Aoki (the Military Attaché) that Japan aspires to keep Vladivostok & the Primorsk Province, & also that he was in favour of Japan retaining the rlwys. for herself because of China's inability to keep the Russians out of Manchuria. But it is not Russian immigration that is to be feared, & if they lose Port Arthur & Dalny the territory behind must be of no value to them. No doubt the Japse. demands will increase when they take Vladivostok. E.S.

54. Satow to F.A. Campbell

6/4/05

My dear Campbell,

Mumm Dubail & I have spent 2 mornings over the amendments to the Trademark regulations, & the draft will be ready in a day or two. I have had to reserve some points on wch. I have sent telegs. to you Nos. 64, 66 & 68. Our next step will be to give copies of the draft to the Italian & the Austrian, who have instructions to follow our lead. Then we shall a few days later, when the Chinese text is ready, communicate copies to the Japse. & American colls: & to the Foreign Board unofficially, & send the dft. to you also.

It is no easy task to harmonize the suggestions of everybody who has a finger in the pie. The Chambers of Commerce in England, & prob. the Board of Trade, seem not to understand the bearing of the fact the the [sic] Chinese Trade Mark Regulations cannot be enforced against foreigners, who are all under the jurisdiction of their own laws & Consular Courts, that the Chinese Regns. can only give protection agst. Chinese pirates, & that agst. foreign pirates the international agreements alone can be of any use. And Japan has hitherto not given her adhesion to any of these international agreements.

We shall have made a great cry about little meal.

The indemnity still sticks fast. We have given the Chinese the draft notes to be exchanged, & I hear they are making a fuss abt. the paragraph relating to the disposition of the silver recd. since Jan. 1. The Russians have not yet accepted the draft, & it has not yet been officially circulated among the Colls:, tho' they have all been made acquainted with its contents.

I think the Br. Delegate shld. be told by the Treasury that no decision can be taken by the Commission of Bankers unless there is an unanimous vote, & that the Protocol has not

created the Commission as an independent body. Each Delegate must act on instructions fr. his govt., & I think it wld. be well if ours were told to refer all questions to the Treasury thro' me. I cld. then give my opinion as to the instructions that shld. be sent to him. There is a great tendency on the part of the Delegates to fancy that what they agree upon binds their govts. tho' the latter may be ignorant of their proceedings.

55. Satow to Lord Knollys

6/4/05

Dear Lord Knollys,

Prince Frederick Leopold of Prussia arrived here last night, & the heads of missions are invited to meet him at dinner at the German Legation tomorrow evening. As you know he started fr. Berlin to join the Russian headquarters at Mukden, but since then the Japse. have taken this place, & the Russian headquarters are now supposed to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kirin. So if he pursues his journey one does not quite know how he will do it. This is not exactly the time of year for a journey thro' Eastern Mongolia. Mumm's idea seemed the other day to be that the Prince after visiting the Great Wall fr. here wld. prob. continue his journey home again by way of Japan & America.

Poor Lessar is in a bad way. He has had a gangrenous wound on the sole of one foot for some months past, & finally the doctors had to perform an operation, removing the greater part of his foot. His recovery is considered to be by no means assured. I saw him a week before the operation, when he talked most cheerfully about it. Everyone says there never was a man who displayed more courage & tenacity under the most trying circs. of health. He told me he shld. ask to be replaced in May.

The Russian military disasters have affected him all the more because he was opposed to the policies of Alexeieff to wch. the war is attributable.

56. Satow to Lansdowne

20.4.05

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

Col. Ameglio the commandant of the Italian troops came a few days ago [on April 14 – diary] to say goodbye before leaving China. He enlarged upon the cordial relations wch. had existed betw. the Italian & British troops. The Germans he said were “overbearing & brutal”, tho' they were allies. The Fr. behaved generally well. Of the Japse. he said they

were good soldiers & the officers well up in their profession, but he evidently does not like them & shares the genl. feeling among foreigners that they are arriving at a preponderant position in China. That they will sooner or later try to expel the Germans fr. Shantung he felt convinced. ¹ An Italian Missionary who had recently come from that province said to my Spanish colleague that it was the general talk there.

Col. Ameglio is not the only man from whom I have heard this sort of thing. It seems to be the general impression, & no one believes in the apparently cordial relations of the Germans with the Japanese. The former are trying to produce an impression that they do not entertain any ambitious schemes with regard to Shantung, & I think they are waiting to see what the result of the war is. Morrison's telegs. to the "Times" are prob. based on information given him by the Japse. Last mail I sent home some articles fr. a Japse-owned newspaper published at Chefoo in wch. the Germans were held up to public detestation. I have not asked Mumm whether the stories of fresh Germ. demands for mines & rwlys in Shantung are correct, for he would of course deny them.

On the other hand the Chinese do not like the Japse, who are apt to ride over them rough-shod. Hillier, who hears a good deal of what is going on, confirms my impression on this head, & I do not think any candid person believes in the combination of China & Japan agst. Europe. I entirely agree with the views expressed by Col. Bower in the memo. enclosed in my desp. No. 125.

I am sending Backhouse on a trip to Urga & places beyond. On his way back he will visit Si-ning, where perh. the Dalai Lama will be interned by that time. He has learnt a good deal of Mongol, a little Thibetan, speaks both Russian & Chinese quite well, so he is well equipped for gathering information. He is to leave early in May & expects to be back by November.

Fr. my Japse. coll: [Uchida] & his military attaché [Aoki] I gather that the object of Marshal Oyama is to cut the Russian communications w. of Harbin, & that they expect Vladivostok to fall into their hands much more easily than Port Arthur did.

57. Satow to F.A. Campbell

20.4.05

My dear Campbell,

¹ Japan did so in 1914 after the First World War began as Britain's ally under the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Apropos of railways, Major Menzies, who is in the employ of Yüan Shihkai, tells me that Liang, the Chinese advisor of the latter on rlwy. matters, said to him the notion of building the Szechuen Hankow line with Chinese capital was absurd, & he encouraged Menzies to telegraph to Pearsons that if they only waited a year they could get a contract to build it. Pearsons he recommended to raise a loan of ten millions to build the line & provide for the necessary squeezes, as is the custom in China (you see Mr. Liang was quite frank). I advised M. if he telegraphed his news to Pearsons, with whom he is in communication, he shld. add a suggestion that they shld. call on you & ask how the land lay.

My last news fr. Chengtu is that the Viceroy has sent out 2 Chinese at £20 a month to “survey” the line to Chungking, & that these gentlemen are totally ignorant of the art. He asked Yüan Shih kai for the services of a very competent Chinese named Jeme[?], who was trained in America & worked under Kinder, but Yüan replied that he cld. not be spared.

I hear nothing fr. either Mumm or Jardine’s agent abt. beginning negotiations for the Tientsin-Yangtze line. When the former approaches the subject, I shall ask him abt. the mines at Tiger Hill on the edge of our sphere of influence at Weihaiwei. Menzies tells me that Yüan is resolved not to sign a final agreement unless he can keep the management in Chinese hands, on the model of the Northern rlwys. & as the Germans are equally resolved not to concede this, I do not see how they are to agree.

Mr. C.H. Ross is here abt. the Canton-Kowloon line. I think the C.O. & the Govr. of H[on]g K[on]g have opened their mouths rather too wide in asking that the traffic receipts shall be pooled, & the net receipts divided in proportion to the sums actually expended by each party, instead of in proportion to mileage. At any rate the Chinese ought to be allowed to bring in their discount on the loan, the interest they will have to pay while waiting for the Kowloon section to be completed & their commissions, & each side ought to bring in the cost of the land.

The preamble drawn up by the solicitors reciting a clause of the Kowloon lease seems to me not quite necessary. The argument may quite well be used by me in discussion, but I do not see the use of putting it into the agreement. The draft contract drawn up by lawyers is a horrid piece of drafting. Ross has been trying to summarize it in plain English for me, & finds the task difficult. I observed that if he could not read a legal document, how could any one be expected to put it into intelligible Chinese.

I have put some of these suggestions into a desp., & even hinted that agreements drafted by lawyers are not plain reading. A lawyer is a useful help, but he is a terrible master.

58. Satow to F.A. Campbell

20/4/05

My dr. Campbell,

Reports have no doubt reached you fr. time to time to the effect that Hippley's health is not good. Morrison has told me on more than one occasion, & I fancy [J.O.P.] Bland of Shanghai is concerned in spreading the report. Also Bredon doubtless. However Cockburn wrote to me fr. Shanghai on March 23 as follows:

[extract]¹

Hart looks very fit. The fact that Bredon is on the spot waiting for his shoes seems to have rejuvenated him. He gives Bredon nothing to do.

The indemnity question hangs fire because Russia has not given her reply. Dubail & Mumm have telegraphed to Paris & Berlin to urge the matter at Petersburg. Lessar is very ill. The doctors have cut away a second piece of his foot, & the prospect of his living to reach Russia seems small. Still he clings to his position, & will not abdicate, because he knows Pavlov is waiting at Shanghai for the succession. We have nearly come to an agreement about our joint amendments to the Trademark Regulations, & in a few days shall be ready to put them before the Chinese unofficially.

Bishop Favier is dead, & [Bishop Stanislas] Jarlin reigns in his stead. My Italian coll: seems to think the Fr. protectorate of Catholic missions will come to an end with the separation of Church & State in France, but I am inclined to think that the Fr. Govt. will insist on it vis à vis the Chinese, & the non-French Catholic missionaries are not of sufficient importance to weigh in the bal[an]ce. So long as the Vatican does not appoint a legate & forbid Fr. missionaries to appeal to the Legation for support, they will continue to do so.

There seems to be some chance at last of the Peking Syndicate getting their rlwy. contract signed, as Shêng has sent in the memorial. I have been constantly at Natung abt. it. Fr. Jamieson I learn that the syndicate is still a long way off getting down to the coal. If they had reached coal as early as they originally expected they wld. have made so much out of it that they cld. have afforded to chuck the rlwy. agreement. He has sent a surveyor into Shansi to look for a workable seam there.

¹ Satow's note.

59. Satow to Lansdowne

4.5.05

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

I see fr. the teleg. sections that Komura said to my Tokio coll: [Claude Macdonald] abt. Mar 9 that if the representations made to the Chinese Govt abt the probability of the Russian ships at S'hai breaking out on the approach of the Baltic fleet were not effectual, Japan wld. do as she did at Chefoo. The Japse. Min. at Washington must have used similar language to Mr. Adey, for the teleg. recd. by Coolidge was also of a menacing tone. He did not at all like it, he told me, & thought Japan was merely trying to find a pretext for going into S'hai & seizing the ships that are there. I communicated to him the instructions I had recd. & said I must speak to the Foreign Board. My arguments that he shld. not address an unofficial note were unavailing, tho' I warned him that if he did, use wld. be made of it by the Japse., just as Cassini had done on a previous occasion. This morning Reuter informs us that the Morning Post has news fr. Washington that "Gt Britain has addressed a note of warning to China couched in identical terms to that sent by the U.S., impressing China with the necessity of observing strict neutrality." I suppose the correspt. of the Morning Post got his information fr. Mr. Takahira ¹, who will make the most of our giving a warning to China, just as Cassini did on the previous occasion when the U.S. gave a warning to China.

The "Askold" & her consorts are not likely to break out of S'hai unless they know the coast is clear for them to join Rojestvensky, as they have no ammunition, & the risks on the way to Vladivostok are too great to encounter. On the other hand I doubt whether any Chinese naval officer wld. be man enough to do his duty & fire on the "Askold" if she attempted to pass out.

Two Scotch missionaries fr. Liaoyang, Dr. Westwater & Mr. Webster came to see me yesterday. They speak very highly of the way in wch. the Japse. army behaves, fr. the commander in chief down to the private soldiers. There is no looting, no disorder of any kind. The missionaries are not interfered with, & are allowed to come & go freely, but no other foreign civilians are allowed at the scene of war, except of course military attachés & properly authorized press correspondents. They say that many of the men who represented newspapers in Manchuria during the first period of the war were quite inexperienced in that capacity, & were very unreasonable in their explanations [sic. expectations?] of what cld.

¹ Takahira Kogorō 高平 小五郎 (1854-1926), Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary then Ambassador at Washington, 1900-09.

be done for them.

A Reuter teleg. the other day said that Ld. Percy in reply to a question in the house of Commons had stated that China was not refusing to carry out the Mackay treaty. Thereupon a Mr. E.S. Little ¹ formerly a missionary & now a trader addressed a letter to the North China Daily News accusing the Chinese Govt. of opposing the conservancy of the S'hai river, the reform of the coinage, the enactment of proper mining laws, the reform of taxation, the development of island navigation, & the protection of trademarks, patents & copyright, & hinted that "British officials" in China had not kept the Govt. duly informed of these matters. A few days later "leading British firms telegd. to me thro' Sir P. Warren asking me to send you the following teleg." ²

"British merchants draw Govts. attention to fact that China ignores Mackay treaty, rendering same ineffective. In most essentials China actively opposes currency, mining, taxation & navigation stipulations. Beg British Govt. to insist on Treaty being made operative."

I replied that I did not see my way to being the channel for sending on this telegram, but that specific complaints of Br. subjects wld. always receive the careful attention of H.M.G. & myself.

Mr. Little has two grievances. One was that we declined to force the provincial authorities to extend a prospecting license given to him, inasmuch as he had not carried out its terms; the other was that I could not help him to register a patent wch. he said he was interested in, as there are no regulations in China.

Lessar is to be succeeded by Pokotilof, who was the agent of the Russo-Chinese Bank at Peking till last year. He knows the language and was a great friend of Junglu, the former Prime Minister who died two years ago. Owing to his intimate relations with the Court thro' the notorious chief eunuch, he will be a dangerous person, but he is better tempered than Lessar was, and not quite so clever. It is said here that the Chinese Govt, fearing that Pavlov wld. be apptd., send [sent?] word to Petersburg that he wld. not be persona grata.

60. Satow to Lord Knollys

4.5.05

Dr. Ld. Knollys,

¹ Edward Selby Little, founder of Kuling missionary settlement. Satow first met him when he was representing Brunner Mond & Co. on May 1, 1902. (Diary)

² The purpose of this first set of quotation marks is unclear.

Prince Frederick Leopold left on the 30th April for the Russian headquarters by way of Mongolia, that being the only route open to him. His advisers did not like the idea of his passing thro' the Jap[ane]se lines. Permission was asked however, & I suppose refused on the ground of the risk he wld run in passing thro' the fighting zone. Mumm says he disliked ladies being invited to dinner, & he has not left a gracious impression behind him, wch. is probably due to his shyness. When I met him at dinner [on April 7, 1905 – diary], I noticed that he had great difficulty in getting rid of the people he had to talk to, & that he conversed after dinner only with those of the colls: who could speak German.

[rest abt. Lessar and Pokotiloff] ¹

61. Satow to Eric Barrington

18.5.05

My dear Barrington,

In the ordinary course of events I shld. be writing to ask for leave of absence, to take effect towards the end of August, but as there are no signs of the war coming to an end, I do not wish to go on leave.

However, a recent circular has just reminded me that, having been appointed there in Oct. 1900, I may perhaps not be continued at Peking after October next. If it were possible to have an indication of Lord Lansdowne's views I shld. be greatly obliged, for in case I am not to remain here I shld. have to make my plans accordingly.

If it is not indiscreet, can I ask you to tell me what the probabilities are.

62. Satow to F.A. Campbell

18.5.05

My dear Campbell,

The Consular Dept. causes me a great deal of trouble by granting extensions of leave without consulting me beforehand, & as my private letters and remonstrances by telegram produce no effect, I am brought to appeal to you for help.

[Chief Justice Sir F.S.A.] Bourne got an extension of 6 months, of wch. I was not informed. When he is on leave a consular man has to be lent to the Court, & of course it results in some other man being kept out of his leave for the same period.

[R.W.] Mansfield's accident may have necessitated his having five months extra leave,

¹ Satow's note.

but I am told that he was at the theatre not very long after he lost his eye, so that it seems not have incapacitated him fr[om] going about.

[T.G.] Carvill's extra 3 months I do not grumble at, as it has ended in his resignation, wch. was not a regrettable event.¹

[James] Scott, who had written to me about an extension, got more than I had conceded to him. The result was [Alexander] Hosie had to be kept at Chengtu until [C.W.] Campbell could relieve him, & was probably unable to get home to see his wife who was dying of cancer.

And now [H.F.] Brady, who went home in good health, has got four months extension. I had been careful enough to telegraph inquiring whether I could count on his return, & was told that he wld. come back at his due date. I had intended that he shld. relieve [G.M.H.] Playfair, whose health is far from good, but I do not know where to look for a man to send to Foochow, wch. is one of the important posts.

These are specific cases. The difficulty of placing the men in the different Consulates according to their capacity & fitness, of providing that men shall get their leave when it is due, and of supplying the places of those who fall sick is very great. It is a system that can only be kept going by constant attention & careful planning. It is rather hard on me who am responsible for the distribution of the service, wch. numbers 78 men, to have this delicate mechanism deranged without warning & not only my calculations upset, but those of a number of men who are calculating on their expectations being fulfilled, upset also.

Wld. it not be possible to induce the Consular Dept. to make a practice of consulting the head of mission at Peking before granting an extension of leave. I shall perh. be told that a man who produces a medical certificate cannot be refused, but one knows how easily & on what trifling grounds a doctor will give a certificate, & the reasons for granting such extension in England are less imperative than for giving leave in China [to a man] who has been bearing the burden & heat of the day.

63. Satow to Lansdowne

18.5.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

¹ "Carvill, an 1894 entrant, managed in his first two years to be reproved by one minister and by a chargé d'affaires, and to be threatened with dismissal by a second minister, for unseemly and disorderly behaviour, extravagance, indebtedness, and neglect of his Chinese studies." (P.D. Coates, *The China Consuls*, p. 437)

As it is quite impossible to ascertain with any approach to correctness what the Germans have been doing at Haichou, I asked the Senior Officer at Weihaiwei to send over a destroyer to see, but he replied that he had none available. I then repeated the suggestion to Admiral Noel, but have no reply as yet. I hope this will not appear to you an excess of zeal, and if it is disapproved, the blame can only be mine.¹

Something has happened, and Mumm either does not know, or will not say. Uchida is naturally much excited, believing that the object is to secure a flying base for the Baltic fleet. We have no chart of that coast, & I do not think it has ever been accurately surveyed, but as the place is near the old mouth of the Yellow River it is not likely to have deep water.

The U.S. Ch. d’Aff [John Gardner Coolidge] looks upon it as a very serious business. Perh. Dubail takes it as seriously as anyone, on the ground, he says, that the German proceedings tend to nullify all our endeavours to keep China neutral. He appears firmly convinced that an occupation has been effected, if only temporarily, & that if the Germs. retired leaving their flag hoisted, it could only be for the purpose of getting it insulted, & of then raising ‘une querelle d’Allemand’. Until this incident occurred he effected to regard what has happened in Morocco as a mere passing freak of the Germ. Emperor, but now he says their relations are too strained for him to venture on putting a question to Mumm.

Gaiffier, the Belgian, who is probably an echo in this matter of Dubail, also says the Germans are trying to push their policy of expansion in Shantung, the opportunity being too good to be missed when Japan has her hands full.

Hart tells me that according to a telegram fr. Chefoo the firms retired after saluting the flag. The officials think it was possibly a surveying party, but if not, recommend that the place shld. be declared an open port! I shld. have imagined that expedient was by this time entirely discredited.

Mumm suggests that the gunboat went there to survey. I said that of so, the best way to avoid trouble was to give notice beforehand, but this he did not admit, because the notice they gave last year abt. firing practice in the Tungting lake had given rise to the rumour that Germany had asked for a lease of it.

The indemnity question has again got tied up into a knot, in consequence of the Russians playing a trick upon the Shanghai Taotai. I have tried hard to keep the Chinese Govt.

¹ “excess of zeal” is the phrase used by Satow in *A Diplomat in Japan* (Chapter 1) to describe the action of a Vice-Consul Gibson in Formosa who ordered a gunboat to bombard a Custom House and was later severely reprimanded by the Foreign Office.

straight, but they will not be guided. We cannot afford to let the Russians get silver fr. the Chinese Govt. below the market rate, as that would give the Russo-Chinese bank an advantage over all the others. I don't think Mumm is quite straight, but both he, Dubail and Gaiffier cannot afford openly to go agst. the Russians.

Every one has now come into line abt. the Shanghai River conservancy scheme, & I hope that our counter-project will be sent in to the Chinese Govt. shortly.

The Min. of Finance tells me that his memorial advocating a reform of the currency will shortly be presented to the Empress D[owage]r. I reported on this a few days ago.

Fr. S'hai Sir P. Warren writes that the real author of the teleg. to you about Chinese neglect to carry out the Mackay treaty is preparing an amplification of his teleg. but that no one takes much interest in the matter. Perh. the mining regulations are the only point in wch. the Chinese Govt. have failed to do their duty, but it is a very difficult question, that of granting mining rights to foreigners not under Chinese jurisdiction. A certain number of people, like Lister Kaye, desire concessions for Stock Exchange purposes, but no one in China cares to invest his money in such enterprises.

64. Satow to F.A. Campbell

22.5.05

My dear Campbell,

In spite of the Chinese Rlwy. Admin[istrator]s Hu & Yüan Shih kai maintaining that they cld. & wld. only employ native engineers to build the Kalgan line, they privately asked [Claude William] Kinder to go over the intended route & report on it. He came back yesterday, & told me that the bit thro' the Nankou pass is very difficult & wld. require the superintendence of a very good engineer. This the Chinese engineer known as Jeme whom they talk of employing, is far from being. And he said that unless he were given control, so that he cld. put one of his best construction engineers on to it, he thought he had better take a back seat.

I replied that this was my advice to him to do. The engagements given by the Chinese to Russia precluded their employing on this job any one connected, as he is, with the B. & C. Corporation. But that I saw nothing to prevent the Administrators fr. employing their own man, one whom they selected & retained full liberty of dismissing. That the accounts ought not to be controlled by the Acct. of the Northern lines, who is apptd. by agreement with the Corporation.

Kinder objected that this would prevent the main lines & the Kalgan extension being worked as one concern. I told him that was unavoidable, & that the best thing we could hope for was that when peace came to be made, Japan wld. obtain the rescission of all compacts betw. Russia & China by wch. restrictions were imposed on the latter's liberty of action re Manchuria & Chihli.

65. Satow to Lansdowne

1.6.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Rockhill has arrived & I have had a good long conversation with him.¹ He told me you had said to him that there was fortunately a good understanding betw. Engl. & America & that they ought to let you know their ideas at the outset so as to facilitate joint working. In return I said to him that you had told me to be quite open with him on all matters, & that I wld. always tell him freely all that I knew of common interest to us both.

He related to me some particulars abt. a let. [letter] of the Emperor William's to Mr. Roosevelt, in wch. he said that England, France & some third Power were planning to make further encroachments on the integrity of China at the close of the present war, wch. had led the President to send a circular to the Powers, & also that the Emperor was believed to have given Russia warning to look out for Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea.² I think these are good specimens of frankness. He added that at Washington the greatest distrust was entertained of Germany.

In passing thro' Japan he saw Komura, & had a conversation with him also marked by great openness of speech. He told Komura that in America the idea of a Yellow Peril found no support, & that on the contrary the sentiment of the American people was in favour of Japan. But if it shld. turn out that Japan was merely seeking to substitute herself for Russia in Manchuria & to acquire a predominant naval position in the Pacific they wld. completely change round. He hoped Japan wld. faithfully carry out the promises she had made at the outbreak of the war, & not destroy the political independence of Korea, at least in form. If Japan were to retain Vladivostok, then America wld. want Sagalin as compensation.

Komura replied that Japan wld. certainly restore Manchuria to China, & ask for

¹ "Two long talks with Rockhill, one of wch. abt. peace arrangements, if Russia consents to ask for terms, I reported in a private letter to Lord Lansdowne." (Satow's diary, June 1, 1905.) This is the letter.

² This warning gave rise to the Dogger Bank incident of October 21-22, 1904 in which the Russian Baltic fleet en route to East Asia fired on British trawlers and one was sunk in the North Sea.

guarantees that the 3 provinces wld. be governed in a better manner than the rest of China. What those guarantees wld. be he did not mention, but he said Japan wld. propose throwing open the whole of Manchuria to foreign residence & enterprise, or if that were too much for China to swallow, to declare some 20 towns or so open ports. The Japanese flag must continue to fly over Port Arthur, but it wld. not be converted into a standing menace agst. the independence of China. As regards Dalny, she wld. carry into effect the Russian promises of making it a port free to the commerce of all nations. Corea however must remain under the influence of Japan, wch. wld. have to take charge of Corean foreign relations as a safeguard agst. Russian intrigue. He disclaimed the wish to possess a fortified post at Vladivostok.

As to the terms on wch. Japan wld. be ready to make peace, it seemed to him that everyone fr. Komura down to the doorkeeper of the Foreign Dept. at Tokio had his own scheme. Before the fall of Port Arthur both Japan & Russia had let Mr. Roosevelt know the terms they thought possible, & at that time nothing was said about an indemnity. Talk abt. peace had been going on ever since. Just before he left he had a conversation with Cassini on the subject, who had said that the great difficulty in the way of peace was the loss of Russia's prestige as an Asiatic Power. Otherwise he thought Cassini on that occasion was more reasonable than he had ever shown himself before.

I replied that I thought too that it was hard for Russia to make overtures to Japan, especially as her own territory had not been touched, & so long as Japan had nothing Russian to bargain with she cld. not get her own terms. Indemnity I thought cld. be provided by Russia surrendering to Japan her share of the Boxer indemnity, the Russian 4% loan to China of 1895, & the whole of the Manchurian railways, wch. cld. be sold to China & the purchase money raised by a foreign loan. As the railway constitutes an international highway, it might be neutralized & managed internationally.

Rockhill replied that he thought Japan wld. be glad to fall in with such an idea, & to invite the Powers to a conference abt. the future of China, after the treaty of peace was signed.

Japan he said feels that she is on her trial, & that it wld. be wise to be moderate. She is entitled to take precautions agst. having to wage war a 3rd time for Corea, & in order to protect her own independence. But if she tries to gain too much for herself, she will find the rest of the world turning agst. her, & great self-control will be necessary on her part. The U.S. is not disposed to see any Power dominating the Pacific, & nothing but the status quo

will satisfy her. He finds at Shanghai all the Americans agst. Japan, & the feeling of Englishmen in the Japanese ports & in China also anti-Japanese.

This, I think, exactly represents the feeling among Europeans & Americans towards Japan. Leading men in Japanese politics are no doubt willing to be reasonable, but from what I know of the rank & file among politicians & newspaper men I fancy there must be a strongly Chauvinistic spirit pervading them.

Altho' the reports do not mention submarines, I incline to believe, fr. what a Japse. acquaintance ¹ who has just come over tells me, that they had a good deal to do with the sinking of so many ships.

I hear that Dubail holds moderating language to Japse. in Peking, telling them they must not demand terms wch. the dignity of a Great Power like Russia wld. not permit her to accept.

66. Satow to Campbell (summary)

1/6 To F.A. Campbell, comments on the draft agreement betw. Chinese Central railways & the French group, negotiated by Carl Meyer.

67. Satow to Curzon

10.6.05

Dear Ld. Curzon,

It is a long time since I have written to you, but there was not much to tell. The Chinese Govt. preserve an absolute silence in regard to Tibetan affairs, and I have not thought it wld. be useful to attempt to discuss them. I think Wu Tingfang is at the bottom of the obstacles put in the way of ratifying Younghusband's convention, & that it is thro' him that information is given to the native press of the state of T'ang's negotiations. His telegs. are I think regularly published. The last was that finding the Indian Govt. immoveable in their refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty of China in Tibet, he asked to be recalled, & that he was told to stay where he is. It is quite certain that he will not go as Minister to London. He does not wish it, as the emoluments do not tempt him, & he does not care to spend his own money.

From what has happened at Batang I conclude that the Chinese are not able to coerce even the inhabitants of the border, much less the Lhasa people, and that our policy should

¹ Probably Mochizuki Kotaro who visited Satow on May 31, 1905 (Diary).

rather be to support the latter. The refusal of China to ratify the convention will prove for the Lhasa lamas that G.B. is not siding with China agst. them, & perh. it might be useful to let them know of the demand for the recognition of China's sovereignty & our refusal. Acc. to Morrison the Dalai Lama is at Gusinn[?] halfway betw. Kiachta & Selenginsk. Confidentially I am told by Nat'ung that he is still at Urga. I am unable to ascertain the truth of the matter, as the man I had been relying on to visit Urga this summer [Backhouse] has cried off on the ground that transport is not obtainable owing to the drought in Mongolia, & the other man who went there last year [Gatrell] is no longer at my disposition.

It was impossible not to feel indignant with the India Office for publishing to the world their rebuke to Younghusband. Whether they did this intentionally is perh. doubtful. My experience with the F.O. is that the compilation of bluebooks is performed very carelessly & I doubt whether an undersecretary reads the papers thro' before they are published. I live in dread of an indiscretion in regard to the Afghanistan papers wch. they have promised to Parliament.

As you say the solution of any Chinese question is so rare, that it seems doubtful whether we shall be able to do anything with regard to Raskam & the recognition of Macartney as Consul. The Chinese are getting into a very obstinate frame of mind, & I cannot get anything settled with them. They still fear Russia, & dislike Japan. I am sure they would prefer the triumph of the former, for they love a good paymaster. As far as one can see they are likely to be disappointed. It will surprise me a good deal if the Emperor Nicolas consents to make peace at this juncture in spite of the meddlesome offers of Mr. Roosevelt, & the Japanese do not desire it until they have captured Vladivostok. Fr. my new American colleague [Rockhill] I gather that the president is rather difficult to keep in order. He is impulsive, & does not understand foreign politics. Mr. Hay appears to be the only man that does, & there seems to be doubt whether he will be able to resume his post. Rockhill says that no one else understands the business of the Dept. of state. The revision of the Exclusion Treaty (contd in next book)

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/16

Letter Book. Chinese mission. (10 June 1905 – 5 April 1906)

“Private Letters”

1. Satow to Curzon (continued from previous letter book)

[The revision of the Exclusion] Treaty is causing great difficulty, & Rockhill is much put out abt. the public agitation agst. the American proposals. His remonstrances with Prince Ching do not seem to have had any effect.

The resignation of Delcassé is a great triumph for the Germans, and now I suppose they will get their way in regard to the proposed conference on Moroccan affairs. Who wld. have thought the Fr. Govt. wld. have proved so weak.

Pokotiloff's apptmt. here [after the death of Lessar] was a good move fr. the Russian point of view, as he has made himself many friends by the mammon of unrighteousness. Perh. Pavlov wld. have been a better man for us, as the Chinese dislike him intensely, & he did not pull well with the Russo-Chinese bank.

The Russian threat, of wch. we hear thro' the Times correspondent at Petersburg, to march troops thro' Mongolia in order to take the Japanese in flank relates I think to the eastern portion abutting on Manchuria, and need not cause us any alarm. The said correspondt. is, I am told by Morrison, Lionel James, who seems to swallow anything that is told him; & the Russians play upon his dislike for the Japanese.

The Germans are making up to the Japanese, but the latter distrust them, for they have not forgotten the way in wch. they suddenly turned round in 1895, after having congratulated Japan on her victories over the Chinese.

2. Satow to Francis Alexander Campbell

14.6.05

My dear Campbell,

The Chinese official alluded to in my desp. abt. the negotiations with America for the renewal of the Chinese exclusion Convention is Wu Tingfang. Having been called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn, he fancies himself a great authority on law! Rockhill tells me he is intriguing for Chên-tung's place. I strongly suspect him of having given the Tibetan convention last year to the same native paper, & it was certainly he who persuaded the Chinese Govt. to refuse their adhesion, & send T'ang Shaoyi to Calcutta. That little game

however has not proved very successful. The proposal that we shld. recognize the sovereignty of China in Tibet is pretty impudent considering their failure to control the Lamas at Batang wch. is actually in Chinese territory.

Two days ago I had a long & wearisome discussion with Shêng over the English text of the Peking Syndicate's rlwy. agreement. Here again Mr. Wu has been making himself obnoxious, but I hope to get Nat'ung on our side.

Lister Kaye's concession seems likely to give us some trouble. [Pelham] Warren has sent me a report enclosing part of the correspce. he has had with Kaye's agents Stokes & Platt, but as it is incomplete I have telegraphed for every shred of information bearing on the question. I have also telegd. to Ker, Consul at Wuhu, to proceed to the locality where the concession is situated and inquire fully into all that has been done there.

Of Kaye's two mining engineers, Duff & Maguire, the former is the man who was formerly in charge of the unlucky Wei hai wei gold mine, and is prob. a Duffer: the latter is a man of whom we had serious complaints in 1902, & I think he is rather a shady person.

It looks at present as if the agents & engineers had not acted in strict accordance with Art. 4 of the agreement. Of this I am sending you a copy, lest you shld. not be provided with one.

You will see that it only gives the right to extract minerals & exploit them; there is nothing wch. gives the right of establishing furnaces for converting ore into metal.

This very considerably reduces the value of the concession, as I pointed out to Kaye at the time. Prob. he wld. prefer to have a grievance agst. the Chinese Govt. on wch. to found a claim to recover all his past expenditure. The Chinese are foolishly trying to give him a handle.

The concession was signed in June. Kaye got his mining permit before leaving China, & then dawdled his way home, not getting to England till October. What he did betw. that date & last month, when he formed his company I have not the least idea. If he can get the British public to subscribe half a million sterling to work his concession investors must be more simple than words can express.

Mining concessions in China are worth very little, as a matter of fact. I do not think the Peking Syndicate's coal & iron concession is likely to turn out well. They have been sinking a shaft in Honan, & have not readied the coal beds yet after 18 months work; the promised completion is always being postponed. The cost of transport is so great that it is doubtful whether the thing will pay. But the sale of the rlwy. to China will diminish the

actual loss of capital. Shanghai-Nanking ought to pay well, but the squeezes extracted by Shêng & his friends are enormous.

Pray believe that I am not neglecting the Canton-Kowloon negotiations; but I must get the Peking Syndicate out of the way before tackling the other in earnest. Neither Shêng nor the Viceroy of Canton will be a desirable person to negotiate with, & I shld. greatly prefer to have Ross negotiate here with the Waiwupu under my own eye, if that cld. be arranged. [Sir Matthew] Nathan seems unduly impatient, but of course he does not know how difficult the situation is.

3. Satow to Lansdowne

15.6.05

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

A few days ago, when the rumour of Russia being ready to listen to Mr. Roosevelt's exhortations to make peace was in possession of the field, a Japanese M.P. who is staying in Peking ¹ came to give me his ideas as to the conditions Japan must insist on. As he is in close alliance with Katō, formerly Minister in London & then Minr. for F.A. what he says has a certain value, tho' I cannot help regarding him as a bit of a windbag. Shortly put, what Japan wants is that Vladivostok shld. be dismantled & converted into a free port. No import duties to be levied anywhere in the Primorsk province. Russia to have no fortifications east of Chita. Sagalien to be ceded to Japan, & the Amur river to be thrown open to the commerce & navigation of all nations.

Of course I pointed out to him that they cld. not well demand the cession of Russian territory, as they had taken none, & that the idea of free trade throughout the Primorsk province was the same thing practically as surrendering it to Japan, agst. whom Russia cld. not compete on equal terms.

He said mysteriously that troops were being sent north, either to occupy Sagalien or invest [?] Vladivostok, so my objection on that head wld. soon be disposed of. We were interrupted before he cld. develope his policy any further, so I heard nothing as to indemnity or cession of the railway. But fr. what he said abt. the line fr. Fusan to Wiju, and thence to Liaoyang, I think there is no doubt they propose to acquire the Chinese Eastern rlwy.

His views coincide with those stated in Asakawa's "Russo-Japanese conflict, its causes &

¹ Mochizuki Kotaro M.P. came to see Satow on June 12, 1905. (Diary)

issues”¹, the introduction to wch. sets forth the necessity of Corea & Manchuria to Japan as a field for the expansion of her commerce, & for receiving agricultural emigrants.

From a British point of view it wld. seem desirable that the surplus population of Japan emigrate to Corea & Manchuria rather than to British Columbia & Australia, & America wld. no doubt prefer their extending over N.E. Asia rather than that they shld. fill up California & the Philippines.

Rockhill’s view is expressed in what he said to me in a burst of confidence after church on Sunday, that neither America nor England desires to see Japan become too powerful in Eastern Asia. I contented myself with saying that Japanese predominance seemed to me less objectionable than Russian.

I gather fr. him that Mr. Roosevelt does not wish to see Russia entirely excluded fr. the Pacific, wch. wld. be the result if Japan gets her own way.

I begin to wonder whether the Japse. have discerned that the President’s efforts to bring peace abt. are not entirely disinterested.

The Chinese are certainly beginning to feel anxious abt. the future of Manchuria, & have no doubt learnt that they will get it back only on conditions. The Japanese idea seems to be that a reformed method of administration will have to be introduced. Nothing could be more hateful to the ordinary mandarin.

The Chinese seem to me to be developing an obstinate resistance to us in all directions. They will give no more railway concessions, no mining privileges, and will curtail inland navigation as much as possible.

The controversy abt. Changsha makes no progress. Nor does the negotiation about Tibet show any signs of reaching a conclusion. I feel that very strong pressure will be needed to obtain the signature of the proposed agreement for the Canton-Kowloon rlwy. Lister-Kaye’s mining concession is going to give a great deal of trouble. I find that Dubail takes the same view of the present situation. There is no reason to fear an outbreak agst. foreigners, but everything will be done to impose restrictions on them. The agitation agst. the American exclusion convention is a serious matter. And in Shantung they are putting the screw on the Germans as much as they can.

¹ Kan’ichi Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict. Its Causes and Issues*. With an Introduction by Frederick Wells Williams. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904. Dr. Asakawa (1873-1948) was a professor of Yale University. Frederick Victor Dickins mentions him in a letter to Satow dated October 9, 1904 (PRO 30/33 11/4).

4. Satow to Lansdowne

29/6/05

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

In my last letter I told you of a Japse. M.P. who is here doing a little private diplomatizing on his own account, and I now hear of a second [Hiraoka – see diary], who has been interviewing Prince Ch'ing and other leading Chinese. He tries to frighten them with the idea that Japan will not restore Manchuria to them unless they undertake to maintain an army of half-a-million for its defence agst. Russia. This sort of thing is calculated to do a great deal of harm, as the Chinese already are suspicious of Japse. intentions, and must considerably embarrass Uchida. Pokotiloff, who is expected tomorrow, will not fail to turn this gentleman's ravings to good account. I am afraid there is a good deal of Chauvinistic spirit among Japse. outside the govt. & that the press in Japan encourages it, so that when peace comes to be made the Tokio cabinet will incur much unpopularity.¹

I have written a desp. abt. the Tientsin-Yangtze rlwy. final agreement & the changes that I shld. like to see introduced into the draft. Mumm is evidently much annoyed with me for not backing him as strongly as he would like. He denies that the railway is a political enterprise, but I told him it is only from that point of view that English politicians regard it, and that if H.M. Govt. allow the financiers to arrange things merely to suit their own convenience awkward questions are sure to be asked in Parliament. What I shld. like to see would be an agreement that the Chinese Central Rlwys. shall build from the Yangtze to Chinanfu, wch. wld. upset the theory that Shantung is a German preserve. I have told the British agent to join the German in starting negotiations, but I do not think they will get very far.

The Fr. proposal that they shld. have the W. section of the Szechuen-Pukou rlwy. as far as Ichang, wch. Carl Meyers seems to favour, is to my mind quite inadmissible. They have no promises fr. the Chinese & bring nothing into the partnership but their money. We have a preliminary agreeet. for the line fr. Pukou to Sinyang, a promise fr. the Chinese to employ English capital in case they cannot find money for the Szechuen-Hankow line & Manifold's exploration. And furthermore the Chinese in Szechuen do not wish to hear of the Fr. in connexion with the rlwy. I hope our political interest in this question will not be sacrificed to the convenience of the financiers.

¹ This prediction proved entirely correct.

5. Satow to Lansdowne

3.7.05

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

Uchida having found out that I was going early yesterday to see Prince Ch'ing came to see me at eight o'clock in the morning to say that he wanted my help. He told me that reports having reached him of telegs. recd. by the Waiwupu fr. Pokotilow (en route fr. Petersburg) advising them to send an agent to Washington & to demand that he shld. be heard by the negotiators whenever matters affecting China's interests were being discussed, he made enquiries at the W.W.P. They told him no such telegs. had been recd., but he knew they had the idea in their heads, so he informed Nat'ung that such an arrangement wld. be impossible unless both belligerents consented, & he was certain Japan wld. not agree. Uchida was going to send a secretary to Prince Ch'ing, being unable to go himself on acct. of a meeting of colls: called by Mumm, to say that such a proposal was not calculated to forward the interests of either China or Japan. He concluded by asking me, in case Prince Ch'ing mentioned the subject, or if I cld. make an opportunity, to dissuade him fr. putting forward any such proposal, that is to say if I saw no objection to giving such advice.

I told him that quite lately in conversation with Shêng, who had asked me abt. Japse. intentions with regard to Manchuria, I had expressed the opinion that Japan wld. carry out her original declaration that it wld. be restored to China, but that she wld. expect China to take effectual military precautions agst. a renewal of Russian aggression. These were the precise words I had used, & they had evoked no objection. Some months ago Wu Tingfang had sounded me about the despatch of a special envoy to the Powers to claim the right of being heard during the peace negotiations, & I had replied to him that it was premature.¹ China wld. have plenty of time to make her voice heard when peace negotiations began. I knew that the Empress-Dowager had recently invited the high officers of state to advise her as to what attitude China shld. adopt in regard to the negotiations & as to the steps hereafter to be taken for the preservation of order in Manchuria. I had heard also that two Japse. M.P. (Hiraoka & Mochizuki) had been freely expressing to Prince Ch'ing & other high officials their views as to the guarantees Japan wld. require in regard to Manchuria, & the language these 2 gentlemen had used was calculated to excite anxiety in the Chinese mind. I said that in my private opinion it was unwise to allow any such persons to talk politics to Prince

¹ See Satow's diary for September 9, 1904. (Ruxton, 2006, Volume II, p. 105)

Ch'ing. Uchida explained that he had been told by Komura to give introductions to Hiraoka, who was interested in economic questions, & that he (Hiraoka) had taken the opportunity to discuss the Manchurian question, but he agreed that it was injudicious. With regard to his suggesting that I shld. myself introduce the subject, I thought it wld. not be advisable as Prince Ch'ing wld. at once divine that I had been inspired by some body else, but shld. he happen to ask my opinion, I was quite ready to tell him that the consent of both belligerents was necessary.

Prince Ch'ing did not allude to the subject. I met Uchida afterwards & told him so, adding that in case the question were put to me at any time I wld. give the answer I had promised him.

I think Nat'ung's denial was untrue, & that Russia has certainly suggested to China to put herself forward. The fact that Russia has made this suggestion is of itself sufficient to condemn it in Japse. eyes. On the other hand I do not think Japan has quite made up her mind how far China can be trusted to keep Russia out of Manchuria. Yüan Shihkai's troops may be good, as far as the rank & file are concerned, but the officers are useless. There has been some talk it seems abt. Japan leaving an army corps in Manchuria to stiffen the Chinese garrison, at of course Chinese expense. If so one can understand why Japan wld. prefer to leave the arrangements to be discussed afterwards betw. herself & China. The policy of Japan is to discuss the terms of peace with Russia in a tête-à-tête, & to demand fr. Russia the transfer of all the rights Russia possesses in Manchuria. Then she will be ready to make terms c. China, & she will not agree to make those terms the subject of discussion with Russia.

As China has taken no part in the war, has not expended a man nor a shilling, her right to be heard in the discussion betw. Japan & Russia is not very clear.

It may seem incredible, but I believe the view of old-fashioned China to be this: - here are two turbulent boys who have been fighting in my backyard. I tried to prevent them fr. creating a disturbance, but they were too headstrong to listen to my advice. Now they are tired of their quarrel, & one of them seems ready to go away, wch. is a frame of mind that ought to be encouraged. He is on the whole a good boy. Now is the time for me to appear on the scene, & with his aid get the other boy to clear out, & then I shall have the yard to myself again.

Intelligent Chinese like Shêng, Yüan & our friend Hu (who gave us the text of the decree) of course see that this theory of the situation is absurd.

Dubail said to me the other day that if Russia has to pay a war indemnity she wld. have to borrow in France & England, & that it was not to our interest to provide Japan with the means of rendering herself still more powerful on the sea and land in the Far East. He affects to see the hand of the Emperor William in everything, including the quarrel betw. Sweden & Norway.

The papers have recently had a teleg. reported to have come fr. London to Japan, reporting that England had declined the invitation of Germany, France & the U.S. to join in recommending Japan to be moderate in her demands. I asked Rockhill if he had seen this, but he replied that the thing was absurd.

It wld. be interesting to know whether Germany was trying to get up a combination similar to that of 1905 [sic. 1895?] to deprive Japan of the fruits of victory.

The local German press is rather disturbed at the fact that Rose, the assistant at Chefoo, has recently visited Chinanfu & other places in Shantung wch. the Chinese declared open to foreign trade, & suggest that he went there to concert with the Japanese the means of opposition to German influence in the province.

Rockhill has apptd. an American missionary named Hamilton consular agent at Chinanfu. I have told him that we are apptg. a consul. On the whole [Rockhill] is very open with me, but as C.W. Campbell says, he cannot be trusted more than 89[?] %. His attitude in regard to the indemnity was certainly not straightforward. He tells me that the U.S. will receive far more than they ought, & are thinking how they can best return the surplus without consulting the other Powers, as I told him they ought to do.

6. Satow to F.A. Campbell

4.7.05

My dear Campbell,

At last we have got the indemnity question settled, as you will see from the despp. There were 2 colls: very disgusted at having to sign the exchange of notes. One was Pokotilow, who being a banker is annoyed at Russia having to lose, as he says, one percent of her share by taking it in silver at the laying down price in Shanghai, & the other is Rockhill who was the originator of the pretence that the Protocol made it a silver, not a gold, debt. I think the Hgkg & Shai Bank are or ought to be satisfied that their interests are protected. Mumm did not like my addition abt. Clause 4 of the Chinese note being “applied in an equitable manner”, as he no doubt sees that it cuts both ways. When we come to discuss the arrears of

Jany-June 1905, I shall perh. be able to bring in your idea of remitting the interest on the 8000000 taels for the accumulated deficit up to last December. I am much obliged for the way in wch. I have been supported in this matter of the indemnity.

Geo. Jamieson has got his rlwy. agreement signed, & we are well rid of a most troublesome business. Morrison & Kinder were recently at the [Peking Syndicate concession] mines, & came back impressed with a very adverse opinion. The shaft they are sinking has gone down 400 ft., & coal has not yet been reached. The water is a great difficulty, & additional pumping machinery has had to be got fr. England. The amount is estimated at 35,000 gallons per hour, wch. seems a great deal. Supposing that the shaft is completed by the end of this year, it will be another 12 months before the colliery will be in full working order. All that time the rlwy. will barely pay running expenses, & the Chinese will have to pay the guaranteed interest out of their own pocket. Morrison was nearly telegraphing all this to the "Times" wch. wld. have had the effect of sending down the Syndicate's shares, but I begged him not to do such a thing just as Jamieson was about to sign. I confess that I do not believe in the value of the Syndicate's concessions, & shall be very sorry for any of my friends who have put money into it.

We seem to be on the point of coming to an agreement abt. the Huangpu Conservancy. The Chinese made some amendments to our last draft, all but one of wch. we have accepted. It was rejected in consequence of an objection made by Dubail, who said he wld. have to refer it to his govt. & that they certainly wld. not accept it.

Pokotilow who arrived here on June 30 is ordered off to Washington to assist in the peace negotiations, & leaves in a day or two. Morrison is also being sent there by the "Times". This looks as if the negotiations were meant to be serious.

Morrison tells me that one of their correspondents with the Japse. army has sent him two uncensored letters thro' a secret Chinese messenger in wch. he describes the Japse. as being in very great difficulties owing to the impossibility of transporting supplies, & that their losses have been much heavier than they have admitted. Morrison who is a great friend of the Japse. refused to send these on. Their publication (I saw one of them) wld. have produced a great sensation, but I daresay military men wld. have thought little of them. No one expected the advance beyond Mukden to be a pleasure excursion. The Russians in retreating previous to the battle of Mukden left the rlwy. more or less intact, but since then they have torn it up as they went, & the Japse. have had to reconstruct the line almost completely.

7. Satow to Lansdowne

13.7.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

By this bag I am sending the Note by wch. the Chinese Govt. declared in advance that they wld. not recognize any arrange[men]ts in the forthcoming negotiations affecting China as to wch. they had not been previously consulted, & in a separate desp. I give Natung's acct. of how this Note came to be sent out. His story is confirmed by Uchida in all its details, & may therefore be regarded as exact. Natung has since told us that both Japan & Russia have replied that the existence of this note will not be allowed to affect the negotiations, & as far as Japan is confirmed [sic. concerned?] Uchida confirms this also. It seems therefore safe to suppose that it is true as regards Russia.

Some people imagined that Pokotilow had suggested the idea of the Note to the Chinese, but this does not seem to have been the case.

The Amern. Govt. Rockhill says altogether discouraged the Chinese idea of sending a plenipotentiary & Dubail too says that he advised agst. it. In fact none of the colls: who were consulted were at all in favour of the plan. One informant says Hart recommended an agent being sent, another says he opposed it.

8. Satow to Lansdowne

8.8.05

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

I understand that General Ventris, whose term as G.O.C. the troops in N. China comes to an end in July 1906, proposes to ask for leave early next year, provided that peace is concluded before that time.

It will in that case become necessary to decide who shall assume command on his quitting China.

Col. Bower's term as commandant of the Legation Guard ends in Novr. next. In view of the prob. conclusion of peace & the consequent diminution both of the troops in N. China & of the Legation guards, wch. is to be anticipated, it wld. not be necessary to have an officer of the rank of Colonel in command of a diminished guard, & it wld. scarcely be worthwhile to appt. a successor to Col. Bower at Peking.

As however he is the next in seniority to Genl. Ventris I wld. suggest that it wld. be right

to give the acting apptmt. at Tientsin when Genl. Ventris goes on leave, & I shld. like to add that this arranget. wld. be agreeable to myself, as my relations with him have always been of a cordial character since he came to command the guard.

It is possible that Col. Wingate, the A.G.M.G. for Intelligence, might aspire to take Genl. Ventris' place, but I do not think it would be a good selection.

9. Satow to Lansdowne

10.8.05

Dear Lord Lansdowne,

It looks as if it wld. become increasingly difficult to get the Chinese Govt. to negotiate satisfactorily abt. rlwy. concessions, even when there is a preliminary agreement. At the present moment there are three of the latter class in wch. we are concerned, 1° Tientsin-Yangtze, 2° Canton-Kowloon, 3° Extension fr. Suchow to Hang-chow and Ningpo. As to 1°. Yuan Shihkai is strongly opposed to allowing the Germans to extend from Chinan-fu to Tientsin. Correspce. betw. Scott & Nathan shows that the Viceroy of Canton, supported by the local gentry, puts forward a pretension to construct the Chinese portion of the line with Chinese funds (wch. cannot be raised) & to get the preliminary agreement with the B. & C. Corporation cancelled. In regard to 3° the Corpn. recently wrote to Lord Li, who is acting for Shêng, that they wish to negotiate a final agreement, & simultaneously the gentry had a meeting & declared their readiness to construct all rlwys. in the province without foreign assistance.

Two things have contributed to this agitation in favour of China constructing her own railways, 1° the belief that the Canton-Hankow rlwy. had passed fr. American into Belgian hands, wch. they regarded as Franco-Russian, 2° the astounding profits of the Northern Railways, built to a large extent with Chinese money & managed by a Chinese directorate.

As for the schemes for a combination of English & Fr. interests in the Szechuen-Hankow-Nanking & Yünnanfu-Chungking rlwys., I regard the prospects of our obtaining concessions as still more remote. If anything is to be accomplished, it must be done not by negotiations thro' consuls and ministers, wch. wld. to Chinese eyes only cover political designs, but by the properly qualified agents of capitalists, who will sit down at Yünnanfu & Chengtu patiently & employ the usual methods of getting over the scruples of mandarins.

The desp. [despatch] of the mission headed by Tuan-fang who is governor of Hunan, and

Hsü Shih-ch'ang and acting member of the Grand Council is a sign that China is waking up. It recalls the mission of Iwakura, Okubo & Ito to America & Europe in 1871. Major Menzies, who has been asked by Yüan Shih-kai to accompany them, tells me they are to visit England, France, Germany & Belgium. It wld. be worth while showing them some attention while they are in England. I am told that Sir Walter Hillier, who is here now, was sounded as to becoming their bearleader, but he declined. A prospect has been held out to him of succeeding Sir H. Macartney, who is to retire when Chang Tê-yi departs.

The boycott of American goods in order to coerce Washington into signing a more favourable immigration treaty is another sign of the times. Conger appears to have said to an interviewer that the Chinese were incapable of combining for a national object, & this has been made much of by the promoters of the boycott. Rockhill suspects Wu Ting-fang of being at the bottom of the whole agitation, & it appears certain that Prince Ch'ing & the Empress-Dowager have been induced to favour it. It is headed by a taotai & one of the Chinese on the board of the Shanghai-Nanking rlwy. is among the chief promoters. The China Association of Shanghai have sent me a teleg. declaring that the boycott interferes with the trade of British merchants, & asking me to take steps. I have asked Warren to ascertain that there are really serious grounds for this statement. It might be imprudent for us to take field officially agst. the boycott, for the possible result wld. be its extension to British manufacturers. Rockhill talks rather big about rendering the Chinese Govt. pecuniarily responsible for all losses inflicted on American trade by the movement, but I do not see how such threats cld. be put in force. The important part of the whole affair is that it indicates the birth of a consciousness of united nationality among the Chinese people with wch. we shall have to count in the future.

E.S.

10. Satow to Lansdowne

24.8.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I confess that it seems to me impossible at present to propose anything abt. Weihaiwei to the Chinese, & so I am leaving to the future any official observations on the subject in reply to your desp. of July 13. Much will depend upon the arrangements Japan makes abt. Port Arthur. It wld. be difficult for us to ask for a longer term than she obtains. And I doubt very much whether it wld. strategically be of any advantage to Japan to maintain a naval base at

Port Arthur. She will want to keep it as a trophy & to guard agst. Russia ever attempting to come back there. But apart fr. those two reasons for her retaining it, surely Masampho [on the south coast of Korea] is a far finer position, for there it lies athwart the route to Kiaochou & the Gulf of Pechili. If however Japan to oblige us, would get China to give her a 99 years' lease of Port Arthur, we cld. come in on her back as it were. Otherwise I do not think there is any likelihood of our persuading China to give us a long lease. The idea that Germany wld. demand W.H.W. if we left it wld. not produce much effect. The ground in any case will have to be very carefully prepared.

Of course no one can with any show of probability maintain that W.H.W. is going to develope into a flourishing colony, if we had even the fee-simple. At best it can but keep its head above water, like a half pay captain at a small seaside watering place in Devonshire.¹

Yesterday an interesting American war correspondent fr. Manchuria named Frederick Palmer came to see me. He is the author of one of the best bks. on the war. "With Kuroki in Manchuria". He says the Japse. are now bringing reservists of 40 years of age into the fighting line; that their military men are at last realizing that modern warfare cannot be carried on without large financial resources, wch. is quite a new & surprising fact to them, & lastly he questions whether Japan will continue to throw up men of the old heroic type like Oyama, Kuroki & Oku.

This last doubt has occurred to me fr. time to time. Italy has ceased to produce statesmen of the same force as those wch. ruled her up to the seventies. France flared up superbly at the time of Napoleon I, but what has she done since. On the other hand, Japan has lost a good many of the great men of her revolution of 1868, and yet has risen to a much greater height than any of those who knew her then foresaw. Sir Harry Parkes in his later days used to predict that she wld. end in the anarchic condition of a S. American republic. I think Redesdale [A.B. Mitford] wld. admit that he never expected her to become anything better than a secondrate Asiatic power, & for myself I am ashamed to say that my estimate used to be that she might perh. attain the level of Portugal.

11. Satow to F.A. Campbell

24.8.05

My dear Campbell,

Rockhill told me today that he has recd. several strong telegrams from the President

¹ Satow may have had Sidmouth in mind here, which he knew well from family holidays.

refusing his sanction to any arrangement by wch. America wld. cease to diplomatically represent the Canton-Hankow rlwy. & that he has protested officially to the Chinese Govt. agst. their pretence to cancel the concession. Rockhill asserts that the agreement obtained by Chang Chih-tung thro' the Chinese Minr. at Washington for the sale of J.P. Morgan's interest was obtained by false representation that the concession was cancelled. This I can scarcely believe. Morgan is far too wide awake, & must have known that the £1,100,000 or \$7,000,000 wchever it is, was to be the consideration for cancelling the concession as well as for buying up the bonds already issued. However, it seems to me that our arrangement with Chang Chih-tung is very likely nay almost certain to fall thro'. I have told Fraser within the last few days to remind him that our sine qua non is that he shall persuade the Canton Viceroy to abandon his opposition to the construction of the Canton-Kowloon line by the B. & C. Corporation; it is only the certainty of that final contract being put thro' that wld. justify H'gk'g in finding the £1,100,000 for Chang.

A teleg. of the Canton Viceroy's urging that the preliminary contract shld. be disregarded, wch. has been published in a Hgkg native paper has greatly upset Sir Matthew Nathan, who asks me what steps I propose to take. I have replied that I propose to ignore it officially, & to ask the Waiwupu to appt. a negotiator as if no such telegram existed.

The £3000000 abt. wch. the Hgkg Bk. telegd. to Townsend was not for the acquisition of the American interest in the Canton-Hankow line, but was what Chang told [E.H.] Fraser he shld. require subsequently for construction. Fraser told the Bk's agent at Hankow, who telegd. to Hgkg. They informed Hillier, who came to question me abt. it, whereupon I said Fraser ought not to have let them know, & that the reason was Chang did not come to do any business with the Germans. He inferred that it was on acct. of the agreement for sharing loans with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, & asked if he might tell his people that my reason for refusing information was that. As I did not wish to give him any more information than I cld. help, I told him he might.

I see fr. the print that the suggestion to get the £1,100,000 fr. the Bank came originally fr. Nathan, who must have sounded the Hgkg manager Smith. That is how the D-A Bank came to infer that our Bank was going to advance the money without giving them a share of the business, & hence the threat to take "diplomatic steps".

It is amusing to find Bob Little, the Editor of the S'hai paper who has been patting the boycott on the back, shld. as Chairman of the China Association have to sign a letter to Warren dwelling on the pernicious results to be anticipated.

12. Satow to Eric Barrington

3 Sept. 1905

My dear Barrington,

I hope my proposal to go on leave before the beginning of next hot season & not to return to China falls in with Ld. Lansdowne's wishes. The mention of 'at least a year from September' in your teleg. made me think that more than that wld. not be expected of me.

I have spent 3 hot seasons in succession on my journey back to Peking [in summer 1903] & in Peking itself, & have been far fr. well both last summer & this. I had this year to give up work for quite 3 wks. & go away for a change of air. ¹ Then, I have served now for 44 years. Peking means very hard work, & I feel that a younger man wld. do it better.

y.s.

P.S. Please let me have a line in answer. My idea is to pack up & bring home everything I have but furniture, & to sell that by auction, as most of it has been in Peking for over 20 years, & I shld. not like to pass it over to a successor. The public therefore wld. know that I was leaving for good.

13. Satow to Lansdowne

6.9.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Peace having been signed ², the Japse. Govt. will shortly proceed no doubt to discuss with China the retention by them of the Liaotung Peninsula in place of the Russians, and the future of the railway.

A Tientsin newspaper has been talking abt. the withdrawal of the foreign troops from N. China, & stating that all the Powers are agreed except Japan. I have therefore explained to Dubail & Uchida that I know nothing of such an agreement, & I propose to say the same thing to Mumm when he returns from the seaside. To Dubail I said that we must at least get the Hwangpu Conservancy scheme agreed to before we entertain any such proposal. To Uchida I have suggested that there are certain Japanese interests wch. might make it appear

¹ Satow went to his cottage outside Peking July 13-21, 1905. Dr. Gray then advised that he go to Peitaiho for a further rest and he did so from July 23rd to August 3rd when he returned to Peking "completely recovered, to all appearance." (Diary)

² The Treaty of Portsmouth (New Hampshire) ending the Russo-Japanese War was signed on September 5, 1905.

desirable to his govt. to keep troops here as a means of pressure, & he quite agrees with me on that point. I have also told him that we wish to have Weihaiwei leased to us for as long a term as the Germans hold Kiaochow and the French Kwangchowwan (that is 99 years).

There are however other matters wch. I consider we shld. get settled with the aid of the leverage the retention of the troops will give us. The first of these is the Canton-Kowloon rlwy. The Foreign Board have had the audacity to write to me that the gentry & capitalists of Canton intend to build it with their own money & that it is therefore unnecessary to appt. any one to negotiate the Final agreement with the B. & C. Corporation. I can hardly believe they mean this seriously, & am preparing a strong reply. But so strong is the notion held all over the country now that the Chinese will build their rlwys. themselves, that I feel sure they will return the same answer to me when I write to them proposing a final contract for the Suchow-Hangchow-Ningpo line. And if I get instructions to act with Dubail in asking for the Szechuen-Hankow rlwy, some kind of pressure will certainly have to be used in order to obtain the concession. Another matter on wch. they are not behaving well is inland navigation, nor have they communicated the mining regulations promised so long ago. And there are two portions of Burma frontier yet undelimited, in regard to wch. they oppose our proposals. I conclude therefore by suggesting that until we find the Chinese govt. disposed to give us satisfaction on at least the more important items of this list, we shld. turn a deaf ear to any invitation, no matter from what quarter, to withdraw or diminish our troops and the Legation guard.

It is thought by the Japse. military attaché Col. Aoki that after the autumn manoeuvres of Yüan Shihkai's new army, the Chinese will ask for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and this seems to me not at all improbable.

In regard to Tibet I have not succeeded in getting the Chinese to accept the draft adhesion agreement, as will be seen from a desp. that goes by this bag. They have had every chance offered to them, and I have tried to "save their face" as much as possible. So now I suppose they will recall T'ang from Calcutta. They had their own way in that matter, & have only themselves to thank for the failure of the negotiation.

Rockhill said to me a day or two ago that he feared Mr. Roosevelt wld. be very unpopular in Japan on acct. of the insistence with wch. he has urged the conclusion of peace. As Reuter telegs. represent him to have chiefly exhorted the Emperor Nicholas to make concessions, I suppose one may conclude that he put quite as much pressure on the Emperor of Japan; but the Japanese negotiators are too discreet to let it be known. The mere

idea that any Power had tried to repeat the intervention of 1895 wld. have stirred the Japanese people into a fury.

14. Satow to F.A. Campbell

7.9.05

My dear Campbell,

I suppose that the arrangement betw. the Chinese Central railways Ltd. & the Fr. group has not yet been signed, or I should have a teleg. informing me of the fact. Yr. letter of July 26 does not quite remove my objections to what I understand to be the principal features of the scheme, namely that there is to be a railway from Pukou to Chengtu, passing thro' Sinyang, & also, in some inexplicable way, thro' Ichang, of wch. the French are to construct the western section from Chêngtu to Ichang. It was à propos of this last item that I uttered a groan, for it strengthens Fr. influence in Szechuen, already stronger than I like, and lowers ours to zero.

[Colonel] Manifold's exploration showed that a line straight fr. Chengtu to Sinyang would be impracticable, and that Chengtu to Ichang is the only possible tracé. At Ichang it comes in competition with water carriage. However, supposing it continued as far as Hankow, a rlwy. fr. the latter point to Pukou could hardly compete with the river steamers. I suppose the original idea was that put for[war]d by the China Association that because the Russo-French-Belgian alliance were going to have a railway fr. Peking thro' Hankow to Canton, fr. N. to S., we ought to have a horizontal line from Shanghai up the Yangtze to the Capital of Szechuen, to cut across theirs. However, the Russians are now out of Manchuria, & the Chinese are buying back the Canton-Hankow concession, so that grandiose policy has come to nought.

You ask me whether Dubail & I will now be able to make the Chinese give us a definite concession for a Pukóu-Chengtû railway. I am afraid I cannot reply "yes". In the first place we cannot base such a request on the promise given to [Secretary of Legation Walter] Townley that if China finds she cannot raise capital herself, she will come to us (and the Americans) for it, as that implies only an undertaking to borrow from us. Secondly, you will see that the Chinese all over the country are now bitten with the idea of constructing their rlwys. themselves, either with their own money or with money borrowed in the cheapest market.

However, we shall see when we get to work, whether Dubail & I together can do better

than say Nathan & I in the case of Kowloon[-]Canton.

Fraser tells us the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank is offering £2 000 000 to Chang Chih-tung for the Hupeh section of the Szechuen-Hankow railway at 5% price 92½ or at 4½ price 83. I have told him to give a copy to Chang Chih-tung of the undertaking we have from Prince Ch'ing to come to us first, & I shall write to the Waiwupu objecting to the Germans being allowed to make any offer.

15. Satow to Sanderson

20.9.05

Secret

My dear Sanderson,

In my letter of 21 June/01 ¹ I explained a scheme for employing Gatrell as a collector of news & to carry on a hospital started by our police-commissioner in the Chinese city, to wch. I proposed to give something. In your reply of Sept. 13 you told me that Lord Lansdowne approved of my proposal to employ Gatrell. Beyond a little money that I gave once or twice out of my own pocket for whitewashing the wards it was unnecessary to provide funds, because the Chinese city authorities made a grant of Tael 100 a month, but this they have now withdrawn, for what reason I do not know, and as the institution bears the name of the "British Charitable Hospital" I do not much care to inquire. It has done a great deal of good, and the patients number over 6000 in the year. Dr. Gray and the surgeon of the Legation guard attend the patients and perform the operations. As Dr. Gatrell has left Peking and I am not spending much on S.S. I should be glad if I were authorized to pay this sum, wch. is abt. £13 or 14 a month.

y.s.

16. Satow to F.A. Campbell

21.9.05

My dear Campbell,

My despp. will show you that[I am pegging away at the Canton-Kowloon rlwy. & beating down the Chinese defences one by one. At p. 160 of Pt. VII of the Print (Jany. to Mar. 1899) there is a memorial officially communicated by the Tsungli Yamên, to wch. I shall take an opportunity of directing Prince Ch'ing's attention, & at p. 251 there is a

¹ See letter no. 18 in PRO 30/33 14/12 above.

correspce. betw. Shêng & the then Viceroy, of wch. I asked Scott to remind the present man. Tsên is very ill & at the beginning of the month his lip was despaired of, so that he did not even see Mr. Taft. But Scott showed it to the private secretary, who was much impressed by its contents. He admitted that the Canton govt. was bound by the arrangement (which Tsên has hitherto denied, on the ground that he was not a party to it), & that the only thing was to come to some understanding, if possible, to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. This also I shall remind Prince Ch'ing of. In this country there is complete ignorance of what their archives contain, on the part of high officials. On our side I seems that Jardines people omitted to communicate copies of the prelimy. agreements they entered into with Shêng, for there is no trace of them in our records, but I have now obtained the originals fr. their man Ross.

I am afraid Lister Kaye's concession is in a bad way, & if the letter published in the "Times", wch. I am quoting in my desp. of today, were inserted in a prospectus it wld. go hard with the directors who authorized the statements if they fell into Mr. Justice Joyce's hands. I suppose it emanated fr. Lister-Kaye himself. He knew perfectly well when he was here that the Anhui gentry were hostile, & he has been grossly negligent abt. the whole business.

Geo. Jamieson tells me he is going home shortly, & that Geo. Brown, a former consul, is coming out to take his place. Brown I am told is an alert person, wch. Jamieson certainly is not, or he wld. never have allowed Shêng to play on him the trick I reported recently.¹ I believe that Shêng has not gained in the eyes of his fellow-officials by his failure to carry it off. The Honan mines of the Peking Syndicate are still giving them trouble & anxiety. It was given out that the shaft wld. get down to the coal measures by the end of Octr; now it is put off to the end of the year. I shld. not like to be a shareholder.

17. Satow to Lansdowne

21.9.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

¹ "To Natung and complained of Shêng's trickery in regard to an interpretation which he made in the heading of the Peking Syndicate's agreement to share the iron-smelting in Honan. He expressed himself very properly." (Diary, August 4, 1905) See also Satow's meeting with Shêng which ended acrimoniously: "It is clear Campbell disapproves of the course I took. It is possible that I have acted impolitely in making an open foe of Shêng, and in allowing myself to give way to my anger. My own feeling however is that no compromise was possible in relation to a piece of trickery, and I am quite satisfied to have marked to Shêng my contempt for his actions and character." (Diary, August 7, 1905)

Very many thanks for your letter of August 3. I quite feel that I cannot expect to hear often fr. you, & that your work must often be overwhelming in the House of Lords & at the Foreign Office.

Of the matters remaining unsettled of wch. I spoke in my last, one at least, the Hwangpu conservancy, seems on the point of being cleared out of the way, as the Chinese have accepted the text proposed by the F.R.R. So we hope to sign in a few days. I am not making much progress with the Canton-Kowloon rlwy. except that I think the arguments of the Foreign Board are being gradually demolished, & I have still some further documents to produce wch. will make it quite clear that they have not a leg to stand upon. I shall exhaust every means of persuasion on them, before suggesting any form of coercion, for that might bring abt. a boycott of British goods, & the public wld. no doubt protest agst. that being provoked merely in the interest of the B. & C. Corporation. That Chinese shld. desire to build their rlwys. themselves is a healthy sign, if they really intend it, but of that we have as yet no proof.

I do not yet see my way clear to make any suggestions as to approaching the Chinese govt. on the subject of Wei hai wei, but I propose to communicate with Sir C. MacD. who may possibly be able to find out fr. the Japse. what their ideas are in regard to the Liaotung Peninsula. That however will be premature until the Treaty of peace is ratified. The Chinese press of late has been showing an anti-Japse. spirit, wch. is apparently inspired by Chinese officials. I have always thought it very unlikely that China wld. submit to Japse. guidance. She is however wholesomely afraid of Japse. military prowess. A few days ago I had a visit fr. the late civil govr. of Moukden ¹, who for two days had looked on the battle there fr. a safe distance. He was much impressed with the determination exhibited by the combatants on both sides, wch. he informed me his own countrymen wld. never be capable of. And in that he no doubt spoke the truth.

Recently [on September 7th – see diary] I had a long talk with Tuanfang, one of the Comrs. who are going abroad to study foreign methods of administration. He told me that the E-D seriously contemplates giving China something in the way of representative

¹ T'ing chieh visited Satow on September 15, 1905. "T'ing chieh 廷杰 Manchu, late Govr. of Mukden, who is going back there to preside over the reclamation of waste lands. He described the misery of the refugees in Mukden as extreme, 100,000 of them, and five or six families in one room. Webster and Cochran had been a great help. Relations with Marshall Oyama, Kodama and Fukushima excellent. The fighting had quite astounded him; he had never seen such courage and endurance on both sides. No Chinese could ever approach such a measure of achievement. The Japanese however besides being good fighters, also understood reason." (Diary, Ruxton, 2006, Volume II, p. 222)

institutions & is greatly in favour of the education of women. At present they seem to be taught nothing. The Comrs. who are to visit England wish to reach London abt. the time when Parlt. opens in Feby. next. I think it wld. be useful to show him some attention, & perh. some one of the Consuls now on leave in England might be usefully attached to them.

Rockhill tells me the President distrusts Japan because documents were discovered in Manila wch. showed that certain Japse. had been intriguing with the Filipinos. I was always of opinion that arms had been furnished fr. Japan to the insurgent Filipinos in the time of the Spaniards. On the other hand, it appears that Japse. military men believe that peace has been made more or less under pressure fr. Mr. Roosevelt & they are furious.

The new Chinese Minister Wang Tahsieh is a much better man than Chang. I think it is a good thing that Li Ching-mai alias Chi-kao was not apptd. I have not heard his name mentioned here as a possible choice, & can only suppose that Sir Halliday Macartney & he were intriguing to secure the post for him.

18. Satow to Lansdowne

5.10.05

Dr. Ld. Lansdowne,

By this mail I have made an attempt to put my ideas as to the extension of the lease of Wei hai wei into the form of a desp., but I am afraid they will not be of much use. From the telegram sections I am led to conclude that the Treaty of Peace provides that Russia shall join Japan in obtaining China's consent to the transfer of the Liaotung Peninsula. If so, Russia will hardly assist in getting for Japan a longer term than she herself enjoyed, and we can hardly ask China for more than Japan gets.

I have had no opportunity of sounding any Chinese officials as to the view they take of the new Anglo-Japanese agreement. Rockhill tells me that a leading man, in discussing it with him, at once put his finger on art. 4, and said that it meant Tibet, to wch. R. replied that it must refer to Afghanistan.¹ A Japanese friend who talked it over with Natung, with some difficulty induced him to acknowledge that the agreement was valuable to China, & then

¹ “**Article IV** Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.”

suggested his getting a telegram of thanks sent to England & Japan. But this the Chinese govt. will hardly care to do. They have officially protested to Japan agst. the term of 18 months provided for the mutual evacuation of Manchuria, and the retention of 15 rlwy. guards per kilometre, wch. means the maintenance of a force of about 12,000 men in Manchuria by each of the late belligerents.

The Chinese Govt. not long ago asked for the withdrawal of Uchida, on account of a scene wch. he made at the Foreign Board, and Uchida is said to be going over to Tokio some time this month to consult Komura. But whether this means he will not return I cannot say.

I am told by one who was an eyewitness of the explosion wch. put off the departure of the Constitution Commission that most of the Chinese officials showed the white feather.¹ Hsü alone preserved his sang-froid. The Chinese guard of honour took to flight, and the crowd of Chinese officials on the platform disappeared like magic. Duke Tsai's mother is imploring the Empress-Dowager not to let her son run such risks again, and Yüan Shih-kai's wife also wishes her son not to go. The govt. seem to have got hold of a clue, but their detective police is very badly organized. The pro-Russian press here tries to throw the blame upon the anarchical notions picked up by Chinese students in Japan, but others say that the assassin & his friends are Russian sympathizers, wch. wld. account for their dislike to a commission in search of a constitution. Again Tuan-fang is said to have been the man that was aimed at, because he took the lead in advising the Empress-Dowager to abolish the old classical examinations. But bombs are not the sort of tools that the old-fashioned Chinese would be likely to adopt.

On the whole, what with the boycott of American goods, the throwing of bombs & the opposition to railways and mines being left in the hands of foreigners, it looks as if we were going to have a troublesome time of it in China, and it seems hardly the time to withdraw troops.

¹ "The Constitution Comrs. were to have started today. But a bomb on the person of prob one of their followers exploded in the corridor of the carriage in wch. they were, and the departure was deferred. The man was killed, several others badly hurt, and three or four more slightly wounded, among who were Wu Ting fang and Shao-ying. The man has not yet been identified." (Diary, September 24, 1905)

19. Satow to F.A. Campbell

7 Oct./05

My dear Campbell,

May I suggest that thanks shld. be given to Hosie for his excellent report of a journey to the Tibetan frontier, printed as a Parly. Paper, China No. 1 (1905). We cannot find that any instruction to thank him has been sent to us. He also wrote a capital report on the products of Szechuen, for wch. apparently no thanks were accorded.

Perh. the Powers that be consider that virtue shld. be its own reward, but I think a word of encouragement to men who do good work of the kind wld. not be wasted.

20. Satow to Lansdowne

19.10.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

In a previous letter I told you something of Mr. Roosevelt's feeling about the Japanese, as described to me by Rockhill. It left on my mind an impression that the President did not like them at all. But Rockhill says now that he has had a letter fr. the President in wch. he uses the most unmeasured vituperation agst. the Russians on acct. of their incredible deceitfulness, in wch. they surpass all other races, & adds that the conclusion of peace has left him still more pro-Japanese than he was at first. I conclude that Mr. Roosevelt is in the habit of changing his mind.

Deloncle ¹ who is here on his way to Saigon has talked at length to me of his earnest desire for a thorough Anglo-French understanding in regard to Chinese affairs. Our alliance with Japan will prove a check upon the lofty aspirations of the latter, and keep her in line with us. Then England, France & Japan will work together for the regeneration of China. He is willing apparently to leave the construction of railways to us, provided we borrow French money for the purpose, and spoke warmly of the proposed combination of Fr. financiers with the Chinese Central rlwys. Ltd. [He did not however tell me that my French & Belgian colls: have been trying to claim fr. the Chinese Govt. the right to lend money for the construction of the Canton-Hankow line, wch. they say comes to them by right on the cancellation of the American concession; the consequence has been our order to Chang Chih-tung not to borrow fr. anybody. However, he is negotiating with the Chinese Central rlwys. for £2000000 to begin the Hankow-Ichang section of the rlwy. into Szechuen. The

¹ François Deloncle (French deputy for Saigon). See Satow's diary entries for October 12 and 19, 1905.

C.C.R. offered to lend the money at 94, but Chang wanted 98, and then came down to 97. It looks promising.]

Deloncle expressed great admiration of the successful manner in wch. we had negotiated the loan to buy out the Americans, so I told him we had not moved a finger to get it. Chang asked for money, and we gave it to him, that was all.

Meanwhile I am unable to report progress in regard to the Canton-Kowloon and Suchow-Ningpo railways. Possibly I may get an extension of time for Mr. Little's coal mining agreement, but Lister Kaye's looks unpromising. Wu Ting-fang came to see me yesterday, and in the course of conversation asked me how about it. I replied that they were not treating Lister Kaye fairly, and that I had a Note on the stocks. He answered that I might make it as strong as I liked, and the Foreign Board wld. pass it on to the Govr. of Anhui. He went on to describe the manner in wch. the Board was bombarded with telegrams from the students in the provinces. He had entreated his colls. to put a stop to this, but they seemed to have no courage. The railway agreements wch. the provinces were crying out should be cancelled were no doubt to be regretted, but they could not be upset, and he had openly said so to the other members of the Board. They were too afraid of responsibility to take upon themselves to say that to the provinces. In fact, Chū Hung-chi and Nat'ung, his colleagues, had no influence at all. The former in a certain way was useful to Prince Ch'ing, but the real power lay in the hands of Yüan Shih-kai, three of whose nominees were on the Grand Council. He had the army behind him, wch. is the source of his power, and Prince Ch'ing, who was formerly not his friend, is now under his influence. He takes on himself to submit drafts, wch. have to be adopted. (I know from an unimpeachable source that he prepared the draft note to Japan & Russia declaring that China wld. not be bound by anything in the Treaty of Peace on wch. she had not been consulted beforehand. The Empress-Dowager is the nominal head of the Govt. but if she gives orders to the Grand Council of wch. they do not approve, they simply ignore them.)¹

He was very urgent that I shld. demand an audience of the Empress-Dowager and explain matters to her.

I said to him that China seemed to be running a two-fold risk. In the first place she was repudiating these rlwy. agreements. If successful the next thing wld. be repudiation of loan agreements & finally of treaties. Her credit in the money market wld. be seriously affected. 2ndly, if the Govt. continued to tell us that they could not carry out their agreements

¹ The closing parenthesis is not written, but presumably belongs here.

because of the opposition of the provinces, Foreign Powers wld. be tempted to take matters into their own hands, & settle directly with the Provinces. As they have no treaties nor diplomatic relations with the provinces, their methods of action wld. be shorter and more drastic than with the Central Govt. As these things were said to him in the privacy of my own study, they cannot be reckoned as diplomatic menaces.

I hope to see Chü Hung-chi in accordance with Nat'ung's advice, and am sending [C.W.] Campbell to thrash matters out with Yüan Shih-kai as soon as the latter comes back fr. the manoeuvres. This is better than running down to Tientsin myself. Not that I anticipate much good from my efforts, but I must do what I can. Yüan may perh[aps] not see the necessity of the preliminary rlwy. agreements being carried out, because he himself is blocking the Tientsin-Chinkiang final agreement.

The only comfort under present circs. is that other Legations encounter the same difficulties.

Nothing has been found out in regard to the man who was hoist by his own petard. In the meantime the Empress-Dowager is in a state of alarm, & the Commission that was to search for a constitution has put off its departure indefinitely. If they go, it will be a quiet departure. They are all thoroughly frightened.

Mumm is going to leave on the 26th & I shall become Doyen pro tem. It involves a good deal of chancery work, and it is unfortunate that the arrival of Garnett has been postponed, as this particular dept. could have been entrusted to him.

The English text of the Treaty of peace was published in Tientsin papers today. The Anglo-Japse. alliance was similarly published abt. Sept. 28 [25?]. I have had no comment on it from Chinese officials.

21. Satow to F.A. Campbell

19.10.05

My dear Campbell,

You will see fr. the despatches I am sending you that the Chinese are in a very fractious mood. They protest agst. the landing of bluejackets to protect the settlement at Amoy when there was a riot, and they have coolly put the morphia article of the Mackay Treaty into operation without so much as saying 'by your leave'. They have also protested agst. gunboats going into the Poyang Lake, on wch. we supposed them to have given way. I have sat on them on each occasion.

Pray read the acct. of my conversation with Natung on railway and other matters. I think it represents the true state of the case. He at least has no influence now, because of the bomb explosion at the rlwy. terminus. Whether I shall get anything out of Chü Hung-chi is very problematical. I don't think he counts for much. The last resort is Yüan Shih kai who occupies pretty much the same position as Li Hung-chang in Wade's time. ¹ Talking to Prince Ch'ing is seldom of any use.

I mentioned Kaye's affair to Natung, who looked on it as a provincial matter, and said it was very difficult to manage. A year ago it prob. wld. have been easier. I have drafted a long Note, & the lawyer who acts as Kaye's agent is coming up to see it. I was rather surprised to read a teleg. fr. you saying that on the strength of one fr. me Kaye had been told I admitted there had been no obstruction on the part of the Chinese. If so, my meaning has been misunderstood. I reported that I had addressed a Note to the W.W.P. based on two telegs. of yours, from wch. it appeared that Kaye had reported obstruction to you. I merely adopted his words. They were afterwards proved to have been altogether without justification at the time he used them.

I find it very necessary in writing to the WWP to distinguish what I say as coming from a concessionaire, who thinks he has a grievance fr. what I say on my own account. My reason for requesting Kaye's agent to come here & see the draft note before it goes in, is that I may not afterwds. be represented to have not said all that could be said on Kaye's behalf. I have had a great deal of experience with B.Ss [British Subjects] who have complaints and claims, & have found it indispensable to have personal interviews with them in order to get at the whole facts. I am in fact the solicitor for the pltf. [plaintiff] & no respectable lawyer wld. take a case into court without seeing the pltf and getting at the whole story.

Poor old Archie Little ² and his Kiangpei coalmining concession. He relied on Hongkong people to find the money. Then he took it to London. There they won't look at it. What is a loan of 500,000 taels to the big money dealers there. So now he wants to come back & try again in Hgkg. I hope we may manage to get his agreement extended, in spite of the express stipulation that it would not be prolonged under any circs. It would be a trifling success for us, and wld. not inconvenience the Chinese in the least, as he never will be able to find the money. He is a nice old gentleman of a literary turn and writes quite readable books on China.

¹ Sir Thomas F. Wade (1818-95)

² Archibald John Little (1838-1908). In 1883 he wrote *Through the Yang-tse Gorges or Travel and Trade in Western China* (published 1888). This book recounts his journey by junk from Hankow to Chungking.

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y.s.

P.S. I cannot make out whether the agreement betw. the Chinese Central railways Ltd. and the French financiers has been signed. But [C.H.] Ross [of Jardine's] is at Hankow negotiating with Chang Chih-tung for £2,000,000 to build the Hupeh section of the Hankow-Szechuen railway.

22. Satow to Lansdowne

1 Nov. 1905

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I am very grateful to you for the kind terms in wch. you speak of my services in your letter of Sept. 4, and I only wish I cld. feel satisfied with them myself. But it has been borne in upon me that I am no longer active enough for a post like this, where there are so many questions demanding constant attention & exertion, & tending rather to increase than to diminish in number. Last summer I was obliged to throw up everything and go away for three weeks. The opinion of the doctor was that I cld. still hold on here, if I passed my summers at the seaside, but the nearest place is twelve hours distant, with very imperfect telegraphic communication, so that the work cannot be properly carried on from there. I came therefore reluctantly to the conclusion that I ought to ask to be excused from returning to Peking after taking leave next year.

It will be with great regret that I shall cease to serve under a chief who has always shown me so much kindness and consideration as you have done, but it seems to me that under the circumstances I have no choice.

23. Satow to F.A. Campbell

2 Nov. 05

My dear Campbell,

You will receive by this bag a copy of my Note to the Chinese Govt. abt. Lister Kaye's concession, wch. has been read by the agent Mr. Teesdale. It embodies all his arguments & contains some of my own. A Chinese newspaper says that the Foreign Board have telegraphed to Anhui, recommending the Govr. to agree to an extension of six months, & it seems not improbable that this may be done.

In the case of Archie Little they have only given six mos, wch. was what they gave to certain Fr. syndicates. But if Little really shows signs of doing something serious during

that period, without actually being able to get to work, it is probable that a further extension might be obtained. Only, I shld. not like him to know this, as it would induce him to go on frittering his time away in London.

This, and a teleg. fr. Canton saying that inland navigation above Wuchow, wch. the Viceroy had suspended, has been resumed are the bright spots in my otherwise cloudy horizons.

When the Peking Syndicate signed their agreement abt. the rlwy. etc. I fancied all my troubles were over, but [George] Jamieson has always something fresh to complain of. He does not seem to understand that appealing to the Legation every time he has a little difference with the Chinese is not the way to conciliate their good will.¹ Each concession agreement contains as many clauses as a commercial treaty and as many points on wch. it is possible to disagree. I mean to keep [Alexander] Hosie here to fight these battles; it is the most useful purpose to wch. a commercial attaché can be put.

Dubail read me a desp. from Paris abt. the Fr. objection to the Chairman of the Chinese Central Rlwys. being always a Br. Subj. & having a casting vote. I hope you will be able to persuade [French ambassador in London Paul] Cambon to give way. We contribute to the enterprise everything, they merely sacrifice their love of opposition to everything British. You will have heard that Chang has been interdicted from borrowing money for either of his rlwys. So, as far as the good we gain by lending him money to buy out the Americans is concerned, I am afraid there is not much to show. It was the Chinese Central railways who were to tender for the Hupeh section of the Szechuen line, not the B. & C. Corporation, who were trying to get the loan for the Canton-Hankow line. Hillier went down to Hankow on the latter business, but cld. do nothing owing to the Belgians bringing forward their obsolete letter fr. Shêng of 1898. Dubail supported Gaiffier in this. Of course they are both furious at our having helped Chang to redeem the American concession, which they hoped with Shêng's help to secure the benefits of for themselves.

You ask me to remember the Newchwang Customs and to get the Japs. out. I am afraid nothing can be done in this line until China & Japan come to an agreement about the Manchuria clauses of the Treaty of Peace. Otherwise I might talk to Uchida till I was black in the face, and to the Chinese with abt. as much success.

The teleg. proposing to return Weihaiwei to the Chinese quite upset me, as I had quite

¹ "Geo. Jamieson came. I said to him that he cld. not expect the Legation to be the 'handy man' of the Syndicate. If the Chinese did not observe the conditions of the agreement, the Syndicate cld. appeal to us, but they must do their own work." (Satow's diary, September 19, 1905)

recently sent you an essay on the difficulty of trying just at present to get our term extended. I suppose the proposal came fr. the Admiralty, & was forwarded on without the Colonial Office being consulted. Or perh. you asked them & they jumped at the idea of saving the grant in aid, wch. I believe is £3000 a year.

We have been nicely dished by the Germ. Emperor in his proposal to withdraw the troops. However, I let Mumm have it straight abt. what happened in connexion with the evacuation of Shanghai. He asked what I meant by expressing a hope that no similar incident wld. happen, so I told him to ask Goltz & his Govt. What I knew was that when the white book was published part of the correspce. had to be suppressed in order to avoid exciting public feeling, but I declined to go into details. Dubail says he sees indications that each Power will act separately, & that no one is particularly anxious to follow the German Emperor's lead. But Berlin goes on sending telegrams out here that everyone is agreed. I have told Genl. Ventris confidentially, and he is coming up here tomorrow to have a talk.

I am much obliged for what you say abt. my giving up. My health cannot stand the summer any longer, and I am getting too old for hard work without relaxation. My chief joy is to get the chancery dinner once a fortnight after the bag is closed and play bridge. The days of curio collecting are over, the soil of Peking is inimical to gardening, & there [are] no booksellers' shops.

24. Satow to Lansdowne

2.11.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

Bower & Perreira have returned fr. the [Chinese army] manoeuvres ¹, but their report will not be ready for this bag.

In the meanwhile this is what they tell me of their impressions.

There were in all abt. 24,000 men on the ground, able-bodied, well-trained, perfectly disciplined; no disorder of any kind, and commissariat arrangements excellent. With followers the total was estimated at 30,000. The officers were well acquainted with the drill & accurate in the performance of their duties. Yüan Shih-kai & Tieh-liang, who commanded the opposing forces, were on horseback, in European military costumes & wearing swords. Such a thing was never before seen in China, a commander in chief in mandarin costume used to be carried abt. in a sedan chair smoking a long pipe. The plan of

¹ See Satow's diary for October 30, 1905. (Ruxton, 2006, Volume II, p. 234)

operations was accurately carried out, & had evidently been carefully studied beforehand; each body of troops reached the position assigned to it without a mistake. It had doubtless been prepared by the Japanese military officers who act as 'professors', but they carefully kept out of sight. On the other hand there were mistakes in tactics; the artillery numbering 120 guns were of four different patterns, & the small arms were also various. There were some desertions during the manoeuvres.

But on the whole the advance on anything previously attempted in the way of raising an army is immense.

The numbers present prob. indicate a total of drilled troops not much exceeding 50,000 for Chihli & Shantung, as some of the units are below their full strength by 25%.

In Bower's opinion a foreign expeditionary force pitted agst. this army shld. not be less than one-half its strength, with plenty of guns.

This body of troops, wch. is being organized on the Japanese model, and with Japanese advisers, is intended to be the nucleus of a national army, & the old provincial levies are to be absorbed into it gradually. How long it will take to extend the organization over the whole of China it is impossible to say. One difficulty is that of finance, and the second the jealousy naturally felt of the commander in chief of such a national army, who wld. be all-powerful. But if the present numbers are only doubled, & if the Yangtze is held by troops disciplined like Yüan's, with an uniform armament, it will be difficult for any European Power to invade either N. China or the Yangtze valley. Our only means of coercion then will be attacks on coast ports, and the occupation of islands.

I cannot help thinking that the days when China cld. be intimidated into ceding portions of her territory or giving what were interpreted by the Powers as preferential rights over one or more provinces, into granting concessions to governments or syndicates for the construction of railways, or for mining, are over, and that it wld. be wise to recognize this and shape our policy accordingly.

Such a course wld. not be approved by the China party in the House of Commons, the China Association, the China League and their supporters in the press, but I venture on the opinion that the supporters of a 'strong policy', who are inspired by a small knot of men now or formerly of Shanghai may be disregarded without much harm. Their counsels in the past have sometimes been disastrous, as it wld. not be difficult to show. Perh. I may return to this subject in another letter.

25. Satow to Lord Knollys

13 Novr. 1905

Dear Lord Knollys,

The action of the German Emperor in informing the Empress-Dowager that he intended to propose the withdrawal of the troops from North China has not been an unqualified success. My French coll: who resents the advantage constantly taken by Mumm of his position as Doyen of the diplomatic body, is indignant. He says “we are not going to be towed in the wake of Germany.” The Italian coll: finds the proceeding incorrect. An old Japse., formerly minister of the Imperial household at Tokio, calling on me the other day, ¹ said it was of a piece with German practice everywhere, & used a phrase, the only equivalent of wch. is “sucking-up to China”, to describe it.

One thing is evident, that German intentions have already been communicated to the Chinese govt., the rest of the Powers cannot join with her in notifying the withdrawal. In fact any common action seems quite out of the question. It will not take long for the Chinese to discover that the alacrity of Germany is due to the difficulty of obtaining money for the German garrison fr. the Reichstag, now that the sum included in the indemnity for this purpose is exhausted.

One can see that Mumm is considerably embarrassed by what he affects to regard as the impulsive character of his sovereign.

The identity of the man with the bomb who blew himself up on the 24 Sept. instead of the party of high officials, has at last been discovered, but none of his accomplices have as yet been arrested. Perhaps this may somewhat abate the fears of the E-D, who has surrounded herself with soldiers & police. She recently received Mumm & Uchida in what is called the winter palace, instead of coming into the palace proper to give them audiences. It will be interesting to see whether she comes out of her shell, or lets the Emperor come out, to receive Komura in the apartment in the Palace prescribed by the Protocol of Sept. 1901.

26. Satow to Cockerell

13.11.05

My dear Cockerell,

¹ Count Hisamoto Hijikata (1833-1918) visited Satow on November 10, 1905. (Diary)

I am sending you copy of a desp. and private letter fr. [G.J.L.] Litton, in wch. he refuses to be made consul at Têngyüeh on the ground that he cannot accept promotion over the heads of his seniors. The chief clerk will be able to show you a desp. fr. Litton of July 1, in wch. he gives similarly eccentric reasons for not drawing acting pay as Cons-Genl. at Yünnanfu when acting there. I sometimes think Litton is a little off his head, and these efforts at dictating how apptmts. are to be made & emoluments distributed rather confirm that view.

The consular service of course is in favour of promotion by strict seniority, because then the indolent and the dull are at no disadvantage. I maintain on the contrary that promotion to the rank of consul must be by selection of the fittest, & that the question who is fittest for a particular post involves a number of considerations.

Wilton has been telegraphing to me from Simla that he understands he has been passed over, and asking on what grounds. I have not answered these telegrams. He is in my opinion a very lucky fellow to have seen Lhasa, & the only man who goes over his head is Litton, whose promotion I recommended for what seemed to me excellent reasons. If Wilton wishes to grumble, he had better do it to the F.O., but it wld. be wiser of him not to do it. When he was acting at Chungking he committed a serious neglect of duty in not reporting the inadequate ¹ sentence passed on the murderer of Fleming in Kuei-chou, a sentence wch. was very inadequate. But I have not reported him to the F.O.

27. Satow to F.A. Campbell

15.11.05

My dear Campbell,

Newchwang Customs. I went to Sir Robt. Hart this morning & reminded him of the great interest H.M.G. & Parliament take in this subject. The Russians when in possession had the revenue paid into their bank, and no one has ever learnt how they disposed of it. The Japse. have followed their example, but we believe they will render an account.

He said I no doubt knew that the Japse. authorities had lately removed the man he put in charge of the native customs, & replaced him by a man of their own choice. He did not know whether this was done by instructions fr. Tokio. Possibly it was the local military commander who did it. There was no help for it, and he had instructed the Comr. of Customs not to make a row about it. As long as the Japanese remained in military

¹ This word has been added in afterwards, but it seems unnecessary.

occupation of Manchuria the only thing to do was to remain quiet, & not offer opposition. It was rumoured that Newchwang wld. be the last place evacuated by the Japanese, tho' personally he thought it ought to be the first.

Komura & the Chinese Plenipotentiaries are to exchange their full powers on the 17th, and then we may perh. hear what will be done in regard to Manchurian questions in general. The Chinese will regard the Newchwang revenue as a very minor matter in comparison with the recovery of administrative freedoms in Manchuria. But Sir Robt. it may safely be said, will not lose sight of the question.

28. Satow to Lansdowne

16.11.05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

I heard last night fr. Sir Robt. Hart that negotiations had been broken off at Calcutta. Ever since May last when T'ang submitted his counter draft, and Prince Ch'ing's proposal early in July to transfer the negotiations to either London or Peking, it has been more or less evident that the Chinese Govt. wld. not accept our terms. On Aug. 4th they were told that these terms could not be modified, & that in default of acceptance of them H.M.G. wld. prefer to dispense with the adhesion of China. However, the Chinese having proposed to omit Art. 1, wch. was intended to recognize the suzerainty of China, we gave way on that. At first they gave us to understand that there were no other important points of difference, but later on said that Art. 2 was particularly objectionable. This was the article by wch. both the high contracting parties undertook to see that the terms of the Lhasa convention were duly carried out. The Chinese wished to be the only party mentioned in this article. It now became increasingly evident that there was no intention of accepting the draft of the Indian Govt. When Lord Curzon's resignation was announced they affected to desire that the negotiations might be brought to a speedy conclusion, but the conclusion was to be in the sense desired by them. If they could not get their own terms, they were prepared to let the discussions drag on, in the hope that his successor would make the concessions they asked for. At Calcutta T'ang was of course in touch with the malcontents, who wld. represent to him that Lord Curzon had been thrown over, and that the new Viceroy might be expected to adopt a different policy. The Chinese govt. have no doubt acted on this view of the probabilities, and it will not surprise me if they endeavour to renew negotiations as soon as Lord Minto takes charge.

They have had repeated warnings for some months past, & have only themselves to blame for the negotiations being broken off. I think they did not believe that H.M.G. wld. ultimately dispense with their adhesion. Now they know it, & what is perh. to be expected is that they will intrigue in Tibet to procure every kind of difficulty being thrown in the way of the convention being carried out.

For the moment they have other fish to fry. They are suspicious of the intentions of the Japanese. I told Yüan Shihkai yesterday, who is one of the Chinese Plenipos, that I saw no reason why they shld. not come to a speedy conclusion with Komura, provided they do not listen to outsiders.

Fr. the way Dubail speaks I gather that he will try to put spokes in the Japse. wheels. Mumm on the contrary ought to do what he can to facilitate the Japse. acquiring special privileges, say for opening mines, as that wld. justify his asking for similar rights in Shantung. I have no knowledge of the line Pokotiloff is likely to take.

Tomorrow the plenipos. meet to celebrate their full powers, and to fix the programme. I have not seen Komura yet, as he wld. make no calls till he had presented his credentials; being ambassador we have to call on him first.

The question of withdrawing the troops makes no progress. Dubail resents the lead taken by Germany, & moreover wishes to make use of the departure of French troops to secure a valuable piece of land at Taku. He tells me he has no instructions. On our side there is no reason to hurry. Yüan Shihkai mentioned the matter to Campbell when the latter called on him at Tientsin, but Campbell avoided the subject. I wish to let the great man understand that he must help us in our difficulties abt. rlwy agreements first, & that then we may meet his wishes.

29. Satow to F.A. Campbell

16.11.05

My dear Campbell,

An interesting incident occurred the other day in connexion with the opening of the Yellow River Bridge on the 12th. The French & Belgians got out some delegates from home, & were going to have the function all to themselves, when T'ang, who has been apptd. Asst. Director-Genl. on his return fr. Calcutta, a few days before sent round to all the other Legations to ask the chefs de mission to be of the party, and if they could not go, to send a representative. None of us went, but Mumm, the Italian & I each sent a Secretary.

The object was to teach the Franco-Belgians that it was a Chinese rlwy. & it seemed to me polite to fall in with the notion. Shêng came up fr. Shanghai for the affair, but did not come on to Peking. There are indications that he will before long cease to have anything to do with railway matters, wch. wld. suit us very well.

Dubail pretends to believe that Komura's negotiations are only ostensibly connected with Manchuria, and that the real object is to bring abt. an alliance between Japan & China. He told me the other day that Japse. prestige had greatly declined of late ¹, and that he had advised the Chinese to turn to England & France, wch. can afford her their powerful moral support, rather than to Japan. He thinks Mumm is staying here to watch the Japan-China negotiations, and not for the withdrawal of the troops, wch. Mumm gives out as his motive. In this he is prob. right, but his other notion seems to me absurd. I contented myself with replying that I had never believed that China wld. put herself in the hands of Japan, as the latter had not the same means of conciliating affection & gratitude as the Russians.

It is rumoured that the Russians are seeking to revise their treaty of 1881, & to obtain powers to construct rlwys. in Mongolia. The former they can claim in accordance with the Protocol of 7 Sept. 1901, but they are not likely to get any railway concessions.

The other day [November 10th – diary] I had a visit from an old Japanese friend, who was formerly Minr. of the Imperial Household. He went to England in 1887 with the Japanese Prince who attended the first Jubilee, & his name is Hijikata. He said the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been of the greatest value in preventing the other Powers from interfering in the war. We had exactly observed our neutrality, wch. was more than the Fr. had done. Their (the Japse) successes both at sea and on land had surpassed their wildest expectations. Russia had committed the great error of despising Japan, because it was a small country.

Mumm was quite nasty to me about the Tientsin-Chinkiang rlwy. a few days ago [November 14th – diary]. He felt it was entirely the fault of H.M.G. that the final contract had not been put thro' already. I rejoined that it was the fault of the Chinese, who were carried away by the idea of getting more control over their railways than they had in the past.

Rockhill tells me [November 11th – diary] he does not think his govt. will appoint a Consul to Antung. Their object was achieved by inserting it in the commercial treaty with China. I do not think it will be worth our while to have a man there either, but I shld. be

¹ See Satow's diary for November 6, 1905.

disposed to recommend transferring the Newchwang Consul to Mukden as Consul-general, & putting a Vice-consul at Newchwang, when the time comes.

P.S. Komura held a reception this afternoon of the diplomatic body. Mumm wanted it to be modelled on Berlin etiquette. However, uniform was dispensed with, & Mumm acted the part of master of ceremonies. We shall have a series of dinners in his honour, wch. will be bad for his health & ours. E.S.

30. Satow to F.A. Campbell Recd. at F.O. 24/1/06

24.11.05

My dear Campbell,

I had not intended to say more about Lister Kaye, but as you have taken the trouble to write to me abt. his case, I add a few more words in explanation of my attitude in the matter.

Your telegram No. 138 of 26 September says that there has been obstruction by the Chinese auth. & I am referred to the language of my teleg. no 115 of June 13. The charge of obstruction was brought by Lister Kaye, acc. to your teleg. No. 89. I merely adopted the language of your teleg. and it was afterwards shown that no obstruction had been offered, & that the agents had not so informed him. It was a figment of his imagination. I infer that Lord Lansdowne's reference to my Note of June 11 is also known to you, and that you had gone into the whole question before his letter to me of Oct. 2 was written. Now if my note to Prince Ch'ing is carefully examined, it will be found to be based on that teleg. & that the latter is little more than a reproduction of Kaye's language to you. So I do not think I can be regarded as its real author.

As for Warren's having made a statement that he was satisfied that the terms of the concession had been properly carried out by the Syndicate (see his desp. to me No. 42 of June 7) I can only say that my experience of the way he does things leads me to infer that he had not examined the concession with any care, & that Kaye cannot rely much on that.

I think Kaye took a mistaken line fr. the beginning. He tried to prove that he had acted in strict accordance with the terms of his agreement, & charged the Chinese Auth. with having obstructed his engineers. If a pltf. takes legal points, he cannot complain if the case goes agst. him when it is shown that his arguments are without foundation.

I admit that the Chinese took advantage of the irregular proceedings he instructed his

agent to adopt, but he knew that there was a strong local opposition against him, & he ought to have avoided giving the Chinese an opening for saying that he had acted irregularly.

The right way to go abt. it wld. have been for him to ask the F.O. to teleg. out here that he had been hard at work getting together the capital, engaging engineers and providing machinery, but that they could not be on the spot before the end of the 12 months, and on those grounds to ask for an extension of time. But he apparently thought that to send any engineer he cld. pick up to the spot to make a pretence of beginning work was sufficient.

It was only much later than June 11[?] & bit by bit that I had any correct information, & my note of that date wld. not have been written had I known what I knew later. I shld. have had to teleg. back what I wrote in my desp. No. 285[?] of Aug. 22.

However, as you will have discovered from my Note of 24 Oct to Prince Ch'ing, I have not spared any effort to induce the Chinese Govt. to take Lister Kaye's view, & my teleg. of today will have told you that there is a prospect of their doing so. I have only troubled you with this long letter of explanation because my action seems to have been misunderstood.

31. Satow to Lansdowne

30 Nov. 05

Dear Ld. Lansdowne,

With regard to the rlwy. matters mentioned in your letter of Oct. 2, I am ready to support the negotiations for a final agreement for the construction of the Tientsin-Yangtze Rlwy, but it appears that the agents of the German group & the Chinese Central Rlwys are not ready. The Central Chinese Govt. is so much in the hands of Yüan Shih-kai that addressing them officially will be of little use, & if the Germans wish to get Yüan to sanction the final agreement, they will find it necessary to make concessions to him in regard to the control of the management. My despp. & a memo. giving the history of this concession, wch. goes by today's bag, show how the matter stands at present.

I find Yüan Shih-kai quite ready to acknowledge that the Canton-Kowloon, & Soochow-Ningpo preliminary agreements are binding on the Chinese govt., and as soon as Komura's mission is out of the way I hope we may accomplish something.

The retention of the Tientsin garrison after the departure of the detachments stationed elsewhere will afford us a lever of wch. I shall try to make the fullest use. As to the application of coercion, I hope we may not have to resort to that. The occupation of Chusan

is the only practicable step, but we shld. do all in our power to avoid having to take refuge in it.

It is impossible to learn anything about the negotiations betw. Komura and the Chinese, as both parties observe absolute silence. No one outside the commissioners actually engaged in the discussions is allowed to know anything. Newspaper men have been informed that press telegrams about Manchuria will be subject to the censorate, wch. step has probably been suggested by the Japanese. I am told that it is expected that an agreement will be arrived at before the 5th Dec. A sort of communiqué has appeared in the English press at Tientsin that Japan is adhering to the declaration she made at the outset of the war that she wld. not claim any territorial advantage at the expense of China, that she will not demand any exclusive right or concession in Manchuria; that the reports she is demanding payment of part of the war expenses, and that she has designs on Fuhkien are pure fabrications. I have told the Chinese through Yüan Shihkai that they may be confident that Japan will not ask anything that is not fair, & that they must not run the risk of forcing Japan to remain in Manchuria, wch. wld. mean that Russia wld. keep possn. of the northern half. Dubail pretends that the result of Komura's mission will either be an agreement so vaguely worded as to be valueless, or that the negotiations will fail, in wch. case Japan will give up nothing that she at present occupies. He also asserts that Japan is asking for a 99 year lease of Port Arthur. I told him I did not believe that, because it wld. be contrary to the wording of the Treaty of Peace, & the other idea, of Japan remaining in Manchuria wld. be contrary to what she has stipulated with Russia in regard to the progressive evacuation, the terms of wch. have just been published.

[Henry Willard] Denison ¹ confirmed to me what I think I have mentioned in a previous letter as to the necessity of the peace to Japan. When Yamagata visited the army in the field after the battle of Mukden, the staff asked for 300,000 men more to enable them to march further. With those reinforcements they could not reach the Sungari river before April 1906, and Harbin a good deal later in the year. Nor had they sufficient rifles and ammunition to go on with. I see too from reports in the Japanese papers of the return of the troops that part of the Landsturm ² had gone to the seat of war. I think it is certain that altho' Japan has a population of 45,000,000, the percentage of men physically fit for active service is much smaller than it wld. be in a European country where the population was equally numerous.

¹ See note to letter no. 30 in PRO 30/33 14/9 above.

² Landsturm: originally a word used in the Prussian army (1813-1918) to signify a militia of non-professional soldiers, the reserves called out last.

The Chinese newspapers have been occupying themselves with Tibet. On the 17th one of them wrote that there had been a likelihood of the negotiations being broken off in consequence of our insisting that China was suzerain and not sovereign over Tibet, but on the production of certain documents fr. the Chinese archives, we abandoned our contention. The article says that clauses 3 and 9 (this must be of the Lhasa convention) have been satisfactorily amended. Having reorganized China's sovereignty in Tibet, we have now asked her to pay the indemnity.

I shld. not mention this nonsense did I not believe that it emanates fr. the Foreign Board, with the object of throwing dust in people's eyes. It may be intended to cover their retreat if they find it ultimately necessary to accept the adhesion agreement. When T'ang came to see me on the 25th he showed a desire to reopen negotiations, but I told him that the only proposal I could hold out hopes of transmitting to you wld. be an offer to sign the adhesion agreement as it was drafted by the Indian Govt.

You will have heard from Söul of the measures employed by Japan to secure the signature of the agreement creating a Japanese protectorate over Corea. Rockhill saw Yüan Shihkai on the 23rd, who asked him what he thought of Japanese aims and intentions. Rockhill replied encouragingly, on wch. Yüan's face became very grave, and he said "But what are we to think of them after what they have just done in Corea". Rockhill hopes they will put forth a declaration that they mean to uphold the treaties of other Powers with Corea, otherwise the whole world will regard them with distrust. Fr. his talk, wch. however varies a good deal, I think he is afraid of Japanese ambitions. I told him that Japan, like every other nation, will take what she can get, ¹ & wait for her opportunities, but we need not expect another move on her part for the next ten years.

Fr. a confidential person who has seen Uchida lately ², I learn that the Japanese think Mumm is stopping here to watch Komura's doings, & to do all in his power to prevent a secret alliance betw. China & Japan. It seems Mumm went to Uchida to pump him. Dubail they believe has instructions to co-operate in every way with Pokotilow. The Japanese hate the Belgians, on account of the way in wch. they play into the hands of the French. Cárcer, the cheery little Spaniard, they accuse of being under pecuniary obligations to the Russians.

¹ "She, like every other nation, wld. expand where she could, there was no finality about the present arrangements." (Satow talking to Rockhill in Satow's diary entry for November 23, 1905. Ruxton, 2006, Volume II, p. 244)

² Captain G.F. Manzies told Satow of an interesting conversation he had with Uchida. (Diary, November 25, 1905)

It is quite true that he is intimate with the Russian consul at Tientsin, & loses large sums to him at cards; so also does Major Nathan.

Dubail tells me he has been giving advice to Natung that Japan must have the Liaotung Peninsula, as a matter of course, & that she wld. be justified in claiming in S. Manchuria the same position that Russia had before the war. But as Nat'ung is entirely excluded from any knowledge of the negotiations, advice given to him, whether honest or insidious, is not likely to be of much effect.

The Great William Jennings Bryan ¹ is here here [sic – written twice], & I met him at dinner. He told me that when in London he sat at dinner betw. Mr. [A.J.] Balfour and Mr. [C.T.] Ritchie, who had not spoken to each other for months. But he got on perfectly happily, for to the Prime Minister he talked bimetallism, and to the ex-chancellor of the Exchequer free-trade, being still a firm believer in both.

The German proposals for the evacuation of troops do not make much headway. Dubail came to me yesterday and said he had only just recd. the instructions despatched fr. Paris on the 6 Novr. They include the acquisition of a large piece of land at Taku for a French naval yard. I have told Mumm that my instructions are to agree to withdraw the outlying detachments only, and that this will take place in March; but as regards the Tientsin garrison, as I expected to go on leave I would not tie the hands of my locum tenens by making any suggestions, and that I was still waiting for instructions on a third point on wch. the War Office had not made up its mind. I added that I proposed to abstain from making any communication to the Chinese Govt. till the time for embarkation came, and then I wld. simply ask them to take over the buildings we were vacating.

32. Satow to F.A. Campbell

5.12.05

My dear Campbell,

In the teleg. sections for Oct 11 & 12 I notice one from the India Office to the Indian govt. containing the statement that I “took action on your teleg. of 28 ult[im]o without waiting for instructions.” That of course is incorrect. My teleg. of 29 Sept. related a conversation with Prince Ch'ing of the previous day, & the Viceroy's teleg. of Sept 28 did not reach me till the 29th. It is incomprehensible to me how the man at the India Office shld.

¹ William Jennings Bryan (1860-1925) was an American lawyer, statesman and politician. He was three-time Democratic party nominee for President of the United States. Satow met him on November 28, 1905. (Diary)

have stated that I had acted on a teleg. wch. I had not recd., or that I had acted on a teleg. fr. India without waiting for instructions.

I have not in a single instance acted on a teleg. fr. India until I have recd. F.O. instructions directing me what to do.

The only thing I can be said to have done “without waiting for instructions” was to tell Prince Ch’ing clearly that Chang could do nothing without credentials, a very obvious & reasonable thing to say under the circs., & I hardly think that this deserves to be described as “without waiting for instructions”, language wch. implies a censure.

The Apostle St. James says the tongue is an unruly member; the telegraph seems to excel in that quality, and I am sure you will agree with me.

33. Satow to F.A. Campbell

11.12.05

My dear Campbell,

Many thanks for your letter of 19 Oct. I hope that the Fr. objection to the British chairman with a casting vote for the Chinese Central railways will not be admitted. On this point I stick to what I said a few days ago in my teleg. abt. the proposal to admit the French to a share in the loaning of capital for the Canton-Hankow line. The Belgians wld. also have to come in. Now it was precisely this combination that the Chinese kicked against, & led them to buy back the concession so dearly. If, after lending them money to carry out that transaction, we were to do exactly the same as the Americans, they wld. consider us as false friends indeed.

The entente is no doubt an excellent thing, but under cover of it our French friends seem to be trying to get too much out of us. It is like the hero of a French adulterous novel, who makes the husband believe he is a good friend, & abuses his confidence in order to lie with his wife. In diplomatic matters the Fr. always try to get the best of the bargain. I for one shld. not be very sorry if the endeavour to combine with them for the Szechuen-Hankow rlwy. fell thro’. Even if they gave way abt. the chairman, the prospect of obtaining a concession to build the line is at present nil, and that of inducing the Chinese to borrow money from an Anglo-Belgian-French combination equally remote.

I do not think the Chinese are very anxious that the Dalai Lama shld. go back to Tibet. They certainly do not want to sign the adhesion agreement to the Lhasa convention, & Mr. T’ang who has just joined the Waiwupu will exert all his influence against it. The

instructions you sent me the other day to refuse the proposal to pay the indemnity unless they signed without further change gave me much joy, and it will be interesting to see what they reply to the Note I have written to them on the subject.

Pray do not be alarmed at the despp. containing correspce. abt. various topics of controversy with the Chinese wch. I am sending you. They are not intended to be read, but only to furnish material for replies in case P.Q. [Parliamentary Questions] are asked abt. these cases. Mr. Bemertz of Changsha fame and Messrs. Pollack & Spitzel with their Hunan Mining Syndicate are a precious lot.

Mr. E.S. Little of Shanghai, the author of the letter of the Shanghai merchants about the non-fulfilment of the Mackay treaty, came to see me the other day [on December 4th – see diary]. He had the impudence to assure me that their representations were only intended to strengthen my hands. I ‘went for him’ at once, and gave him a good talking to.

Apropos of the Mackay Treaty, I take some credit to myself for having abstained from criticizing it when it was signed. The fact is he consulted both [Henry] Cockburn, who was his assistant commissioner, & myself very little abt. it. Had he done so, I shld. have strongly protested agst. the article holding out a prospect of the abolition of consular jurisdiction. Cockburn wld. have done the same, & probably much more, but his opinion was not asked. I felt that as H.M.G. had sent out a special mission to negotiate that treaty, it was necessary that he shld. sign a treaty of some sort, and gave him all the help I could. I verily believe that but for my urgency he wld. not have succeeded in signing it. But I do not regard it as being of any great value, & have never believed that the Chinese wld. act in good faith in carrying out the abolition of likin¹ article. They wld. have taken the surtax, done away with the likin stations, and put on a consumption tax to replace likin, to wch. we could not have objected. So I was not sorry that the Germans declined to tread in our footsteps, as you will have seen fr. my recent desp. abt. the German negotiations.

I ought to have reported to you that on receipt of W.H. Wilkinson’s desp. of Aug. 18, 1904, I replied by sending him the enclosures to your desp. of May 19, 1903, refusing to appt. Mr. Bulich[?] Consular agent, & informing him that the proposal to appt. him pro-consul could not be entertained. I had not noticed, I suppose, that he had sent you a copy of his desp. of Aug. 18 of last year.

¹ Chinese (Wade-Giles) *Li-chin*, or (Pinyin) *Lijin*, special tax paid by merchants and traders in mid-19th-century China. Likin (“a tax of one-thousandth”) was levied on goods in transit or as a sales tax in shops where goods were sold. (*Encyclopedia Britannica*)

Apropos of this subject, it seems to me that this gentleman is too fond of sending copies to you. The other day he reported about the laches [an equitable term similar to negligence] of Mr. Russell at Chungking in regard to the release of a man accused of taking a leading share in the Fleming murder. I have informed him officially that he has misinterpreted the rule abt. sending copies of despp. direct to the F.O., & that it is for the Minister, & not for him, to decide whether the shortcomings of his brother officers shld. be reported home. I have not reported to you on the subject, because I did not wish to rake up mistakes committed before my time, but the fact is that Wilton omitted to report to the Legation the sentence passed on T'an, & Russell probably supposed that he need not inform me of its having been served. I came down upon him however, and he will be more cautious for the future.

34. Satow to Sir Edward Grey

14.12.05

Dear Sir Edward,

There must have been a universal chorus of satisfaction throughout the diplomatic service when it was made known that you were to be Foreign Secretary, & as far as I am concerned I look forward with great pleasure to serving under your orders.

It is unfortunate that your entry upon office shld. be signalized by the trouble wch. has occurred at Shanghai. The fact is that the Municipal Council overrates its importance, and the chairman is a peculiarly obstinate person who is convinced that he possesses the gifts of a statesman in a more than ordinary measure. He is known among his friends as Silly Anderson. The temper of Shanghai may be gauged by the fact that Mr. R.W. Little, the editor of the leading paper [*North China Herald*] and chairman of the China Association, not long ago printed the statement that the International Settlement is an independent republic established on a small portion of the soil of China.

I am very sorry that I did not nip this affair in the bud when I recd. Sir Pelham Warren's desp. of last July, but I was ill at the time & scarcely able to work, and I am afraid I did not read it through. If I did, the serious character of what the council and the consuls were doing escaped my notice.

The temper of the Chinese is very different from what it was a year or two ago. The example of Japan has shown them what an Eastern nation may achieve in the way of resisting European encroachments, & the success of the boycott agst. American trade has

taught them what a powerful weapon they possess against foreigners whose only motive for coming to China is to push their trade.

Lately in talking to a member of the Foreign Board I found I had to complain against popular opposition to the exercise of treaty rights and the privileges granted to foreign rlwy. & mining syndicates in nine out of the eighteen provinces in China. The only way of overcoming this opposition is by steady persevering and patient argument with the officials in Peking and in the provinces. I shld. deprecate the use of force to obtain the recognition of our rights, for the remedy is worse than the disease; except of course where the lives or property of Br. subjects are directly attacked. In such cases there must be no hesitation.

35. Satow to F.A. Campbell

14.12.05

My dear Campbell,

I learnt fr. a teleg. a short time ago that the suggestion put forward by [Governor of Hong Kong Sir Matthew] Nathan & myself that the B. & C. [British & Chinese] Corporation shld. be induced by the repayment of their out of pocket expenses was disapproved at home. Of course I did not mean that we shld. ourselves make such an offer to the Chinese, but that if, after the binding force of the preliminary agreement was fully acknowledged by them, they themselves mooted it, we might come to an arrangement satisfactory to both sides, wch. wld. secure the construction of the Chinese section and the joint working of the whole line. The B. & C. Corporation's interest in the matter is merely to make as much out of the issue of the loans & the commission on materials, & the rlwy. will stand the Chinese in far more than if it were constructed on the lines suggested by Nathan.

36. Satow to F.A. Campbell

27.12.05

My dear Campbell,

This is a very annoying affair at Shanghai. I have written a long private letter to Sir Ed. Grey about it [no. 38 below], to wch. there is not much to add. The people who run the Municipal Council have behaved very imprudently, relying no doubt upon the fact of [John Otway Percy] Bland, their secretary, being "Times" correspondent, & therefore able to put their doings before the public in the most favourable light. My friend Warren writing to me the day after the row in the Court says: "There was an unpleasant fracas in the Mixed

Court.....I should prefer abolishment & the introduction of some other system in its place.”

With the exception of the minutes of the consular meeting at wch. this momentous decision was so light-heartedly taken regarding Chinese women prisoners and a report by the police of a Chinese public meeting to protest, this is all I have from him in the shape of writing since the 8th, tho’ there has been plenty of time to send me [B.] Twyman’s and the police inspector’s account of the row in the Court, and I have been greatly inconvenienced by the absence of detailed information. The Chinese have persistently gone for Twyman & the police. I cannot think that it has been made sufficiently clear to them that the consular body & the municipal Council accept the responsibility of the orders given to Twyman & the police. The probability is that the other consuls, some of whom disapprove of the decision to send Chinese women to the municipal gaol, were unwilling to do this, and Warren unable to get them to see things in that light. My object in proposing to instruct the consular body to rescind their decision, is to fix the whole of them with the responsibility, and then to administer a rebuff to the Municipal Council through the rescission. It was the latter who started the business, and were apparently doing things without the sanction of the Consular Body, who jibbed at first, but were, I suspect, brought round by [German Consul-General] Knappe, who is a masterful individual. If the consuls have to refer such proposals in future to the diplomatic body, they will be much better able to resist the encroachments of the municipal council. Brennan was able to keep these gentry in order, but I think Warren is rather under their influence. He likes a little popularity.

P.S. Knappe has gone home, and it is given out that he will retire. Bland is said to have taken the shilling of the B. & C. Corporation, so that in April he gives up the Secretaryship of the Municipal Council, and I hope the “Times” also. If so, things will go more quietly.

37. Satow to Sir Edward Grey

28.12.05

Dear Sir Edward,

My Germ. coll: [Mumm] has kept me for an hour chiefly abt. the desire of his Govt. to withdraw the international troops fr. N. China, & left me but little time to write abt. topics of a general nature. He admitted that the way in wch. the proposal was communicated to the Chinese at the same time as to the heads of state was a mistake, and to that he ascribed the difficulty in obtaining the consent of the other PP. That is partly so, but my object has been

to use the withdrawal of troops as a means of getting the Chinese to treat our rlwy. & mining concessions a little more reasonably. The position at present is this. The Germans want to take all away in March, but if we insist on keeping a garrison at Tientsin will reluctantly consent to leave a couple of companies there. The Fr. are quite willing to do the same. The Japse. wish to send all their troops home, but desire to act with us.

As long as the S'hai affair is not settled, a public announcement that the troops were being withdrawn fr. here wld. prob. cause a howl in the Engl[ish] press.

I have recd. Warren's report on the Mixed Court fracas, but cannot send it off today, as I have not had the time to digest it, and moreover Sir H. de Saumarez has been asked to hold an inquiry into the conduct of the police, wch. was only commenced today.

We have had a teleg. fr. Washington in the press, exactly reproducing the confl. information given by Komura to Rockhill. The Dept. of State must have given out the news of the arrangement concluded with China regarding Manchuria.

38. Satow to Grey

27.12.05

Dear Sir Edward,

This mixed Court business & the riots wch. have grown out of it seem to call for the exercise of more careful supervision of the doings of the municipal council and Consuls. Both bodies seem to regard themselves as exercising independent powers, and as bound to render an account to no one. That this is the way in wch. the council interpret their position is to be seen throughout the history of Shanghai, during 1862-1869, when the existing Land Regulations were being discussed and since.

Most of the consuls are more or less independent of their respective ministers, corresponding direct with their Foreign Offices, and it is perh. scarcely to be wondered at that our consul-general also likes to act without reporting to the legation. The tendency to act independently has certainly been rather marked during the five years that I have been here. It arose during the troubles of 1900, when the legation was cut off from communication with the outer world, so that the Consul-general was brought into direct relations with the F.O., and the authority of the minister has never since been fully re-established. I do not think this is a desirable state of things. China is too far off for the consuls at the ports to be superintended directly fr. the F.O. and there has to be an intermediary. As my time is nearly up, I can speak frankly on this subject, without its being

supposed that I have a personal interest in the matter.

The municipal franchise, as I reported in a desp. of Aug. 1904, is of such a character that Br. subjects, who are less than one half of the foreign population, control a majority of the votes, and they could easily elect a council composed entirely of nine British subjects, tho' the practice is to allow one American and one German to be chosen. For a long time past the Germans have been trying to get a second member, but without success. Dr. Knappe, the late consul-general, laid himself out to please the municipal council, in the hope of getting them eventually to give way on this point, and being Senior consul he was able to give a direction to the resolutions of the consular body wch. harmonized with the wishes of the council. His manoeuvres no doubt excited the emulation of Sir P. Warren, who also likes to be popular – and undoubtedly is. He is a man who in an emergency, like that of the recent riots, can be relied on to keep his head & not get into a flurry. It is a very valuable quality. But he is not a very painstaking consul, and has such great difficulty in putting his ideas on paper that it is almost impossible for him ¹ to extract from him any detailed reports as to what happens. It is partly to this peculiarity, no doubt, that is to be attributed the meagre character of the information that I have as yet received from him, except by telegraph, of what has recently occurred at Shanghai, and his complete silence after July 22 as to the intentions & resolutions of the consular body in regard to female prisoners, and the protests of the Chinese magistrate agst. women being sent to the municipal jail. Knappe got his reward, for a few weeks ago the municipal council gave him a big dinner & speeches were made in his honour such as never before fell to the lot of any consul-general, British or foreign.

The council, being mainly British, has come to look on the International Settlement as a British concern, and to endeavour, as rulers of 'an independent republic', to extend their authority. The Chinese have sometimes concurred, as for instance in regard to the confinement of Chinese men convicts, who are mostly sent to the municipal jail, & if condemned to hard labour are put to roadmaking in the settlement. Two years ago the council thought it wld. be proper to extend this arrangement to female convicts: they built a female ward, & naturally wished to get it tenanted. I daresay the women's quarters there wld. be cleaner than in the Mixed Court jail, but it does not necessary [sic necessarily?] follow that they wld. be healthier, and in fact I am told that the mortality in the municipal jail is very high, especially from beriberi.

¹ This "for him" seems to be unnecessary to the sentence's meaning.

The constitution of the Mixed Court under the rules of 1869 by wch. the Chinese magistrate decides & the consular officer sits with him only in cases where a foreigner is concerned is a great grievance to the municipal council. In the French settlement it seems that the positions of magistrate & consular officer are reversed. The Council desires to get rid of the magistrate if possible, & to have all cases decided by the consular officer; all their efforts are directed towards this end. In Sir P. Warren's desp. No 57 of July 22 of wch. I have sent home a long extract, it is shown that his programme was insistence upon sending women to the municipal jail and certain other innovations with or without the consent of the Taotai & magistrate; it was anticipated that the Taotai might close the court, & then the consular officers could be instructed to sit alone as magistrates. This programme is, I feel convinced, quite as much that of the municipal council as his and, as he says, the initiative came from the council, who had already put some of these changes into force without consulting the consular body. This shows that the consular body are sometimes quite unable to control the reforming zeal of the municipal council, & that their hands require to be strengthened by the authority of the F.R.R. [Foreign Representatives] at Peking.

The Council as a purely British institution is naturally regarded with a jealous eye by other nationalities, who consider that they have not a fair share of representation. If the franchise were assimilated to that of the Fr. settlement, wch. is far more democratic, there can be scarcely any doubt that the other nationalities wld. be able to elect to the Council. Formerly the Shanghai settlement was run on non-political lines, but since the strife for political influence in China began about ten years ago, the situation has changed. The Germans would seize the first opportunity to bring up this question of the franchise, & they would not be without allies. We should be isolated, for the Japanese in this case wld. not consent to efface themselves merely to please us, nor wld. the Americans. And the Chinese are certainly not well-disposed towards the Council, who treat them as pariahs and will not allow a Chinese into the public garden. The Chinese have plenty of grievances of which one hears thro' the native press. It is a very unwise policy on the part of the Council to stir up trouble by trying to assert an authority they do not possess. They should confine themselves strictly to the functions conferred on them by the Land Regulations, & then their position wld. be impregnable. But when they arrogate to themselves an independent status they provoke criticism, & then may come an inquiry into the sources of their authority, wch. will reveal unexpected weakness in the foundations. For strange to say the Joint Minute of 24 Sept. 1869 signed by the five F.R.R. then at Peking, states that they agree

provisionally to the Land Regulations, and some of the PP [Powers] have apparently never definitely approved them. I can find no record that they were formally approved by any but the Br. Govt. Without the consent of his own govt. no foreigner can be taxed in the International Settlement, and this is the weak point in the position of the Council. The foundation is insecure and the edifice in a state of unstable equilibrium. To endeavour to be ever building higher and wider at the top is lamentable imprudence. Not all the efforts of the Br. Govt. & their agents in China will be able to save the institution as it at present exists, almost entirely in British hands, if all the PP [Powers] including China shld. be arrayed agst. it.

For a good number of years the Secretary has been a Mr. J.O.P. Bland, a very clever & energetic man, who has practically been the Council. The members change, but he remains. He has also been Secretary of the Shanghai branch of the China Association. The ideal of Mr. Bland & a few more is the predominance of English influence in the Yangtze basin, & I have little doubt that the endeavour made a few years ago to obtain from the Chinese govt. a sort of refusal of this vast territory in case of the partition of China, then so confidently expected, was prompted by them and their associates of the London branch. I think that they have frequently been too much listened to. They first appeared on the scene as bitterly opposing the treaty of 1894 with Japan by wch. consular jurisdiction was surrendered. They were the prime movers in the agitation to have troops landed at Shanghai in 1900, their notion being that this wld. afford the means of firmly establishing England in sole possession. At the moment they started this proposal, all real danger was over, and the troops were not put on shore till the day after the relief of Peking and the flight of the Empress-Dowager. Other Powers at once followed suit, France, Germany and Japan, and when the troops were finally withdrawn at the close of 1902, the Germans took advantage of the opportunity to get from the Chinese exactly the same undertaking in regard to the Yangtze valley wch. we obtained in 1898. Not only was the British general in N. China weakened by the withdrawal of some 3000 men from his command, but the scheme of these gentlemen was wrecked by the fact that other Powers also landed troops. The published white book does not contain all the letters that passed between the F.O. and the German Embassy regarding the trick played on us by the Germans in 1902, and it is well that it does not. For if the press had got hold of the correspce the result wld. have been strained relations betw. the two countries, and perh. something worse.

The conclusion I draw from all this is that the China Association is a bad counsellor on

political matters, & that the Shanghai municipal council wld. do better to confine its energies to roadmaking and policing the streets, wch. are duties imposed on them by the Land Regulations. With the administration of justice in the International Settlement they have nothing to do. To strive for the improvement of Chinese justice is the function of the consuls, if they find it so bad as to interfere with the legitimate interests of foreign residents.

Forgive me for inflicting such a long letter upon you. What I have said wld. be confirmed by a good many soberminded Englishmen, but they have not the ear of the "Times".

39. Satow to F.A. Campbell

29.12.05

My dear Campbell,

In your letter of Nov. 3 you ask abt. Fr. opposition to the British offer of money for the Hupei section of the Szechuen rlwy. [Consul-General at Hankow Everard H.] Fraser's desp. of 31 Oct. to me, of wch. he forwarded you a copy direct, tells the story as he had it from Chang Chih-tung thro' his secretary Wang.

I presume that Dubail's reason for opposing this loan was that he had heard fr. Paris that the agreement of the Fr. financiers with Carl Meyer was hanging fire owing to the Fr. govt. opposing the clause providing for a Br. chairman with a casting vote. Whether he alleged our understanding with Szechuen in regard to this line, or whether he referred to [Emile] de Marteau's application mentioned by [French ambassador to Britian] M. [Paul] Cambon I cannot say, but possibly he made use of both pretexts to frighten the Waiwupu fr. sanctioning any loan until the Fr. Govt. get their way about the Chairman.

40. Satow to Grey

7 Jany. [1906]

Dear Sir Edward,

I enclose extract from a letter written by Mr. A.E. Hipplesley to my American coll: betw. the occurrence of the row in the Mixed Court & the riots on the 18 Dec. Hipplesley is the candidate we favour for the succession to Sir Robt. Hart, whenever the latter disappears from the scene, and his judgment is sound. He is an old friend of Rockhill's, fr. whose house in Peking he was married a good many years ago, and that explains his corresponding with him.

S'hai

14/12/05

Shanghai is going thro' a somewhat serious crisis at this moment, wch. will prob. have important results however it be eventually settled. I will not go into the much debated question whether the agitation among the Chinese is spontaneous or whether it is being artificially created by those who wld. view with pleasure an estrangement betw. China and the two Great Powers who are doing so much on China's behalf. There seems sufficient explanation in the fact that the Chinese have for a considerable time been worked up by what seemed to them a deliberate attempt on the part of the [municipal] council to destroy the authority of the Chinese magistrate, & in the fact that the council cld. not have chosen a more inopportune time than the present when the Chinese are inordinately sensitive regarding anything wch. seems to touch their dignity, to force matters to an issue. Indeed, seeing that the Senior Consul admitted in June last that the change desired by the council in the treatment of female prisoners and accused could not be introduced without the Taot'ai's consent, that he asked for that consent and was refused, and that he then interviewed the Viceroy on the subject with no better success, it seems to me inexplicable that the Assessors shld. have been ordered to insist on the change. If they were, the blame lies with the Consuls who gave the orders. The difficulty now is to find a means of settlement wch. will not involve a loss of prestige on the part of foreigners. Even so, it would, I think, be better to acknowledge that a mistake has been made and start afresh, care being taken to prevent the Council's again overstepping the bounds of its legitimate rights.

41. Satow to Sanderson

7.1.06

My dear Sanderson,

I enclose my account for the past year, and if on examination you find it correct, will you kindly have the amount paid to my credit at Parr's Bank Ltd 77 Lombard Street.

	1905	\$	£	s.	d.
June 7 Cons. Genl. Yünnanfu	10			19.	2
“ 22 Johnston's expenses on board “Sirius” to Haichou, to look after Germans	92	8.	16.	4	
Oct. 3 British Charitable hospital	200	19.	3.	4	
Nov. 16 “	142.35	13.	12.	10	

Dec. 14	“	142.35	13.	12.	10
“ 22	Compensation to family of Chinaman accidentally shot by a bullet from the rifle range where our men were practising	170.98	16.	7.	8
“ 30	Moyes at Tachienlu to 31 March, 1906 thro’ Goffe	521.74	50.	0.	0
			£122	12.	2

42. Satow to F.A. Campbell

8.1.06

My dear Campbell,

Perhaps you will think I have been in too great a hurry to sit on the consular body about this question of women prisoners, but to me it seems very necessary to stop them fr. further meddling c. Shanghai institutions. The Mixed Court rules & the Land Regulations are of the same year, & were enacted in precisely the same manner by the F.R.R. at Peking & the Chinese Govt. If the consuls can change the former, they can also modify the latter. To preserve the Land Regulations unaltered is of the greatest importance, for as soon as any one begins to tinker at them, we shall have the various nationalities coming forward to demand their proportion of representation on the municipal Council, & then what will become of our present legalized predominance?

Quieta non movere [“Do not move settled things” or “Let sleeping dogs lie.”] ought to be the working principle of Bland & the English members of the Council. But they have been trying to depart from it, & to extend their powers & limits of jurisdiction; e.g. last year they spent the money of the rate payers in purchasing land and laying out a road some 30 miles away to the hills, far outside settlement limits & the Chinese authorities naturally objected. In all these ambitious projects they have been patronized by Knappe, who of course saw where it wld. all lead to. Warren seems, to judge by the tone of his despp. to have backed up the municipal Council in all their ambitious schemes, whether because he approved them or because he could not put the drag on cannot be said with confidence; but I think he was not alive to the ultimate consequences.

What I am afraid of is that the present constitution of Shanghai is going to be attacked, & chance observations of Mumm & Rockhill lead me to suspect that they have ‘reform’ in an anti-English sense at the back of their heads. The letter of the diplomatic Body to the

consular body will I hope act as a drag, and in sending a copy to Warren I am pointing out to him the danger of letting the consuls tamper with institutions. I do not pretend that the Shanghai constitution is perfect, nor the Mixed Court a model tribunal, but it seems wiser to tolerate some abuses than by trying to mend them run the great risk of bringing the whole house down about our ears.

43. & 44. Satow to Sir W. Chauncey Cartwright, Chief Clerk of the Financial Dept. of F.O., 1900-13. (summary only)

11.1.06 Two letters to Cartwright, asking his help regarding Shanghai Consulate-general re-organization, & £100 a year each to be added to Hankow & Newchwang salaries.

45. Satow to Grey

11 Jany. 1906

Dear Sir Edward,

I am afraid you will scarcely have time to read the voluminous despp. abt. the Shanghai troubles. They leave on my mind the impression that there has been a great want of good sense on the part of the municipal council, of prudence on that of Sir Pelham Warren & of loyalty on the part of the German & American Consuls-general whom he believed to be supporting him. That Knappe, of Samoa fame, shld. play an anti-English part does not however surprise me.

The Tibetan affair looks more hopeful. I did not like answering the question whether Calcutta or Peking wld. be preferable for re-opening negotiations, as I fully recognize the difficulties in the way, and tho' I wld. do my best if the negotiations were entrusted to me, I did not feel disposed to volunteer for the task. Prince Ch'ing the year before last proposed to send T'ang [Shao-yi] to Calcutta, thus showing that he preferred to have another negotiator than myself. T'ang failed however, and now it seems that both he and the Prince are inclined to fall back on me after all. It was a pleasant surprise to find them actually coming forward with written proposals, wch. might with certain changes be safely accepted as it seems to me. With the Chinese it is often best to play a waiting game, as it is impossible to hustle them. Even with the Canton-Kowloon and Soochow-Ningpo rlwys. we are making a little progress, and I do not despair of eventually coming to a satisfactory arrangement, provided I am not told to present an ultimatum in the form of final agreements wch. China is to be made to sign. Believe me, y.v.f.

46. Satow to F.A. Campbell

22.1.06

My dear Campbell,

As I do not know whether Eric Barrington is still Private Secretary, I write to ask you a question about precedence among members of this Legation.

At p. 26 of the F.O. List for 1905 the precedence is stated thus:

Secretary of Legation

Military Attaché

Chinese Secretary

Commercial attaché

2nd. Secretary

Does this apply when the Chinese Secy. & C.A. are only acting?

[Alexander] Hosie in his letter of apptmt. as acting C.A. was told that he ranked after the Chinese Secy., so that it wld. appear to make no difference whether the occupant of the post is permanently apptd. or only acting. If so the inference wld. similarly be that an acting Chinese Secy. comes next after the Military Attaché.

If there were any doubt abt. the matter, however, I wld. suggest that it shld. be given in favour of the acting Chinese Secy., because of the importance of the functions wch. he discharges, & of the need of giving him a high place among the members of the legation, in order that he may have due weight with the Chinese officials, whom he often has to see on behalf of the Minister. Campbell, who is acting Chinese Secy. as a matter of fact is senior in the Service to J.W. Jamieson & wld. naturally have as high a place in the Legation as that gentleman.

Will you kindly teleg. to me your decision. I greatly hope it will be a favourable one.

47. Satow to F.A. Campbell

25.1.06

My dear Campbell,

I do not quite know to whom I ought to write abt. the question of [Launcelot Douglas] Carnegie being made a Councillor, but perh. you will not mind passing this on. I am told that [Secretary of Tokyo legation George H.] Barclay was made a Councillor last year, before the Legation was raised to an Embassy, & I wld. suggest that the duties of the Secy.

at Peking are prob. more important than those of his coll: at Tokio. Carnegie has done excellent work since he arrived here nearly two years ago, both in drafting despp. & memos. on different subjects, & has relieved me of the whole of the routine work in connexion with the distribution of the members of the Consular service.

I shld. personally be very pleased if he were made a Counsellor.

48. Satow to F.A. Campbell

25.1.06

My dear Campbell,

Since my teleg. of Jany. 4. abt. Lister Kaye's affair, I have had 2 conversations with T'ang Shaoyi on the subject. On the 9th he proposed to me that the concessions shld. be recognized as having fallen thro' & that Kaye shld. get back the fees he had paid (I think abt. £5000). I said this was quite unacceptable, & proposed that Kaye shld. have another clear six months given to him. I showed him the text of the agreement, & pointed out that Kaye's agent had produced a detailed plan of the ground required for the works & asked for the apptmt. of a delegate within the English year, & argued that to take their stand on a mere technical question as to date showed that the provincial authorities were not acting fairly, especially as Kaye had demonstrated his intention of working the concession by registering his company and paying the stamp duty amounting to £1400. The conversation ended by T'ang saying he thought the choice ought to be given to Kaye of its being recognized that he had fulfilled his part of Art 4 (wch. wld. mean that the concession was still alive) or of having a clear six months' extension. We did not come to any conclusion, & T'ang said this was only a private exchange of views. I told him you were pressing for an answer to my Note of Oct. 24. On the 19th & 22nd C.W. Campbell had conversations with Hu (who is an Anhui man) & T'ang, as a result of wch. they called on me on the 23rd. The whole subject was thrashed out again, & they undertook to see the delegate of the Govr. of Anhui and impress upon him the necessity of recognizing that the concession is still alive, & that the local officials & gentry must give an assurance that in future they would heartily co-operate in facilitating arrangements with Kaye's representatives in working the mine. The concession had been granted by the Chinese Govt. who were not in a position to allege local opposition as an excuse for not seeing the matter thro'.

I have not heard the result, & as today is the Chinese New Year, it will prob. be some days before I do. But I thought it wld. be well to let you know exactly what I am doing.

49. Satow to Grey

25.1.06

Dear Sir Edward,

We have not yet got to the end of our Shanghai troubles, but I am trying to settle the question of compensation with the Viceroy thro' our Consul at Nanking, Mr. Ker, who is a capable little man and takes trouble. If the principle were admitted, that would clear the air. But my colls: here take little interest in the question, as the damage to other than British property was small. Mumm tells me he is observing an attitude of "benevolent neutrality", & that prob. signifies that he will rather rejoice if I fail. It is pretty certain that he & the American coll: take a malicious pleasure in seeing the Municipal Council at loggerheads with the Chinese, because of its preponderantly British composition. The Council have made the most of their being nearly all English, forgetting the fact that all the authority they have rests on an international basis provided by some 13 or 14 Treaty Powers. I am sending a correspce wch. shows what a mistaken view the Chairman [F. "Silly" Anderson] takes of the council's position. He has written to me another long letter, in wch. he suggests that the "Consul or part of our local govt. could be placed in the hands of a small number of Powers; England, America & Germany for example, if America would arrange always to send a reliable man here; better still if it could be arranged with the Powers that the settlement should revert to its original status of Anglo-American, and America wld. recognize the importance of being represented by men of undoubted standing."

The last is a pious wish that is not likely to be realised till the Millennium, & to revert to the Anglo-American status of 50 years back wld. be to make water flow uphill with a vengeance. I only mention these absurd suggestions to show what sort of harebrained people can arrive at the position of Chairman of the Municipal Council.

The question of withdrawing the foreign troops in North China makes no progress. Mumm asks me abt. once a week whether I have heard fr. London, & tells me that he has no reply to his own teleg. to Berlin suggesting the retention of a couple of companies at Tientsin in order to preserve the unanimity of the Powers. My answer is always that I do not expect any further instructions than those communicated to him long ago. I am not disposed to regret the delay, for the present is no time for withdrawing troops, when Young China is in the ascendant.

In the matter of the Canton-Kowloon rlwy. a little advance has been made. The Viceroy,

acting on a suggestion from Peking, has asked Sir Matthew Nathan for a copy of the Northern Railways loan agreement of 1898, & intimated that he wld. be disposed to negotiate on a similar basis. I have suggested to Sir Matthew not to give it, as that wld. imply an admission on our part that we were disposed to take that as a model, but to tell him he cld. get it fr. his own govt. I want to force the Viceroy to negotiate on the basis of the B. & C. Corporation's draft to begin with. If he wld. start c. that, I am inclined to think there wld. be no objection to his bringing forward his own proposals, for it seems to me very unlikely that we shall succeed in obtaining again such a concession as that for the Shanghai-Nanking rlwy, by wch. the construction is virtually left in the hands of the foreign concessionaire. The Chinese now-a-days want to build their own rlwys, to manage them & to get the profits, as in the very remarkably successful instance of the Northern Railways, & if we concede that to them we shall be able to induce them to borrow our capital. These observations apply to the Soochow-Hangchow-Ningpo line also. Even the Tientsin-Chinkiang line in wch. the Germans are interested together with us appears unlikely to be constructed on other terms than Chinese control.

50. Satow to F.A. Campbell

25.1.06

My dear Campbell,

I quite agree with the reply you have given to Lord Curzon abt. the reasons for recommending poor Litton to be made Consul at Têngyüeh. He had an intimate knowledge of the local affairs & had done extremely well. If Wilton had been in China all the time, I shld. still have proposed Litton, & Wilton himself wld. have come in for a reprimand for never reporting the inadequate sentence passed on Fleming's murderer in 1901. Under the cires. tho' I have recommended him as Litton's successor. I shld. not be disposed to ask for his commission to be ante-dated, any more than in the case of Pitzipio[?] who now becomes a consul after having enjoyed the fat things of Shanghai for five years as Vice consul in charge of the Land Office.

51. Satow to Knollys (summary)

7 Feb

Audiences, moves of colleagues, to Lord Knollys.

52. Satow to Grey

8 Feb. 1906

My dear Sir Edward,

My Germ. coll: Baron v. Mumm has been apptd. Ambassador at Tokio, a post he does not much care for, as he knows nothing abt. the country or the officials or the course of business. His chief duty I imagine will be to see if he cannot manage to weaken the Anglo-Japse. alliance. He is a clever, active and enterprising person, who spends a good deal of time in calling on his colls:, rather given to intriguing. During the negotiations of 1901 wch. followed on the Boxer troubles he played us a good many tricks, & during 1905 when he became Doyen of the Dipl. Body he tried to take advantage of the position to settle various questions without previously consulting the rest of us. Dubail, Rockhill & I have generally united to keep him in order. He stays here till about March 10, & then his mantle descends on my shoulders. ¹ There is no doubt that the position of Doyen carries with it considerable opportunity for directing the course of affairs in wch. the Powers are interested in common. At Peking it is pretty much the same as at Constantinople & Tangier, where the Doyen is a sort of permanent chairman in connexion with business matters; the drawback we labour under here being that we have to take council with the represves. of Powers that have hardly any political or commercial interests, such as Holland, Mexico, Italy, Austria-Hungary & Belgium. I do what I can to counteract this state of things by discussing matters before hand with those of my more important colls: who are more specially concerned in any question that comes before me.

Mumm's successor is to be Count Rex, who has been Germ[an] Minister at Teheran for the last 8 years. Carnegie knew him 13 years ago as a rather blustering secretary at Petersburg, but perh. he may have improved in the interval.

Dubail talks of going on leave in April, & it is supposed that he will not return, as he is just past 60, the age at wch. envoys have to retire. ² I think he has on the whole been successful in his management of French affairs, and my relations with him have been very friendly since the conclusion of the agreement abt. Egypt, Morocco & Newfoundland. He is not quite trustworthy.

Rockhill & I are on very friendly terms, & I find him very frank & outspoken. At bottom I think he dislikes us, but we do not clash with each other. In such a question as that of the

¹ In fact Mumm left Peking by the night train to Hankow on April 23rd. (Satow's diary)

² Dubail left Peking by the 7 o'clock train on May 2nd. (Satow's diary)

Shanghai municipal council he naturally sympathizes with Mumm, as both the Americans & Germans consider that they are not fairly represented on it. I see the "Times" in a leading article in Dec. said that $\frac{2}{3}$ of the foreign population was British. The fact is that not quite $\frac{1}{2}$ is British. Of men the Br. are 29.71 per cent, Americans 8.05 per cent & Germans 7.77. So that while the German & American men are rather more than half the British, they have together only two members on the council as against 7 Br. members. The full statistics were sent home in my desp. No. 3 of this year. What the proportions may be if ratepayers only are taken I am endeavouring to ascertain. It is not desirable to introduce any changes into the constitution, but under the circs. it is natural that there shld. be some jealousy on the part of other nationalities, & I do not, consequently, complain of a want of hearty cooperation in connexion with the recent occurrences at Shanghai.

I am preparing a report on the subject of the Land Regulations, as it seems desirable that H.M.G. should be placed in possession of the facts relating to the constitution & history of the Municipal Council of Shanghai.

Things are still in an uncomfortable stage generally. Provincial governors obstinately putting difficulties in the way of our railway & mining concessionaries, & the Central Govt. unable or unwilling to bring them to reason. The most obstructive is the Viceroy of Canton, who is said to have the special protection of the Empress-Dowager. The only thing to do is to continue to worry the Foreign Board, & try to wear out the provincial opposition.

53. Satow to F.A. Campbell

8.2.06

My dear Campbell,

You will receive by this bag copies of two notes I have sent to Prince Ch'ing abt. the row in the Mixed Court & the responsibility of the Taotai for that & the subsequent riots. I have made out as good a case as possible for our side, but it must be borne in mind that the council & the consuls put themselves in the wrong at the beginning by ordering the confinement of women in the municipal jail. They have no jurisdiction over the persons of Chinese subjects, except what they derive fr. the right to police the settlements or from the consent of the Chinese Authorities.

Bob Little the editor of the N.C.D.N. [North China Daily News] wrote me a letter setting forth the situation from the Shanghai point of view, to wch. I replied privately controverting his arguments. A third letter fr. Anderson, late chairman of the municipal council, is on its

way, I hear. There is no harm, but rather advantage, in their telling me what their views are. I suspect that when things come to be examined into, it will be found that the patres conscripti¹, aided actively or passively by the consuls, have arrogated various powers to themselves of which we know nothing. I[t] has recently come to my notice that in July 1900, Warren, the U.S. Consul-general & the Germ. actg. Cons-genl. addressed certain instructions to the Mixed Court assessors, in which they declared the Mixed Court rules to be obsolete, and prescribed certain other rules for their guidance wch. they say have become established by practice. They forgot to report this when the Legations were relieved, & I have asked Warren to explain. Former Consuls-general took care to inform the Legation but Warren sends me very little unless I specifically ask about his proceedings.

[C.W.] Campbell went to see T'ang today about Lister Kaye & other matters. He hinted that if the Chinese Govt. did not bring Anhui to reason, there would be a claim for damages. I have no doubt I could get back the £5000 Kaye paid on the signature of the agreement, but he wld. prob. not be content with that, & I have said in reply to an offer to that effect that it cld. not be entertained. The Waiwupu are I think on our side, but, as you know, the authority of the central govt. is very weak.

I sent you a long teleg. in reply to your question about the Canton-Kowloon rlwy. The Viceroy is still obdurate. Meanwhile he has greatly offended public opinion in Canton by imprisoning some leading men who declined to be squeezed for the purposes of the Canton-Hankow rlwy. They are making a great row abt. his arbitrary proceedings and the Canton officials here have memorialized agst. him. We cannot well use force to compel him to fall in with our views abt. the Canton-Kowloon railway, but he has given us a better excuse by laying an embargo on a quantity of coal mortgaged to a bank in Hongkong, and has 20 soldiers guarding it, supported by two gunboats lying in the river opposite. I am working the Waiwupu to send him positive orders to give up the coal, and shall shortly ask permission to use force to take possession of it, after warning the Chinese govt. that you cannot permit the property of British subjects to be withheld from them in this style. Nathan telegraphs that he is certain of the bank's title. If we take his two gunboats or sink them, we shall prob. find the gentleman more yielding in other matters.

It is a great pity the Council of Defence deprived the China station of nearly all its handy gunboats & sloops.

¹ "The Conscript Fathers; the Roman Senate. (Often jocularly applied to the members of a town council.)" <http://www.sacklunch.net/Latin/P/patresconscripti.html> accessed November 17, 2006

I am also pushing the Suchow-Hangchow-Ningpo railway business by all means in my power, and am giving my support to the Peking Syndicate in the dispute about their 'sole right' to mine coal in certain districts in Shansi.

I hear nothing more about the withdrawal of troops from this province. The matter rests with the Germ. govt. who apparently do not like to be forced to leave even 2 companies at Tientsin. Mumm says he believes they have been making representations to you on the subject, but if they have I suppose you have been too busy owing to the change of government to attend to them. I hope it will not be forgotten that it is sometimes useful to let your representatives have a diplomatic success, and I can say this with an unruffled conscience as my time is so near an end.

I have made no progress with the Northern Burma frontier question. I wrote last month to propose a meeting at the Waiwupu, to discuss the reports they and we had recd. fr. Taotai Shih & Litton. They replied a week ago that Litton having died some one shld. be apptd. to take his place in connexion with the affair. To this I responded by saying that the reports of our 2 Commissioners having been completed long ago, it was unnecessary to appt. any one in Litton's place, & again asked them to fix a day. Perh. they wish to get the Tibetan question settled first. It is a month tomorrow since T'ang handed me the proposals I telegd. to you, but I suppose the secretary of state has not had time to decide what shall be done. The Cashmere boundary & Raskum, for wch. I recd. the map fr. India only yesterday, must come after these other two questions, but I hope before I leave to fire in a Note. The Chinese cannot accuse us of precipitancy, since we have waited since 1898 for a reply to [Sir Claude] MacDonald's Note on the subject.

54. Satow to Grey

22.2.06

Dear Sir Edward,

I had a conversation with Prince Ch'ing on the 17th abt. rlwy. & mining affairs, in wch. it seemed to me that a little progress was made, but I have not attempted to report it yet, as I am waiting for some papers wch. he promised to send me. Tang Shaoyi, who is Yüan Shihkai's nominee at the Foreign Board, went down to Tientsin a day or two ago to consult his chief, & when he returns I hope to be able to report progress. T'ang is also charged with the negotiations abt. Manchuria with Pokotilow & with the Tibetan discussions with me, so the poor man is fully occupied. I have sounded him thro' Mr. C.W. Campbell abt. the

permanent exclusion of the Dalai Lama fr. Tibet, but do not know the result as yet. I think it of great importance to secure this if possible, for the return of that sacred functionary to Lhasa wld. be the signal for the punishment of all the Tibetans who have been friendly to us. The desire of the Indian Govt. to get rid of the I.M.C. men fr. the trade marts seems to me quite justified by experience. It is to the credit of Englishmen that they serve the govts. whose salt they eat [i.e. who pay their salaries] with perfect fidelity, & put their duty to their employer before patriotism; but that does not as a rule make them acceptable to us. The only thing that can be said [in their favour is] that they are less harmful than a German or a Frenchman, who wld. play into the hands of their own govt.

I am afraid I did not quite understand your teleg. about the uneasiness caused in England by newspaper & other statements of Chinese hostility, but trust that my teleg. of today will have put the situation clearly enough, as it appears to me. I shld. like to say that I put great confidence in Mr. [C.W.] Campbell's opinion, & that all important telegs. are discussed with him & Mr. [L.D.] Carnegie before they are despatched to you. I cannot find any indications of anxiety abt. the attitude of the Chinese govt. towards foreigners in the conversation of my colls: But it is quite possible that if the American congress does nothing to relax the strictures with wch. all Chinese entering the States are treated, there may be a revival of the boycott of American goods. It is reported that the Chinese Commissioners on their arrival at San Francisco were within an ace of being subjected to the same indignities as their unofficial countrymen.

I am afraid that press correspondents out here are rather given to hasty & sensational reports. Few of them are in a position to have any real knowledge of what passes. I except Dr. Morrison, who is still absent, & Mr. Collins of Reuter's Agency, who has just returned from the seat of war. But even he must try to furnish the sort of thing desired by his employers. He was asked to send a teleg. of 1000 words abt. the present situation, & Rockhill tells me that after going the round of the diplomatic body, he could get no more material than for 350. Being himself an American, he gets most of his information from the Amer. legation. But the Tientsin correspondents are not in touch with Chinese affairs, & derive most of their information fr. Chinese newspapers, wch. pens the wildest fables.

I am afraid my desp. enclosing a précis of correspce abt. the Shanghai Land Regulations will prove very heavy reading, but it contains historical data of wch. most people out here are perforce ignorant, as they have not access to the records. Those of the Consul-general [at Shanghai] before 1870 perished in a fire, & have never been replaced. Ours fortunately

are almost complete.

55. Satow to F.A. Campbell

3.3.06

My dear Campbell,

In your letter of Jany. 12 you say you wld. like to see a more energetic consul at Newchwang, that what [H.E.] Fulford does is all right and he makes no mistakes, but we have to drag information out of him. Of course one cannot expect the consul at Newchwang to know what goes on in other parts of Manchuria, such as Tatungkou, Dalny and Port Arthur, as the Japanese keep everyone out except missionaries, and even they cannot go anywhere but betw. their own stations & Newchwang. You know that our allies are adept at keeping their own secrets. The missionaries are afraid to write any news to him, because their letters might be opened, and if anything were found in them that the Japanese did not like, their freedom of movement and residence in the zone occupied by Japanese troops would be at once curtailed. So I hardly think Fulford is to be blamed if you do not get all the information you would like, but I will give him a hint. As the papers have published some regulations abt. the use of the Japanese light railway from Hsin-min-tun to Mukden, & [Alexander] Hosie had to go down to Tientsin on business connected with transit passes. I asked him to run over to Newchwang & Hsin min tun to see how things stand. He knows that part of the country very well.

I think so highly of Fulford that I intended to recommend him for the Consulate-general at Mukden, whenever it comes to be established.

y.s. E.S.

56. Satow to Grey

8.3.06

Dear Sir Edward,

Altho' there is no doubt that the Chinese magistrate in the Nanch'ang affair tried to commit suicide, and was not, as the Chinese Govt. disingenuously insinuate, wounded by Père Lacruche, it seems clear to me that the whole trouble is the result of the pernicious French practice of allowing their missionaries to discuss & arrange mission cases directly with the local officials. This practice has gone on for the last 45 years, & the Fr. missionaries have grown more & more arrogant, and in many places take the law into their

own hands. A good many cases have occurred during the last few years where Protestant converts have been the sufferers, & several have been reported by me; but these are only a small percentage. If you had time I wld. ask you to look at my desp. No. 400 of Oct. 21, 1901 and Bax-Ironside's desp. No. 106 of 27 April 1899 on the privileges accorded to the R-C. missionaries & especially the letter of the Fr. missionaries addressed to M. Pichon wch. is enclosed in the former. I consider the position of the Fr. missionaries to be a serious political danger. They are absolutely detested by all Chinese officials.

Another paper wch. I wld. ask you to read is a circular wch. I addressed to our consuls, wch. is enclosed in my desp. No. 311 of Sept. 3, 1903, laying down the rule that missionaries must not interfere on behalf of their converts, but if the toleration article of the Treaty of 1858 is violated by officials, must report to the nearest consul.

It seems to me that the time has come when this circular might be made public, or instructions might be sent to the consuls throughout China to communicate it to the missionaries in their respective districts. To some of them it has been given confidentially, but to make it known as an expression of the views of H.M. Govt. wld. have a good effect.

It is a fact worth noting that in the two instances of Changpu (in S. Fuhkien) and Nanch'ang English Protestant missions wch. had given no offence were involved in attacks made primarily on R.C. establishments.

57. Satow to F.A. Campbell

8 March 06

My dear Campbell,

I am sending rather a long desp. in compliance with the request contained in your teleg. of Feb. 21 that I shld. report on the general situation, showing how far the anti-foreign agitation is likely to develope into a general movement. The history of the boycott of American goods occupies the major portion, for that is the origin of the trouble, & the unwillingness of Congress to modify their present attitude is the real cause of the Anti-American feeling. Decent Chinese are treated disgracefully when landing in America, & they have the sympathy of both merchants & missionaries out here. The message of the U.S. Govt. to that of China wch. I am sending you seems to me exaggerated in tone. I do not believe there is any danger of an outbreak like that of 1900. For one thing there is no more talk of a partition of China; the Powers have no designs on Chinese territory, such as provoked the Chinese Court in 1897, 1898 & 1899. There is no one in power at Peking like

Prince Tuan & his associates. Thirdly, there is no Jimmy Bruce to egg on the other Admirals to demand the surrender of the Taku forts (they have been demolished) without sufficient reason. During the past 5 years there have been several scares announced to us from Europe, & we have always reported that they were without foundation. Personally I believe myself to be as easily frightened as anyone, but descending into the innermost depths of my being I discover no signs of alarm. Thence I conclude that there is no ground for apprehension of a general rising against foreigners.

I admit however, as I have said before to you & to Lord Lansdowne, that I wish the Admiralty had not deprived us of all the small ships, wch. are so useful on the Yangtze & the West River, & even in the Peiho. I admit also that the bumptiousness of people like the Shanghai municipal council may get us into a row, & that the foreigner in general and the Englishman in particular is in the habit of treating the Chinaman with contempt & rudeness. And after what occurred in Shanghai last December the good folk there, who cannot see that they were in the wrong, are in a very “jumpy” state. E.H. Fraser also now & then writes an alarmist private letter. But give me back the gunboats & sloops and I shall be afraid of nothing.

Some people here suspect Mr. Roosevelt of making all this fuss in order to alarm Congress into relaxing the restrictions on Chinese immigration, and as I told you very confidentially in a telegram Rockhill thought the message he was told to deliver to the Chinese govt. extremely ill-advised.

However, I do not suppose that my colls: and I, who agree about the absence of serious danger, will be believed. People quote 1900 agst. us and say we shall be caught napping in the same way as our predecessors. I assure you we keep our eyes open, and sleep with only one sheet. But let us have the gunboats back.

58. Satow to F.A. Campbell

31.3.06

My dear Campbell,

Mr. E. de Bavier a well-known Swiss merchant of Shanghai, whose firm I believe has been placed under Br. protection at the request of the Swiss govt. called on me the other day [March 15 – see diary] to ask for an introduction to T’ang Shao-yi, who as you know has succeeded Shêng as Administrator-general of the Peking-Hankow and Shanghai-Nanking railways, besides being Yüan Shih-kai’s man in the Foreign Board.

I asked what he wanted to see T'ang abt. to wch. he replied that it was to offer him the loan of money to enable China to repurchase such of her railways as she might be able to get back into her own hands, & in ans. to a further question he said that his principals were prepared to advance 125,000,000 francs for the purchase of the Peking-Hankow rlwy.

His principals were, he said, Baring Bros., J.P. Morgan & some Fr. capitalists.

I remarked that as the greater portion of the capital for the construction of the line had been provided by Fr. financiers it seemed unlikely that the Chinese would care to borrow money fr. one set of Frenchmen merely to pay off another set. As for J.P. Morgan his name was abhorred by the Chinese on acct. of the part he had played in connexion with the Canton-Hankow concession.

He said to this that Morgan's name need not appear & that the whole of the money could be procured in England & America. Besides the Barings, Rothschilds wld. take a share.

The terms offered were price 97 or 98, interest at 5%, mortgage of the rlwy. & an undertaking to employ a foreign staff engaged by China herself, much as the same way as the Customs service is manned.

He promised to report to me the result of his interview with T'ang, wch. I arranged for him, but he has not been near me since, and I see his name in a list of visitors at a Tientsin hotel. So whether anything will come of it I cannot yet say. De Bavier told me that if he was able to arrange this affair, more money would be forthcoming for other railways.

T'ang is gradually strengthening his hold over the Peking Hankow line, & squeezing the Belgians out of the management. He says he expects it to produce an annual revenue of 20 millions of taels, nearly £3,000,000. Also that the rlwy. sold to China by the Peking Syndicate can be made to pay. This seems possible, for while the Chinese cld. have starved it if the Syndicate had held on, they can bring business to a railway if they like.

y.s.

P.S. After I had written this I recd. a letter fr. Bavier giving an account of his talk with T'ang. The latter said that he could do nothing in regard to the Peking-Hankow line till 1908, when the clause giving to the Chin. govt. the right to purchase becomes operative; by that time it would be shown that the line wld. do much more than pay its way, and money could then be borrowed on it at a cheaper rate than now. He intimated however that the Chinese govt. might enter into negotiations for a loan to build the Canton-Hankow line. Bavier told him he wld. write to his friends & let him know the result. But T'ang did not seem inclined to accept a foreign controlling board, or an organization similar to that of the

Imperial Maritime Customs, while Bavier thinks that people at home wld. not be disposed to lend large sums of money unless they had a say in the management.

I do not know whether Bavier's negotiations are likely to interfere with the plans of the Chinese Central Rlwys Syndicate. The latter I am afraid are not likely to come to much.

The truth is that the huge profits of the Northern railways, exceeding the wildest dreams of those who started the enterprise, have created a belief that China wld. find the construction of railroads with her own money a very profitable business. Added to that belief, one must also take into account Chinese unwillingness to give foreigners any control over rlwys. Dubail & I have long ago come to the conclusion that no more railway concessions will be granted. Depend upon it, there is going to be a new China, run by Chinese who have been educated abroad. y.s.

59. Satow to Grey

21.3.06

Dear Sir Edward,

By last mail I wrote a letter to Mr. Campbell, by way of supplement to a long desp. abt. the boycott of American goods and the present temper of the Chinese people. Perh. a more extended view of the situation may be useful to you at the present moment.

As I have said in my telegs. I do not regard it as in itself a subject of anxiety, but it is certainly difficult and likely to become more so as time goes on. And by "difficult" I mean that China is no longer as ready to submit to all & every demand of the Powers as she was, & unless she gets another knock-down blow, will in the future be less & less tractable. Not to go back too far, she recd. such a blow fr. England & France in 1860, the effects of wch. lasted for half a dozen years, until what was known as the "gunboat policy" was put a stop to by Lord Clarendon. This expression was used to designate a habit that consuls had got into of calling in the aid of a gunboat whenever they had a dispute with the local officials. It was effective, but liable to abuse. Questions were settled promptly that without the immediate application of pressure on the spot, have a tendency to drag on for months and years. Properly applied, with the sanction of H.M.G. it wld. often be useful in these days, when the central govt. evade giving orders to the provinces, either because they sympathize with the obstructive attitude of Viceroys & Governors, or because they fear to provoke anti-dynastic movements. To make a long story short, we abandoned the practice of putting on local pressure, in favour of recognizing the responsibility of the Peking Govt., forgetting

that China is not a centralized state of modern type, but rather a congerie of semi-autonomous satrapies, a confederacy of territories each possessing a separate financial, naval, military and judicial organization, in fact a sort of “Home rule all round” system, but presided over by a committee for deciding questions referred to it by the provincial authorities, wch. also represents the whole country diplomatically, tho’ sometimes we hear of viceroys sending telegraphic instructions direct to Chinese ministers abroad.

As years went on the Peking Govt. became more & more difficult to deal with. It gained a partial triumph over France in 1884 and continued on its course of obstruction until the war with Japan in 1894-5 once more brought China to feel her own impotence. After the conclusion of peace & the intervention of France, Russia & Germany to procure the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula China seemed to lie a helpless prey at the feet of the Powers. One after another obtained cessions of territory, besides railway & mining concessions; the navigation of foreign steamboats of China Inland waters, whatever was asked for, the recognition of the French protectorate over Roman Catholic missions was granted with more or less reluctant readiness, and the eventual partition of China among the Great Powers became an accepted political doctrine. The Manchu dynasty awoke to the necessity of doing something to prove that it was still fit to rule the country, & turning agst. foreigners the “Boxer” movement wch. at the outset was anti-dynastic, conceived the idea of a sort of “Sicilian Vespers”¹, in the execution of wch. it signally failed. (When I say dynasty I do not mean to assert that the Empress-Dowager & the Emperor were the authors of this policy. It seems more likely that it was a scheme of certain members of the Imperial Clan, whose figure head was Prince Tuan, aided by leading Manchus.) The Powers naturally assumed that after their easy triumph over the Boxers & the Imperial troops, in wch. they were greatly aided by the prudent good sense of Yüan Shih-kai, Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung they would be able to go on having their own way as before, & for a short time it seemed as if their anticipations might be realised.

However, the Anglo-German agreement of Oct. 1900, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 had the effect of reassuring the Chinese with regard to the threatened partition of their country, at least as far as England & Japan were concerned, & America also was known to uphold the policy of the integrity & independence of China. Then came the Russo-Japanese war wch. seemed to knock on the head all Russian schemes of territorial acquisition, with

¹ The Sicilian Vespers is the name given to a rebellion in Sicily in 1282 against the rule of the Angevin king Charles I of Naples, who had taken control of the island with Papal support in 1266.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilian_Vespers accessed November 21, 2006)

the further effect that the Germans began to draw in their horns in Shantung and the French also let it be understood that they no longer believed in the possibility of partition. Finally the renewal & extension of the Anglo-Japanese alliance came to confirm the belief of the Chinese that they had nothing further to fear.

From the time of the intervention of the Eastern Triplice in 1895 up to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war China feared only Russia, to wch. power she had to grant whatever was asked of her. For France & Germany, who helped to recover the Liaotung Peninsula she was also compelled to do something to prove her gratitude. Her readiness to oblige these three Powers was an argument why she shld. comply with the demands of England, & so her fear of one forced her to be complaisant to others who cld. urge their requests on the ground of their title to equal treatment. But now she has been relieved of the dread of Russia, & her position is consequently strengthened as regards other Powers. She has begun to pluck up courage again, not only to refuse further concessions, but also to endeavour to resume those she made during her period of extreme weakness.

Since 1900, the Japanese, who made friends for themselves in Peking by their considerate behaviour among officials and common people, have enormously increased their influence. They have become the teachers of the military and all other arts to the Chinese, doing their work more efficiently & much cheaper than any Europeans or Americans. They have thrown open their military colleges and other educational establishments to Chinese students, who have flocked to Japan in thousands. These young Chinese have seen with their own eyes what an Oriental nation can do to thrust back the advancing tide of European influence and strengthen themselves agst. all forms of aggression, & the lesson has not been thrown away upon them. In diffusing the ideas acquired in Japan the native newspaper press, which has developed enormously, has produced great results, and the idea has dawned upon the Chinese that they too are an independent nation. They mean henceforward to assert their rights within their own frontiers, & to circumscribe & pare down those wch. they have been forced at the cannon's mouth to grant to foreigners. Even consular jurisdiction has begun to seem to them an institution that may be got rid of at no distant date, since the insertion in the Mackay treaty of an article by wch. we promised to relinquish our extraterritorial rights when we are satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration & other considerations warrant us in doing so. The U.S. & Japan in the following year signed treaties containing an identical clause. The interpretation put on it by the Chinese seems to

be that they will be allowed to recover jurisdiction over foreigners by instalments and that no long time will elapse before the abolition of Consular Courts is achieved.¹

This self-assertion on the part of the Chinese is quite a new phenomenon, & a very disagreeable one for all those who have been accustomed in the past to ride rough-shod over the native. It is particularly offensive to the foreign communities resident at the open ports, and is stigmatized by them as the 'anti-foreign' spirit. I have never been in any country where the members of the foreign mercantile colony did not dislike the native inhabitants, & perh. in no part of the world is this feeling of dislike more vigorous than in China, & in China nowhere more rampant than at Shanghai.

The determination of the Chinese to defend themselves agst. aggression of all sorts, coupled with the aversion to foreigners implanted in their bosoms by the events of the past sixty or seventy years, & the unwillingness of the foreign mercantile community to march with the times & recognize that after all even Asiatic nations can have rights, constitute it seems to me the "difficulty" of the situation, a difficulty wch. will make itself felt more & more as the years roll on.

The change in China is prob. not realized by any of those who having quitted the country a few years ago have lost touch with actual facts. Indeed I would almost go so far as to say that the opinion on current events of any resident ceases to be of value once he has quitted its shores, & that in 6 months he may become as unsafe a guide as if he had never lived in China. Only by constant intercourse with the people & seeing what happens from day to day is it possible to form a right judgment on political tendencies. This was shown the other day in the case of the Times correspt. at Shanghai [J.O.P. Bland], who returning there after only seven months' absence found to quote his own words a remarkable change in the morale of the nation & an unmistakeable movement of native opinion. He said it was impossible to deny that since the conclusion of the war the Chinese time-honoured tactics of evasion & passive obstruction had given place to the definite policy of China for the Chinese & to a deliberate & organized resistance to all foreign influence. He urged that united action shld. be taken by the commercial Powers to warn the Chinese govt. & the provincial viceroys of the inevitable consequences of their encouragement of these tendencies, for wch. they would be held responsible (see Times of Dec. 12). In other words,

¹ This had already been achieved in Japan in July 1899 by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed five years earlier. But extraterritoriality in China, imposed by the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, persisted at Shanghai until the end of the Second World War when the International Settlement and French Concession were officially closed.

China has become conscious that she is a nation, & this feeling we must do all in our power to crush.

It was the same correspt. who telegd. on the occasion of the Shanghai riot of 18 Dec. last that a significant feature of the outbreak was that the Japanese had been quite unmolested, & that in certain cases they appeared to be actually fraternizing with the mob. This was indignantly denied by the Japse. Consul-genl. & the correspt. telegd. the denial home in a very half-hearted sort of way. He added that tho' the majority of the Mikado's subjects undoubtedly deprecated the Chinese anti-foreign movement, this country had since the war attracted a certain number of the same class of Japanese as that wch. had prejudiced the administration of Corea.

In these statements is reflected the general sentiment of foreign merchants in China towards Japan & the Japanese. On the other hand there seems to be an impression in England that because of the alliance, we can count upon the Japse. to back us up in putting pressure upon the Chinese in relation to railway & mining concessions. I am inclined strongly to doubt this. Japan has entered into an alliance with us for certain definite objects, & we can rely with confidence on the strict performance of her engagements, but outside of those undertakings she will not sacrifice her own interests or sympathies for our benefit. She proposes to secure as large a share of the trade of China as she can, by all the contrivances she can think of. In regard to mines and railways, Japan has never allowed the foreigner to get any footing at all. For the construction of the first 20 miles she built a loan was made in England, but it has long ago been paid off, & the remainder of the 4600 miles she now possesses was constructed with her own capital. The same with her mines; they are owned & worked by Japanese alone. All this of set purpose, the [to?] keep the control of the sources of wealth & means of communication in her own hands. She will not, I feel pretty sure, lend her aid, even to an ally, for the purpose of compelling the Chinese to accept the contrary system. The fact that her recent treaty of commerce signed a year after the Mackay treaty contains no clause similar to our art. 9 regarding the introduction of foreign capital into Chinese mining enterprises is a sufficient indication of her attitude. While she cannot sympathize with the ownership of Chinese railways by foreign govts. or companies, she is nevertheless quite ready to obtain such privileges for herself as far as possible. In regard to China's territorial integrity and independence she values our alliance because it goes a great way in checking foreign aggression. It also secures for her equality of opportunity in commercial matters, and her proximity & other natural & acquired facilities for carrying on

trade will enable her to turn that opportunity to the best account. So we must not be under any illusion as to the alliance being of any economic advantage to us.

To sum up in two sentences:

China will continue to act on the principle of China for the Chinese, & to aim at restricting the rights of foreigners in China to the ordinary operations of commerce.

Japan will sympathize with her efforts in this direction.

And Chinese policy as indicated in the first of these constitutes in my opinion the increasing difficulty of the situation.

60. Satow to Grey

April 5. 06

Dear Sir Edward,

A Chinese newspaper wch. has relations c. the ¹ Waiwupu stated recently that my Germ. coll. Mumm had informed the Chinese govt. that Tibet was of the greatest importance to China & that its affairs shld. receive serious attention & not be treated with carelessness. It was added that this action of the Germ. Min. was in obedience to instructions fr. the Germ. Foreign Min.

If, as I gather fr. yr. teleg. of March 12 the House of Commons was told that negotiations were proceeding at Peking, I think that this newspaper para. is prob. correct. Firstly, because I know that the Germ. govt. carefully scrutinizes the telegs. fr. Peking or statements abt. China that appear in English newspapers, & keep Mumm informed; & the statement that negotiations were going on here wld. certainly not escape their attention. Secondly, because, in spite of the denial of Mumm's interference when the Lhasa convention was signed in 1904 wch. was given to Sir Frank Lascelles, there is no doubt whatever that Mumm did inquire of the Chinese Govt. whether the published text was genuine & hinted that art. 9 infringed the m.f.n. clause.

Up to the present I have seen no signs of any effect being produced on the course of our negotiations by any remarks made by Mumm, & in any case the objection to art. 9 has been removed. He is a meddlesome person & I always try to keep him in the dark abt. any business of my own.

He is still detained here by orders fr. Berlin. The explanation they give him is that his salary as Ambassador at Tokio has not yet been voted by the Reichstag, but he does not

¹ This "the" and some others in this letter are written in a shorthand used by Satow.

believe this to be their real reason. Perh. it may be connected with his want of success in carrying out the Germ. Emperor's scheme for inducing all the Powers to withdraw their troops simultaneously fr. N. China, & one is almost inclined to conjecture that he will not be sent to Tokio after all. ¹ For Germany one wld. have said that Peking was a more important post than Tokio, where the new Ambassador will not have much to do, except to try what he can do to counteract the effects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, & to prevent as far as in him lies its renewal at the end of ten years.

I cannot think that the position of Germany at Kiaochou is very secure, & I notice that some German newspapers are beginning to suggest that the £5,000,000 already spent there have have been thrown away. It perh. does not require a great gift of prophecy to foresee that the force of events will compel her to leave, as the place cannot be made defensible agst. all comers, & when that time arrives I suppose we shall have little reason for retaining Weihaiwei. Japan might after a time give up Port Arthur, wch. is only a military trophy, since she has a much better naval base at Masanpho. But I suppose that Russia in N. Manchuria will compel her to remain at Port Arthur for the present. It is unfortunately doubtful whether Manchuria will ever be completely evacuated by the late belligerents.

I had hoped to start homewards on the 20th, but it seems scarcely possible to conclude the Tibetan negotiations in time, and the settlement of the Nanch'ang missionary murder case may also detain me. ²

61. Satow to F.A. Campbell

5.4.06

My dear Campbell,

I don't suppose P. Morgan means serious business abt. Szechuen, after lying quiet all these years, & can only conjecture that the Hunan Mining Syndicate has got him to come forward & try to get leave for his engineers to examine mines in Szechuen, in order that they may then have an instance to refer to as a ground for their being allowed to do the same thing in Honan.

Mr. Louis Spitzel I am afraid is a shady person. Abt. 2 years ago a reputable Engl. firm of mechanical engineers apptd. him their agent for some business at Nanking, & you telegd. to me to tell [Nanking consul A.J.] Sundius to give him support. Then I telegd. back that

¹ Mumm left Peking for Tokyo on April 23, 1906. (Diary)

² Satow left Peking by train at 7 am on May 4th (Diary).

reference shld. be made to the Home Office for an acct. of his antecedents, & I was told that I might drop him. He was furious at losing our countenance, & wrote to me for an explanation, wch. I refused to give. He has now addressed me again, expressing surprise at not having an explanation. To this letter I do not propose to give any reply. It is a pity that so many of these people are clever rogues.

Lister Kaye has apptd. as his agent here one Sabbione, an Italian much mixed up in the affairs of the Peking Syndicate in the time of Luzzatti. The Syndicate got rid of him because he had made an “illicit commission” on the purchase of a house for them in Peking. He is out here now for some other Syndicate, the International I think it is called. Of Lister Kaye’s chances of inducing the Anhui notables to let him work his mines Sabbione sees very little chance, but he is just now much taken with a suggestion of old Hu [Hu Yü-fên], himself an Anhui man by origin, that Lister Kaye and the notables shld. work the Anhui mines in partnership. Whether that wld. be practicable seems to me doubtful. Kaye’s misfortune is that he is not a man of business, & that he imagines himself to be one. All the schemes he put forward in MacDonald’s time, for a railway of portentous length right across China & for improving the navigation of the Yangtze gorges were of the wildest description.

[Edward T.C.] Werner’s report on the Nanch’ang missionary murder case is full of gruesome details, wch. I daresay you will skip. Like the colonial judge we have all heard of Werner’s judgment is right, but his reasons are wrong, at least, many of them are. He does not seem to be able always to distinguish betw. an ascertained fact and hearsay. However I have thanked him for the careful manner in wch. he has carried out his instructions. This case ought to teach the Fr. govt. how unwise it is to allow missionaries to have an official standing & discuss disputed questions affecting converts directly with the provincial authorities.

Your telegs. inquiring abt. sentences inflicted by the Chinese deputy in the British concession at Shanghai lead one to suppose that you have some troublesome ignorant philanthropist ‘poseurs’[?] in the House of Commons. Sir H. Cotton will give us a worrying abt. Tibet on the F.O. estimates I suppose. What a lovely time of it all good conservatives must be having.

[There follows a list of the letters in the file, including dates, addressees and page numbers.]

Satow Papers: PRO 30/33 14/17

Letter Book. Chinese mission. (19 April 1906 – 12 May 1906)

“Private Letters”

1. Satow to Grey

19.4.06

Dear Sir Edward,

My Fr. coll: [Dubail] & I hope to come to a satisfactory arrangement in regard to reparation for the Nanch'ang murders with the Chinese Govt. & already the calumnious campaign of the Chinese press shows signs of abating. A Peking daily paper that had been foremost in accusing the late Père Lacruche of having tried to murder the magistrate has recently admitted that the latter committed suicide. I have sent a copy of the naval surgeon's examination of the corpse to the leading Shanghai paper, for publication.

It has been rather a difficult matter for me to go hand in hand with Dubail, because of the undoubted fact that Père Lacruche had previously acted in a very high-handed manner as do many of the R.C. missionaries. The Chinese are greatly to blame for having weakly consented to give them relative rank with Chinese officials and for recognizing France as the protector of missions. I hope the Fr. Govt. will adopt the views of the reporter on the budget, and abandon the notion that the maintenance of an imperium in imperio redounds to the advantage of France.

There is an excellent article entitled the ‘awakening of China’ in the March number of the National Review. It is by Hippenley of the Customs, who is our favourite for Sir Robt. Hart's successor. Sir Robt's wife, who has been here for a couple of months is leaving again in a few days, leaving him behind. It is devoutly to be hoped that he may survive Bredon, and so save us a troublesome dispute when Hart eventually disappears from the scene.

Dr. Morrison arrived back a few days ago, and I suppose is giving the benefit of his impressions. He does not always see eye to eye with [J.O.P.] Bland, the Shanghai correspondent. Bland, who has entered the service of the British & Chinese Corporation at £2000, £2500 and £3000 for 3 years, by what, one cannot but regard as a corrupt bargain, is allowed to remain correspondent. He used to attack the Corporation, but they have made an end of that. Bland is coming up here about the end of the month about the Canton-Kowloon railway negotiations and the issue of the balance of the Shanghai-Nanking railway loan, so I shall see him before I leave. I have written a rather tedious despatch on railway matters,

which I am afraid you will scarcely have time to read, hinting that one at least of the Corporation's lines, the Pukou-Sinyang, is not likely to be built by them. I am doing all I can on behalf of their remaining line, from Suchow to Ningpo, more for the look of the thing than because I believe they seriously contemplated taking it in hand until the people of the province began to agitate in favour of being allowed to construct it themselves.

I hope to sign the Tibet adhesion agreement within the next ten days, and then to take my departure. I propose to go down by train to Hankow and visit the Yangtze viceroys. It seems desirable to remind Chang of his promises on the strength of which we lent him money to buy back the Canton-Hankow concession from the Americans, and to impress on Chou-fu the magnitude of our interests at Shanghai which he cannot be allowed to trifle with.

I am not at all in favour of the Shanghai municipality raising their force of Sikhs to 1000 men; under the name of police it would be in reality a British garrison at a place which is not a British colony. Your despatch on the subject only arrived yesterday, but I hope to reply by next bag stating my own views. I shall also ask Sir Pelham Warren to furnish his, and thus you will hear both sides of the question.

Mumm is at last taking his departure, having handed over to me the Doyen's functions & archives. Dubail says he will go about the beginning of May, if the Nanch'ang affair is settled before then, as we hope it will be. Uchida leaves a few days later, so that there will be no old hands among the 'chefs de missions' but Pokotiloff. He has been in China some 15 years or so, but has not yet learnt to discern the truth from falsehood, if one may judge from his telegraphing home that we were negotiating about Tibet in a sense contrary to Russian interests, at a moment when all negotiations had been broken off, and the Chinese had not come forward with their proposals.

2. Satow to Grey

Shanghai

11 May 1906

Dear Sir Edward,

The affair of the Nanch'ang missionary murders was not, I regret to say, finally settled before I left Peking [on May 4th – diary]. My French colleague had been unable to come to an agreement on two minor points. One of these was the issue of a proclamation exonerating the Fr. missionary Lacruche from the charge of having wounded the Chinese magistrate, [and the other was] the arrangement of the earlier question of the murder of

some native Christians in 1904 out of which grew the dispute between Père Lacruche and the magistrate which ended so fatally for both of them. The dismissal of the Governor and the removal of the provincial judge and the amount of indemnity to be paid 1° for the support of the Kinghams' orphan, 2° for the destruction of the French mission property and the murder of the five Marist brothers had been agreed to, and the final winding up had to be left to Mr. Carnegie and the Fr. chargé d'affaires.

The Empress-Dowager was very gracious at my farewell audience, but the gift of one of her watercolours was nothing special. She bestowed one also on Dubail, and I presume also on Mumm. I left the day after, having signed the Tibetan agreement on April 27. The really important article in it seems to me the first by which it is agreed that both parties shall see to the enforcement of the Lhasa convention, as it is [unnecessary word?] emphasizes the joint interests that Great Britain and China have in Tibet. T'ang told me I might assure you that the Dalai Lama would not be allowed to return to Lhasa for the present, and I think it is not unlikely that in this matter the Chinese Govt. are sincere, as they cannot wish him to be re-established there under the protection of a Russian guard. I showed T'ang a paraphrase of your telegram about the proposed escort of 40 Russian Buriats, but did not give him a copy, and I trust this was not an indiscretion on my part.

At Wuchang [on May 7th – diary] I found the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung looking very old and feeble, and his memory bad. No occasion presented itself for reminding him of his promises to give us the loan for constructing the Canton-Hankow railway, but he is still trying to engage [Claude W.] Kinder to re-survey the line. He talked chiefly about the proposed newspaper press law, and his desire to get the Powers to prohibit the publication of Chinese newspapers in the foreign settlements. I replied to him, as I had previously done to T'ang in Peking, that such a proposal would be unwise for two reasons, 1° it would be interpreted as an attack upon the settlements, 2° there were Chinese newspapers published by Japanese in the interior as at Nanch'ang and Peking which it would not reach. But if the Chinese Govt. enacted a press-law of a reasonable character, which would restrain the newspapers from publishing articles calculated to disturb friendly relations, I would advise H.M.G. to proceed as was done in a similar case in Japan (I think in 1872) and prohibit British subjects from becoming proprietors or publishers of newspapers in the native language.¹ I do not think it would be advisable to re-enact the Chinese press-law as a

¹ See J.E. Hoare, 'The 'Bankoku Shimbun' affair: foreigners, the Japanese press and extraterritoriality in early Meiji Japan', *Modern Asian Studies*, ix: 3 (1975), pp. 289-302. John Reddie Black (1827-80) attempted to publish a newspaper in Japanese in the Tsukiji foreign settlement in 1876. The Japanese

King's regulation and enforce it against British owners of Chinese newspapers, as that would involve the consular courts in troublesome suits brought by the Chinese authorities, or it might lead to their claiming to have it acted in the case of newspapers published in the English language. Total prohibition would be much simpler.

After I left, the Viceroy sent a message to say that he had intended to speak to me about the missing regulations drafted under his supervision, which he forwarded to Peking four months ago. I replied to his messenger that if he wld. give a copy to Mr. Fraser, it would enable us to press the question on the attention of the Chinese Govt.

T'ang has admitted to me that he has the draft in his possession, but says it is so voluminous that he has not had time to read it through. If I could obtain a copy, it would be possible to point out to the Chinese Govt. any provisions which seemed to us to require amendment before publication.

At Nanking [on May 9th – diary] I saw the acting Viceroy Chou-fu. He talked about the Chinese Commissioners who have been sent to Europe to study foreign methods of government with a view to framing a constitution, and asked my advice. I replied that in my opinion it would be unwise to copy foreign institutions, and suggested that it would be better to proceed on purely Chinese lines. It seemed to me that a useful innovation would be for the Viceroys and governors to assemble annually at Peking for a short session, in which they could consult together on matters concerning the general welfare. At the present moment there were two measures of urgent importance which could be usefully debated by such an assembly, 1^o the currency, 2^o the reform of judicial procedure. He seemed to think this was a practical suggestion, and asked me to put my ideas on paper, but I am not sure that I can find time to do it before leaving. He told me that much difficulty had been experienced of late because the Peking govt. sent down orders which the provincial notables declared could not be carried out because they had not been consulted beforehand. It had consequently been proposed to summon a select number of notables from each province to meet at Peking. I am afraid this would prove dangerous in practice. As it is, the notables have far too much say in affairs, and if they came together, even as a merely consultative body, they would very possibly develop into a revolutionary assembly, much

government tried to suppress the paper. Eventually the "Bankoku Shimbun" newspaper became the subject of diplomatic negotiations between the Foreign Ministry and the British minister, Sir Harry Parkes. Sir Harry, desiring not to upset British-Japanese relations, decreed that Britons could not publish Japanese-language newspapers.

in the same way as the States-general in 1789.¹ Separated they can do little harm, except in their own localities, but combined together they would exercise a popular influence that the central government could not withstand, and I hope the notion will be dropped.

On returning my call in the afternoon he talked about the opinion that has grown up abroad that an anti-foreign movement is on foot. He declared that this was not the case. It was only the frothy utterances of young students under 30 that had given rise to this belief. The central govt. & the provincial authorities were animated by a sincere desire to maintain friendly relations with foreign countries. I reminded him of the boycott of American goods and the agitation for cancelling railway & mining concessions, of the language of the native press and of the harangues delivered at public meetings, all of which had produced a very bad impression in foreign countries. In reply he admitted that existing concessions & preliminary agreements ought to be upheld, but asked what harm was there if China determined in future to reserve the prosecution of such enterprises to her own subjects. He had been in correspondence with Yüan Shih-kai about a law to restrict the liberty of public meetings, and both of them were in favour of adopting something like the Japanese law, by which a police officer has to be present at all assemblies of more than 15 persons with power to dissolve the meeting if seditious talk is indulged in. On my telling him that the Peking govt. were drafting a press law, he went on to say that both laws ought to be applied against Chinese residing in the foreign settlements, for if they were enforced only outside, Chinese would flock into the settlements to evade the law. The newspapers published under foreign protection did much harm, and amongst them those which were nominally owned by the Japanese were the worst. I replied that at Peking and Nanch'ang, where there were no foreign settlements, such papers existed, & that the proposal therefore to apply the law in foreign settlements was insufficient to meet their case. I repeated what I had said to Chang Chih-tung on this subject, & added that if the Japanese Govt. had the precedent of 1872 quoted against them they would see the necessity of following suit in prohibiting the ownership of Chinese newspapers by their people.

The control of the press & of public speeches is becoming a burning question in this country. It is to the interest of the foreign Powers as well as of the Chinese government that this should be made effective. Scarcely a day passes without articles appearing in the native press in which foreigners and their doings are held up to public hatred and contempt. The

¹ In France under the Ancien Régime the States-general was a legislative assembly of the different classes (estates) of French subjects. It convened in Versailles on May 5, 1789. This was the start of the French Revolution.

Shanghai riots and the Nanch'ang murders were preceded by public meetings at which inflammatory speeches were delivered by notables. Mumm, Dubail, Rockhill and I have told the Govt. that such meetings ought to be prevented, because of the evil consequences that invariably follow. If therefore laws are enacted related to public meetings and newspapers, it seems that we must, for our own sake even admit their application to Chinese inhabiting the foreign settlements. As to newspapers my suggestion would be to prohibit British subjects from owning them, and other govts. would have to follow our example. The only foreign settlement where Chinese live in any large number is that of Shanghai, and I think it will be necessary to place on the municipal police the duty of seeing that the prescribed limits of discussion are not exceeded. It would never do to admit that a Chinese police inspector or other official could exercise such a function within the settlement limits.

Probably there will be some persons in England who will rise up and denounce H.M.G. for giving their sanction to restrictions on the right of free speech and unlicensed printing. To such people I should reply that liberties enjoyed by Englishmen, who for generations have been accustomed to exercise them with the good sense and moderation of a grown up nation cannot be safely accorded to populations that are only just out of the swaddling clothes of autocracy; that free speech and free printing would be as dangerous gifts to the Chinese people as an automatic repeating pistol to a child that is learning to walk.

I hope to reach England by way of America about the 30 June.¹

E.S.

3. Satow to F.A. Campbell

Shanghai

12 May 1906

My dear Campbell,

I have had a talk with Admiral [Sir Arthur] Moore about naval precautions desirable for assuring the safety of the settlement here. He thinks, and I agree with him, that it is necessary to keep here a 2nd class cruiser, like the "Astraea", & says that in order to keep the crews efficient the "stationnaire" must be changed from time to time. Consequently a third ship of her class is required on this station. He would be willing to exchange the

¹ Satow was delayed in Japan and did not reach England (Liverpool) until July 12th. The *Siberia* was quarantined in Japan for ten days because of a case of plague, so Satow visited Lake Chuzenji. (Diary May 28, 1906).

“Diadem”, for example, against another “Astraea” and a couple of ships of the “Clio” class. This seems sound sense.

He suggested to me that as the senior officer at Shanghai receives reports from and directs the movements of the Yangtze gunboats and in the event of trouble should be able to confer with the consul-general, it would be desirable for the latter to be kept informed by the consuls at the Yangtze ports. I have explained to him that the consuls at Chinkiang & Nanking are in a measure under the Consul-General at Shanghai, but that those higher up the river are as a rule directed to send their reports through the Consul-general at Hankow; and that all report to the Legation. In case of danger the Admiral can always be communicated with by the Head of the Mission. I have also promised to suggest to Carnegie to communicate to the Admiral copies of the political portion of the quarterly intelligence reports received from the consuls.

I should also like to suggest that it would be a useful thing if the print containing despatches on other than commercial questions were supplied regularly to the Admiral & the Governor of Hongkong with injunctions to regard them as very confidential. I am persuaded that it is to the advantage of the public service that these two high officers should have as complete political information as it is possible to give them.

I do not myself regard it as desirable that the Consul-general at Shanghai should be authorized to “confer” with the Senior Naval Officer regarding the movements that may be required for the protection of any other port than his own. Such an arrangement would probably result in the Minister being kept in the dark, besides being deprived of the authority which he ought to have as the British Representative.

y.s.

E.S.

[End of PRO 30/33 14/17, the last file in the 14 series.]